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River basins provide essential services for both humans and ecosystems. Understanding the connections 
between ecosystems and society and their function has been at the heart of resilience studies and has 
become an increasing important endeavor in research and practice. In this dissertation, I define basin 
resilience as a river basin system’s capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt to biophysical, social-economic, 
and political changes (or stressors) while still maintaining its essential structure, feedbacks, and functional 
integrity. I address the question of resilience, scale, and development in the Mekong and Columbia River 
Basins. This dissertation answers the following questions: 1) is systems theory an appropriate model to 
evaluate basin resilience, 2) is the Mekong Basin resilient, 3) are the Mekong and Columbia River Basins 
resilient across multiple scales, 4) can conflict management and collaborative learning enhance resilience, 
5) can a resilience framework be used for basin comparisons, and 6) what lessons can the Mekong basin 
take from rapid development in the Columbia basin? In Chapter 2, I create and apply a social-ecological 
systems (SES) model of the Mekong River Basin to assess resilience at sub-basin (provincial), watershed 
(national), and basin (regional) scales. Feedbacks,  thresholds, vulnerability,  and  adaptive capacity are 
determined and used as inputs into an overall basin resilience assessment. Drawing upon field work done 
in  the  Mekong  Basin,  Chapter  3  uses  Conflict  Management  and  Collaborative  Learning  processes  to  
address  resilience  weaknesses  across  multiple  scales  in  the  Mekong Basin.  Chapter  4  uses  the  basin 
resilience  framework  to  compare  the  Mekong  and  Columbia  Basins  against  physical  characteristics, 
development rate, conflict and cooperation, and institutional responses to development projects. In this 
dissertation I find the Mekong has medium-low basin resilience and that scale is a critical determinant in 
basin resilience assessments. I find that in this study, vulnerability is inversely proportional to resilience, 
and low resilience at one scale, for example fisheries in the Tonle Sap  Lake in Cambodia, decreases 
resilience for the entire basin. I find that Cambodia and Lao PDR are the least resilience and Thailand the 
most resilient countries in the Mekong Basin – Thailand more resilient in some sectors than the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC). I find that the MRC’s conflict management strategy is hampered by a restrictive 
mandate  and  weakness  in  capacity  building  at  tributary  and  national  scales  but  that  Collaborative 
Learning processes are effective in enhancing resilience at the sub-basin scale. Finally, I demonstrate 
through the basin comparison that the Mekong has a highly resilient biophysical system and traditionally 
a resilient institutional system however, the proposed rate of development is unsustainable with trends 
indicating  a  significant  erosion  of  resilience.  I  find  the  Columbia  Basin  lacking  resilience  in  fishing, 
hydropower, and water quality – sectors mitigating the effects of development in the Columbia Basin, 
manifesting as overall negative trends in cooperation. However, the Columbia shows signs of increasing 
cooperation  due  recent  inclusion  of  Tribal  Nations  in  water  management.  Flexible  and  inclusive 
institutional responses to water resource development challenges, in the Mekong to rapid development 
on the mainstream and in the Columbia to negotiations over renewal of the Columbia River Treaty, are 
key determinants to whether or not each basin can halt the current negative trends and strengthen basin 
resilience to face the challenges now and those coming in the future.  
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RESILIENCE OF LARGE RIVER BASINS: APPLYING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
THEORY, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND COLLABORATION ON THE MEKONG AND 
COLUMBIA BASINS 
1.  CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
River basins provide essential services for both humans and ecosystems and are inseparably linked to 
each other. Understanding how ecosystems and society functions and interact has become an increasingly 
important endeavor. Concerns over climate change and large natural disasters have motivated scientists, 
engineers,  academics,  and  practitioners  to  find  more  effective  methods  to  characterize  and  manage 
multi-scalar systems such as large river basins. In this dissertation, I employ a systems model to do this by 
characterizing complex behavior in a large river basin. 
There  are  several  drivers  behind  the  move  towards  a  systems  perspective  on  river  basins.  First,  the 
emergence  of  River  Basin  Organizations  (RBOs)  on  river  basins  have  precipitated  a  need  to  better 
understand how these systems function, behave, and react under normal and stressful conditions. Much 
of the work to understand how RBOs function has focused on institutional responses to basin conditions 
(Alaerts 2003; Della Priscolli 2004, 2001; Della Priscolli and Wolf 2009; Frederiksen 1992; Kliot et al. 2001; 
Mostert 2003; Schmeier 2010;
1 Stefano et al.  2010; Wolf, Stahl, and Macomber 2003 ).  However, the 
feedbacks  between ecological and social systems are a critical dimension to understanding how to 
manage river basins. Therefore, a better unders tanding of the feedbacks  is needed to properly address 
basin function and resilience.  
Second, a single theory to assess resilience in complex river basins is still lacking. One of the difficulties is 
that complex systems contain multiple scales of spatial and temporal data. Water knows no boundaries , 
and river basins by the ir very nature flow across physical, political, economic, social, and cultural 
boundaries. Any useful theory used to understand complex systems needs to account for issues of scale in 
time and space.  Holling’s work in the 1970s paved the way for understanding how complex systems 
function and adapt (Holling 1973). He came to understand that complex ecological systems needed to 
have functional diversity to survive and prosper, and that our way of managing natural systems was to 
value functional efficiency.  
                                                                 
1 See Schmeier (2010) for a comprehensive literature review of perspectives on RBOs of international watercourses.  
2 This question is split into two components in Chapter 3. 
3 This data is housed at the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) at Oregon State University 2 
 
These insights and other led to what we now know as resilience theory. Large river basins are inherently 
complex and exhibit non-linear behavior in the form of thresholds, feedbacks, and adaptive responses. 
River basins do not behave in a simple, linear fashion and thus a relevant model must take into account 
the characteristics of thresholds and feedbacks. Systems theory, using a social-ecological system (SES) 
model does this by providing a framework for evaluating resilience across several scales. This is the theory 
I will use to study the Mekong and Columbia River Basins in this dissertation. Along with resilience theory, 
there is another pressing reason to do this research. 
The Mekong is commonly held up as a resilient basin (Browder 2000; Jacobs 1995; Le-Huu and Nguyen-
Duc 2003; Stefano et al. 2010; Wolf 2009). Until recently, this claim has not been significantly challenged. 
There are several reasons for this. The Mekong has withstood conflicts over its history, primarily as the 
Mekong Committee. While facing social and political pressures due to war in the region, the committee 
continued to meet and plan water resource projects. Plans to build and develop over 180 projects, seven 
on  the  mainstream,  were  drawn  and  redrawn  by  the  early  1960s  however,  unfortunately,  very  few 
projects were successfully completed during this period exceptions were Nam Pong (1966) in Thailand 
and Nam Ngum (1967) in Lao PDR (Jacobs 1995; Varis et al. 2008). Monitoring of the basin continued (and 
expanded) through the 1960s and 1970s despite lack of domestic funding and wars in Viet Nam and 
Cambodia. Development plans did not really resurface until the early 1990s during negotiations of the 
current Mekong Agreement signed in 1995 (MacQuarrie et al. 2008).  
Much has changed since the days of the Mekong and Interim Committees, and there is concern over how 
the Mekong Basin in general, and the Mekong River Commission in particular, will respond to a host of 
stressors (Cumming 2011; Grumbine et al. 2012; Käkkönen 2008; Kirby et al. 2008; Kummu et al. 2008; 
Liebman 2005; Schmeier 2011; UNEP et al. 2006). The basin has rapidly expanding energy needs, growing 
basin  population  exceeding  60  million,  climate  change  threatening  the  timing  of  critical  flood  pulses 
essential for fish production, and plans to build over a hundred dams in the basin by 2030 (MRC 2010; 
ICEM/MRC 2010). There is concern that the rate of development will exceed the capacity in the basin, 
threatening years of perceived resilience, raising questions of what can be done to either slow the rate of 
development, enhance the resilience of the basin, or both.  
In response to stress and rapid development, how can basins address potential and current conflicts? 
Water management is effectively conflict management (Postel and Richter 2003; Wolf 2007). Balancing 
competing uses is the foundation of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). The question is, 
how? IWRM emphasizes the principle that competing uses have equal importance. But in reality, all uses 
are not equal – so how can conflicts be addressed and resolved, particularly in regions where even the 
word ‘conflict’ provokes a cool response? Some would take a water security view (Dimitrov 2002; Gleick 3 
 
1993; Homer-Dixon 2001; Toset et al. 2000) segmenting the water into sectors building protections into 
the institutional frameworks that manage water resources. Others would advocate a more cooperative 
and  collaborative  approach  to  water  management  (Badenoch  2002;  Buxton  et  al.  2003;  Gerlak  and 
Heikkila 2006; Jaspers 2003; MacQuarrie et al. 2008; Margerum and Witall 2004; Wolf 1998, 2002; Yoffe 
et  al.  2003;  Zeitoun  and  Mirumachi  2008)  emphasizing  processes  that  promote  equity,  stakeholder 
involvement,  and  collaboration  (Alaerts  2003;  Daniels  and  Walker  2001;  Hirsch  and  Phanvilay  1998; 
Janprasart  2008).  In  Europe,  Mesoamerica,  and  more  recently  in  the  Mekong  region,  new  forms  of 
collaborative processes such as Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs), are emerging to address conflicts at 
the provincial and community scale (Jaspers 2003; Dore 2007; Warner 2007). There is still uncertainty 
how  effectively  these  processes  actually  manage  potential  conflicts  and  whether  or  not  they  build 
capacity and resilience across multiple scales of water management in the Mekong Basin (Huitema et al. 
2009).  
Finally, failing to have a single theory to model resilience in complex river basins, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to compare the rate of development in basins from different geographies and social-economic 
and political conditions. For example, tropical basins in South America likely have little social, economic, 
or political commonalities with Mediterranean basins in mainland Europe, such as the Rhine or Danube. 
Professionals  have  been  forced  to  make  sectoral  comparisons,  such  as  fisheries  or  hydropower 
infrastructure, but often omit the important social-ecological response to change in the system (Ferguson 
et al. 2010). Facing prospects of rapid development, diplomats and water professionals have reached out 
to the Columbia Basin seeking knowledge and lessons from large-scale water resource development. The 
lack of a common framework to compare basins have made it difficult to compare apples to apples and 
instead making assumptions about how basins function and response to stressors. Systems theory using a 
resilience framework allows an apples to apples comparison and provides a baseline understanding of 
how social and ecological systems function, react, and adapt to stress (Cumming 2011). The lengthy and 
costly response to declining salmon runs in the Columbia Basin is a painful lesson shared with the Mekong 
Basin Commission – a response they hope to avoid to enable sustainable development in the Mekong 
Basin (MRC 2008). These points lead to the objectives of the dissertation.  
1.1.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF DISSERTATION 
Based on the aforementioned concerns, the research in this dissertation answers the following questions. 
An outline of the dissertation organization is shown in Figure 1.2. First:  4 
 
(1)  Is a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model an appropriate tool to evaluate basin 
resilience? 
In Chapter 1: Introduction, I address question (1) and give the case for completing this research in the 
general introduction. I also lay out the research questions that link each of the three Chapters (papers) to 
follow in the dissertation. Next, I describe the evolution of thought for Social-Ecological Systems (SES) and 
resilience  theory,  bringing  together  geography  and  environmental  determinism,  water  conflict 
management,  and  social-ecological  systems  theory  into  a  resilience  definition  for  river  basins. 
Importantly,  I  define  the  terms  used  in  the  dissertation,  including  basin  resilience.  I  then  give  a 
comprehensive  literature  review  of  resilience  meanings  and  studies  on  freshwater  systems.  This  is 
followed by the methodology of the dissertation and references from Chapter 1.  
Second, Chapter 2 addresses the following research questions in Part A in Figure 1.2: 
(1)  Is a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model an appropriate tool to evaluate basin 
resilience? 
(2a)  Is the Mekong Basin resilient?  
(2b)  Is the basin resilient at some scales and not others? 
In Chapter 2: Modeling the Mekong as a Social-Ecological System: Resilience and Scale on the Mekong 
River  Basin,  I  address  questions  (1),  (2a)  and  (2b)  above.  A  significant  part  of  this  research  is  the 
application of the Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model to a large river basin. Of the exhaustive literature 
search conducted, very few studies have attempted this task. After a brief introduction, the research 
questions and hypothesis is given followed by the methodology explaining how resilience is determined. 
Next,  I  describe  the  significant  stressors  facing  the  basin  followed  by  the  characteristics  of  complex 
systems and their application to the Mekong Basin, and importantly make the link between conflict, scale, 
and resilience. The next section gives examples of threshold behavior in the Mekong Basin, followed by 
the section that lays out the SES model used to characterize the basin system. This section also derives a 
list  of  multi-scalar  feedbacks  that  link  the  Mekong  system  elements.  In  the  next  section,  I  apply  a 
vulnerability framework and data collected by the MRC to determine vulnerability scores to District and 
Provincial scales. In the final section, I use an adaptive capacity framework to evaluate adaptive capacity 
for each Lower Basin  Country and the MRC. I then  take elements and  findings from the model and 
vulnerability study to analyze and score resilience of the basin across multiple scales, feedbacks, and 
thresholds. In this chapter, I apply a SES model to the Mekong, characterize the relationship between 
scale, vulnerability, and resilience, and assess resilience in the basin.  
Third, Chapter 3 addresses the following research question in Part B in Figure 1.2: 5 
 
(3)  Does Conflict Management and Collaborative Learning enhance resilience in the Mekong 
Basin? 
2 
In  Chapter  3:  Building  Resilience  across  Scale:  Regional  Cooperation,  Conflict  Prevention,  and 
Collaborative  Learning  on  the  Mekong  Basin  System,  I  address  question  (3)  above.  I  give  a  brief 
introduction  followed  by  the  chapter’s  research  questions  and  hypothesis.  I  give  a  brief  review  of 
Collaborative Learning theory and the links to Multi-Stakeholder Platforms emerging in Southeast Asia. I 
then discuss the evolution of the Mekong Basin System taking a critical view of the conflict prevention 
mechanisms present in the institutional framework, followed by an account of the link between regional 
cooperation and conflict prevention. In the next section, I design and implement a conflict management 
strategy at the Mekong River Commission Basin Development Plan Programme. The section outlines the 
strategy and components of work to enhance resilience and prevent conflict at the institutional level 
within the Mekong River Commission. Next, I design and implement a Collaborative Learning process pilot 
study to manage and prevent conflict while building resilience at the sub-basin, or provincial scale. The 
process uses collaborative learning theory which synchronizes with systems and resilience theory and 
engages  stakeholders  in  a  process  of  improving  the  outcomes  of  complex  environmental  issues  or 
conflicts. In this chapter, I discuss and analyze conflict prevention and capacity building work done in the 
basin  and to demonstrate  the  effect  and  legitimacy  of  collaborative  learning  and  conflict  prevention 
processes in enhancing resilience in the Mekong Basin.  
Forth, Chapter 4 addresses the following research questions in Part C in Figure 1.2: 
(4a)  Is a resilience framework an effective tool for making comparisons of large river basins? 
(4b)  Can large river basins rapidly develop while still remaining resilient? 
In Chapter 4: Responses to Water Resource Development: Comparing Resilience of the Mekong and 
Columbia River Basins, I address questions (4a) and (4b) above. I use a resilience framework to analyze 
and compare institutional resilience in the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. The approach is different 
than Chapter 2. I do not apply a SES model to the Columbia Basin. Instead, I assess the common stressors 
and analyze and compare the hydrology and physical characteristics of both basins. I calculate the rate of 
development for both basins and evaluate the basins in terms of physical, developmental, and political 
resilience. In the next section, employ the conflict and cooperation (BAR) scale developed at Oregon State 
                                                                 
2 This question is split into two components in Chapter 3. 6 
 
University to assess the amount of conflict and cooperation over water management in the two basins.
3 
The data is updated through 2011 and Tribal Nations, as  distinct and sovereign nations, are for the first 
time included into the list of parties participating in water management. I analyze declining cooperation in 
both basins in the context of basin resilience and explain the positive effect of Native American Tribes on 
water management in the Columbia Basin. In the final section, I analyze the institutional resilience of both 
basins  with  particular  focus  on  their  flexibility  and  response  to  rapid  development.  The  MRC’s  prior 
notification procedure against the threat of developing the first mainstream hydropower project in Lao 
PDR,  and  the  possible  reformation  of  the  Columbia  River  Treaty  is  evaluated  against  institutional 
resilience principles. In the final section, I consolidate physical, developmental, and political data from 
previous sections to compare the resilience of both basins and discuss the implications of findings.  
Fifth, and finally in Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusions, I discuss the findings from the dissertation and 
respond  to  the  original  research  questions.  I  make  conclusions  from  the  findings  and  discuss  the 
significance of the conclusions from the dissertation finishing with recommendations for future work.  
A flow of the entire dissertation is given in Figure 1.2 below in the Methodology (Section 1.3).  
1.2.  SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND RESILIENCE 
In this dissertation, I use a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model to evaluate the Mekong Basin System, or 
MBS, using a resilience and adaptive capacity framework to evaluate the system (Nelson et al. 2007). The 
evolution of this type of model has taken a while to reach river basin analysis, although it has been used in 
ecology for many years. An evolution of geographic thought leading to systems theory and resilience is 
given below, followed by definitions of key terms used in the dissertation and a literature review of 
resilience definitions and perspectives. 
1.2.1.  Environmental Determinism 
Extreme variants of environmental determinism propose that the environment is the causal agent for the 
behavior of social systems. This theory proposed that temperate or balanced climates were responsible 
for the virtuous qualities of the inhabitants, and it was used to explain the relationship between societies 
in “temperate” climates and other societies in less “hospitable” climate zones (Moran 1979, 24). Taking it 
a step further, Friedrich Ratzel’s notion of environmental determinism manifested itself on his treatment 
                                                                 
3 This data is housed at the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) at Oregon State University 
(http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu). 7 
 
of physical features’ effect on the course of history (Ratzel 1880). Ratzel took a more humanistic view in 
his second volume of works, called Anthropogeographie. His observations led to the belief that habitat 
was  primary  in  bringing  about  cultural  diversity;  that  human  cultural  evolution  emerged  out  of  the 
territorial competition between migrating groups (Ratzel 1882). This theory has an interesting parallel to 
Holling’s theory on functional diversity, covered later (Holling, 1973). Ratzel’s theory, then called Social 
Darwinism, started a view that humans were limited by their habitat, consequently human culture being 
shaped by the environment. This led to the view that the environment shaped human culture, choices, 
and ultimately trait selection, hence the label, Social Darwinism (Darwin 1871; Fisher 187; Huxley 1883; 
Ratzel 1882).  
The biggest impact Friedrich Ratzel had on geography in America was through Ellen Churchill Semple, who 
studied under him from 1891 to 1892. Semple well expressed the spatial role water plays in human 
agency. In fact, she calls them “water highways” (Semple 1911, 318). The water routes, mainly river 
bound,  were  used  not  only  for  transportation,  but  for  attacks.  Through  this  strenuous  relationship, 
humans and their physical geography were shaped into a struggle for life, death, or prosperity. At this 
stage, Semple notes the beginnings of human agency acting on the environment in the United States, as it 
had been acting in Europe for hundreds of years. However, America was different; it was a new frontier 
and settlement was rapid. And it was at this time that Ellen Churchill Semple made such an important 
statement.  Deriving  from  what  she  had  learned  of  environmental  determinism  in  Europe  and  was 
witnessing in America, she stated: 
“In such organized struggles to reduce the domain of the water and extend that of the 
dry land, the material gain is not all: more significant by far is the power to co-operate 
that is developed in a people by prolonged war against overwhelming sea or river. A 
common natural danger, constantly and even regularly recurring, necessitates for its 
resistance a strong and sustained union, that draws men out of the barren individualism 
of a primitive people, and forces them without halt along the path of civilization. It 
brings a realizing sense of the superiority of common interests over individual 
preferences, strengthens the national bond, and encourages voluntary subservience to 
the law.” (Semple 1911, 327 my emphasis) 
Water calls human agency to task requiring humanity to work together. Inherent in this argument is the 
concept of Ratzel and Darwin’s theory of natural selection based on geographic determinants. However, 
in this case, Semple goes a step further describing the motivation to work together as social and political 
gain. This should not be too surprising, as hydro-society in the Middle East had well been established. 
Moreover, there is a plethora of historical data to back up this significant claim. The Greeks embodied 
much of their mythology with the story of Perseus and the destruction of the sea monster who destroyed 
the coast. The Chinese have long lists of engineering heroes who saved the land from flooding for the 8 
 
betterment of society, and Roman history demonstrates respect and political status of engineers and 
watermasters who designed and built famous aqueducts. One can certainly see this agency at work in the 
history of Egypt and Mesopotamia, and might suggest that humankind failed to become “civilized” until it 
mastered Mother Nature. Using this criterion, it was probably Egypt and Mesopotamia who first reached 
civilization. In fact, there were a number of early hydro-civilizations: Yangtze, India, Mesopotamia, Persia, 
Peru, and Mexico, not to mention prehistoric irrigation canals throughout Mesopotamia, in addition to 
settlements in the Salt, Gila River and upper Rio Grande valleys (Semple 1911). 
The link between civilizations and the environment and water resources goes back thousands of years, 
but only in the last 50 or 60 years has this linkage become important in policy thought. Wittfogel, agreeing 
with Ratzel and Semple’s Social Darwinism theory, made the argument that societies were built around 
“hydraulic civilizations” – citing many cases from the Middle East, Greece, Rome, and South America 
(Wittfogel  1956).  He  maintained  that  many  of  these  communities  built  institutions  surrounded  and 
formed by human’s connection to water and natural resources, suggesting that in turn society has an 
effect on the environment as a result of the development of the hydraulic civilization and the expansion 
of  its  institutions,  infrastructure,  and  development.  He  claims  that  achievements  in  mathematics, 
sciences, and astronomy were linked to the development and advancement of hydraulic societies – that 
these developments were drivers for advancement of human society. This could be seen as a type of 
environmental determinism – hydraulic culture vs. non-hydraulic culture.  
Taking  a  different  view,  Toynbee  sees  the  environment  as  having  an  effect  on  society  –  not  the 
centerpiece of humanity - the challenge resting between humans and the environment (Toynbee 1958). 
He argues that natural disasters and environmental stress, or challenges, act as a catalyst for human 
advancement and development. This is viewed as extreme environmental determinism. He goes on to 
indicate  that  trans-sea  migrations  created  the  most  formidable  advancements  in  society  –  one  that 
formed the United States. His central thesis is that difficult environmental conditions cause humans to 
migrate, stimulating minds and bodies, effecting the greatest of advancement in human organization and 
society, directly contradicting Wittfogel.  
Wittfogel’s argument is not totally out of line with Toynbee, and in Wittfogel’s world, the environment 
does shape human development around natural water infrastructure. In this case, although settlements 
are somewhat stationary, the environment still plays a role in shaping civilizations, as it does in Toynbee’s 
view. Except in Toynbee’s case, society is shaped by extreme events and migration – therefore society is 
shaped  by  being  displaced.  It  is  not  clear  from  Toynbee’s  accounts  what  does  the  shaping  –  the 
environment or the journey away from it. So they do agree on one point – environment does have an 9 
 
impact on the human condition and does to a varying extent, shape society, a point Sprout and Sprout 
pick up on with respect to politics (Sprout and Sprout 1957). 
1.2.1.1.  Not Determinism, but Environmental Probablism 
Sprout and Sprout argue that the environment has an effect on international politics. Their basic point is 
that the environment affects the attitudes and decisions of those that shape foreign policy or policy 
decision makers. This seems obvious. However, Sprout argues against determinism and challenged this 
idea  by  presenting  an  alternative  geographical  theory,  as  free-will  environmentalism,  environmental 
possiblism, and environmental probablism, each with their own set of assumptions about the interaction 
between humans and the environment. This is the main thrust of historical possibism introduced by 
Geographer Franz Boas in the early 1900’s (Boas 1912). Sprout and Sprout admitted that these theories 
were  limited  by  the  difficulty  in  proving  them  in  a  reasonable  scientific  manner.  He  settled  on 
environmental  probablism;  humans  choose  options,  but  those  options  are  constrained  by  the 
environment  –  and  that  major  assumptions  inherent  in  these  choices  are  how  we  perceive  the 
environment, our motivations, and how we use our knowledge of the environment. He then made a fairly 
large leap to the conclusion that foreign policy is dependent on policy-makers’ psychological environment 
–  or  how  they  perceive  the  environment  at  the  time  of  making  policy  decisions.  He  suggested  a 
reductionist  approach  –  that  policy  makers  remove  improbable  choices  first  and  then  proceed  with 
options forward (Sprout and Sprout 1957).  
The  link  between  Sprout  and  Sprout’s  environmental  probablism  and  water  development  and  the 
environmental  movement  of  the  1970s  came  from  Geertz  (1963).  His  book  Agricultural  Involution 
challenges the model of cultural ecology, insisting that models to understand the environment use an 
ecological approach (Geertz 1963). Geertz argues that the ecological approach better represents human, 
biological,  and  physical  processes  –  focusing  on  a  systems  model  rather  than  bi-nodal  relationships 
between  human  and biophysical  systems  (Davidson-Hunt  and Berkes  2003).  This  approach  is  termed 
ecological anthropology, and while Geertz broke the ecological system into social, political, and biological 
components (now common dimensions for evaluating resilience in water systems), it was difficult to 
measure at the time. Consequently, studies were focused on human adaptation (Vayda and McCay 1975; 
Moran 1979, 1990).  
While  many  case  studies  were  published  in  the  years  following  Sprout  and  Sprout,  there  was  little 
“international” debate on the subject post-WWII. Within the U.S. there was significant debate over how 
to develop the nation’s water resources led mostly by Gilbert White (White 1945). White’s own view 
changed over time, moving from a development-centric ethos to a more human environment balanced 
view following the massive floods on the Columbia, Missouri, and Mississippi Rivers in the 1940s and 10 
 
1950s (White 1962). His water development plans began to advocate moving societies out of the flood 
plains rather than additional water resource command and control infrastructure, a view that eventually 
caused  friction  with  US  planners  and  moved  White  to  begin  advising  other  countries  on  water 
development, such as the Mekong in the late 1950 and early 1960s. White was clearly opening to the view 
that humans should not merely master their control over the environment, but should begin to work with 
the environment while developing social and political structures (White 1977). 
As water thought was being “practiced” in the United States via infrastructure, political thought was 
surrounding  the  idea  of  ecosystems.  The  combination  of  environmental  determinism,  environmental 
possibilism, Social Darwinism, ecological anthropology, historical ecology, and political ecology shaped 
academic  thought  on  how  to  analyze  and  understand  humans  and  nature  systems.  This  line  of 
evolutionary thought led to the concept of resilience, but at the same time, a debate on whether or not 
the environment causes conflict had begun. 
1.2.1.2.  Environmental Link to Conflict, or Not 
Many commentators argue that the approach to solving problems with respect to natural resources lack 
robustness (Brown 2011; Clark and Munn 1986; Gunderson et al. 1995; Worldwatch Institute 2003). In 
particular, the same people fear there will be wars over water (Amery 2002; Cooley 1984; Starr 1991). 
Others  maintain  that  there  are  conflicts,  but  that  they  originate  primarily  at  the  local  level  and  not 
necessarily directed related to environmental pressures (Carius et al. 2004; Elhance 1999; Wolf et al. 
2003).  
Sprout  and  Sprout’s  proclaimed  environmental  factors  inherent  in  international  politics  became  the 
intellectual precursor to the environmental security literature that is common today, as spearheaded by 
Homer-Dixon (Homer-Dixon 1991; Sprout and Sprout 1957). Homer-Dixon took the debate to the next 
step in the 1990s. He completed a study and published results indicating an indirect effect between the 
environment and conflict and violence (Homer-Dixon 1991). This study and its findings started a spirited 
debate  –  a  debate  that  started  in  the  1980s  linked  to  claims  of  environmental  security.  While 
inadvertently pushing the security hot-buttons, Homer-Dixon focused on the theme of natural resource 
scarcity and its effect on human nature, most directly conflict. He noticed that while natural resource 
scarcity did not (appear) to have a direct effect on violence, it did have an indirect effect on conflict and 
violence,  particularly  in  the  presence  of  severe  degradation  and  depletion  of  natural  resources, 
particularly where the affected groups are economically and socially weakened  – or lacking adaptive 
capacity  (Homer-Dixon  1999).  In  these  cases,  resource  scarcity  can  cause  population  migrations  that 
weaken and threaten groups and states – raising the potential for violent conflict. But some argue that 11 
 
Homer-Dixon’s  methods  were  flawed,  and  that  the  case  studies  were  chosen  to  support  his  claims 
(Homer-Dixon 1999). 
Homer-Dixon softened his assertions by the end of the 1990s to proclaim that water “wars” were actually 
rare in many river basins (Homer-Dixon 1999). Reports emerged refuting the claims that conflicts, or wars, 
were evitable over water scarcity. Two authors, Peter Gleick and Aaron Wolf, engaged in this debate, the 
first claiming there are those who did fight over water, and the former claiming that people actually 
cooperated over water (Gleick 1993; Wolf 1998). Wolf’s “Basins at Risk” (BAR) study went a long way to 
debunk  the  claims  that  water  wars  were  probable,  refuting  many  myths  over  what  produces  water 
conflicts  at  the  international  basin  level  (Wolf  et  al.  2003).  Its  main  findings  were  that  the  lack  of 
institutional capacity, unilateral development, and hostile relations between countries were the main 
precipitators over water conflict. Other factors, such as climate, scarcity, and economic well-being, were 
not found to be significant factors in predicting water conflict. In fact, more agreements were signed over 
water during the last century then the many centuries previously – indicating an international regime of 
water  sharing  rather  than  fighting  (Conca  2006;  Wolf,  Stahl  and  Macomber  2003;  Wolf,  Yoffe,  and  
Giordano 2003).  
More recently, Sandra Postel and others have called upon lessons learned previously, namely that nation 
states  do  cooperate  over  water,  and  have  called  for  action  on  protecting  rivers  and  freshwater 
ecosystems (Postel and Richter 2003). Capitalizing on the agreements already in place and recognizing 
that some are inflexible, Postel and Delli Priscoli have called for a new ethic for water sharing – a modified 
IWRM approach that take the river’s needs into account. Postel is arguing for a more river-centered 
approach, aligned with global moves to include environmental flows into the mix of uses under IWRM. 
However, Postel and Delli Priscoli’s calls are for more of a holistic approach to water management – 
moving away from competing use arguments (Delli Priscoli 1997). The injection of ethics into water use 
involves two parallel approaches – an economic one and human-centered one. The following review 
accomplishes the second approach  – matching the biophysical systems with the human dimension  – 
termed hereafter as the Social-Ecological System (SES). But understanding humans and natural systems 
means understanding their complexity. This is discussed in the next section; in particular, how the system 
theory evolved to describe large-scale complex ecological and social systems is addressed. 
1.2.2.  Definitions: Social-Ecological Systems and Resilience 
Linking social-ecological systems and resilience is not trivial. Alone, SESs are difficult to get your head 
around and contain many characteristics that are not only difficult to model, but hard to measure. Using 
an engineering definition, it should be straight forward. But using the ecological definition brings with it 12 
 
many more concepts that need clarification. In the next section, I will give clear definitions of the key 
terms used in the dissertation. 
1.2.2.1.  Social-Ecological System (SES) 
A system consists of a number of components connected by a series of interrelationships among those 
components, e.g., the internet, financial markets, knowledge networks, or a computer. A social system is 
a set of components that deal with property rights, land and water resource tenure systems, economic 
institutional structures, systems of knowledge pertinent to the environment and resources, and world 
views and ethics concerning the environment and resources. An ecological system, or ecosystem, is simply 
the natural environment. Therefore, the link between social and ecological systems represents a humans-
in-nature system, or Social-Ecological System, or SES (Berkes et al. 1998). The question that arises is how 
to manage SESs sustainably. The definition of sustainability is often problematic. Here, we will use the 
meaning agreed upon at the 1992 United Nations-sponsored Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Sustainable 
development was discussed in the context of a 1987 report entitled Our Common Future, which defined 
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Toffel and Lifset 2010; UNEP 2003). This 
definition compels an understanding of not only current needs, but a prediction of future needs. Later in 
an  effort  to  measure  sustainability,  the  definition  expanded  to  include  effectively  managing  social, 
economic, and environmental aspects of the system, the so-called “Triple Bottom Line” (Elkington 1998).  
Therefore, the challenge becomes not only how to predict the future, but how to manage the present. 
Managing the present includes understanding what is being managed – or understanding natural complex 
systems, or SESs. This is where the term resilience becomes operative. 
1.2.2.2.  Engineering vs. Ecological Resilience 
In the 1960s and 1970s studies were focused on interacting populations and their functional responses in 
the study of ecology. Ecologist C.S. Holling published a paper in 1972 and first introduced the idea of 
functional resilience and stability in ecological systems through multiple domains of attraction at various 
spatial and temporal scales (Holling 1973). Holling’s definition of resilience is strikingly similar to what is 
used today. He proposed that “resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and 
is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables” (Holling 1973, 17). The 
key shift in thinking and subsequent understanding of complex systems was the focus on variability, not 
stability.  
Until  then,  the  single-state  equilibrium  model,  which  treated  systems  as  approaching  a  steady-state 
system, assumed resilience as a “fast a variable that has been displaced from equilibrium returns to it,” 13 
 
commonly referred to as engineering resilience (Folke 2006, 256; Pimm 1991). Engineering resilience was 
measured  by  the  speed  at  which  a  system  returns  to  steady-state,  assuming  a  linear  path  towards 
stability. The focus was on optimization, maintaining efficiency, and speed of response. There are, of 
course, important applications of this type of resilience in water systems. However, this theory contains 
an important assumption. It assumes the system is near a stable equilibrium and that it is linear. For 
complex systems, such as ecosystems however, this assumption is incorrect. Often they are non-linear 
with multiple states of attraction or multiple optimums. Figure 2.1 displays how engineering resilience 
differs from complex ecological systems resilience the latter with multiple states of attraction. The ball 
rests between two possible states, but the objective is not to optimize in one state or the other.  
 
Figure 1.1: Engineering vs. Ecological Resilience. Engineering resilience seeks to optimize around a one 
defined optimum, while ecological resilience allows several optimums or operating states.  
Complex adaptive systems often do not exhibit these characteristics, and are near an unstable equilibrium 
near  a  domain  of  attraction,  and  are  often  non-linear  (Levin  1998;  Ludwig  et  al.  1997).  These 
characteristics of the Mekong Basin System (MBS) are discussed later. 
In systems, resilience refers to the amount of change a system can absorb and still retain its ability to 
function and form while still maintaining the ability to evolve (Nelson et al. 2007, 398). There are many 
variations  on  this  definition.  Carpenter  et  al.  (2001)  defines  system  resilience  as  the  “magnitude  of 
disturbance that can be tolerated before a system moves into a different region of state space and a 
different set of controls” (Carpenter et al. 2001, 766). Gunderson (2000) describes ecological resilience as 
“magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system redefines its structure by changing the 
variables and processes that control behavior” (Gunderson 2000, 426), while Adger (2000) defines it as 
“buffer capacity or the ability of a system to absorb perturbations, or the magnitude of disturbance that 
can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that 14 
 
control behavior” (Adger, 2000 349). Forest fires are good examples of systems that have more than one 
state and that are altered by disturbances. Global weather patterns is another  – the transition from 
winter to spring in the northern hemisphere never occurs in the same way twice. The rate of change 
depends on sun intensity, cloud cover, and other perturbations. A perturbation can be thought of as an 
external stimulus, or stressor, having an impact for example, on a water institution. The definition of 
institutions, or a water institution, is one that receives much debate and contains no one answer that fits 
all international water contexts. A description of water institutions is presented next before continuing to 
develop a working definition of basin resilience. 
1.2.2.3.  Water Institutions 
Frederiksen states that a nation’s institutions comprise of “laws, customs, and organizations and all that is 
associated”  that  form  a  framework  from  which  society  is  constructed  (Frederiksen  1992,  2).  Jaspers 
expands this a bit and contends that institutions are “organizations or establishments founded for a 
specific  purpose  based  on  a  set  of  working  rules  originating  from  an  established  custom,  law  or 
relationship in a society or community” (Jaspers 2003, 79). Likewise he defines institutional arrangements 
as sets of working rules that determine who will make decisions in a particular arena, using rules to 
describe  the  procedural  action.  Landovsky  then  refines  the  distinction  between  institutions  and 
frameworks by defining a transboundary water institution as a persistent and predictable arrangement 
incorporating treaties, laws, or organizational structures pertaining to transboundary waters (Landovsky 
et al. 2007; Landovsky 2006, 5). The institutional framework then comprises of all institutions connected 
to a transboundary water basin.  
These definitions are also consistent with Giordano and Wolf (2003) and Wolf et al. (2003) and their work 
on the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) indicating that institutions are principles, joint 
commissions, shared water agreements, treaties, and international agreements and relations between 
states, significantly widening the definition of water institutions (Giordano and Wolf 2003; Wolf et al. 
2003). There have been large efforts to expand the definition of water institutions to include individuals: 
private,  public,  subnational,  intranational,  supranational,  international  organizations,  also  including 
coalitions, groups, transnational communities, networks and regimes. All these are receiving substantial 
attention in the water governance literature, and there is an increasing work on multi-scalar institutional 
studies (Alaerts 2003; Blatter and Ingram 2001; Conca 2006; Conca et al. 2006; Finger et al. 2006; Heikkila 
and Gerlak 2005; Jaspers 2003; Lipschutz and Conca 1993; Ostrom, et al. 2002).  
1.2.2.4.  Institutional Capacity and Water Conflict 
Linking  institutions  to  conflict  and  cooperation,  results  from  the  Transboundary  Freshwater  Dispute 
Database (TFDD) project indicate that institutional capacity is a significant indicator of conflict and/or 15 
 
cooperation in transboundary basins (Wolf, Stahl, Macomber 2003, 4). Particularly they found that the 
likelihood of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin surpasses the ability of institutions to 
respond in that basin. The ability of institutions to respond to change, either through water management 
bodies, treaties, river basin organizations, or positive international relations, can be termed institutional 
capacity. The findings by Wolf et al. (2003) appear to be valid for not only international transboundary 
water basins but also, to some extent, intranational basins in Oregon State (Fesler 2007). Wolf (2007) and 
Iyob (2010) outline a set of principles critical for institutional capacity on river basin institutions:  
1)  Adaptable management structure 
2)  Clear and flexible criteria for water allocations and water quality management 
3)  Equitable distribution of benefits 
4)  Concrete mechanisms to enforce treaty provisions, and 
5)  Detailed conflict resolution mechanisms (Iyob 2010, 55; Wolf 2007, 3.19). 
Understanding the nature of how institutions are structured, how they function and how they interact 
with one another is critical to unpacking the secrets of institutional capacity on large river basins. Water 
management is considered conflict management, employing multi-level involvement from all areas of life 
(Postel  1999).  The  complexity  of  institutional  structures  follows  a  nonlinear  disposition  by  forming 
complex interactions with one another. The ability to predict the effectiveness of large organizations, such 
as the Mekong River Commission, is dependent on an accurate understanding of the characteristic of 
complex systems and how they function particularly, at different scales, and how the scales interact with 
each other.  
1.2.2.5.  Hydropolitical Resilience of Institutions 
At the international scale, hydropolitics is the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water 
resources. Hydropolitical resilience is defined as the human-environmental system’s ability to adapt to 
changes, or perturbations, within these systems (Wolf 2009; Delli Priscoli and Wolf 2009). Taking a three-
dimensional  approach,  institutional  capacity  on  a  river  basin  can  be  evaluated  according  post-Rio 
sustainability  discourse,  employing  three  categories,  or  lenses,  with  which  to  measure  hydropolitical 
resilience and outcomes to stressors: socioeconomic, biophysical, and geopolitical (UNCED 1992). Rapid 
changes to inputs, or perturbations, can be modeled into the system and evaluated against these three 
lenses (Landovsky et al. 2007).  
The problem with this approach is the failure to effectively capture the multi-scalar characteristics of 
basin systems. In particular, non-linear aspects of river basin systems, such as thresholds, feedback loops, 
and interactions between spatial and temporal scales are not modeled in the system. It is precisely the 
characteristics found in large river basins that define complex social-ecological systems. Therefore, the 
definition of resilience for large river basins must account for scale, feedbacks, and threshold behavior for 16 
 
both  social  and  ecological  systems.  A  useful  way  to  understand  the  relationship  between  these 
characteristics is the concept of vulnerability which is inversely related to resilience. These definitions are 
given next.  
1.2.2.6.  Vulnerability 
Responding to the presence of natural hazards, the commonplace meaning of vulnerability is being prone 
to or susceptible to damage or injury. Linking it more to resilience, Wisner et al. (2004) expands this to:  
“The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity 
to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner 
et al. 2004, 11). 
This sounds very similar to the resilience definitions discussed in the previous section. Wisner et al. (2004) 
go on to define characteristics as class, occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, and health status, 
including age and the connection to social networks (Wisner et al. 2004, 14). Vulnerability clearly involves 
a variety of dimensions of varying magnitudes. Importantly, the notion of risk means those who are 
vulnerable at the worst end of the spectrum, or less capable of coping with disturbances than the rest. In 
this regard, the term vulnerable has been linked to capacity, particularly as it relates to responses to 
climate change where much of the research has been done recently (Brooks et al. 2005; Smit and Wandel 
2006).  
Social vulnerability relates to the exposure of groups of people or individuals to stress as a result of the 
impacts of environmental change (Adger 2000). Stress disrupts a person or group’s livelihood and hence 
their security (Lonergan et al. 2000). Debate over the links between the environment and extreme human 
vulnerability, defined as conflict, have been fierce over the last twenty years (Brown 2011; Diehl and 
Gleditsch 2001; Homer-Dixon 1991, 1999), raising fears in some camps that water insecurity will bring 
water wars (Bulloch and Darwish 1993; Starr 1991). Following the security idea, Langridge et al. (2006) 
and others link this concept to the increasing lack difficulty of access to water resources, with the ability 
to access water being known as water security (Falkenmalk et al. 1989; Langridge et al. 2006; UNDP 2006; 
Wolf et al. 2005).  
In  freshwater  ecosystems,  vulnerability  can  occur  when  individuals  or  communities  of  species  are 
stressed, and where thresholds of potentially irreversible changes are exceeded through environmental 
changes. It follows that social vulnerability to ecosystem changes and other causes of vulnerability are 
often observed at different scales and in relation to a range of pressures such as human-induced risks or 
natural hazards. The UNEP have defined vulnerability as the interface between exposure to the physical 17 
 
threats to human well-being and the capacity of people and communities to cope with those threats 
(UNEP GEO 2006). That means both the social and ecological systems are involved. 
Social vulnerability usually involves more than one person, and therefore is a community concept. It 
follows that institutional vulnerability is closely linked as institutions are often collections of personal 
actors engaged in collective action (Conca 2006). Many commentators have been working to measure 
institutional and social vulnerability (Brooks et al. 2006; Colding et al. 2003; Eakin and Lynd Luers 2006; 
Hamouda et al. 2009; Smit and Wandel 2006; Turner II et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). In Bangladesh, 2 
million  people  living  on  the  Jamuna  Chars  are  prone  to  flood  risk  (Colding  et  al.  2003).  Basin-level 
indicators  to  measure  social-ecological  vulnerability  were  used  in  the  Yangtze  River  Basin  in  China 
(Nakamura 2006), and other studies aggregated international basin and country data to determine which 
basins were at risk and vulnerable to climate changes (Brooks et al. 2005, Stefano et al. 2010; Wolf, Yoffe, 
and Giordano 2003).  
Importantly for this chapter, vulnerability is seen as the inverse of resilience. If resilience is the ability to 
absorb  changes  and  retain  function,  then  vulnerability is  the  lack  of  ability  to  absorb  changes.  So  if 
vulnerability is the lack of capacity to absorb changes, the question is then, how do you measure it? What 
are its components? 
There are many indicators one can use to measure vulnerability (Adger et al. 2004; IPCC 2001; UNDP-GEF 
2000;  Vogel  2001).  However,  to  correctly  assess  the  scale  and  level  of  risk,  a  proper  conceptual 
framework must be used. Turner II et al. provides a generic vulnerability framework for sustainability 
science (Turner II et al. 2003), Smit and Wandel look at community level response to climate change (Smit 
and Wandel 2006), and Eakin and Lynd Luers focus on social-ecological vulnerability reduction in terms of 
equity and social justice (Eakin and Lynd Luers 2006). A study done recently by Hamouda (2009) on the 
Eastern Nile River Basin is most relevant to this study. Hamouda develops a vulnerability framework for 
the Eastern Nile Basin using a list of 31 indicators link to hydro-physical and socio-economic and political 
drivers. On the Mekong Basin, Kirby et al. uses a different approach but some of the same indicators, 
linking  poverty,  proximity  (or  exposure),  hydraulic  sensitivity,  perceived  weak  institutional  structure 
(MRC), and potential disturbances, as a model to assess social and ecological vulnerabilities in the basin. 
They conclude that if current vulnerabilities are not reduced (increased resilience) and disturbances not 
decreased or mitigated, conflict in the basin is likely (Kirby et al. 2010). 
Going back to Wisner et al. and their definition of vulnerability, there is a need to take it a step further to 
get a system-level working definition of vulnerability. Hamouda defines it as “the degree, to which a 
system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of environmental change” (Hamouda 
2009, 2701 my emphasis). In other words, vulnerability of a social-ecological system can be determined by 18 
 
the character, magnitude, and rate of the disturbance on the one side and the system’s sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity on the other (Hamouda 2009; IPCC 2001).  
Therefore, vulnerability needs to include three dimensions:  (1) resilience, (2) sensitivity, and (3) exposure. 
Resilience relates to the system’s adaptability to disturbances, sensitivity relates to the system’s proximity 
to disturbances, and exposure relates to the system’s impact from a disturbance. A revised definition for 
the purpose of this study is: 
“The degree to which a system is sensitive to, exposed to, and resilient to the adverse 
effect of human or environmental disturbances, is a measure of its vulnerability.” 
It is important to note that the resilience definition used in the vulnerability assessment in Section 2.8 is 
limited to the district and provincial scale, and does not indicate resilience at the basin level. This means 
that vulnerability at the basin scale, minus sensitivity and exposure, would be roughly the inverse of 
resilience at the basin scale. This is defined next. 
1.2.2.7.  Resilience in Complex Social-Ecological Basin Systems 
The amount of change a system can absorb and still function depends to large extent on how well the 
system can adapt to stimulus. Therefore, adaptation, or the adjustment to ecological, social-economic, or 
political changes, is the companion to resilience. Based on the definitions given earlier, integrating both 
hydro-institutional (social) and ecological resilience definitions, the resilience of a complex river basin 
system is defined as: 
“A river basin system’s capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt to biophysical, social-
economic, and political changes (or stressors) while still maintaining its essential 
structure, feedbacks, and functional integrity.” 
This  definition,  termed  hydro-systematic  resilience,  or  more  simply,  basin  resilience,  will  be  used 
throughout this paper. Notice that the basin not only needs to absorb, but manage and adapt to changes 
to the system. Doing this is not an easy task, particularly if the basin variables are changing rapidly – so-
called fast variables verses slow variables. The term basin resilience makes the important assumption that 
the basin is complex and linked to both social and ecological systems. Table 2.1 sketches an evolution of 
resilience  definitions  and  characteristics  throughout  the  literature,  and  Figure  2.1  illustrates  a  rough 
graphical representation of social-ecological resilience.  
A good example of the dilemma between engineering and social-ecological resilience can be found in 
municipal water delivery. Water engineers are trained to use design principles to optimize efficiency, 
maximize output, and minimize cost. This approach is problematic in the design of the water delivery 
system. The lack of redundancy leaves the system vulnerable to failure, comprising design objectives. 19 
 
Therefore, the system is designed with functional diversity, redundancy, fail-safes, factor of safety - there 
are  many  terms  used  to  describe designing  in  redundancy. A  water  delivery  system  is  complex,  and 
therefore  needs  to  operate  at  any  number  of  optimum  states  –  this  maximizes  utility,  decreases 
vulnerability, enhances resilience, and importantly over the long-term, reduces operating costs.  
The  above definition  raises the question  of  what  is  essential structure  and  functional  integrity.  First, 
essential structure refers to the configuration of the system needed to carry out its essential functions 
maintaining structure, such as relationships and feedbacks. This leaves considerable flexibility in the types 
of structures that can persist and maintain resilience. In fact, a resilient complex system is flexible and has 
capacity for reorganization, or self-organization, and can exist in many states while keeping its essential 
functions.  These  multiple  states  are  referred  to  as  a  regime.  In  complex  ecological  systems,  the 
reorganization stage is part of the adaptive renewal cycle and can exist and manifest itself at many scales 
– referred to as panarchy (Berkes et al. 2003; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling 1986). Functional 
integrity relates to the function or functions the system provides. In large-scale social-ecological systems, 
there could be many functions across a number of scales and regimes. Some of these regimes may or may 
not be acceptable to society, based on economic or ecological norms. For example, three or four levels of 
governance with overlapping functionality in a river basin organization such as the Murray Darling in 
Australia or Columbia River Basin in North America might not attract appropriate levels of funding due to 
concerns over inefficient use of public funds and resources. In addition, questions of authority are often 
raised. This has been the case in the Columbia River Basin where decisions are made at several levels and 
jurisdictions. These issues are exacerbated in large complex, transboundary basins where there are many 
levels of governance, cultural, and geographic boundaries – such as the Mekong Basin. The characteristics 
that define the functional integrity depend on system variables and have different implications for the 
societies that depend on services from the system (Scheffer et al. 2002). This aspect of complex systems 
has emerged in the study of ecosystem services (Walker and Meyers 2004). 
There has been a flurry of work recently on research into resilience of social systems – much of it broad in 
scope. Rather  than  review  all  of  it  here,  a  set  of  references  to  specific  characteristics  of  river  basin 
systems such as feedbacks, scale, thresholds, regime shifts, and institutional frameworks are summarized 
in Table 2.2. There is significant overlap in resilience concepts. However, some effort has been made in 
the last few years to distinguish between engineering, ecological, social-ecological, socio-economic, social 
(including human), and institutional resilience concepts. In an effort to present works important to this 
research, Table 2.2 also outlines works completed on adaptive capacity and adaptive management of 
basins, social resilience and vulnerability research, which contributes to define much of the methodology 
for the resilience in this paper.    20 
 
Table 1.1: Evolution of Resilience Meanings and Characteristics. Source: Adapted from Brand and Jax 2007; 
and Folk 2006. 
Resilience 
Concept 
Definition/Meaning  Characteristics  References 
Engineering 
resilience 
How fast a variable that has been displaced 
from equilibrium returns to it 
Linear, single and stable 
equilibrium, return time, 
efficiency, single optimum 
Pimm 1991, 13; 
Ludwig et al. 1997 
Ecological 
resilience – 
original  
Measure of the persistence of systems and of 
their stability to absorb change and 
disturbance while still maintaining the same 
relationships between state variables 
Buffer capacity, structure, 
withstand shock, variables 
Holling 1973, 14 
Ecological 
resilience - 
extended 
The magnitude of disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the systems changes its 
structure by changing the variables and 
processes that control behavior and the 
capacity of a system to experience shocks 
while retaining essentially the same function, 
structure, feedbacks, and identity 
Absorb disturbances, self-
organization, learning for 
adaptation, latitude, 
resistance, precariousness, 
cross-scale relations 
Gunderson and 
Holling 2002, 4; 
Walker et al. 2006 
2; Walker et al. 
2002; Folke et al. 
2004, 573 
Ecological 
resilience – 
operational 
The ability of the system to maintain its 
identity in the face of internal change and 
external shocks and disturbances 
Buffer capacity, adaptive 
capacity, structural integrity, 
functional response 
Carpenter et al. 
2001; Cumming 
et al. 2005 
Sociological 
resilience 
The ability of groups or communities to cope 
with external stresses and disturbances due to 
social, political, and environmental change 
Vulnerability, social capital, 
coping ability, learning, 
trust, security, criticality 
Adger 2000, 347; 
Pretty 2003; 
Scheffer et al. 
2002 
Ecological-
economic 
resilience 
The ability of the system to withstand market 
or environmental shocks and disturbances 
without losing the capacity to allocate 
resources efficiently 
Robustness, buffer capacity, 
response capacity, resource 
allocation, efficiency 
Brock et al. 2002; 
Carpenter and 
Brock 2004 
Eco-system 
services 
resilience 
The underlying capacity of an ecosystem to 
maintain desired ecosystem services in the 
face of changing environmental and human 
stress 
Buffer capacity, loading, 
functional diversity, 
functional response, 
adaptive capacity 
Folke et al. 2002, 
14; Suyanto et al. 
2007; Schlüter et 
al. 2009 
Social-
ecological 
system 
resilience 
The capacity of social-ecological systems to 
absorb recurrent disturbances so as to retain 
essential structures, processes, and feedbacks. 
a) Amount of change a system can undergo 
while retaining controls on function and 
structure, or still be in the same state, within 
the same domain of attraction, b) degree to 
which the system is capable of self-
organization, or c) ability to build and increase 
the capacity for learning and adaptation 
Adaptive capacity, functional 
diversity, response diversity, 
thresholds, self-
organization, feedbacks, 
panarchy, regime shift, 
institutional flexibility, social 
memory, social capital, 
learning and capacity 
building 
Adger et al. 2005, 
1036; Armitage 
2005; Gunderson 
2001; Berkes and 
Folke 2003, 13; 
Ostrom 2005; 
Olick and Robbins 
1998; McIntosh 
2000 
Hydropolitical 
resilience 
The human-environmental system’s ability to 
adapt to changes, or perturbations, within 
these systems. 
Institutional capacity, 
flexibility, political, 
biophysical, and socio-
economic stress, adaptive 
capacity, sustainability, 
vulnerability, risk 
Delli Priscoli and 
Wolf 2009; Wolf 
2009 
Basin 
resilience 
A river basin’s ability to absorb, cope, and 
adapt to biophysical, social-economic, and 
political changes (or stressors) while still 
maintaining essential structure, feedbacks, and 
functional integrity 
Adaptive capacity, 
vulnerability, thresholds, 
self-organization, cross-scale 
feedbacks, social capital, 
institutional flexibility, 
learning and innovation 
Gunderson et al. 
2006; MacQuarrie 
2012  21 
 
1.2.3.  Literature Review: Applications of Social-Ecological Resilience 
Table 1.2 gives a review of academic work on the application of social-ecological resilience. 
Table 1.2: Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Engineering resilience 
Engineering resilience 
response and 
vulnerability 
Water reservoir  
(watershed; community) 
Uses the “engineering” definition of resilience 
by using three criteria for evaluating the 
performance of water resource systems. These 
measures describe how likely a system is to fail 
(reliability), how quickly it recovers from failure 
(resiliency), and how severe the consequence of 
failure may be (vulnerability) 
Hashimoto 
et al. 1982 
Adaptive capacity and management 
Ecological resilience 
and adaptive 
management 
Columbia River Basin, 
Pacific Northwest, USA 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Identifies 3 criteria for management based on 
natural variability: the capacity of aquatic 
habitat to recover from disturbance, a range of 
habitats distributed across stream networks 
with diverse salmon life histories, and ecological 
connectivity. Outlines current threats to habitat 
resilience and describes how regulatory and 
restoration approaches can be modified to 
better incorporate natural variability 
Bisson et al. 
2008 
Adaptive capacity 
using socio-political 
framework 
Southern Africa, Gariep 
and Zambezi Basins 
(watershed and basin; 
international, regional 
and community) 
Evaluation of the scope of an impact, the scope 
of the awareness of the impact, and the scope 
of the power or influence to respond drawing 
from the experience of the Southern African 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (SAfMA) 
Bohensky 
and Lynam. 
2005 
Ecological resilience 
and adaptive system 
management 
North American and 
European Lakes 
(Lake basin; provincial 
and regional) 
Describes the processes that control resilience 
of lakes, the pathology of degraded lakes, and 
lake restoration by reviewing published 
literature in degraded lakes from North America 
and western Europe 
Carpenter 
and 
Cottingham 
2002 
Adaptive water 
management 
Amudarya River basin, 
Uzbekistan 
(basin; community, 
provincial, national) 
Evaluation of the participatory research with 
respect to (i) the choice and application of 
different participatory methods and their 
adaptation to the given political, socioeconomic, 
and cultural environment, (ii) their usefulness in 
improving system understanding and 
developing strategies and measures to improve 
water management and monitoring, and (iii) 
their acceptance and suitability for enhancing 
policy-making processes in the basin 
Hirsch et al. 
2010 
Ecological resilience 
and adaptive system 
management 
Baltic Sea 
(basin; provincial, 
regional, national, 
international) 
Studies the dynamics of marine ecosystem in 
the Baltic Sea and evaluates its capacity to 
withstand further nutrient loading (stress) and 
future surprises across multiple spatial and 
temporal scales  
Jansson and 
Jansson 
2002 
Adaption to 
ecological and social 
changes 
Mekong Delta, Viet Nam 
(watershed; provincial) 
Exploring the social-ecological shift of the 
Mekong Delta’s land and water uses from 
subsistence to product orientated markets 
Käkönen 
2008 
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Table 1.2b (Continued): Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Adaptive capacity and management (continued) 
Institutional 
resilience, 
adaptability, and 
governance 
Diverse set of case 
studies worldwide 
(catchment, watershed, 
basin; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Addresses the question: How do certain 
attributes of governance function in society to 
enhance the capacity to manage resilience? 
Looks at: (1) participation builds trust, and 
deliberation leads to the shared understanding 
needed to mobilize and self-organize; (2) 
polycentric and multilayered institutions 
improve the fit between knowledge, action, and 
social-ecological contexts in ways that allow 
societies to respond more adaptively at 
appropriate levels; and (3) accountable 
authorities that also pursue just distributions of 
benefits and involuntary risks enhance the 
adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups and 
society as a whole 
Lebel et al. 
2006 
Institutional resilience and adaptive capacity 
Institutional and 
socio-political 
resilience linked with 
security theory 
Mekong and Zambezi 
River Basins 
(basin; provincial, 
national, regional, 
international) 
Uses a security framework to argue that 
international agreements reduce ecological 
resilience and therefore enhances human 
insecurity. It argues current models of 
transboundary river basin cooperation in the 
Mekong and Zambezi basins do little to advance 
sustainable ecosystem governance 
Fox and 
Sneddon 
2007 
Institutional resilience 
and adaptability 
Sweden 
(basin; regional, national) 
Focuses on how learning processes are affected 
by strategic behavior among natural resource 
users and how social conflict is affected by 
social and ecological uncertainty and 
institutional change in Swedish water 
management institutions 
Galaz 2005 
Institutional and 
economic resilience 
Columbia and Snake 
River Basins, Pacific 
Northwest, USA 
(basin; regional and 
national) 
Discusses the institutional challenge of 
integrating salmon  ecosystems and human 
systems in ways that effectively promote 
resilience – focusing on incentive and 
transaction costs 
Hanna 2008 
Institutional and 
social resilience and 
vulnerability 
Mekong Basin 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Looks an array of stressors facing the basin and 
uses social and ecological vulnerabilities coupled 
with perceived weak institutional structures to 
predict conflict over development in the basin  
Kirby et al. 
2010 
Institutional and legal 
treaty resilience 
Mekong, Indus, Ganges–
Brahmaputra, Nile, 
Jordan, Danube, Elbe, Rio 
Grande and Colorado, Rio 
de la Plata, Senegal, and 
Niger River Basins 
(basin; national, 
international) 
Examines the evolution structure and 
characteristics of the management systems of 
12 transboundary river basins. It evaluates the 
legal principles which guide the legal regime of 
the studied rivers, particularly the principle of 
equitable use of transboundary water resources 
and the obligation not to cause harm in the 
management of transboundary water resources 
Kliot et al. 
2001 
Institutional adaptive 
capacity 
Orange Basin, Southern 
Africa, and Rhine Basin, 
Europe 
(basin; regional, 
international)  
Comprehensive overview of regime features 
that support adaptive management describing a 
framework of actor networks, policy processes, 
information management, and legal and 
financial aspects, applied to two basins 
Raadgever 
et al. 2008 
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Table 1.2c (Continued): Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Institutional resilience and adaptive capacity (continued) 
Institutional resilience 
of river basin 
organization 
Nile Basin 
(basin; international, 
regional, and national) 
Uses the principle of equitable distribution of 
benefits and institutional capacity to respond to 
basin stressors to determine resiliency of river 
basins, particular the Nile Basin Initiative 
Iyob 2010 
Institutional resilience 
and adaptive capacity 
and management 
Orange-Senqu Basin, 
Southern Africa and 
Botswana 
(watershed; provincial, 
regional) 
Review of international agreements and in-depth 
interviews with water managers throughout the 
Orange-Senqu basin. Results reveal a variety of 
flexibility mechanisms embedded within the 
existing treaties 
Kistin and 
Ashton 
2008 
Structural and 
institutional adaptive 
capacity on basins 
Elbe, Guadiana, Rhine, 
and Tisza basins in 
Europe, Nile and 
Orange in Africa, 
Amudarya in Central 
Asia 
(basin; international) 
Review of existing practices for coping with floods 
and droughts in different river basins, existing 
protection measures, and response strategies 
against floods and droughts. An overview is given 
of expected climate changes of the seven basins 
studied 
Krysanova 
2008 
Institutional resilience 
of a river basin 
organization  
Amudarya River Basin 
(basin; regional) 
Agent-based modeling approach to explore 
system characteristics and mechanisms of 
resilience in a complex resource management 
system 
Schlüter and 
Pahl-Wostl 
2007 
Institutional resilience 
and vulnerability 
International Basins 
(basin; national, 
international) 
Uses basin and risk climate change predictions 
and international basin treaty characteristics to 
classify basin and country/basin components at 
risk – risk being vulnerable and non-risk meaning 
resilience to change 
Stefano et 
al. 2010 
Socio-economic 
institutional resilience 
and adaptive capacity 
Southern Africa 
(sub-basin, basin; 
international, national, 
regional) 
Develops a theoretical model that links natural 
resource scarcity (water), with the adaptive 
capacity of a society that can contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the social dynamics of 
resource scarcity 
Turton 1999 
Institutional resilience 
and capacity on 
international river 
basins 
International Basins 
(basin; international) 
Draws upon previous research in indicators for 
basins at risk of conflict to indicate characteristics 
of international river basin institutions that 
enhance cooperation and build institutional 
capacity 
Wolf 2007 
Institutional resilience 
and vulnerability 
International Basins 
(basin; national, 
international) 
Develops an international river basin spatial, 
biophysical and socio-economic database that 
analyses indices verses conflict and cooperation 
scale. Study indicate particular international river 
basins at risk of conflict over water resources 
Wolf et al. 
2003 
Social and institutional resilience 
Social and ecological 
resilience and 
resource dependency 
Viet Nam, Southeast Asia, 
mangroves conversion 
(watershed; community 
and provincial) 
Studies the commonalities between social and 
ecological resilience, particularly in resource 
dependent societies 
Adger 2000 
Social and 
institutional resilience 
Lakes in Wisconsin, USA, 
wetlands and lakes of 
Kristianstads Vattenrike 
in southern Sweden, 
Everglades of Florida 
(basin; regional) 
Uses comparisons to examine the responses of 
social networks and learning from the 
degradation of ecological resilience of 
freshwater systems 
Gunderson 
et al. 2006. 
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Table 1.2d (Continued): Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social and institutional resilience (continued) 
Social and 
institutional resilience 
Paraíba do Sul River 
Basin, Brazil 
(watershed; provincial) 
Used questionnaires to access the effect of 
social learning and institutional flexibility on 
adaptive capacity in the face of a severe drought 
Kumler and 
Lemos 2008 
Social and 
institutional resilience 
Belgium, England and 
Wales, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Holland, 
Scotland, and Spain 
(municipal, watershed, 
basin; community, 
provincial, regional) 
Analyzes 10 case studies of participatory river-
basin management with focus on social 
learning, which emphasizes the importance of 
collaboration, organization, and learning. Critical 
factors included role of stakeholder 
involvement, politics and institutions, financial 
resources, and others 
Mostert et 
al. 2007 
Social resilience and vulnerability 
Vulnerability, 
adaptive capacity, 
and social resilience 
No geographic focus 
(International, national) 
Presents a set of indicators of vulnerability and 
capacity to adapt to climate variability, and by 
extension climate change, derived using an 
empirical analysis of data aggregated at the 
national level on a decadal timescale. Analysis 
based on a conceptual framework in which risk 
is viewed in terms of outcome, and is a function 
of physically defined climate hazards and 
socially constructed vulnerability 
Brooks et al. 
2005 
Social resilience and 
vulnerability 
Gabsara union, district of 
Tangail, Jamuna chars, 
Jamuna River, 
Bangladesh 
(watershed; community) 
Details the crisis-response strategies developed 
among the 2 million people living on the Jamuna 
chars in Bangladesh, focusing on response to 
flood and risk management measures among 
char-dwellers 
Colding et 
al. 2003 
Vulnerability and risk 
framework 
No geographic focus 
(International, national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Highlights new insights into the 
conceptualization of the vulnerability of social-
environmental systems including vulnerability 
reduction—including concerns of equity and 
social justice. Synthesizes current literature with 
an outline of core assessment components and 
key questions for future research 
Eakin and 
Lynd Luers 
2006 
Socio-economic, 
political, and 
institutional 
vulnerability 
Eastern Nile Basin 
(watershed, basin; 
provincial, national, 
international) 
Provides a framework for assessing vulnerability 
of water systems. Using a list of 31 indicators, a 
vulnerability assessment was identified and 
categorized to separate hydro-physical 
indicators from other indicators of socio-
economic or political nature 
Hamouda et 
al. 2009 
Social and 
institutional resilience 
and security 
Mekong River Basin 
(watershed, basin; 
community, provincial, 
national, regional, 
international) 
Research program including comparative 
studies such as C1-Fisheries: ensuring food 
security, C2-Floods: reducing the risks of 
disaster, C3-Irrigation: managing supply and 
demand, C4-Hydropower: meeting energy 
needs fairly and sustainably, C5 Watersheds: 
securing resilient livelihoods, C6 Water works: 
providing water for households and industry. 
Research Themes:T1-Dialogue: deliberation, 
diplomacy, and negotiation, T2-Social justice: 
gender, ethnicity, and class, T3-Knowledge: 
assessment, practice, and communication, and 
T4-Policies: integration, decentralization, and 
privatization 
M-POWER 
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Table 1.2e (Continued): Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social resilience and vulnerability (continued) 
Social resilience to 
water scarcity 
Eel and Russian Rivers, 
Northern California, 
USA 
(watershed; regional) 
Focuses attention on the processes and relations 
that create social resilience analyzing how 
community resilience to the stress of water 
scarcity is influenced by historically contingent 
mechanisms to gain, control, and maintain access 
to water 
Langridge et 
al. 2006 
Social-ecological 
resilience from basin-
level indicators 
Yangtze River Basin, 
China 
(basin; national) 
Set of indicators is proposed for the purpose of 
making an effective decision within an ecosystem-
based approach to river basin management. The 
index is intended to represent the ecosystem 
vulnerability and resilience to pressures and 
threats caused by human intervention within the 
specific river basin 
Nakamura 
2006 
Multi-sited resilience 
framework  for 
adaptation and 
innovation 
Ghana, Africa  
(international, national, 
community) 
Examines the mutual construction of “local” and 
“global” notions and practices of resilience 
through multi-sited processes in response to 
severe flooding in 2007 
Olwig 2012 
Vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity 
conceptual 
framework 
No geographic focus 
(provincial, community) 
Reviews the concept of adaptation of human 
communities to global changes, especially climate 
change, in the context of adaptive capacity, 
exposure, and vulnerability. It focuses on 
scholarship that contributes to practical 
implementation of adaptations at the community 
scale 
Smit and 
Wandel 
2006 
Vulnerability 
framework 
development for 
social-environmental 
systems 
No geographic focus 
(international, national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Provides vulnerability framework for the 
assessment of coupled human–environment 
systems is presented including not only exposure 
to hazards (perturbations and stresses) but also 
sensitivity and resilience of the system 
emphasizing linkages between the human and 
environmental systems and across nested scales 
Turner II et 
al. 2003 
Vulnerability, natural 
hazards, and risk 
Africa, Bangladesh, 
China, Cuba, Fiji, 
Guatemala, India, 
Ireland, Japan, 
Mozambique, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Philippines 
(basin: international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community 
A book that defines vulnerability in the context of 
national disasters and sudden shocks, and 
explores what constitutes risk, vulnerability, and 
the characteristics of natural disasters 
Wisner et 
al. 2004 
Social-ecological resilience 
Network resilience of 
social-ecological 
systems 
Goulburn Broken 
Catchment, Murray-
Darling Basin, Australia 
(watershed, basin; 
regional, provincial) 
Proposes a network perspective for social-
ecological systems that enables us to better focus 
on the structure of interactions between 
identifiable components of the system 
Janssen et 
al. 2006 
Social-ecological 
institutional resilience  
San Pedro Basin, 
Arizona, USA 
(basin; regional) 
Analyzed how the collaborative development 
process of a decision-support system (DSS) model 
can effectively contribute to increasing the 
resilience of regional social–ecological systems 
Serrat-
Capdevila et 
al. 2009 
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Table 1.2f (Continued): Selected Studies using Resilience Theory on Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social-ecological resilience (continued) 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive 
management 
Everglades, Southern 
Florida, USA 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Develops a heuristic model to provide a 
framework for discussing resilience in the 
Everglades – in the freshwater marshes and in 
Florida Bay. It also discusses some management 
implications for ecosystem resilience (adaptive 
management) 
Gunderson 
and Walters 
2002 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive 
management 
Fiji, Australia, Indonesia, 
Caribbean, Kenyan Indian 
Ocean, Maldives, 
Mombasa, East Africa 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Introduces basic aspects of reef ecology and 
discusses the conditions that lead to 
characteristics of both resilience and non-
resilience of ecological structures, functions, 
and management of them at different scales 
McClanahan 
et al. 2002 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive capacity 
Ibiraquera Lagoon, 
Imbituba Municipality, 
Santa Catarina State, 
(southern) Brazil 
(catchment, watershed; 
community, provincial, 
national) 
A very detailed and thorough study of social-
ecological resilience combining the common-
property approach. Identifies key factors that 
build (and threaten) social-ecological resilience 
in resource management. Catalogs drastic 
changes (flips) in the system at the local, 
provincial, and national scales 
Seixas and 
Berkes 2003 
Socio-economic 
resilience 
Way Besai watershed, 
Lampung Province, 
Indonesia 
(watershed; community) 
Reviews the relationship between poverty and 
environmental services using surveys and socio-
economic indicators of inequality and social 
capital 
Suyanto et 
al. 2007 
System resilience for 
water resources 
None. Example of 
rainwater tank use 
(municipal; community) 
Looks at resilience as a response to crossing 
thresholds, recovery from disturbances, and 
adaptive capacity 
Wang and 
Blackmore 
2009 
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1.3.  DISSERTATION METHODOLOGY 
 
Figure 1.2: Dissertation Flow. The graphic shows how the dissertation addresses the questions of basin 
resilience across scales and development in the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. It gives a schematic of 
the Social-Ecological System (SES) model used to assess basin resilience in the Mekong and shows how 
basin resilience is evaluated across scales. It illustrates the relationship among feedbacks, thresholds, 
adaptive capacity, and social and ecological entities. It shows how Collaborative Learning and conflict 
management is used in the Mekong Basin. Finally it illustrates how resilience is compared against 
development in the Mekong and Columbia Basins. 
In  this  dissertation  I  use  a  multi-scalar  methodology  to  address  key  research  questions.  First,  in  the 
Introduction, partly addressing research question (1), I make the case for the research based on the need 
to understand complex river basin behavior, the challenges facing the Mekong Basin, and the similarities 
to development on the Columbia Basin. I provide a review of geographic and systems thought relating to 
freshwater ecosystems in part to address why I use systems theory in the dissertation. Of particular 
importance is how systems theory addresses non-linear behavior, scale, and the links between conflict 
and resilience. For these reasons, systems theory and a resilience framework is used throughout the 
dissertation.  Importantly,  I define  vulnerability  and  resilience  making  distinctions  between  ecological, 
institutional, and basin resilience. In Chapter 2, a systems model is created for the Mekong Basin.  28 
 
Chapter 2, or Part A, formulates a systems model for the Mekong River Basin using a Social-Ecological 
Systems (SES) model. The purpose of this chapter is to define and construct a model for the Mekong 
Basin, characterize its primary components, and finally assessing resilience of the basin. This chapter 
addresses research questions (1), (2a), and (2b) by applying a method to calculate resilience of the entire 
basin system while also addressing resilience at multiple scales. The method starts by addressing basin 
stressors. It then characterizes the basin as complex system and links resilience, scale and conflict. In 
order to calculate resilience for the entire basin, a matrix of indicators is assembled. This involves first 
assessing threshold behavior in the basin from both ecological and social elements of the basin. Critical 
thresholds identified and discussed based on data and institutional responses. Next, model for the basin is 
constructed identifying the specific elements of the basin SES. Next, an inventory of basin feedbacks is 
constructing  effectively  linking  basin  elements  to  each  other.  The  feedbacks  become  the  primary 
descriptor for the resilience assessment. Next, vulnerability of the basin at the district and provincial level 
is evaluated using data and studies commissioned by the Mekong River Commission, including impact 
assessments of hydropower projects planned for the basin. The final piece of the matrix is the adaptive 
capacity data completed by assessing each country’s adaptive response. The matrix is then assembled by 
feedback, linking feedback mechanisms, thresholds, variable speed, issues area, stressors, vulnerability, 
and adaptive capacity. Limitations for the data and methods used are addressed. An aggregated resilience 
value is then assigned to each feedback providing a multi-scalar methodology for assessing resilience at 
the provincial, country, and basin levels.  
Chapter 3, or Part B, addresses the research question (3) of how to build resilience across scales in the 
Mekong Basin. First, resilience at the regional scale is assessed in the context of Conflict Prevention and 
Management  (CPM)  by  first  critically  reviewing  the  ecosystem  protections  in  the  current  Mekong 
Agreement followed by reviewing cooperative activities towards conflict prevention. This is followed by a 
comprehensive  review  of  the  Conflict  Prevention  and  Management  strategy  at  the  MRC.  Second, 
addressing conflicts at the district and provincial scale, a Collaborative Learning (CP) process pilot study is 
designed  for  two  specific  conflicts  in  the  basin:  bank  erosion  in  the  Chiang  Rai/Bokeo  region  and 
transboundary issues in wetlands between Cambodia (Stung Treng) and Lao PDR (Campassak). Limitations 
for the data and methods used are addressed. The chapter addresses resilience at the regional, provincial, 
and district scales by applying CPM and CP processes in the Mekong Basin.  
Chapter 4, or Part C, addresses research questions (4a) and (4b) on how a resilience framework can be 
used to compare the impact of development on river basin resilience on the Mekong and Columbia River 
Basins. First, the chapter compares the physical characteristics of each basin, the effect of development 
on  physical  basin  performance,  and  calculates  and  compares  the  rate  of  development  (planned  and 
completed) in each basin. Second, the chapter uses conflict and cooperation data to trend and compare 29 
 
water management among international partners in each basin. Trends and the percentage of negative, 
or conflictive, events are analyzed including the effect of Tribal Nations in the Columbia Basin. Issue areas 
of  each  basin  are  also  compared  in  a  pre  and  post-development  context.  In  the  final  section,  the 
institutional responses are analyzed for mainstream dam development in the Mekong and the Columbia 
River Treaty in the Columbia Basin. The three pieces are threaded together and compared in terms of 
basin resilience. Limitations for the data and methods used are addressed. The resilience framework 
employed  is  assessed  as  a  tool  for  basin  comparisons  followed  by  an  evaluation  of  the  effects  of 
development on basin resilience.  
Chapter  5  pulls  together  findings  from  the  previous  chapters  and  discusses  the  findings  against  the 
original research questions for the dissertation. Conclusions are made based on the findings from the 
dissertation and the implications for basin resilience assessments and scale, enhancing basin resilience, 
basin comparisons, and the effects of basin development on resilience are given. 
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2.  CHAPTER 2: RESILIENCE AND SCALE ON THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN: 
MODELING THE MEKONG AS A SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Mekong Basin has long been described an example of a resilient watershed, an example of how river 
basin organizations should operate in the presence of conflict (Browder 2000; Jacobs 1995; Le-Huu and 
Nguyen-Duc 2003; Stefano 2010; Wolf 2009). These assertions are based on half-truths. Over time the 
Mekong basin in general, and the Mekong Basin Committee and Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 
particular, have remained as resilience institutions primarily due to the fact that they have persisted for 
over  50 years  (Nguyen 1999).  However, the  past  is not  like  the  future,  and  the basin  is  now  facing 
unprecedented development pressure, environmental, social, and political stress (UNEP et al. 2006). 
The MRC has the responsibility to sustainably manage develop the basin and a new regime of water 
resource development is threatening to unravel the recent history of friendly  relations in the region 
(Käkkönen 2008; Kirby et al. 2008; Kummu et al. 2008; Liebman 2005; Schmeier 2011; UNEP et al. 2006). 
Development has begun in the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB), or Lancang, where China has already built 
four  dams  with  plans  for  many  more.  Not  part  of  the  Mekong  River  Commission  (MRC),  China  is 
developing the Lancang to power its industrial centers in the east. Meanwhile, intensive development in 
the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam has begun. The total number 
of  mainstream  dams  on  the  upper  and  lower  Mekong  River  could  exceed  20  by  the  year  2030  and 
including dams on tributaries and other mainstream projects projected, there could be over 100 dams 
installed in the basin by 2030 (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
It is because of this remarkable stress, in addition to the normal pressures facing river basins, that a new 
and thorough characterization of basin resilience is needed (Costanza et al. 2011; Grumbine et al. 2012; 
Walker et al. 2009). Moreover, resilience is increasingly being utilized to understand and characterize 
large river basins (Cumming et al. 2012; Kirby et al. 2010). It is even getting the attention of the public as 
the threat of environmental collapse reaches the mainstream media (BBC 2011).  
In Chapter 1, and referring back to Figure 1.2, I presented a review of resilience meanings and definitions 
used  throughout  this  dissertation.  In  Chapter  2,  or  Part  A  in  Figure 1.2,  I  derive  and  apply  a  social-
ecological systems model to analyze resilience on the Mekong River Basin. It first lays out the rationale for 
such as approach followed by articulating a definition of systematic basin resilience. The methodology is 
then described followed by a description of stressors facing the basin. In the next section, the model is 
developed taking note of how scale is built inherently into social-ecological systems theory. In this case, I 
choose a model specifically to address multi and cross-scalar variables. Characterization of thresholds 42 
 
comes next followed by a review of literature on SESs and models for complex systems.  In the next 
section, I develop the SES model for the Mekong Basin followed by a multi-scalar accounting of non-linear 
feedbacks in the system. Next, I analyze a vulnerability assessment sponsored by the MRC based on 
intensive water resource development and proposed hydropower projects at the District and Provincial 
scales and incorporate it into the context of basin resilience. Following the section on vulnerability, I 
determine and incorporate adaptive capacity at the national and regional levels into the model. Finally, I 
develop a matrix of thresholds, stressors, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity, linked by feedback and 
utilized to evaluate basin resilience of the Mekong. The questions below are revisited in the final section 
on findings and conclusions.  
2.2.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this chapter, referring back to Part A Figure 1.2, I incorporate a systems approach to evaluate basin 
resilience. In particular, I address the following research questions: 
(2a)  Is a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model an appropriate tool to evaluate basin 
resilience? 
(2b)  Is the Mekong Basin resilient?  
(2c)  Is the basin resilient at some scales and not others? 
2.2.1.  Hypothesis 
The default hypothesis is that the Mekong River Basin is a resilient system. This assumption is based on 
the perception and evidence that the regional institution, the MRC, that has the mandate to manage 
development in the basin, has functioned and survived through several challenges, and is thus a resilient 
institution. The purpose of this chapter is to challenge that assumption. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
  The basin is dysfunctional (non-resilient) at some scales while remaining functional 
(resilient) in others, reducing basin resilience of the entire system. 
It is assumed that not all “lack of resilience” occurs at small scales. In some cases, this may be the case. 
Some conflicts, a consequence of lack of resilience, are manifested as a natural consequence of decisions 
made or actions taken to allocate water resources, not directly a result of reduced resiliency. Another 
assumption is that given no major development pressure (dams) on the basin, the system would be 
resilient,  or  stay  the  same as  it  is  before  dams  are  built.  This  would  mean  the  basin  could become 
vulnerable, or not resilient, due to outside stressors alone, i.e., climate change, population growth, etc. In 
addition, there is a general perception that resilience and vulnerability are inversely proportional. In some 
instances may be true, but systems can have both resilience and vulnerability. This is discussed later. 
However, lack or absence of capacity at specific scales affecting essential functions in the face of emerging 43 
 
and present stressors, can fail to adequately absorb persistent stress in the basin. In other words, can 
weak parts of the system cause the entire system to fail or lose resilience?  
2.3.  METHODOLOGY 
Step  1  in  this  chapter  (Figure  2.1)  is  to  model  the  Mekong  Basin.  I  apply  a  model  framework  that 
characterizes  threshold  behavior  and  non-linear  feedbacks.  Recently  a  number  of  models  have  been 
applied to complex freshwater systems outlined in Table 2.7 (Anderies et al. 2004; Carpenter et al. 2001; 
Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Nelson et al. 2007; Plummer and Armitage 2007; Hamouda et al. 2009; Cifdaloz 
et al. 2010). In this paper, I build a model framework that includes resources, resource users, public 
infrastructure providers, and the public infrastructure, stressors, fundamentally connected by feedbacks. 
A list of feedbacks is compiled and organized into functional groups. Within each group, feedbacks are 
connected to a basin management function, i.e., the MRC, national line agency, or village group.  
Referring back to Part A in Figure 1.2, Chapter 2 models the Mekong Basin as an SES and provides a 
method to determine basin resilience. In this paper, first I create a SES model for the Mekong Basin, 
second, characterize the components the model, third link and utilize model components to calculate a 
resilience score, and finally evaluate the resilience scores across multiple scales, if possible. 
 
Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 Methodology. This paper applies a SES to the Mekong Basin by characterizing 
thresholds, feedbacks, vulnerability and adaptive capacity to assess overall resilience in the basin. 
In  Step  2,  I  analyze  characteristics  needed  for  the  basin  model  include  stressors,  thresholds,  and 
feedbacks.  Stressors  of  the  Mekong  Basin  are  analyzed  and  put  into  the  context  of  rapid  basin 44 
 
development. A majority of the data comes from the Mekong River Commission (MRC) which coordinates 
overall basin planning and publishes regular updates on basin health and performance. Data is also taken 
from  other  regional  organizations  such  as  the  Asian  Development  Bank  and  World  Bank.  Threshold 
behavior is addressed in Section 2.6 by analyzing both ecological and social-political behavior using case 
studies that contain specific basin responses to stress. The emphasis in the threshold analysis is not to list 
specific  threshold  indicators,  a  significant  and  important  task,  but  to  identify  general  and  significant 
threshold behavior manifested in the basin and their relationships to feedback mechanisms used in the 
model.  
As  part  of  Step  2  (Figure  2.1),  I  utilize  data  collected  from  a  multi-scalar  vulnerability  assessment 
commissioned by the MRC from 2009 to 2010 in addition to resilience data collected at the provincial 
scale (see Figure 2.2 below). I adapt a vulnerability framework from the MRC’s vulnerability pilot study to 
input  into  the  basin  resilience  assessment.  I  use  the  vulnerability  analysis  to  identify  the  weak  or 
vulnerable parts of the Mekong Basin system, not to determine whether or not the Mekong Basin System 
is vulnerable as a whole. Going back to the definition of basin resilience – the extent to which a system is 
able  to  absorb  and  withstand  shocks  and  stresses  –  the  vulnerability  analysis  is  utilized  to  identify 
elemental or structural weaknesses in the system at sub-basin scales. 
The  MRC  project  collected  data  at  the  community  and  District  level  by  an  international  team 
commissioned by the MRC to conduct a Social Impact and Vulnerability Assessment (SIMVA) from 2009 to 
2010. In each country, teams interviewed 340 randomly selected households, spread across 17 randomly 
selected villages (20 interviews per village, 68 villages in total). The interviews were carried out using a 
highly structured questionnaire. All 1,360 interviews were conducted within 15 km of the Mekong and its 
dependent wetlands. The study sites were, from north to south, as follows: Chiang Saen and Udon Thani 
in Thailand; Champasak in Lao PDR; Pursat and Siem Reap in the Tonle Sap area of Cambodia and the 
freshwater zone of the Mekong Delta in Viet Nam (Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC 2010b). The study was 
completed in part to provide livelihood and vulnerability data input into the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) prepared by International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM) and the MRC 
in 2010 in addition to developing a baseline of parameters for long-term monitoring (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
Note the MRC’s vulnerability assessment contains three dimensions:  (1) resilience, (2) sensitivity, and (3) 
exposure.  The  definition  of  resilience  used  for  the  MRC’s  vulnerability  assessment  varies  from  my 
definition of basin resilience. Within the MRC’s vulnerability framework, resilience is measured as in social 
terms at the community level, i.e., household data (see Figure 2.2). Assessments used for social resilience 
are data collected on poverty, food security, health, nutrition, education, income security, and access to 
basic services such as water and sanitation. This data is aggregated at community and district levels. 45 
 
Sensitivity  is  defined  as  how  vulnerable  groups  are  to  changes  in  livelihood,  resources,  or  external 
stressors and shocks. Data included in the sensitivity indicators include percent of income from fishing, 
percent of households dependent on fishing for livelihoods, proximity to the river which in this study is 
referred to as a corridor, and the population affect either by living the basin, corridor, or inundation zone.  
 
Figure 2.2: Vulnerability Framework for the Mekong Basin System. Source: Adapted from SIMVA Pilot 
Study. Vulnerability across multiple scales is assessed by combining exposure, sensitivity, provincial and 
community resilience into an integrated framework.  
Exposure is related to the effect of water resource development on the system – dams, irrigation projects, 
and infrastructure. Data is drawn from impact analysis conducted by ICEM and the MRC in addition to 
other expert studies.  
I have added an additional scale to the MRC’s analysis in Figure 2.2. To determine provincial resilience, I 
aggregate data at the provincial scale. In this dataset, I include 14 provincial indicators, such as population 
density, growth rate, percent employment for women, etc., into an average provincial resilience score. 
These  parameters  are  lumped  into  an  average  provincial  resilience  score  (1=LOW,  4=HIGH)  using 
quartiles. This data has the advantage of showing province to province resilience while also accounting for 
site specific location of dams. An analysis of provincial resilience by dam location in completed in Section 
2.8. Full provincial data including a list of indicators are given in Table 6.4 in Appendix C. The selection of 46 
 
parameters was harmonized with the MRC’s vulnerability framework and previous work by Hamouda 
(2009), Brooks, Adger, and Kelly (2005), and the framework presented by the Stockholm Institute (Brooks 
et al. 2005; Hamouda et al. 2009; Kemp-Benedict et al. 2005).  
In final part of Step 2 (Figure 2.1), I evaluate adaptive capacity of each feedback by country. In resilient 
complex systems each feedback in the basin structure has multiple functions. There may be one or more 
socially constructed institutions responsible for creating or maintaining these feedbacks. In this section, 
the  institutional  response,  or  adaptive  capacity  to  feedbacks,  particularly  those  at  risk  of  crossing 
thresholds or particularly vulnerable, are analyzed and linked to specific feedbacks and thresholds (Table 
2.23 Section 2.10). In dealing with management of natural resources, adaptive capacity relates to the 
management  capacity  that  secures  the  capacity  of  ecosystems  to  sustain  societal  development  and 
progress with essential ecosystem services (Berkes et al. 2003). Therefore, to enable successful ecosystem 
management  for  social-ecological  sustainability,  the  definition  for  adaptive  capacity  used  in  this 
dissertation is: 
“The institutional capacity to respond to environmental feedbacks, learn and store 
understanding, and adapt to change thereby enhancing self-organization” (Armitage 
and Plummer 2010; Berkes et al. 2003).  
There are many methods to evaluate adaptive capacity. Wolf’s (2007) analysis included five principles for 
institutional capacity of international institutions included flexibility, adaptable management structure, 
and conflict resolution mechanisms, among others (Wolf 2007, 3.19). Berks et al. (2003) recommend a 
more  learning-centered  approach  emphasizing  change  and  uncertainty,  diversity  and  reorganization, 
multiple  types  of  learning  and  knowledge,  and  self-organization  (Berkes  et  al.  2003,  355).  Other 
approaches  take  a  more  administrative  approach  advocating  polycentric  governance  in  water 
management  (Cosens  2010;  Huitema  et  al.  2009).  In  particular,  Cosens  (2010)  emphasizes  multiple 
overlapping  levels  of  governance,  horizontal  and  vertical  decision-making  control,  meaningful  public 
participation, local capacity building, and authority to respond or adapt to changes (Cosens 2010, 256). 
Huitema et al. (2009) also emphasizes the importance of funding of river basin organizations. 
I use a distillation of the aforementioned studies to evaluate adaptive capacity of the Mekong Basin. The 
three general criteria are: 
1)  Flexibility 
2)  Self-organization and Learning (SOL) 
3)  Capital. 
To evaluate (1) Flexibility, I graded key national water resource planning documents for evidence of a) 
overlapping responsibility of resource providers, b) cross-scale institutions and c) learning activities from 47 
 
crises or conflict management processes. For (2) Self-organization and Learning (SOL), I look for evidence 
of  social  memory,  in  particular  a)  support  for  Watershed  Management  (WSM),  and  evidence  of  b) 
Collaborative Learning processes or Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). Finally for (3) Capital, I look for 
a) evidence of national financial support for programs related to the particular Issue area, b) the presence 
of planning documents, and c) outside funding support. Criteria are shown below in Table 2.1. Full Tables 
of the Adaptive Capacity data are given in Appendix D (Berkes et al. 2003; Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 1990; 
Gunderson et al. 1995; Folk 2006).  
Table 2.1: Adaptive Capacity Framework. The table gives the framework used to evaluate adaptive 
capacity at national and regional scales. 
Framework  Adaptive Capacity  1=LOW  2=MED  3=HIGH 
Flexibility 
Overlapping 
responsibility 
1 agency  2 agencies  More than 2 agencies 
Cross-scale 
institutions 
State control  Some local  Vertically integrated 
Learning from crises  Little evidence  Ad-hoc conflict mgmt. 
Conflict mgmt. 
programs 
Self-
Organization 
& Learning 
Support for WSM  Little evidence  Occasional support  WSM programs 
Evidence of CPs or 
MSPs 
Little evidence  Occasional support  CP or MSP programs 
Capital 
Rolling plans to 
support 
Little evidence  Occasional support 
Annual funding 
program 
Planning documents 
Weak, lumped 
plans 
Draft, some law & 
plans, weak 
enforcement 
Operational (laws, 
plans, enforcement) 
Outside support  Little evidence  Occasional support  Annual funding 
 
2.3.1.  Basin Resilience 
In Step 3 in this chapter (Figure 2.1), I link the basin system characteristics, vulnerability, and adaptive 
capacity assessments into one matrix shown Figure 2.3. A complex system such as a river basin depends 
on the structure of its components and their relationships. The matrix, using feedbacks as the primary 
row  from  Table  2.10,  each  component  in  the  system  is  given  a  score  (Figure  2.3).  The  scores  are 
aggregated by feedback, or row in the matrix, for the entire basin and data is analyzed by SES element 
depicted in Figure 2.16. Data is aggregated by threshold level, variable speed, national vulnerability, and 
national and regional adaptive capacity. Full tables are found in Appendix E.  
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Figure 2.3: Basin Resilience Framework. Basin resilience is evaluated from a SES model and basin system 
characteristics.  
 
2.3.2.  Data Sources 
Data used in this study come from a variety of sources, some at the basin and international scale, some 
from national datasets, and others from field studies. The vulnerability pilot study was conducted by a 
mixture  of  consultants  commissioned  by  the  MRC  with  support  from  the  NMCs,  line  agencies,  and 
international organizations. The scale and sources of data is given in Table 2.2 below. The data used in this 
dissertation are tested for statistical significance and all conclusions are statistically significant to 99.5 
percent (α<0.05) except where otherwise noted.  
   49 
 
Table 2.2: Data Scales and Sources.  
Scale  Uses  Sources 
International 
 
Basin 
Conflict/Cooperation 
Basin vulnerability 
Poverty indicators 
Progress on MDGs 
 
UNDP Data Portal http://hdr.undp.org/en/, 2011 
World Bank Data Bank http://databank.worldbank.org, 2011 
MRC State of the Basin Reports , 2003 & 2010 
FAO Datasets (AQUASTAT, FAOSTAT, TERRASTAT) faostat.fao.org, 2011 
ADB Social Atlas of the Lower Mekong Basin, 2003 
ADB Statistical Dataset sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp, 2011 
 
National 
Provincial 
 
Sub-Basin  
Watershed 
Spatial variation; 
Migrations; 
Social vulnerability; 
Provincial resilience; 
Development Impacts; 
Dependence on fishing 
 
MRC Report Hydrology of the Mekong Basin, 2005 
UNEP Report Mekong River GIWA Regional assessment 55, 2007 
Statistical Yearbook of Cambodia, 2008 
Laos PDR Poverty Atlas population, Population and Housing Census, 2005 
Social-Economic Assessment of Freshwater Fisheries Cambodia, 1998 
Consumption Study by MRC, 2007 
ADB Social Atlas of the Lower Mekong Basin, 2003 
NMC Sector Reviews (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam), 2005 
 
District 
Village 
 
Watershed 
Catchment 
Spatial proximity; 
Reliance on fishing; 
Exposure 
Social vulnerability 
Development impacts 
Sensitivity and 
dependence 
Social resilience 
Dependence on fishing 
Adaptive capacity 
 
HH Livelihood and Vulnerability Surveys (SIMVA Pilot study) 2008-2010 
Living Expenditure and Consumption Survey (LECS4), Laos PDR, 2008 
Fisheries Sector Reviews, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Thailand, MRC 
2008 
Capture fisheries and Aquaculture in the Mekong Delta MRC, 2008 
Socio-economics of Songkhram River Basin, Thailand MRC, 2008 
Luang Prabang Fisheries Survey, AMFC/MRC Vientiane, 2000 
Consumption Study by MRC, 2007 (reviews fisheries surveys, 1992-2008)   
NMC Sector Reviews (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam), 2005 
Sub-Area Reports by NMCs and MRC, 2005 
Poverty Studies (WB, ADB, REACH, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, MRC), 1998-2009 
Population and Housing Census (LPHC), Laos PDR, 2005 
Living Standards surveys (VHLSS) Viet Nam, 2004 
Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES), 2004 
Household Living Standard Survey (LHLSS),Laos PDR, 2006 
Thailand Household Socio-Economic Survey (TSES), Thailand, 2000 
Comp Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment by (CFSVA) 2005 (WFP) 
 
 
2.4.  STRESSORS TO THE MEKONG BASIN SYSTEM (MBS) 
Economies in the Lower Mekong Basin are catching up with other developed countries in Southeast Asia. 
Thailand’s economy, the strongest in the basin, has leveled off in 2008 since the economic crash while 
economies in Cambodia, Laos PDR, and Vie Nam are continuing to grow steadily (Figure 2.4a). These 
countries continue to see steady growth in gross national incomes and in the export and  goods and 
services while accounting for some slowdown in international demand for goods (Figure 2.4b).  50 
 
    
Figure 2.4: (a) GDP per Capita in Current US Dollars for LMB Countries. (b) Exports of Goods and Services 
from LMB Countries. Source: World Bank Database 2011. Trends indicate increasing economic growth in 
the Lower Mekong Basin. Thailand stands out as having the highest GDP per capita among countries in the 
LMB.  
As Thailand and Viet Nam diversify their developing economies away from relying on agricultural goods to 
manufacturing and services, and as standards of living increase, their energy needs grow. Thailand in 
particular, receives less than 10 percent of its energy from hydropower relying on fossil fuels and natural 
gas (MRC 2010; Work Bank DB 2011). And while Thailand and Viet Nam both have the lowest population 
growth rates in the region, at just 0.8 and 1.2 percent (0.8, 1.2%), they also have the largest populations in 
the  LMB  at  63.9  and  87.4  million,  respectively
4 (MRC 2010, 32). As both populations  transition  into 
developed economies, their energy needs couple d with large unexploited natural resources in Lao  PDR 
and Viet Nam are make hydropower an attractive industry for both Lao PDR and Viet Nam.  
2.4.1.  Energy Pressure 
The Mekong region has experienced a high rate of growth expanding by 8 percent (8%) annually from 
1993 to 2005. Demand for power is predicted to continue to grow at 6-7 percent (6-7%) annually up to 
2025 as Lao PDR and Cambodia continue to develop and Thailand and Viet Nam diversify their economies 
(ADB 2009d).  
To meet these demands, regional leaders have recognized the massive natural resource potential in the 
region particularly in Lao PDR and the Vietnamese Highlands. The four LMB countries of Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam have a combined estimated national hydropower potential of 50,000-65,000 
MW, of which 30,000 MW is available in the LMB. If the upstream Lancang cascade in Yunnan Province is 
                                                                 
4 Population figures are from 2007.  51 
 
included, the hydropower potential is 53,000 MW. The region, or Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), has 
somewhere between 175,000-250,000 MW technically feasible hydropower potential (ICEM/MRC 2010, 
11).  
Energy demand is a burgeoning question in the Lower Mekong Basin. Figures from national planning 
documents differ substantially from assessments by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). National power 
demand forecasts indicate peak demand to be over 130,300 MW by 2025 and national energy demand to 
be 820,458 GWh per year for the four LMB countries (see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: National power demand forecasts by 2025. Source: ICEM/MRC 2010 
Energy Demands
5  Cambodia  Lao PDR  Thailand  Viet Nam 
Total 
Regional 
Peak Demand (MW)  2,401  2,696  53,824  72,445  130,366 
National Energy Demand (GWh/yr)  14,302  16,060  339,479  450,618  820,458 
LMB mainstream dams Mean 
Annual Energy (GWh/yr) 
19,740  46,054  --  --  65,794 
Percent contribution of LMB 
mainstream hydropower to 
national demand* 
13.8%  28.7%  11.6%  4.4%  8.3% 
Percent contribution of LMB 
mainstream hydropower to peak 
demand 
        11.3% 
 
Given  Thailand  and  Viet  Nam  represent  96  percent  (96%)  of  the  power  demand  in  the  region, 
considerable attention is being given to their forecasts. ADB’s forecast for Viet Nam’s power demand is 
roughly half of government estimates. To put these discrepancies in perspective, this offset is equal to 
over 3.5 times the power potential for all 12 mainstream dams being planned for the Mekong (ICEM/MRC 
2010; MRC 2010).  
Other significant drivers for hydropower development are energy growth rates for Thailand and Viet Nam. 
Thailand expects to more than double its demand in 15 years; Viet Nam will nearly quadruple its power 
needs in the same period. While Cambodia’s energy needs are modest in comparison with Thailand and 
Viet Nam, its primary energy source is diesel and it is expensive. It could be said that Cambodia is energy 
insecure over the next 10 years with less than half of its energy needs being met by national sector 
planning. Lao PDR has the greatest potential for hydropower and a significant need for income to fund 
                                                                 
5 It is assumed that 90% of mainstream hydropower will be exported to Thailand and Viet Nam and 10% will be used 
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electrical infrastructure and poverty reduction programs. While improving its electrification coverage by 
some 40-50 percent (40-50%) over the last decade, it has to go much further to match Thailand and Viet 
Nam that claim 95 and 85 percent (95, 85%) coverage, respectively (ICEM/MRC 2010, 47). 
An argument could be made that other sources of power production exist and that hydropower, while a 
“green” energy source, a term being used less and less with respect to hydropower, is a viable option. In 
fact Thailand plans to use up to 20 percent (20%) renewable energy by 2022 and build a number of 
nuclear facilities, as does Viet Nam. Thailand’s natural gas reserves are limited and at best and estimates 
are they will expire within 15 years. Thailand has relatively few options to grow the energy sector other 
than demand-side management of which Thailand has already begun to implement saving just under 10 
percent (10%) peak energy use (World Bank DB 2011). 
For Lao PDR and Cambodia it is about income and energy security, respectively. Lao PDR expects to earn 
over US$ 2 billion per year by 2030 if all its hydropower plans are implemented. That is about 10 percent 
(10%) of the country’s gross domestic product. Fortunately, the economy in Laos only slowed slightly in 
2009 due to the global recession, bouncing back to 7.5 percent (7.5%) growth in 2010 due mainly to 
investments in mining and hydropower development.  
The  energy  situation  for  the  Mekong  Basin  countries  is  complex  however,  a  few  salient  points  are 
summarized to capture the essence of the current debate. First, energy poverty is widespread throughout 
the Basin. There is an overdependence on traditional sources of energy (e.g. fuel wood), 20 percent (20%) 
of the GMS population, over 74 million, has no access to electricity, and energy consumption in the GMS 
is only 67 percent (67%) of the world average for developing countries (ADB 2009b). Second, energy 
vulnerability is high and increasing. From 1993 to 2005, there has been eight percent (8%) annual growth 
in energy consumption. Over 21 percent (21%) of total energy consumed in the region is imported, and 
volatile energy prices and limited alternative energy sources, except for Lao PDR, mean the region is 
vulnerable to future energy security (MRC 2010). Third, but less of a driver for development, is the use of 
contentious hydropower energy sources. Energy productivity policy in Southeast Asia is such that energy 
supplies are low and unpredictable – there is a general low quality of energy supply. There is a lack of 
competitive  pressure  on  energy  suppliers  and  policy  regimes  are  insufficient  to  address  emerging 
challenges (ADB 2009b; ICEM/MRC 2010; MRC 2010). 
Having said that, if the mainstream dams are not built, Thailand and Viet Nam would not be appreciably 
harmed, but Cambodia and Lao PDR would lose out. Thai and Vietnamese energy prices would not be 
affected much in terms of total energy portfolio, Cambodia might have to import coal, and Lao PDR would 
have  to  forego  income  from  exports  only  in  later  years  of  Build  Own  Operate  and  Transfer  (BOOT) 53 
 
projects (ADB 2009e, 2010; ICEM/MRC 2010). While energy needs are potential stressors to the basin, 
poverty and underdevelopment have been and continue to undermine resilience in the basin.  
2.4.2.  Poverty 
Poverty in Southeast Asia has been steadily declining over the past ten years even though some countries 
are  still  struggling  to  cope  with  rural  unemployment,  low  incomes,  and  wage  growth  (UNDP  2006). 
Thailand has clearly made the most progress in human development, moving from a Human Development 
Index (HDI) of 0.5 in the 1980s to nearly 0.7 currently (see Figure 2.5). Thailand is actually showing greater 
human  development  than  other  East  Asian  countries  in  the  region  such  as  Hong  Kong,  Singapore, 
Malaysia, and more recently, China.  
Viet Nam’s HDI is on the rise and is quickly approaching the regional HDI average whereas Lao PDR and 
Viet Nam still lag behind approaching 0.5 some 30 years behind Thailand (Figure 2.5). There are also 
encouraging signs in all four LMB countries as poverty levels are declining across the region. Figures 2.6 
and 2.7 show trends for Millennium Goals (MDGs) relating to poverty and access to water, respectively. 
While the trends are downward, poverty is still a problem in Cambodia and Lao PDR with levels still above 
20 to 40 percent (20, 40%), respectively. Wage growth is also still an issue in Cambodia and Lao PDR 
compared to Thailand and Viet Nam, leaving nearly half of the employed populations in Cambodia and 
Lao PDR living below US$ 1 per day (Figure 2.6a, b).  
Although progress is being made on the Millennium Goals, poverty is still very high in selected provincial 
areas. Three provinces in Cambodia (Kratie, Prey Veng, Siem Reap), four provinces in Lao PDR (Huaphanh, 
Oudomxay, Phongsaly, Xaysomboun SR), one province in Thailand (Yasothon), and four provinces in Viet 
Nam (Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Lai Chau, Quang Tri) have poverty rates exceeding 50 percent (50%) incidence, 
with the highest nearly 100 percent (100%). For more poverty data, refer to Section 2.8 on vulnerability, 
provincial resilience tables in Appendix C, and Table 2.2 for data sources.
6 
                                                                 
6 Data comes from the baseline vulnerability data collected by the MRC sourced from selected poverty reports from 
the WB, ADB, REACH, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, and MRC, 1998-2009. See Table 2.2. 54 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Human Development Index (HDI). Data source: UNDP Database accessed April 2011. Cambodia 
and Lao PDR have the lowest HDI in the LMB, followed by Viet Nam in the middle, and Thailand at the top. 
With respect MDG7 dealing with water access and  sanitation, Thailand  is clearly ahead of the other 
riparian countries with nearly 100 percent (100%) access in both areas and Viet Nam approaching 95 
percent (95%). Cambodia and Lao PDR, are lagging behind at just over 50 percent (50%)
7 of the population 
using improved water sources and having access to sanitation facilities in rural areas (M RC 2010; UNDP 
database 2011).
8  
The gaps widen when comparing rural to urban areas. Both Cambodia and Lao PDR report only 20 percent 
(20%) of the rural populations with access to safe water and sanitation facilities, while urban areas report 
over 80 percent (80%). This gap is closing in Thailand and Viet Nam, at only 5 -10 percent (5-10%) and 40 
percent (40%), respectively. So while overall progress is being made to close the poverty gap with respect 
to income and water access, there are still enormous chall enges to equity across rural and urban areas 
particularly in Cambodia and Lao PDR (Baseline MRC data, Section 2.8).  
 
                                                                 
7 MRC’s State of the Basin compiled in 2010 puts the figures for Cambodia and Lao PDR at 65 and 60%, respectively, 
for safe drinking water, and 28 and 56% for access to sanitation.  
8 Rural data was used as a ‘worst case’ scenario. 55 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Millennium Development Goals: a) MDG 1.1 and b) MDG 1.6. The graphs show decreasing trends on poverty in the LMB. Data sources: 
World Bank, International Labor Organization. 
 
Figure 2.7: Millennium Development Goals: a) MDG 7.8c and b) MDG 7.9c. Figures show increasing trends on water availability and sanitation in the 
LMB. Data sources: United Nations Children's Fund. 56 
 
2.4.3.  Climate Change 
Changes in runoff and precipitation in the Mekong Basin due to global and regional climate change are 
beginning to manifest themselves in wet and dry seasons. Most forecasts predict increased precipitation 
for wet season followed by decreases for the dry seasons. The MRC’s report on climate change for the 
LMB indicates at 0.79°C increase in regional temperature with greater increases in the northern reaches 
of the basin. The wet season is due to receive a 15.3 percent (15.3%) increase in precipitation followed by 
dry season increases in rainfall predominately in northern areas and decreases in dry season in southern 
catchments (MRC 2009; Eastham et al. 2008).  
The  predictions  translate  to  a  21  percent  (21%)  increase  in  annual  runoff  for  the  Mekong  Basin, 
potentially  easing  water  stress  in  the  dry  season  in  most  catchments,  except  for  selected  areas  of 
Northeast  Thailand  (Isaan)  and  pockets  of  the  Tonle  Sap  in  Cambodia.  Results  might  lead  some  to 
conclude that climate change will be a benefit to the region. However, due to greater intensity of rainfall, 
also predicted in the assessment, there is greater risk of floods and crop damage thereby impacting food 
security particularly in the Lower Mekong Basin. Increased flooding could lead to greater fish production 
particularly in the Tonle Sap and other fish production areas of the river. However, the construction of 
dams along the mainstream and tributaries could offset these gains (MRC 2009; Eastham et al. 2008).  
2.4.4.  Population Growth and Environmental Degradation 
Population growth in the Lower Mekong Basin is slowing in Thailand and Viet Nam at about one percent 
annually and remains near two percent in Cambodia and Lao PDR. The population of the basin grew from 
55 million in 2003 to 60 million in 2010, approximately a 1.3 percent (1.3%) increase annually, which if 
remains constant would lead to a population of 100 million by 2050 placing tremendous pressure on the 
environment and freshwater ecosystems in the Mekong region (MRC 2010; UNDP 2011). Figures from 
FAO indicate that nearly 80 percent (80%) of land in LMB countries is degraded, over 50 percent (50%) in 
Thailand and Viet Nam severely degraded from population pressure (see Figure 2.8). These figures are 
nearly four to five times higher than the regional average and are due to a number of factors in addition 
to water resource development (Binh et al 2004; MRC 2010a; UNEP et al. 2006). See Appendix B for the 
complete data. Figure 2.8 below shows the sources of degradation of land in the Lower Mekong Basin.  
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Figure 2.8 Degradation of Land in the Lower Mekong Basin Countries: Data source FAO TERRASTAT 
Database (2003). The most developed countries, Thailand and Viet Nam, also have the highest percentage 
of land degradation in the LMB.  
2.5.  THE MEKONG BASIN AS COMPLEX SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM 
One of the objectives of this research is to understand the impact of scale on basin resilience. In order to 
do  that  effectively,  a  model  to  analyze  the  basin  has  to  address  multi-scalar  processes.  Attempts  to 
determine resiliency in the past have focused only on one or more parts of the system most dealing with 
institutional or management principles (Hanna 2008; Kilot et al. 2001; Kistin and Ashton 2008; Raadgever 
et al. 2008). Most of these studies fail to capture the multi-scalar and non-linear characteristics of river 
basins. 
In this dissertation, a Social-Ecological System (SES) model is chosen to address multi-scalar processes. 
SESs  are  often  complex  and  non-linear,  largely  interconnected,  and  exhibit  an  array  of  feedback 
mechanisms.  They  often  organize  around  one  or  more  equilibrium  states,  or  attractors,  and  given  a 
certain amount of change, breach thresholds and change state, transform, or “flip” to a new domain of 
operation (Abel et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2007). Scale is an important factor in the behavior in complex 
systems as specific spatial scales, for example at the local, national, or regional level in river basins, exhibit 
different feedback and threshold behavior. Another important aspect of complex basin systems is self-
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organization,  which  is  commonly  enabled  through  feedback  mechanisms  embedded  in  the  social-
ecological  system  (Berkes  et  al.,  2003).  Feedbacks  have  functional  manifestations  that  characterize 
complex systems and can often represent different scales functional diversity (Holling, 1973). Overlapping 
functional groups, or groups providing the same services, enhance system resilience thereby absorbing 
greater disturbances. These essential characteristics of complex systems are addressed and applied to the 
Mekong Basin system in this section. 
2.5.1.  Complex Social-Ecological Systems 
The world is uneven and constantly changing in unpredictable ways. Unpredictable systems are inherently 
complex,  but  not  infinitely  complex  so  as  to  make  them  impossible  to  understand.  Social-ecological 
systems are non-linear and interconnected (Berkes et al. 2003) and can exhibit asymmetry (Norberg and 
Cumming  2008).  Asymmetry  in  the  spatial  sense  is  co-determinant  with  non-linearity  in  functional 
relationships. Many complex systems express non-linear functions at various temporal and spatial scales. 
Within  each  scale,  the  sub-system  can  possess  inherent  thresholds  that  can  be  modeled  by 
approximations  within  that  particular  domain.  For  example,  a  capture  fishery  in  the  Tonle  Sap  in 
Cambodia has thresholds that can only be modeled within the context of freshwater ecosystem and social 
behavior in the Tonle Sap system.  
However,  several  sub-systems  with  cross-scale  interactions  can  create  multiple  equilibrium  states,  or 
attractors, as seen in Figure 2.9. Capture losses in the Tonle Sap in one particular year can force fishers to 
relocate upstream affecting other systems possibly having adverse effects on fish yields in future years. 
Exceeding thresholds can cause interconnected systems to “flip” from one stage to another (Berkes et al. 
2003; Folke et al. 2004). Given that both social and ecological systems are complex and unpredictable, 
linking them presents difficulties in modeling their behavior and social-ecosystem management. 
 
Figure 2.9: Multiple States of Attraction of Complex Systems. Adapted from Resilience Alliance 2007. 
Multiple states of attraction can interact with variable speed.  
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An additional complexity is added when social-ecological systems experience conflict such as large basin 
systems.  These  systems  are  inherently  complex  because  they  contain  a  multitude  interdependent 
characteristics and dimensions. They often have numerous parties and roles, multiple issues, complex 
boundaries,  scientific  uncertainty,  various  power  asymmetry,  various  joint  interests,  and  widespread 
negative perceptions (Table 2.4).  
Table 2.4: Complex Environmental Multi-Scalar Conflict in a Social-Ecological Basin System. 
Issue 
MEKONG CASE STUDY 
Transboundary Management of Wetlands between 
Cambodia and Lao PDR 
(Stung Treng – Champassak) 
Multiple parties 
Local communities dependent on wetland resources at Stung Treng and Champassak, 
Governments of Lao PDR and Cambodia, LNMC, CNMC, IUCN, MRCS 
Multiples issues 
• Illegal and destructive harvesting activities 
• Increased pressure on wetlands due to increasing human population  
• Threat to dolphins 
• Change in flow and hydrological patterns from the upper stream 
Cultural 
differences 
Communities along the borders of Cambodia (Stung Treng) and Lao PDR (Champassak) heavily 
utilize and depend on wetland products from this area for both subsistence and income. This 
conflicts with predominant Western values to preserve wetlands (Stung Treng province has a 
Ramsar site, No 999) and the involvement of conservation groups (ICLARM, now World Fish 
Center (2002-2003), Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Program (MWPB) (2004-2006), and WWF. 
Deeply held 
values 
The major feature of the Stung Treng - Siphandon is the presence of a unique type of open and 
flooded forest growing on the sandy islands within the Mekong River channel.  The area contains 
a unique habitat – deep pools for (freshwater) animals and fish at critical stages. As a result, 
communities from both Cambodia and Lao PDR have become heavily dependent on wetland 
products for their subsistence. 
Scientific and 
traditional 
knowledge 
Lessons learned from the “wetland approach” project indicated that heavy dependency of local 
communities of both Cambodia and Lao PDR on wetlands may lead to transboundary conflicts, if 
not managed well. Started early 2002, MRC initiated consultation processes at provincial, 
national and regional levels to provide a forum for exchange of important lessons learned on 
wetlands management in dealing with trans-boundary wetlands management issues. 
Legal 
requirements 
Local – Lao and Cambodian traditions; National - LNMRC, CNMC, Lao PDR, Cambodia; Regional - 
MRCS, MWPB; International - IUCN, ICLARM, WWF 
Conflict industry 
Not an immediate factor. Historical conflict in region has securitized some landholdings and 
associated fishing rights. 
 
In  addition  they  usually  have  a  long,  protracted  history,  changing  set  of  actors,  public  opinion, 
institutionalization of solutions, and new regimes and rules (Faure and Rubin, 1993; Lang, 1991; Daniels 
and  Walker,  2001).  Daniels  and  Walker  (2001)  identify  seven  sources  of  environmental  conflict 
complexity: multiple parties, multiple issues, cultural differences, deeply held values and worldviews, 
scientific  and  traditional  knowledge,  legal  requirements,  and  “conflict  industry”  (Daniels  and  Walker, 60 
 
2001: 41-46). These characteristics, like ecological systems, express themselves across multiple scales. An 
example of a complex environmental conflict in the Mekong Basin is presented in Table 2.4. 
2.5.2.  Linking Resilience, Conflict, and Scale 
As discussed earlier, scale is an important characteristic of social-ecological systems such as large river 
basins. The number of interacting spatial scales complicate governance and management functions of 
river basin organizations who need to make trade-offs among several competing interests. Linking human 
and natural complex systems is difficult enough at the same scale. Researchers have recognized the need 
for multi-scalar approaches to management of basin systems for some time evidenced by the rise of river 
basin organizations as primary governance units (Chenoweth et al. 2001; Giordano et al. 2002; Sneddon et 
al. 2002; Trottier 2001). Often conflict arises over the lack of communication or interconnections between 
scales,  such  as  the  case  in  the  Nam  Phong  watershed  northeast  Thailand  over  water  management 
(Sneddon et al. 2002, Sneddon 2002). Sneddon is critical of watershed management as a primary political 
unit.  Likewise,  Cumming  et  al.  (2006)  researched  scale  mismatches  in  Arizona  and  southeastern 
Zimbabwe  and  determined  that  when  social-ecological  systems  are  disrupted,  mismatches  between 
ecological processes and management institutions are largely blame thereby decreasing social-ecological 
resilience (Cumming et al. 2006).  
Table 2.5 lists published works that link conflict and scale with resilience in social-ecological systems. In 
addition  to  the  inherent  characteristics  of  social-ecological  systems,  disturbances  that  act  on  these 
systems also have multi-scalar effects. Over a hundreds dams are planned on tributaries in the Mekong 
Basin with the potential of significant impacts on ecosystem thresholds. The effects of these changes are 
still  unknown.  Critical  thresholds  that  govern  the  health  and  behavior  of  tributary  and  mainstream 
functions are significantly affected by hydropower development. Threshold behavior is addressed in the 
next section.  
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Table 2.5: Selected Studies on Resilience, Scale, and Conflict. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Resilience, conflict, and scale in social-ecological systems 
Social-ecological and 
institutional 
resilience and scale 
South Eastern Zimbabwe, 
Africa; Salt River Valley, 
Arizona, USA 
(watershed, basin; 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Investigates scale mismatches when the social-
ecological system is disrupted. Mismatches 
between the scales of ecological processes and 
the institutions that are responsible for 
managing them can contribute to a decrease in 
social-ecological resilience, including the 
mismanagement of natural resources and a 
decrease in social resilience 
Cumming et 
al. 2006 
Adaptive capacity, 
social-ecological 
resilience 
Se San River Basin, Viet 
Nam and Cambodia 
(watershed, basin; 
international, national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Ninety indigenous communities along the Se San 
River in two provinces of north-eastern 
Cambodia have been impacted severely by 
flooding and altered hydrological regime 
affecting fisheries and livelihoods. Paper looks at 
impacts of Yali Falls dam on local and 
downstream communities and the process of 
scaling up response from the community level to 
provincial, national and regional institutions, 
such as the MRCS. 
Hirsch and 
Wyatt 2004 
Socio-political and 
geographic 
governance 
Mekong Basin 
(catchment, watershed, 
basin; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Argues that benefits to understanding issues of 
scale from those of place and position. 
Illustrates with examples from the governance 
of water resources in the Mekong region, where 
key scientific information is limited to a few 
sources and actors’ interests fit along various 
spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, and other social 
scales 
Lebel et al. 
2005 
Socio-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive and 
institutional capacity 
Mekong Basin 
(catchment, watershed, 
and basin; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Outlines research goals to improve livelihood 
security, human and ecosystem health in the 
Mekong Region through democratizing water 
governance pursued through critical research 
and direct engagement with stakeholders 
involved in managing floods, irrigation, 
hydropower, watersheds, fisheries and urban 
water works at various scales 
Lebel et al. 
2010 
Socio-ecological 
resilience and 
management 
Nam Phong Basin, 
Northeast Thailand 
(watershed and basin; 
provincial, regional) 
Discusses geographic scale, social conflicts, and 
shifting socio-ecological contexts central to the 
prospects for and obstacles to co-management 
of river basins. The co-management and scale 
quandaries are presented in the Nam Phong 
basin and provide a useful example for similar 
efforts to construct viable management regimes 
at a basin scale 
Sneddon 
2002 
Multiple scale of 
conflicts in water 
systems 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the 
United States 
(basin; international) 
Study of multiple causes of conflicts over water 
sensitive to the complex interrelations in social-
ecological systems focused on analyzing 
conflicts over water and water-related 
resources; the complex character of 
environmental (or ecological) conflict, and 
questions of sustainability. 
Sneddon et 
al. 2002 
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Table 2.5 (Continued): Selected Studies on Resilience, Scale, and Conflict. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Resilience, conflict, and scale in social-ecological systems (continued) 
Institutional and 
security 
No geographic focus 
(basin; international, 
national, regional) 
A sectoral and security approach to conflict and 
cooperation on transboundary basins. Identifies 
four mechanisms that deeply affect water 
conflicts or their resolution: gender, 
territorialization, ethnicity, and uneven 
economic development. Mechanisms contribute 
to the creation of second-order water scarcity 
and the generation of water conflicts 
Trottier 
2001 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive capacity 
No geographic focus – 
worldwide 
(International, national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Account of ideas and propositions about 
resilience in social-ecological systems expanding 
understanding of how complex systems change 
and what determines their ability to absorb 
disturbances in either their ecological or their 
social domains. Based on 15 case studies. 
Walker et 
al. 2006 
Social and 
institutional 
resilience and 
vulnerability due to 
development 
Sesan River Basin, Viet 
Nam 
(watershed and basin, 
community, provincial, 
national; regional, 
international) 
Discusses the Yali Falls Dam project in the Sesan 
Basin in Viet Nam, a tributary of the Mekong. 
Failure to implement standard international 
planning processes and to follow due process in 
planning, construction and operation caused 
downstream transboundary harm before, 
during, and after building the dam. 
Wyatt and 
Baird 2007 
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2.6.  THRESHOLD BEHAVIOR 
Thresholds are an important characteristic of complex SESs and often determine how the system behaves 
with respect to external stressors (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Thresholds can be biophysical, social, 
economic, or political. Recently, more effort has been placed on connecting relationships between social, 
natural  ecosystems,  and  thresholds  –  particularly  the  management  of  threshold  behavior  in  natural 
ecosystems  in  different  bio-regions.  For  example,  Olsson  et  al.  (2006)  has  worked  in  Scandinavia, 
Morehouse et al. (2008) in the Southwestern United States, Walker et al. (2009) in in the Murray-Darling 
in  Australia,  Abel  et  al.  (2006)  in  Africa  and  Australia,  and  Gunderson  and  Holling  (2002)  in  Florida, 
Australia,  and  other  select  basins.  Table  2.6  reviews  literature  on  thresholds,  collapse,  and 
transformations in social-ecological systems across a range of geographies.  
The  following  sections  outline  specific  cases  demonstrating  the  significance  and  impact  of  threshold 
behavior on the Mekong Basin. The first section will analyze hydrological behavior of tributaries in the 3S 
region in the Mekong Basin to the mainstream. The second section looks at specific cases where tributary 
effects  (primarily  fisheries)  have  effects  on  mainstream  activities.  Case  studies  include  hydropower 
impacts on fisheries, the effect of Pak Mun dam on social agency in Thailand, the transboundary effects of 
Yali Falls dam downstream into Cambodia (in the 3S region), and fish mortality thresholds when passing 
dam structures. These cases demonstrate that changes to the tributaries and basin dynamics can have 
unintended and unpredictable consequences in other parts of the basin. Understanding these thresholds, 
their limits, and their potential impacts are critical when planning water resource development projects in 
a large complex river basin.  
2.6.1.  Hydrological Relationship between the 3S Region and the Mekong 
Mainstream 
The Mekong Basin includes a number of power tributaries that contribute significantly to its mean annual 
flow. The 3S region contains three of these catchments. Plans to exploit hydropower potential in this area 
combined with the negative effects of Yali Falls dam on the Sesan have prompted a closer look at the 
hydrology and policy implications of the area (Wyatt and Baird 2007).  
To understand the threshold effects of the 3S region on the mainstream, I determine the hydrologic 
characteristics of the 3S basins and estimate their contributions to the mainstream Mekong. How do the 
tributaries affect the mainstream during the wet and dry seasons, and how do they contribute relative to 
each other? What, if any, threshold behavior exists in the catchments and corresponding mainstream? 
What are the potential impacts on the mainstream Mekong and Tonle Sap system?  
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Table 2.6: Selected Studies on Thresholds, Collapse, and Transformations. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Thresholds, collapse, and transformations in social-ecological Systems 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
panarchy 
South East Lowveld (SEL) 
of Zimbabwe, and 
western New South 
Wales, Australia. 
(rangelands; provincial, 
regional, national) 
Tests the explanatory usefulness and policy 
relevance of panarchy theory in exploring 
processes of collapse and release and recovery 
in regional social-ecological systems (SESs) in 
Zimbabwe and Australia. Study found that 
political power, institutions, and multiple forms 
of capital, particularly broad forms of capital, 
were key to regional and national resilience 
during collapse and reorganization. 
Abel et al. 
2006 
Social-ecological 
resilience, adaptation, 
and panarchy 
Australia, Florida, and 
others 
(watershed, basin: 
international, national, 
regional, provincial) 
Introduces and describes the theory of collapse 
and renewal, or panarchy. Emphasizes cross-
scale interactions, self-organization, and 
transformations in human and natural systems 
Gunderson 
and Holling 
2002 
Socio-ecological 
resilience and 
transformability  
Colorado River Delta, 
Upper San Pedro River, 
Arizona and Mexico. 
(basin; international and 
regional) 
Concepts of socio-ecological resilience and 
transformability provide a foundation for 
examining interactions between society and 
nature, and between society and science in a 
region vulnerable to systemic changes with 
serious consequences for the environment and 
society 
Morehouse 
et al. 2008 
Social-ecological 
resilience of 
transformations 
Kristianstads Vattenrike, 
Sweden; Northern 
Highlands Lake District 
and Everglades, USA; 
Mae Nam Ping Basin, 
Thailand; Goulburn-
Broken Catchment, 
Basin, Australia 
(catchment, watershed, 
basin; community, 
provincial, national, 
regional) 
Addresses transformations of entire governance 
systems including government agencies. It 
investigates how actions have succeeded or 
failed to transform SESs into more desired 
configurations; in particular, it studies why some 
windows of opportunity generate dramatic 
change and others do not. It focuses on 
transformations within the social domain of the 
SESs that increase capacity to learn from, 
respond to, and manage environmental 
feedback from dynamic ecosystems 
Olsson et al. 
2006 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
thresholds 
No geographic focus 
(aquatic and terrestrial 
systems; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial) 
Introduces a thresholds database with a set of 
24 descriptors, including the variables along 
which they occur, the variables that change, and 
the factors that have driven the change. 
Examples range from conceptual models to 
empirical evidence. Examples are presented 
whether the threshold occurs in the ecological 
system, the social system, or both, and the 
direction of interactions between systems. 
Walker and 
Meyers 
2006 
Systems resilience, 
adaption, and 
transformability 
Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment, Murray-
Darling Basin, southeast 
Australia 
(watershed; provincial) 
Resilience-based approach by identifying main 
issues, drivers, and thresholds in the basin, 
generating recommendations for adaptive 
management 
Walker et 
al. 2009 
   65 
 
2.6.1.1.  Study Area 
The Sesan, Sre Pok, and Sekong River Basins, otherwise known as the 3S region, cover approximately 
78,650 km
2, take up 33 percent (33%) of total basin area in Cambodia, 29 percent (29%) in Lao PDR, and 
38 percent (38%) in Viet Nam (ADB 2006). The sources of the three rivers are in the Central Highlands of 
Viet Nam from where the Sekong flows through the Lao PDR before merging with the Sesan and Sre Pok. 
The Sesan and Sre Pok rivers flow from Viet Nam to Cambodia where the three rivers merge over a 
distance of about 40 km before the confluence with the main stem of the Mekong River at Stung Treng 
(see map in Figure 2.10). With a combined discharge of about 17 percent (17%) of the annual discharge of 
the Mekong (up to 475 km
3 in the wet season), managing the basins requires innovative arrangements 
that involve the three countries to ensure sustainable management of land and water resources and 
equitable benefit sharing (UNEP et al. 2006). This means gaining an intimate knowledge of the Basins’ 
contribution of flows to the mainstream Mekong River Basin. 
Viet Nam is increasing its development focus on the Central Highlands which are economically depressed 
and are an integral part of the 3S region. In Cambodia, population pressure in the central and western 
provinces in the Tonle Sap basin coupled with improving transport infrastructure in the eastern provinces 
is driving migration to the lower parts of the 3S basins. Lao PDR is also looking to develop Sekong basin 
water resources to contribute to economic development as Sekong Province is among the poorest in the 
Lao PDR (ADB 2006, LNMC 2004, VNMC 2003).  
Substantial potential exists in the 3S area for agriculture, forestry, hydropower, fisheries, ecotourism, and 
increased  processing  of  agriculture  and  forestry  products.  However,  the  potential  benefits  and 
contribution to reducing widespread poverty in the basins are lost when planning is carried out in narrow 
country-specific  or  sector-specific  contexts  and  without  adequate  consultation  with  stakeholders. 
Hydropower development is one example where planning has generally taken place as a strongly sector-
oriented  and  technology-driven  process  treating  the  rivers  as  hydraulic  systems  to  be  operated  for 
maximum  economic  benefits  with  little  consideration  of  the  need  for  upstream  management  of 
watersheds or of the downstream impacts on flow regimes (He et al., 2006). The result is unintended 
negative impacts on downstream communities (CNMC 2005). 
2.6.1.2.  Hydrologic Properties 
The Eastern Highlands cover the mountain ranges extending over eastern Lao PDR and central Viet Nam, 
spanning an area of approximately 300 km long and 50 km wide (Hirsch and Cheong 1996; MRC 1997).  
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Figure 2.10: 3S Region of the Mekong. All 3S tributaries drain into the mainstream Mekong at Stung Treng 
in Cambodia. Note: Yali Falls is one of the largest projects in the Sesan Basin. 
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The Highlands are the most heavily forested area of the entire MRB and rich in biodiversity. Rotational 
farming is the commonest crop production method practiced by a wide range of indigenous communities 
in this area (Evans 1992). 
The  upper  part  of  the  Highlands,  generally  of  high  relief,  has  a  high  potential  for  hydropower 
development  several  large  projects  are  already  underway  or  imminent  in  Lao  PDR  and  Vietnamese 
sections (Hirsch and Cheong 1996). The hydropower potential of the sub-basins in Viet Nam alone makes 
up for 18 percent (18%) of the total national capacity and 20 percent (20%) of the national electricity 
production (ADB 2006). Hydropower is the key strength of the region. However, the construction and 
operation of hydropower works also have downstream impacts. This is a major point of concern among 
upstream and downstream riparians (VNMC 2003). 
The runoff pattern closely follows the rainfall pattern but is slightly buffered by retardation of runoff by 
the  tropical  evergreen  rain  forests  in  the  mountains  and  recharge  and  runoff  from  substantial 
groundwater aquifers under extensive plateaus of basaltic volcanic rocks (ADB 2006). Recurrent flooding 
takes place during short periods late in the rainy season and is aggravated by intense rainfall and flash 
floods, when tropical cyclones from the South China Sea enter the basin at this time of the year (UNEP et 
al. 2006).  
The stability of hydrological systems and local climate is threatened by  degradation of critical upper 
catchments  due  to  deforestation  and  compounded  by  increased  cultivation  of  annual  crops  and 
abstraction  of  groundwater  for  irrigation  on  the  plateaus.  Deforestation  and  clearing  of  land  for 
permanent  cultivation  and  increased  cultivation  of  annual  crops  have  already  led  to  a  measurable 
increase in the frequency of flash floods in the upper catchments and there are indications of declining 
low flows during the dry season. Continued deforestation is likely to aggravate these trends and may 
eventually lead to soil erosion on a scale that will constitute a significant risk for rapid silting of reservoirs. 
(ADB 2006).  
2.6.1.3.  Flow Contributions 
The MRC estimates that 23 to 24 percent (23-24%) of mainstream Mekong annual flow occurs between 
Pakse and Kratie (i.e., from 3S basins). Figures from the ADB (2006) indicate that the contribution from 3S 
basins is approximately 17 percent (17%). However, this figure is controversial. The MRC (2008) maintains 
that the 3S region contributes over 20 percent (20%) of the flow at Kratie, whereas Toda et al. (2004) 
report that the percentage is less than 20 percent (20%). Toda’s figures indicate the 10-year contributions 
of Se Kong and Sesan basins are 6.9 and 13.9 percent (6.9, 13.9%), respectively (Toda et al. 2004). These 
are  significant  contributions  to  the  Mekong  mainstream  but  vary  due  to  the  monsoonal  seasonal 68 
 
variation. The seasonal variation is displayed in the hydrographs of the region, showing the extreme 
variability between the dry and rainy seasons (MRC 2008). 
The hydrographs indicate a large variation from the wet and dry seasons – a familiar trait of the Mekong 
River Basin. For the Se Kong sub-basin, the daily discharges (cubic meters per second, cumecs) range from 
less than 150 cumecs in the dry season to 4000 cumecs in the monsoon season, an increase of 2600 
percent (2600%). The Se San and Sre Pok basins, maintaining dry season low-flows of approximately 100 
cumecs similar as the Se Kong, all also exhibit large monsoonal daily floods on the order of 800 and 3300 
cumecs, respectively, an increase of 800 and 3300 percent, respectively (MRC 2008).  
2.6.1.4.  Hydraulic Data 
The data was collected from the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and daily mean discharges were used 
to compute the monthly hydrographs. Basin areas were collected from several ADB (2006) and MRC 
(2008). Catchment contributions were calculated using specific runoff figures – taken from averaged daily 
flow data and monthly averaged mainstream runoff aggregated at Kratie. While there were conflicting 
data from the sources used, all efforts were made to rely on data from the MRC – the most reliable source 
of flow data available.  
The  approach  used  to  determine  if  threshold  behavior  exists  was  to  analyze  the  relative  flow 
contributions of the 3S basins, calculate their relative impacts, and determine their dry and wet season 
contributions. An effort was also made to determine the threshold behavior of catchments in the 3S 
region by comparing normal runoff behavior (1926-2004) to a flood year (2000). 
2.6.1.5.  Threshold Behavior 
There is ample evidence of Sesan, Sre Pok, and Sekong effects on Mekong mainstream flow. Clearly 20 to 
24  percent  (20-24%)  contribution  is  a  significant  addition  to  mainstream  flow  however,  does  this 
proportion persist throughout the season, and if so, how does it turn on and off? Do the basins act 
together as a similar unit, or are they independent? 
Looking more closely, the runoff data shows some interesting features. In the year 2000, results showed 
over two-times the average flood volume (considered a flood year) and the specific discharge of the 3S 
basins show exceptional contributions from both the Se Kong and Sre Pok sub-basins. In flood years, the 
Se Kong turns on early in the wet season (April or May) while the Sre Pok rises in September towards the 
end of the wet season.  
Interestingly, the mainstream only begins to respond when the runoff response of the Se Kong exceeds 
1000 mm, in the case of the 2000 year, in May to June (Figure 2.11a). This suggests a threshold response 69 
 
from the Se Kong to the mainstream. It is unlikely that the Mekong would otherwise peak systematically 
in May or June as this is still the dry season. While storm precipitation data was not available, it is likely 
that the multiple peaks in the hydrograph response correspond to dry season storms. This is not the case 
for the mean annual runoff response.  
Basin contribution comparisons 
During the mean annual runoff response, the threshold response from Se Kong basin is significantly less at 
200 mm (Figure 2.11b) and the Se Kong makes up much of the flow contribution at Kratie, almost 4 
percent (4%) (Figure 2.11d). The Sre Pok and Sesan basins only contribute 1 to 2 percent (1-2%) of flow to 
the mainstream during the wet season. This would suggest that during normal years, i.e., non-flood years, 
basins in the 3S region particularly the Se Kong and Sre Pok basins activate at roughly the same time in 
April. Under these conditions, the threshold to activate the Mekong at Kratie is four to five times less than 
during flood years.  
This finding has significant impacts on the contribution of the 3S basins on total Mekong flow at Kratie. As 
discussed earlier, figures for 3S contributions range from 16 to 22 percent (16-22%). However, Figure 
2.11c and d tell a different story. During flood years, the Se Kong basin can contribute up to 28 percent 
(28%) alone. This compares with a seven percent (7%) annual mean contribution during the same month 
in May (Figures 2.11c and d). The Se Kong contributes 1.5 to 2 times to mainstream runoff compared to 
Sre Pok contributions during flood years, and 3 to 4 times as much as the Sesan during flood and normal 
years.  
Wet and dry season contributions 
Also of interest is the contribution of flow during wet and dry seasons. From the data collected at the 
MRC the combined contribution of flows in the dry season are two-times the wet season. This data 
disagrees with Toda et al. (2004). Their figures indicate that the relative contribution stays the same for 
both wet and dry seasons, averaged over the decade 1991to 2001. Data compiled from the MRC suggests 
that the dry/wet ratio of tributary contributions from the Se Kong, Sre Pok, and Sesan basins is 1.27, 2.61, 
and 2.63, respectively. The importance dry season contributions of the Sre Pok and Sesan basins are 
apparent along with the overall contributions of the Se Kong. The data suggests that runoff generation for 
the 3S region in the dry season exceeds the wet season by a factor of two to one.  
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(c)  (d) 
(b)  (a) 
Figure 2.11: (a) Runoff response of 3S Basin for Flood Year 2000
 and (b) Annual Mean Discharge. Annual mean discharges taken from 1926-
2004 from MRC data. (c) 3S year 2000 flow contribution to the Mekong mainstream at Kratie and (d) annual mean flow contribution to Mekong 
mainstream at Kratie. Data source MRC. The Se Kong tributary demonstrates threshold hydrological behavior by “turning on” the Mekong 
mainstream in flood years. 71 
 
The  figures  suggest  the  Se  Kong  Basin  exhibits  threshold  behavior  –  effectively  “turning  on”  on  the 
Mekong mainstream at Kratie early in flood years and later in normal years when acting in concert with 
the Sre Pok and Sesan catchments. The data also suggests that the Se Kong basin is the largest contributor 
of the three catchments. This could have impacts on policy decisions made to develop hydropower in the 
region. Currently Viet Nam have plans to build over 30 dams in the Sesan basin alone. This is alarming due 
to the disastrous effects from the Yali Falls project built in 2000 (Wyatt and Baird, 2007).  
The data suggests that the Se Kong basin might be a better choice for development than the Sesan region. 
Its contributions to the mainstream of the Mekong at Kratie are larger than the Sre Pok and Sesan, and its 
ratio of dry/wet season is less than the others. Its hydropower potential is thus somewhat guaranteed 
year-round. Consistent runoff generation during the dry season may provide reliable hydropower benefits 
however, it could also alter the naturally functioning threshold behavior found in the catchments. 
Also important is the fact that the Se Kong turns on the mainstream in flood years. This is a benefit to the 
Tonle Sap system, driving return flows into the lake. If the hydrographs were regulated to levels below 
threshold behavior, the system could not function properly. During flood years the Se Kong contributes 
over 25 percent (25%) of monthly flow to the Mekong. Any reasonable development policy on tributaries 
in  the  3S  catchments  would  maximize  the  runoff  generation  prevent  excess  runoff  causing  harm 
downstream but also retraining the pulse functionality critical for fish migrations and spawning behavior. 
With the data that exists, preserving the natural functioning of the basin is paramount to maintaining the 
proper ecological functioning of the 3S tributaries and the Mekong mainstream and Tonle Sap. Over-
development  on  tributaries  is  certain  to  alter  hydrologic  threshold  behavior  creating  unexpected 
transboundary effects downstream potentially forcing the river into a new domain of operation.  
2.6.2.  Hydropower Development 
There are plans to build 12 mainstream and over 75 tributary projects on the Lower Mekong Basin (Figure 
2.12). There are obvious financial and energy benefits gained for pursuing hydropower development – 
US$ 3-4 billion per year by 2030 for the LMB if all projects are built. Lao PDR is expected to gain 70 
percent (70%) of the benefit (US$ 2.6 billion per year), 30 percent (30%) for Cambodia (US$ 1.2 billion per 
year in export revenues) and 11-12 percent (11-12%) for Thailand, and 5 percent (5%) for Viet Nam. The 
construction phase is expected to bring US$ 5 billion to Lao PDR and US$ 3 billion into Cambodia in jobs – 
however over 50 percent (50%) of skilled labor is expected to come from China and Viet Nam (ICEM/MRC 
2010, 52-56; MRC 2010). A list of planned mainstream dams and details is given in Appendix A. 
It is important to point out that the net benefit from export of power generation goes to developers and 
financiers during the first 25 years due to the Build Operative Own Transfer (BOOT) mechanism. After that 72 
 
period, ownership of the structures is transferred to the host countries where they stand to take 25-30 
percent (25-30%) of the gross revenues from the projects (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
There is also a risk of exploding government debt due to the financing of these projects, and if not 
managed properly, could lead to economic imbalance in the country resulting in currency devaluation as 
has been the case in other countries under huge development projects such as Turkey (MacQuarrie 2004). 
The distribution of costs and benefits due to the hydropower projects in the Mekong Basin are unequal. 
Benefits are mostly  gained  by  consumers  of  electricity  –  that  is  those  connected to  electricity grids, 
developers, financiers, and host governments. Costs on the other hand are paid by vulnerable riparian 
communities and some economic sectors such as fisheries and farmers. Some benefits are also unequally 
distributed between countries – Viet Nam and Cambodia will suffer short and medium-term losses due to 
the negative effects of hydropower development of fisheries and agriculture (ICEM/MRC 2010). At the 
time of this writing, the institutions required to implement benefit sharing mechanisms do not exist.  
2.6.2.1.  Development on the Lancang (Upper Mekong) 
The Upper Mekong Basin, or UMB, named the “Lancang” in China, was one of the last great undammed 
rivers in the world. This is no longer the case (Figure 2.12).  
A cascade of 8 to 14 Chinese dams is being planned and built in the Upper Mekong Basin. Officially, China 
has plans for eight hydropower projects on the UMB (Figure 2.12 and 2.13) although one of those, the 
Mengsong, has been put on hold indefinitely.
9 The Lancang cascade of  now seven dams has a potential 
installed capacity of 15,450 MW with an additional 7,550-13,480 MW upstream of Gongguogiao that has 
yet to be exploited (Dore and Yu 2004). 
The Mekong River Commission has carried out an extensive study into the impacts of hydropower 
development in the Mekong Basin, se parating the basin into six ecological regions as shown in Figure 
2.13. Zone 1 refers to the Chinese cascade of dams on the UMB or Lancang, Zone 2 the Upper Lao 
Cascade (ULC), Zone 3 the Middle Lao Projects (MLP), Zone 4 the Lower Lao Projects (LLP), Zone  5 the 
Cambodian projects, and Zone 6 the Mekong Delta – there are no projects planned for this zone.  
   
                                                                 
9 This decision, made during the Mekong Summit in Hua Hin 2010, may have been an effort to curry favor with 
downstream riparians Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Viet Nam after several years of negative publicity 
regarding China’s development policy.  73 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Hydropower Projects and Benefits Planned in the Mekong Basin. Source: ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Between 8 and 14 dams are planned for the Upper Mekong (Lancang) and nearly 100 dams for the Lower 
Basin. Lao PDR is the largest beneficiary of hydropower development. 
   74 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Ecological Zones and Hydraulic Cascade on the Mekong River. Map Source: Adapted from 
MRCS; ICEM/MRC 2010. Ecological zones characterize how the Mekong functions from wet to dry seaons. 
Dams will “flatten” the Mekong hydrograph. 
In Zone 1, due to the rapid elevation change and potential for reservoir storage, the Chinese dams have 
the  ability  to  store  water  in  the  wet  season  releasing  it  in  the  dry  season,  a  potential  benefit  for 
downstream  riparians.  The  potential  cost  of  this  is  the  augmentation  of  the  flow  regime  effectively 
“flattening” the hydrograph – attenuating flood pulses in the wet and transition seasons – pulses that are 
essential for the proper function of the Mekong ecosystem.  
It is important to point out that the MRC has included in its baseline development scenario six or eight 
(now 6 of 7) Chinese dams and 41 tributary projects as part of the definite future scenario for hydropower 
development by 2015. That means that any further development, including additional Chinese dams, 
mainstream dams LMB and additional tributary dams, are evaluated against the baseline of six Chinese 
and 41 tributary (47 dams) in 2015. This means that the baseline development scenario is not subject to 
decision-making authority and is essentially unchangeable course of action. The Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) and decision-making choices center on the additional 12 mainstream and 31 tributary 
dams and combinations thereof planned for the basin.  75 
 
2.6.2.2.  Development on Tributaries 
There are 77 new tributary projects being developed in the Mekong Basin. They are a large benefit to LMB 
countries even in absence of mainstream Mekong development. For Lao PDR, investments in tributary 
projects accounted for over 2.5 percent (2.5%) of national GDP in 2007, and this is expected to increase 
slightly until 2012 (ADB 2010). The baseline scenario accounts for 16 tributary projects as of the year 
2000. If all plans are implemented, 77 tributary hydropower projects would be operating by 2030 (MRC 
2008b). 
However, a number of hydropower development projects on tributaries have had adverse effects on 
surrounding populations. Pak Mun in Thailand, Yali Falls in Viet Nam, Theun-Hinboun and Nam Theun 2 
projects in Lao PDR, and Kamchay dam in Cambodia have all had substantial impacts on downstream 
riparians,  upstream  habitats,  and  loss  of  ecosystems  resilience  primarily  in  fisheries.  Tributary 
development is particularly at risk because most of the attention is focused on mainstream projects. 
Potential losses of 10-25 percent (10-25%) in fish product due to only tributary projects is sizeable and is 
largely due to the elimination of fish habitat on large tributaries in the 3S (Sre Pok, Sesan, and Se Kong 
River Basins) and upper Mekong regions in Lao PDR. It is well understood that the negative impact of 
dams on fish increase dramatically the further downstream the dam is located as the structure effectively 
cuts-off fish migration upstream of essential habitat used for spawning. While campaigners, the media, 
national governments, and the MRC are focused on preventing devastating effects of mainstream dams, 
projects on the tributaries are continuing and have the potential for drastic negative effects on fisheries, 
agriculture, and livelihoods, even if the mainstream projects are abandoned completely. 
The focus of the Mekong River Commission Secretariat over the last 10 years has been to study and report 
on the impact of hydropower development on the Lower Mekong Basin across a number of sectors. The 
results are discussed in the section on vulnerability.  
2.6.3.  Fisheries 
There Mekong is the world’s largest freshwater fishery providing nearly 20 percent (20%) of the world’s 
total freshwater fish yield (World Fish Center 2011). There are over 1,200 recorded species of fish found 
in the Mekong River with yields amounting to 2-3 million tons per year – or almost three percent (3%) of 
the total world capture of fish – valued at over US$ 2 billion dollars per year (Hortle 2007; World Fish 
Center 2011). Up to 80 percent (80%) of animal protein is derived from inland fisheries, some 47 percent 
(47%) in Thailand, 48 percent (48%) in Lao PDR, 59 percent (59%) in Viet Nam, and over 80 percent (80%) 
in  Cambodia  (Baran  2006;  Catch  and  Culture  2005;  Hortle  2007).  As  a  result,  food  security  is  very 
important  to  the  livelihoods  of  the  60  million  people  living  in  the  Mekong  Basin.  It  provides  food, 
employment, economic activity, and is a source of livelihoods for mainly the rural and poor. Of the 2-3 76 
 
million tons of food caught on the Mekong, nearly two-thirds are from natural water systems and a third 
from aquaculture (MRC-BDP 2002). 
Nearly every report written about the state of fisheries in the Mekong region expresses concern about the 
falling numbers of fish – particularly the indicative larger species (Baran 2006; Hortle 2007; MRC-BDP 
2002; Sokhem and Sunada 2006; Swerdrup-Jensen 2002). There is little agreement on how much will be 
affected historical numbers of fish. The ability to monitor fish consumption has improved dramatically in 
the last 10 to 15 years however, large gaps in the data still exist. Table 2.7 illustrates this clearly.  
Table 2.7: Summary of Fish Consumption Studies for the Mekong (not including FAOSTAT data). 
Year 
(Projected) 
Fish 
Consumption 
(tons/year) 
Source  Notes 
1970  492,000 
Netherlands Economic 
Institute 
Population 30 million, Intake 16.4 kg/cap/yr 
1973  460-511,000  Lagler (1976)   
1989-90  670,000 
Mekong Basin Fishery 
Sector Review (1992) 
Population 47.8 million, Intake 6.5-30 kg/cap/yr 
1980-90s  1,000,000  Jensen (1996)   
1999/2000  2,030,000 
Sverdrup-Jensen 2002 - 
MRC study 
Population 56.3 million, Intake 36 kg/cap/yr 
2000  >1,000,000  Jensen 2001  +200,000 tons/year for aquaculture 
2000  2,700,000 
Zalinge et al. 2004; ADB 
2005 
Population 55 million, Intake 55.6 kg/cap/yr; 
232,200 res, 259,200 aquaculture 
2003  2,500,000  Sokhem and Sunada 2006  Population 55 million, Intake 56 kg/cap/yr 
2007  2,600,000  Hortle 2007 – MRC study 
Population 56 million in 2000, Thailand 33%, 
Viet Nam 33%, Cambodia 25%, Lao PDR 20%. 
Average intake 34 kg/yr. Inland fish and OAAs 
provide 47-80% of animal protein. Review of 20 
past surveys 
2008  2,800,000  MRC State of Basin 2010 
2008 estimates – inland fish + OOA – 900,000 
est. for aquaculture 
2009  2,200,000  Hortle 2009 
Worth US$ 2.2–3.9 billion annually at first sale 
and between US$ 4.3 and US$ 7.8 billion on 
retail markets 
2050 
3,500,000-
4,700,000 
Sokhem and Sunada (2006)  Intake based on a 2005 estimate 
 
Data from Table 2.7 suggests that the consumptive intake on fisheries in the Mekong could reach 4 million 
tons by 2050, with the highest growth rates near the sensitive Tonle Sap and Mekong Delta regions. 
Sokhem and Sunada (2006) challenge the notion that the freshwater ecosystem can sustain this amount 
of growth (Sokehm and Sunada 2006). The feeling among most researchers is that there will be a declining 
available fish take – some believe it has already started to level off and recess (Sverdrup-Jensen 2002).  77 
 
Massive effort has been put into estimating the effects of dams on fisheries in the Mekong, in particular 
the potential loss of fish yield. Loss in fish yield is assumed also to be loss with respect to human nutrition, 
primarily  protein.  The  larger  the  river,  and  the  more  downstream  the  location  of  the  dam,  the  less 
potential there is for a reservoir fishery to compensate (in terms of yield) for losses sustained by the river 
fishery.  In  this  regard,  mitigation  emphasis  should  concentrate  on  surface  to  volume  ratios,  and 
temperature regimes for the reservoir (Dugan et al. 2010; Halls and Kshatriya 2009). 
There is a wealth of evidence that fisheries in the Mekong behave as a complex system. Many species of 
fish respond to variations of flow, temperature, and weather and are highly dependent on system triggers 
and thresholds, making it difficult to predictably model general fisheries behavior in the river system. 
Some 26 species are known to be triggered by thresholds or changes in discharge, water level or current 
(Baran 2006). The Tonle Sap Lake is particular vulnerable to flow changes as its depth and surface area 
changes  dramatically  with  flow  rate  and  volume  (Junk  et  al.  1989).  Figure  2.14  shows  that  a  large 
percentage of the fish consumed surrounds Tonle Sap Lake and is there highly susceptible to changes in 
the fragile freshwater ecosystem and to upstream development projects.  
2.6.3.1.  Impact on Fisheries 
Fisheries  and  agriculture  will  suffer  huge  losses  if  all  the  mainstream  and  tributary  projects  are 
implemented, with an estimated negative impact of US$ 476 million per year. Over half (54%) of river 
bank gardens will be lost valued at over US$ 25 million per year, combined with lost nutrient loading in 
the flood plains means losses in excess of US$ 50 million per year (ICEM/MRC 2010, 10-13). Gains in 
reservoir and irrigation development are expected to be worth US$ 14 million and US$ 15.5 million per 
year, respectively. It is thought that creation reservoir fisheries would produce up to 10 percent (10%) of 
lost capture fisheries, however this figure is disputed (ICEM/MRC 2010, 13-15; MRC 2010). 
The  potential impact  on  fisheries  cannot  be  over  overstated.  If  all  planned  hydropower  projects  are 
implemented, based on a year 2000 baseline scenario which includes 2.1 million tons of fish produced and 
16 dams on tributaries, a reduction of 26-41 percent (24-41%) of fish production is expected by 2030 if 12 
mainstream  dams  and  77  new  tributary  dams  are  built.  The  negative  impact  from  77  new  tributary 
projects alone is a 10-25 percent (10-25%) decline in fish production, compared to a 16 percent (16%) 
impact  from  mainstream  dams.  In  addition  Mekong  Basin  riparians  rely  on  fish  for  protein  intake 
particularly in Lao PDR and Cambodia. 78 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Consumption of Fish and OAAs in the Mekong Basin. Sources: GIS layers: MRC; Fisheries data: 
Hortle 2007. The highest yearly consumption of fish per capita (kg/cap/year) occurs surrounding the Tonle 
Sap Lake in Cambodia. Viet Nam consumes the largest total amount of fish (tons/year) per annum. 79 
 
It is estimated that up to 30 percent (30%) of protein intake from basin inhabitants are under threat due 
to hydropower projects with no effective replacement protein sources offered (ICEM/MRC 2010, 8-13; 
MRC 2010). Projected increases in rice productions due to irrigation development schemes do not offset 
impact losses and often irrigation plans are overstated resulting in a fraction of original plans realized. 
If all mainstream dams are built, 55 percent  (55%)  of the Mekong River will be converted to into a 
reservoir, losing 76 percent (76%) of rapids, 48 percent (48%) of deep pools, and 16 percent (16%) of sand 
bars. Estimates are that over 80 percent (80%) of migrations would be blocked if mainstream dams are 
built. Additionally, 550,000 to 880,000 million tons of fish yield will be lost if all mainstream and tributary 
dams are built. The presence of 77 new tributary dams by 2030 has the potential to block 37 percent 
(37%) of fish migration routes. In 2000, over 20 percent (20%) of the LMB was already barred due to the 
presence of 16 dams on tributaries. By 2015, this area will have increased by 14 percent (14%) to nearly 
34 percent (34%) . Without any mainstream dams, over a third of the Mekong Basin will be blocked from 
fish migrations due to tributary dams alone (ICEM/MRC 2010, 95-100).  
A group of fisheries experts have concluded that the Mekong Basin is headed for collapse by stating,  
“The dams currently planned for the Mekong will have a major impact on the fisheries of the 
basin. In particular, we concluded that the barriers created by the dams will disrupt 
upstream spawning migration of economically and biologically important species” (Dugan et 
al. 2011, 345). 
They  contend  that  migrating  species  contribute  to  40-70  percent  (40-70%)  of  fish  consumed  in  the 
Mekong. In addition, they stated that technology is not going to solve the problems of fish passage,  
“Our assessment concluded that existing mitigation technology in the form of fishways, locks 
and lifts cannot cope with the scale of fish migration on the Mekong mainstream, which 
involves over 50 species, many tens of millions of individuals, and biomass that is much 
greater than that found today in the rivers of Europe and North America” (Dugan et al. 2011, 
345). 
This was an important statement coming from a group of fish experts who have worked worldwide to 
preserve and mitigate the effects of dams on regional and global fish stocks.  
2.6.3.2.  Fish Mortality Due to Dams 
Another example of threshold behavior is the relationship between fish mortality, size, migration, turbine 
size, and dam height. The relationship is complex and is nicely modeled in a paper by Halls and Kshatriya 
commissioned by the MRC (Halls and Kshatriya 2009). Their findings indicate that small fish species (<50 
cm in length) experience relatively low downstream passage mortality rates of 2-15 percent (2-15%), or 80 
 
approximately 5 percent (5%), cumulatively. However, for fish species greater than 50 cm, the mortality 
rates are very high from 75 to 100 percent (75-100%). This represents a threshold based on fish size. As 
the fish size increases, fish begin to die rapidly when migrating past dams downstream. The study also 
indicates there are additional critical thresholds including migration patterns and fish exploitation (Halls 
and Kshatriya 2009, XX).  
For upstream survival rates of small fish, the study predicted that dams would need to pass at least 60 to 
87 percent (60-87%) of migrating adults of a single dam, and 80 to 95 percent (80-95%) in the case of two 
or  more  dams  to  maintain  a  viable  population  of  the  species.  This  is  a  tall  order  indeed.  They  also 
indicated that improving downstream passage would not improve these thresholds, rendering improved 
fish passage or bypass mechanisms ineffective (Halls and Kshatriya 2009, xxi).  
The predictions for upstream survival rates for large fish are daunting. They predict that large species of 
Mekong fish will disappear for species that are currently exploited (large catfish) even if downstream 
passage were improved to 75 percent (75%) or greater via passage facilities. They also indicate that for 
large  species  to  survive,  upstream  passage  would  have  to  near  100  percent  (100%)  with  perfect 
engineering solution in order to maintain current stocks, a solution that is highly unlikely in any event 
(Halls and Kshatriya 2009, xxii).  
Importantly the authors of this study make the point that even after 30 years spending US$ 7,000 million 
on the study of salmon passage in the Columbia River Basin in the Pacific Northwest, there is still only 
modest success if passing fish up and downstream even given the fact that pacific coast salmon and highly 
adaptive species and swim in the upper third of the water column. Additionally, Mekong fish may make 
several spawning migrations during their lifetime whereas salmon only make a single journey.  
2.6.3.3.  Pak Mun Dam 
The Pak Mun dam is located approximately 80 km downstream from Ubon Ratchathani at the confluence 
of the Mun and Mekong Rivers shown in Figure 2.15 below. The dam, approved in 1989, was constructed 
from 1990 to 1994 and is 17 meters high, 300 meters wide, and has eight spill gates to regulate flow 
(Foran and Manorom 2007).  
The initial EIA assessment completed in 1982 indicated that 4000 households would have to be displaced 
if the water levels were maintained at 113 Mean Sea Level (MSL). An alternative design with a normal 
water  level  of  108  MSL  was  agreed  upon  in  1985  minimizing  the  relocation  to  an  estimated  248 
households. The original project design was further modified by relocating the dam 1.5 km upstream to 
avoid the submergence of Kaeng Tana rapids, an important environmental and tourist site (Amornsakchai 
et al. 2000).  81 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Pak Mun and Yali Falls Projects on Mekong Tributaries and the 3S Region of the Lower 
Mekong Basin. The collapse of fisheries on the Mun River and adverse transboundary effects of Yali Falls 
dam on the Sesan River are examples of threshold behavior. 
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In 1990, EGAT, Thailand’s state electricity utility, applied for World Bank funding which was due a year 
later in 1991. However, 12,000 potentially affected villagers protested the loan the next year in 1992, 
drawing  unwanted  attention  to  a  newly  formed  Thai  government.  Despite  the  protests,  the  loan  is 
approved and work commenced on the project. The dam was completed in 1994 and a series of claims 
flooded the government for compensation for fisheries losses (Foran and Manorom 2007; Amornsakchai 
et al. 2000).  
The next five years were wrought with political upheaval, protests, and loss claims. In 2000, the World 
Commission on Dams released a report criticizing the dam’s performance and fish passage mechanism 
amidst  a  blockade  of  the  dam  by  villagers.  The  government  created  a  “neutral”  problem-solving 
committee and agreed to open the gates for four months as a trial period.  
Prior to 1994, 265 fish species were recorded in the Mun-Chi watershed and there had been no indication 
of decline pre-1990. Since 1994, only 96 species were recorded to be present upstream of Pak Mun dam, 
51 species were caught less significantly, and 50 species are thought to have disappeared altogether. 
Importantly,  fish  catches  directly  upstream  of  the  dam  declined  60-80  percent  (60-80%)  after  the 
completion  of  the  dam  (Amornsakchai  et  al.  2000).  In  addition,  the  fish  passage  facility  was  an 
afterthought and does not allow fish passage upstream.  
The loss of fisheries was directly measured in the loss of livelihoods. It is estimated that 50 to 100 percent 
(50-100%) of the fish catch up and downstream from the dam was lost, and the number of households 
dependence on fishing dropped from 96 to 67 percent (96-67%) including a loss of over 6,200 individuals 
engaged in fishing.  
However, not all declines are directly attributable to the presence of the dam. Deforestation, domestic 
waste  water  discharge,  agriculture  intensification  and  development,  fisheries,  industrial  waste  water 
discharge, saline soils and enforcement of water quality standards and classification are partly to blame 
for the declines losses (Foran and Manorom 2007; Amornsakchai et al. 2000).  
Clearly there was a biophysical threshold reached in fish stocks by building the dam. But there was also 
social and political thresholds observed in both Thai civil society and Thai politics, in addition to shifts in 
regional (and to some extent, international) water development norms. From 1988 to 2006 there were no 
less  than  seven  different  political  leaders  in  Thailand  (a  new  one  every  2.5  years)  including  two 
administrations ruled by military juntas. Local fishermen and civil society groups, largely formalized into 
the  Tai  Baan  research  group  in  2000,  a  community-based  research  network,  pressured  the  Thai 
government into opening the flood gates of the dam to monitor the fish catch. After initially asking for an 
11-month opening, the Thai government, then headed by Thaksin Shinawatra agreed to a four-month 83 
 
opening. And the case received national, regional, and indeed international attention, prompting the 
World Commission on Dams (WCD) adding Puk Mun as a case study, demonstrating the example of civil 
society stepping up to challenge decisions made by government and regional authorities to build large 
water resource projects that have adverse impacts on local and potentially regional livelihoods.  
2.6.3.4.  Yali Falls and 3S Dams 
The response to Yali Falls and other proposed 3S dams demonstrated not only biophysical threshold 
responses  but  importantly,  socio-political  thresholds  and  community  action  to  water  resource 
development and to the lack of response by national and regional actors. The location of Yali Falls dam is 
shown in Figure 2.15 above. 
As demonstrated earlier, tributaries have significant threshold effects the mainstream. Together, the Se 
San, Se Kong, and Sre Pok Basins contribute 20-25 percent (20-25%) of the mean flow volume of the 
Mekong mainstream at Kratie (see Figures 2.11a-d). The case of the Yali Falls Dam on the Sesan River, a 
tributary of the Mekong, is a case where a transboundary impact environmental assessment (EIA) was not 
carried out until it was too late and it was insufficient. And when it was, it was not shared with the 
Cambodians, who were directly downstream of the project. The EIA was funded by the Swiss government. 
Even though the project began in 1993 before the 1995 Agreement on the Mekong, it was under the 
watch of the Interim Mekong Committee and the hydrological impacts downstream were known in 1996 
before the project went into operation in 2000. As a result of the lack of notification and prevention of 
harm  downstream,  the  Yali  Falls  project  had  significant  and  large-scale  environmental,  social,  and 
economic impacts on riparian communities living in Viet Nam and Cambodia. Attempts at mitigation and 
compensation for harm done are still unsolved (Wyatt and Baird 2007). 
The Yali Falls project exposes another deficiency in the 1995 Agreement. The lack of EIA requirements in 
the  Notification  Procedure  puts  tributary  and  potentially  wet-season  mainstream  projects  in  direct 
conflict with Article 7 in the 1995 Agreement (Bruch et al. 2007). Wyatt and Baird (2007) summarized 
impact data collected from a number of NGOs. They indicate that over 55,000 people from 90 villages 
were adversely affected by the Yali Falls project due to unusual flooding events resulting in the loss of 
property,  crops,  livestock,  including  deaths.  Due  to  the  unusually  flows,  the  fishery  and  terrestrial 
ecosystems are declining, and reports indicate that larger species are declining at a faster rate. Villagers 
have reported that less fish are affecting their food sources. The causes of this are thought be increased 
sediment  load  and  turbidity  (Wyatt  and  Baird  2007).  Along  these  lines,  monthly  household  incomes 
dropped from US$ 109 in 1996 to US$ 46 in 1999, a 137 percent (137%) reduction in monthly household 
income. Similarly, household property losses were conservatively estimated at US$ 800,000 and probably 
much higher (Wyatt and Baird 2007).  84 
 
This case represents threshold behavior in the institutional response to rapid changes in a basin. Yali Falls 
was built and there was no official assessment of the project post construction and operation, leaving the 
local communities and provinces to carry out the assessments themselves. In response to local flooding 
downstream of the dam, a local coalition of international and local NGOs formed the Se San Working 
Group (SWG) to investigate the flooding. Members included, among others, a Ratanakiri based NGO, Non-
Timber Forest Products Project (NTFP), and Phnom Penh based Oxfam America East Asian Regional Office, 
who took the lead to coordinate the group. They completed two impact studies, or rapid rural appraisals 
(RRA) of all 90 communities along the Se San River in Cambodia, and found over 50,000 people had been 
impacted by the project. Reports were unusual flooding events, increased dry-season flows, unpredictable 
fluctuations in river flow and water height, water quality degradation, fisheries collapse, and serious 
health impacts (CRES 2001; Hirsch and Wyatt 2004).  
The SWG initiated action and eventually was replaced by the Se San Protection Network (SPN) which is 
supported by the MRC and ADB. However, it was not easy to convince national and regional bodies that 
action needed to be taken. SPN gained support from the coalition of NGOS and ADB before the CNMC and 
VNMCs were on board, creating a source of conflict within the MRC. In particular, at a workshop in 
Ratanakiri  Province,  the  SPN  and  partners  presented  a  serious  of  proposals  and  the  NMCs  and 
government officials from Cambodia and Viet Nam failed to attend. Eventually, the MRC came on board 
and helped to coordinate the SPN Secretariat which is now partly supported by IUCN, WWF, and the ADB. 
However, this was a serious black eye for the MRC, NMCs, and Cambodian and Viet Nam governmental 
line  agencies,  and  it  attractive  very  negative  regional  and  international  attention  in  the  context  of 
sustainable water resource development that embraces public participation. It was also a prime example 
of how water resource development can have detrimental transboundary downstream effects and the 
MRC has seen setup a transboundary working group (TWG) to address such issues. (Baird 2009; CRES 
2001; Hirsch and Wyatt 2004; Öjendal et al. 2002; Wyatt and Baird 2007).  
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2.7.  THE MEKONG BASIN SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM (SES)  
A model for the Mekong Basin System (MBS) needs to account the unique characteristics of complex 
systems,  accounting  for  differences  in  scale,  feedbacks  across  scales  (panarchy),  threshold  behavior, 
interconnectedness, transformations, and self-organization and adaptability. There have not been many 
models applied to river basins. Most social-ecological system models on freshwater systems are applied to 
lakes and wetlands. A review of these methods is given in Table 2.8.  
2.7.1.  Frameworks for Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems 
Anderies et al. (2004) use a Social-Ecological Systems model that importantly accounts for feedbacks 
among main elements. Walker et al. (2009) use a similar approach but instead focus on thresholds and 
relationships between scales. Harmouda et al. (2009) uses vulnerability to parameterize sectoral variables 
in biophysical, socio-economic, and political (or institutional) dimensions. Nelson el al. (2007) presents 
both sides of the framework – the resilience and adaptive models. Daniels and Walker (2001) address 
primarily  the  social  and  institutional  aspects  of  social-ecological  systems  employing  a  collaborative 
learning model within a systems framework.  
Table 2.8: Frameworks used in Resilience Studies for Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social-ecological Frameworks for Freshwater Systems 
Components of these frameworks are utilized to develop the framework for the Mekong River Basin 
Social-ecological resilience 
Social-ecological 
System Robustness 
Framework 
No geographic area; 
Freshwater System 
(basin; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Presents a framework to identify potential 
vulnerabilities in SESs to disturbances – a 
robustness model. Model emphasizes links in 
the system and how they are vulnerable to 
stress. MODEL IS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Anderies et 
al. 2004 
Resilience and 
Adaptive Cycle 
Framework of Social-
ecological Systems 
Great Lakes Region, USA; 
New South Wales 
Rangelands, Australia 
(basins, watersheds; 
national, regional, 
provincial) 
Paper compares resilience properties in two 
contrasting SES, lake districts and rangelands, 
with respect to the following three general 
features: (a) ability of an SES to stay in the 
domain of attraction is related to slowly 
changing variables, (b) ability of an SES to self-
organize is related to the extent to which 
reorganization, and (3) adaptive capacity of an 
SES is related to the existence of mechanisms 
for the evolution of novelty or learning 
Carpenter 
et al. 2001 
Collaborative Learning 
Model for Social-
environmental 
Systems  
United States 
(basin, watershed, 
catchment; national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Presents a collaborative learning framework to 
address environmental conflicts. Looks at 
conflict theory, negotiation, and collaboration in 
a systems framework to address complex 
environmental resource conflicts 
Daniels and 
Walker 
2001 
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Table 2.8 (continued): Frameworks used in Resilience Studies for Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social-ecological resilience (continued) 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive 
management 
Everglades, Southern 
Florida, USA 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Develops a heuristic model to provide a 
framework for discussing resilience in the 
Everglades – in the freshwater marshes and in 
Florida Bay. It also discusses some management 
implications for ecosystem resilience (adaptive 
management) 
Gunderson 
and Walters 
2002 
Socio-economic, 
political, and 
institutional 
vulnerability 
Eastern Nile Basin 
(watershed, basin; 
provincial, national, 
international) 
Provides a framework for assessing vulnerability 
of water systems. Using a list of 31 indicators, a 
vulnerability assessment was identified and 
categorized to separate hydro-physical 
indicators from other indicators of socio-
economic or political nature 
Hamouda et 
al. 2009 
Conceptual model 
development of 
Social-ecological 
Systems 
Southwest Michigan; 
Florida Everglades; South 
Israel; Cascades, Oregon; 
Luquillo, Puerto Rico, 
Phoenix, Arizona;  
(basin; national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Uses conceptual models as a communication 
tool and shares lessons from a workshop in 
which interdisciplinary teams of young scientists 
developed conceptual models of social-
ecological systems using data sets and metadata 
from Long-Term Ecological Research sites across 
the United States 
Heemskerk 
et al. 2003 
Network resilience of 
social-ecological 
systems 
Goulburn Broken 
Catchment, Murray-
Darling Basin, Australia 
(watershed, basin; 
regional, provincial) 
Proposes a network perspective for social-
ecological systems that enables us to better 
focus on the structure of interactions between 
identifiable components of the system 
Janssen et 
al. 2006 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive 
management 
Fiji, Australia, Indonesia, 
Caribbean, Kenyan Indian 
Ocean, Maldives, 
Mombasa, East Africa 
(basin; provincial, 
regional) 
Introduces basic aspects of reef ecology and 
discusses the conditions that lead to 
characteristics of both resilience and non-
resilience of ecological structures, functions, 
and management of them at different scales 
McClanahan 
et al. 2002 
Resilience and 
Adaptation 
Frameworks in Social-
ecological Systems 
No geographic focus 
(basin, watershed; 
international, national, 
regional, provincial) 
Reviews adaption and resilience frameworks 
arguing that resilience provides a useful 
framework to analyze adaptation processes and 
to identify appropriate policy responses. 
Distinguishes between incremental adjustments 
and transformative action and demonstrate that 
the sources of resilience for taking adaptive 
action are common across scales. Finds that 
resilience approach is systems orientated, takes 
a more dynamic view, and sees adaptive 
capacity as a core feature of resilient social-
ecological systems 
Nelson et al. 
2007 
Resilience Framework 
for evaluating Co-
management in 
Social-ecological 
Systems 
No geographic focus 
(basin, forest; 
international, national, 
regional, provincial, 
community) 
Develops an evaluative framework for adaptive 
co-management which directs attention toward 
3 components: ecosystem conditions, livelihood 
outcomes and process and institutional 
conditions. Scale-specific parameters are 
offered for each component to facilitate 
systematic learning from experience and 
encourage cross-site comparisons. 
Plummer 
and 
Armitage 
2007 
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Table 2.8 (continued): Frameworks used in Resilience Studies for Freshwater Social-Ecological Systems. 
Resilience Study 
Geographic Area 
Scale 
Approach  Reference 
Social-ecological resilience (continued) 
Social-ecological 
resilience and 
adaptive capacity 
Ibiraquera Lagoon, 
Imbituba Municipality, 
Santa Catarina State, 
(southern) Brazil 
(catchment, watershed; 
community, provincial, 
national) 
A very detailed and thorough study of social-
ecological resilience combining the common-
property approach. Identifies key factors that 
build (and threaten) social-ecological resilience 
in resource management. Catalogs drastic 
changes (flips) in the system at the local, 
provincial, and national scales. 
Seixas and 
Berkes 2003 
Social-ecological 
institutional resilience  
San Pedro Basin, Arizona, 
USA 
(basin; regional) 
Analyzed how the collaborative development 
process of a decision-support system (DSS) 
model can effectively contribute to increasing 
the resilience of regional social–ecological 
systems 
Serrat-
Capdevila et 
al. 2009 
Socio-economic 
resilience 
Way Besai watershed, 
Lampung Province, 
Indonesia 
(watershed; community) 
Reviews the relationship between poverty and 
environmental services using surveys and socio-
economic indicators of inequality and social 
capital 
Suyanto et 
al. 2007 
Adaption to Climate 
Change Framework of 
Social-ecological 
Systems 
Southern Africa 
(basin, watershed, 
catchment; international, 
national, regional, 
provincial, community) 
Examines the characteristics of people’s 
responses to recent historical climate variability 
and change in southern Africa. Uses a range of 
social science data collection methods and 
household data on community -level 
understanding of climate trends, livelihood 
changes, and relationships to the environment. 
Explains what people know and did and why 
decisions to respond to changes 
Thomas et 
al. 2005 
Systems resilience 
Framework, adaption, 
and transformability 
Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment, Murray-
Darling Basin, southeast 
Australia 
(watershed; provincial) 
Resilience-based approach by identifying main 
issues, drivers, and thresholds in the basin, 
generating recommendations for adaptive 
management 
Walker et 
al. 2009 
System resilience for 
water resources 
None. Example of 
rainwater tank use 
(municipal; community) 
Looks at resilience as a response to crossing 
thresholds, recovery from disturbances, and 
adaptive capacity 
Wang and 
Blackmore 
2009 
 
2.7.2.  Model of the Mekong Basin System (MBS) 
For  the  Mekong  Basin,  I  use  a  Social-Ecological  System  model  with  four  main  elements.  The  main 
elements  of  the  Mekong  Basin  are:  Resource  Users,  the  Resource,  Public  Infrastructure,  and  Public 
Infrastructure Providers. The structure of the model is shown below Figure 2.16. I have developed a model 
for the Mekong Basin that combines features of models by Anderies et al. (2004), Walker et al. (2009) and 
Hamouda et al. (2009). 
Using the model from Figure 2.16, Table 2.9 lists the primary elements of the Mekong Basin System. 
Understandability, not every single user, provider, or piece of infrastructure is listed recorded however, 
the most relevant categories for the Mekong Basin are listed. 88 
 
Many of the components of the system are multi-scalar – meaning they affect or cross both spatial and 
temporal boundaries. For example, farmers growing rice will feed their own families first and sell the 
excess in the market, affecting village and provincial economies. Fishers and navigators will travel up and 
down the river in search of fish at specific times of the year (Hortle 2007; MRC 2010). The Mekong Basin is 
a very integrated and interactive system – effects in one area are seen and felt in another. It is important 
then to characterize how these feedbacks are manifested. 
From a systems perspective, and referring back to Figure 2.16, feedbacks that connect elements in a 
social-ecological  system  define  its  behavior.  If  one  part  or  element  of  the  system  stops  working  or 
becomes defective, the feedbacks to other parts of the system can respond to take up the slack. This 
would provide a resilient framework from which to evolve or adapt. Therefore it is important to define 
the essential feedbacks in the Mekong Basin System.  
 
 
Figure 2.16: SES Model of the Mekong River Basin System. Source: Adapted from Anderies et al. 2004. The 
Mekong Basin SES contains four main elements, feedbacks, and stressors. 
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Table 2.9: Elements of a SES for the Mekong Basin. Data sources: MRC State of Basin 2010; MRC State of 
Basin 2003; MRC BDP 2005. 
Country  Resource  Resource Users 
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
Public Infrastructure 
(physical and social) 
 
 
 
Cambodia 
 
 
 
 
Lao PDR 
 
 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
 
Viet Nam 
Water 
  agriculture 
  domestic 
  industry 
  navigation 
  recreation 
  spiritual/ritual 
Forested areas 
  watershed protection 
  shade/ground cover 
  species habitat 
Wetlands Ecosystem 
Food / Protein 
  irrigated rice prod 
  fish capture 
  aquaculture 
  Other aquatic animals 
Income 
  rice production 
  fishing 
  tourism 
  aquaculture 
  fishing 
  Fishers 
  Boat operators 
  Farmers 
  Irrigators 
  River gardeners 
  Households 
dependent on 
fish economy 
  Tourists 
  Government 
(FDI, tax) 
  Neighbor 
riparians 
  MRC Secretariat 
(programmes) 
  NMNCs 
  Nat’l Line 
Agencies 
  Provincial 
Agencies 
  District Agencies 
  Water User Orgs 
  Private/State Dev. 
  Private 
Developers 
  International 
Banks 
  Regional Orgs 
  NGOs, 
International Orgs 
  International 
donors 
  Protected areas 
  Irrigation canals 
  Dams 
  Levies 
  Water diversions 
  Roads 
  Transmission lines 
  Goods and services 
  Basin orgs 
  Watershed orgs 
  Water user orgs 
  IDMC/WUC/WUAs 
  Hydropower 
  Supply chain 
  Economic markets 
  Research orgs 
  Universities 
  Credit agencies 
  Banks 
 
2.7.3.  Feedbacks in the Mekong Basin System (MBS) 
Feedbacks in Figure 2.16 are shown by green arrows that connect system elements to each other, such as 
Resource Users and Resources. Feedbacks can be put into three broad categories – social feedbacks, 
ecological feedbacks, and social-ecological feedbacks. In this model, I categorize Resources as part of the 
ecological system, Resource Users and Public Infrastructure Providers as part of the social system, and 
Public Infrastructure as both the social and ecological systems.  
To characterize the system, I produced an inventory of essential feedbacks existing in the Mekong Basin 
System in Table 2.10 below. The essential feedbacks of the system are derived from the biophysical 
characteristics, geography, and major actors in the Mekong region. The feedbacks can be either positive 
or negative depending on their interactions, and many of them feedback in both directions.  
The first column in Table 2.10 is the Type of Feedback in the Mekong Basin System. The type of feedback 
is determined by inputs to the Mekong SES model in Figure 2.16. The four major elements of the model 
are the Resource (R), for example water and fish, the Resource Users (RU), the Infrastructure Providers 
(IP), usually government agencies or private/public corporations, and the Public Infrastructure (PI) itself, 
such as dams and irrigation canals. A fifth type of feedback, Resource to Resource (R-R), is added to 90 
 
represent ecological function in absence of the social system. While the social system dominates the 
behavior in many SESs, the Mekong Basin system is still largely dominated by natural ecosystem functions. 
Along these lines, one could also add a Resource Users to Resource Users (RU-RU) type of feedback. This 
might be relevant in systems were the social-social interactions dominate in absence of the ecosystem 
such as highly urbanized and metropolitan areas such as Bangkok or New York City.  
The  Feedback Mechanisms are the processes by which the mechanisms act – the specific  actions or 
agency between elements. In the ecological system, an example is the triggering of fish migration due to 
the wet and dry seasonal flows. In the social system, this is represented by the building of dams that 
relocate villages, affect fish populations, irrigate rice paddies, and potentially bring water and sanitation 
infrastructure to rural populations. Feedbacks among social systems often rely on institutions or social 
structure to provide the mechanism to feedback information, capital, or rules and regulations. This is 
expanded upon further later.  
Feedback Characteristics are a description of the feedback pathways and examples of where and when 
they occur in the Mekong Basin. For example, in Resource to Resource Users, illegal fishing in upstream 
tributaries  from  one  region  of  the  Mekong  Basin  can  affect  fish  populations  in  the  mainstream. 
Deforestation in uplands affects water quality downstream, etc. In the link between resource users and 
public  infrastructure  providers,  the  rapid  development  of  water  resources  has  forced  regional  and 
national agencies to engage with stakeholders about the impacts of water development. The pathways 
are scale dependent and can come from multiple agencies – international, regional, national, provincial, 
and community.  
The Threshold Risk field is a category to assess the risk of exceeding the threshold of the behavior of the 
mechanism and accessing the speed of the process variable. A high threshold risk is one that carries a high 
possibility of exceeding the established operating regime of the system. This creates a high probability of 
changing the system, i.e., causing a shift in regime to an alternate state, a transformation to new domain 
of attraction within the scale of activity, or forces an adaptive response within the scale or across scales. A 
low threshold risk is one that carries a low probability of changing the system, i.e., causing a shift in 
regime to an alternate state, a transformation to new domain of attraction within the scale of activity, or 
forces an adaptive response within the scale or across scales (Walker et al. 2009; Walker and Meyers 
2006).  
The Variable field indicates whether or not the acting variable is slow acting or fast acting (Carpenter et al. 
2001; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2006). A slow variable is one that acts over a period 10-
50 years. A fast variable is one that acts within a 1-10-year period. In general, most ecological variables 
are slow acting and therefore do not attract attention of the social systems that manage the basin. The 91 
 
Mekong Basin is unique in this respect due to the wet and dry season pulses that create a rich diversity in 
the basin. Changes are seen year to year, particular in flood years and fish capacity as is shown in Figure 
2.17 (Catch and Culture 2005; van Zalinge 2002). Water levels are therefore considered a fast variable. 
This behavior is also an example of a resource to resource (R-R) feedback (see Table 2.10a). 
 
Figure 2.17: Fast and Slow Variables: Bagnet catches and peak water levels in the Tonle Sap. Source: Catch 
and Culture 2005. The chart demonstrates fast variables – the link between fluctuating water levels and 
fish catch every 2-3 years. 
Note: Bagnet catches and peak water levels in the Tonle Sap Water level is for Phnom Penh Port which is 
well correlated with levels elsewhere in the Tonle Sap and Great Lake. Bagnets, or dai, are similar to trawl 
nets and are suspended in one location. Each dai is about 25 meters wide and 120 meters long, extending 
a few meters to the river bed. The 2004-5 season had 65 dais in 13 rows. 
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Table 2.10a: System Feedbacks in the Mekong Basin System. Feedbacks provided connections between system elements.  
Types of 
Feedbacks 
a 
Feedback Mechanism 
b  Feedback Characteristics / Links to Stressors 
c 
Threshold Risk
d 
Variable 
(Slow/Fast)
e 
Resource 
to 
Resource 
 
(R-R) 
(1) Ecosystem changes and fish 
stocks 
(1) Changes to long term ecosystem health can redistribute fish stocks   R-R1 - Low/Slow 
(2) Wet/dry season flood and fish 
stocks 
(2) Fish populations migrate based on flow rate, depth, and water temperature  R-R2 – Med/Fast 
(3) Water quality / turbidity and fish 
stocks 
(3) Greater turbidity in the wet season reduce fish migration in specific species  R-R3 – Med/Slow 
(4) Predation   (4) Invasive species or predators can affect fish populations  R-R4 – Med/Slow 
(5) Nutrient cycling  (5) Riparian forested areas provide nutrient cycling for fish spawning  R-R5 – Low/Slow 
(6) Flood/spawning ground  (6) Floods create spawning grounds in Tonle Sap and enable rich species diversity  R-R6 – High/Fast 
Resource 
to 
Resource Users 
 
(R-RU, RU-R) 
(1) Timing of monsoons trigger fish 
migrations 
(1) Fish capture local knowledge on regular monsoonal cycles and triggers  R-RU1 – Med/Fast 
(2) Deforestation practices 
(2) Deforestation increases sediment load, turbidity, and chemicals into water 
reducing healthy fish habitat and suitable drinking water 
RU-R2 – High/Slow 
(3) Floods and fish yields  (3) Floods provide higher field yields and species diversity  R-RU3 – High/Fast 
(4) Boats and pollution  (4) Leakage of petrochemicals reduces water quality, increasing health risks  RU-R4 – Med/Slow 
(5) River gardens and wet/dry season  (5) Farmers plant in river gardens in dry season  R-RU5 – Med/Fast 
(6) Over/Illegal fishing  
(6) Overfishing and illegal methods (mesh size) threaten large and mid-large 
sized fish populations (catfish, dolphin) 
RU-R6 – High/Fast 
(7) Land use and river health  (7) Dense settlements releases untreated waste and destabilizes river banks  RU-R7 – High/Slow 
(8) Agriculture and 
chemical/fertilizers 
(8) Fertilizer and chemicals reduce species diversity and short life cycles for 
eatable fish and OAAs 
RU-R8 – High/Slow 
(9) Septic use  (9) Untreated discharges into the Mekong cause health problems downstream  RU-R9 – Med/Fast 
(10) Logging and mining 
(10) Illegal and non-regulated logging and mining techniques reduce water 
quality and destroy fish, OAA, wetland, and forest ecosystems 
RU-R10 – High/Fast 
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Table 2.10b (Continued): Feedbacks of the Mekong Basin System. 
Types of 
Feedbacks 
a 
Feedback Mechanism 
b  Feedback Characteristics/ Links to Stressors 
c 
Threshold Risk
d 
Variable 
(Slow/Fast)
e 
Resource 
to 
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
 
(R-PIP, or PIP-R) 
(1) Operational – dam releases, 
water levels, flows 
(1) Dam releases impact fish and settlements along river banks, timing of flows 
not in synch with natural pulses. Level changes in delta and Tonle Sap 
PIP-R1 – High/Fast 
(2) Irrigation management 
(2) Overexploitation of irrigation and improper management of return flows 
pollute groundwater and tributaries 
PIP-R2 – Med/Fast 
(3) Use of EIA/SEA studies 
(3) Lack or weak EIAs on dams caused devastating impacts on tributaries in 3S, 
Nam Theun 2, Pak Mun watersheds, and potentially mainstream projects 
PIP-R3 – High/Fast 
(4) Transparency and public 
participation in planning processes 
(4) Theun-Hinboun, Kamchay, Nam Theun 2, Pak Mun failed to include adequate 
public participation, or was ignored, avoidable impacts were realized 
PIP-R4 – High/Fast 
(5) Institutional capacity and 
knowledge 
(5) Lack of understanding of ecosystem and poor incentives gives ineffective 
natural resource policy  - no staged development, high dam density, etc. 
PIP-R5 – High/Slow 
(6) Short-term development policy 
(6) Short term policies such as promoting the Thai water grid without proper 
long-term scenario planning – Lao PDR Eco-zones without public mgmt.   
PIP-R6 – Med/Slow 
(7) Resource capture/energy use 
(7) National policy to develop hydropower and participation in regional energy 
market causing resource capture and securitization of water resource 
PIP-R7 – High/Fast 
(8) Extreme weather causes flooding 
(8) Extreme weather events such as storms in 2008 put pressure on institutions 
to warn, release, and cope with floods 
R-PIP8 – High/Fast 
Resource 
to 
Public 
Infrastructure 
 
(R-PI, or PI-R) 
(1) Dam reduces fish capture 
(mortality, blockage, habitat) 
(1) Dams block fish migration reducing habitat and increasing mortality, 
significantly reducing fish stocks and species diversity 
PI-R1 – High/Fast 
(2) Pulse timing / structure failure 
(2) Potential dam failure and delayed pulses cause destruction or reduced fish 
yields 
R-PI2 – Low/Fast 
(3) Relocation due to inundation 
(3) Inundation of forest and spawning grounds create physical barrier– also 
flooding of river bank gardens – reduce resource availability  
PI-R3 – High/Fast 
(4) Downstream effects on fish  (4) Erratic downstream releases cause irregular fish catch and mobility  PI-R4 – High/Fast 
(5) Change to ecosystem – loss of 
habitat 
(5) Loss of riparian habitat, deep pools, and increased temperature reduce fish 
populations, irrigation runoff reduces water quality 
PI-R5 – Med/Slow 
(6) Impact of tourism  (6) Higher loading of pollutions and impact of boats, cars, and discharges  PI-R6 – Med/Slow 
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Table 2.10c (Continued): Feedbacks of the Mekong Basin System. 
Types of 
Feedbacks 
a 
Feedback Mechanism 
b  Feedback Characteristics/ Links to Stressors 
c 
Threshold Risk
d 
Variable 
(Slow/Fast)
e 
Resource Users 
 to  
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
 
(RU-PIP, or PIP-
RU) 
(1) Water resources development – 
long-term impacts on local, 
provincial, and national resource 
users 
(1) Public not aware in short and long-term natural resource policy impacts. 
Conflict over Pak Mun Dam, resettlement delays, plans not available to public, 
distrust. Rural development: water and sanitation infrastructure, roads, 
electrification, jobs 
PIP-RU1 – High/Fast 
(2) Public participation in 
construction and operation process 
(2) Insufficient planning process, non-use of indigenous knowledge, failure to 
account for environmental costs (Pak Mun, Yali Falls, Nam Theun 2, Theun-
Hinboun) 
PIP-RU2 – High/Fast 
(3) Public ownership, stewardship, 
symbolic participation 
(3) Basin and watershed organizations can enhance public livelihoods, improve 
river health, and increase NPV of water development projects 
PIP-RU3 – High/Slow 
(4) Monitoring and local involvement 
in water policy 
(4) Employing local monitoring through watershed committees, WMAs, WUAs, 
cost effective involvement, lower rates. Environment Programme at MRCS 
PIP-RU4 – Med/Fast 
(5) Mitigation and resettlement 
issues over water resources 
development 
(5) Resettlement and mitigation plans not co-managed. Lack of transparency, 
weak local involvement in resolving issue, no grievance or conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
PIP-RU5 – High/Fast 
(6) Employing local knowledge in 
water policy development 
(6) Policy for developing water and land resources not linked to local and 
indigenous knowledge, cultural memory, ethnic traditions 
PIP-RU6 – High/Slow 
(7) Regional and national dialogues 
over water development 
(7) Communication sessions build capacity and share knowledge between 
regional, national, provincial, and district level governance structures 
PIP-RU7 – Med/Slow 
(8) Stakeholder participation 
meetings over water development 
alternatives 
(8) Arranged by MRC to get stakeholder inputs on a agricultural, flood, 
hydropower, watershed, navigation, and environmental issues in the basin 
PIP-RU8 – High/Slow 
(9) Watershed management support, 
conflict management at local level 
(9) Regional and (weak) national support for watershed management 
organizations, - funding primarily from ADB, NGOs, and International donors. 
Ground-up – 3S region 
RU- PIP9 – High/Slow 
(10) Sector programs to enhance 
cross-scale capacity building 
(10) MRCS programmes in agriculture, irrigation, flood control, hydropower, 
environment, navigation, fisheries, knowledge, climate change, and watershed 
mgmt. 
PIP-RU10 – High/Fast 
(11) National institutional capacity, 
regional involvement 
(11) Weak national institutions and line agencies and limited to the MRC’s ability 
to resolve conflicts have forced regional orgs (ADB, WB, etc.) to fund provincial 
and community capacity building, for example 3S Basin organization 
PIP-RU11 – High/Fast 
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Table 2.10d (Continued): Feedbacks of the Mekong Basin System. 
Types of 
Feedbacks 
a 
Feedback Mechanism 
b  Feedback Characteristics/ Links to Stressors 
c 
Threshold Risk
d 
Variable 
(Slow/Fast)
e 
Resource Users 
To 
Public 
Infrastructure 
 
(RU-PI, or PI-RU) 
(1) Resettlements 
(1) Migration due to structures create disharmony, impact to livelihoods – 
distrust of public institutions and providers  
RU-PI1 – High/Fast 
(2) Impact on communities 
(2) Impacts leave imprints on communities – dislocations, resettlement, distrust, 
resource depletion, loss of traditional livelihoods 
PI-RU2 – High/Slow 
(3) Social memory 
(3) Generational struggles, social fragmentation, urbanization, transitional 
employment 
PI-RU3 – Med/Slow 
(4) Ecosystem changes 
(4) Loss of naturally functioning ecosystems change community focus, resource 
user well-being – lack of capacity to change employment, livelihoods 
PI-RU4 – High/Slow 
(5) Local involvement – monitoring, 
design 
(5) Water user organizations, irrigation committees, and watershed committees 
enhance public participation and trust in water development process 
RU-PI5 – Med/Fast 
(6) Sabotage and terrorism 
(6) Increasing community angst and distrust and resource depletion could lead to 
migration and social conflicts 
RU-PI6 – High/Fast 
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers 
to 
Public 
Infrastructure 
 
(PIP-PI, or PI-
PIP)) 
(1) Impacts during construction 
phase 
(1) Mismanagement adverse environmental impacts during construction of 
projects 
PIP-PI1 – High/Fast 
(2) EIA/SEA into design cycle  
(2) Weak or lack of environmental costs in planning process leads to failure to 
return on investment, public conflict, or decommission as in Pak Mun 
PIP-PI2 – High/Fast 
(3) Public participation in planning 
process 
(3) Lack of public participation leads to insufficient, ineffective, or lack of 
appropriate infrastructure 
PIP-PI3 – High/Fast 
(4) Maintenance of structures  (4) Lack of finances, capacity, or negligence leads to crumbling infrastructure  PIP-PI4 – Med/Slow 
(5) Enforcement of allocation rules 
(5) Weak line agencies fail to enforce cheaters, illegal fishers, water diversions, 
etc. 
PIP-PI5 – Med/Fast 
(6) BOT / BOOT building schemes 
(6) BOT and BOOT financing schemes lack incentives for developers to build 
environmentally sound projects with minimal local impacts on livelihoods 
PIP-PI6 – High/Fast 
(7) Institutional capacity and 
knowledge 
(7) Weak institutional capacity causes failures in the design, management, and 
implementation of water projects – lack of understanding of needs 
PIP-PI7 – High/Slow 
Notes 
a  Type of feedback is determined by input to the Mekong SES model in Figure 2.16.  
B  Feedback mechanism is the process by which the mechanism acts – the specific action between entities.  
c  Characteristics of the feedback mechanism are the specifics of the feedback and examples of where and when they occur in the Mekong Basin 
d  Threshold risk and Variable column is an effort to categorize the risk of exceeding the threshold in the behavior of the mechanism and accessing the speed of 
the process variable. A high threshold risk is one that carries a high possibility of exceeding the established operating regime of the system. A low threshold risk 
is one that carries a low probability of changing the system, i.e., causing a shift in regime to an alternate state, a transformation to new domain of attraction 
within the scale of activity, or forces an adaptive response within the scale or across scales.  
e  A slow variable is one that acts over a period 10-50 years. A fast variable is one that acts within a 1-10-yr period.  96 
 
2.8.  VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Referring to the vulnerability framework laid out in Section 2.3 and Figure 2.2, the data is organized by 
scale into three areas – resilience, sensitivity, and exposure. Sources come from baseline national and 
provincial data (Table 2.2) and the MRC’s SIMVA study (Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC 2010b). 
2.8.1.  Sensitivity to Mainstream Development 
Over 60 million inhabitants live in the LMB, half (30 million) of those living within a 15 km corridor along 
the Mekong River, and 25 percent (15 million) live within 5 km of the river. Table 2.11 gives overall 
population projections for LMB countries used in the study.  
Table 2.11: Projected Population Growth in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). Source: MRC 2003; WRI 2002. 
Country 
Population 
2000 
(million 
Avg. Annual Growth 
2000-2020 (%) 
Projected 
Population 
2020 
(million) 
% Urban 
Population 
2000 
% Urban 
Population 
2025  Rural  Urban  Total 
Cambodia  13.1  1.2  6.2  2.3  20.5  16  26 
Lao PDR  5.3  1.8  7.3  2.6  8.1  24  36 
Thailand  62.8  0  3.7  1.0  75.1  22  33 
Viet Nam  78.1  0.8  1.4  1.4  100.2  20  28 
Total  159.3  3.8  18.6  7.3  203.9  82  123 
 
Table 2.12 below gives the population of inhabitants living in the Lower Mekong Basin and their proximity 
to water resources along the Mekong River corridor. Viet Nam is most exposed with almost 14 million or 
73 percent (73%) living within the 15 km corridor, with Cambodia next with almost 10 million or 82 
percent (82%) living within the corridor. 
Table 2.12: Population proximity to the Mekong River. Source: Adapted from Hall and Bouapao 2010 MRC 
2010. 
Country 
Total 
Population 
(million) 
Population in 
LMB (million, %) 
Population in 15km 
corridor (million, % LMB, % 
total) 
Population in 5km 
corridor (million, % LMB, 
% total) 
Cambodia  14.1  11.9 (85)  9.8 (82, 70)  8.1 (68, 57) 
Lao PDR  6.5  6.1 (94)  3.4 (56, 52)  2.1 (34, 32) 
Thailand  64.8  24.4 (38)  2.4 (10, 4)  1.2 (5, 2) 
Viet Nam  84.7  18.9 (22)  13.8 (73, 22)  12.1 (64, 14) 
Totals  170.1  61.3 (36)  29.4 (48, 17)  23.5 (38, 14) 
 
Figure 2.18 below gives a graphic representation of the population in the 15, 10, and 5 km corridor zones 
with dark red indicating high populations. Viet Nam has a high population density in the Mekong Delta 97 
 
with households living in close proximity to the river, Cambodia next with high/medium sensitivity to 
water resource development followed by Thailand and Viet Nam with low populations - see Table 2.13. 
Table 2.13: Populations at Risk to Development - Proximity to the Mekong River. Data source: SIMVA Pilot 
Study; Table adapted from Hall and Bouapao 2010, 131. 
Risk Indicator  Cambodia   Lao PDR   Thailand   Viet Nam  
Population at risk 
        Total corridor population (5 km)  8,092,245  2,135,497  1,192,212  12,079,681 
Total rural corridor population (5 km)  6,628,750  1,341,907  932,769  10,463,838 
Sub-total score and rank  Medium  Low  Low  Very High 
 
Table 2.14 displays the color coding system used to indicate the most vulnerable in red and least in grey. 
Of course, this system is reversed for resilience, whereas grey is the most resilient and red is not resilient. 
Additionally, a quartile system was used to organize the data generated from the pilot study, grouping the 
data into four quartiles. The highest value for each indicator was divided by four and the others put into 
each quartile accordingly. In this way the data was also normalized allowing differing indicators to be 
represented on the same score sheet. The pilot study was vast and not all the data is used here. Selected 
data are used to paint the picture of exposure, sensitivity, and resilience to water resource development 
on the Mekong. 
Table 2.14: Color Coding System. 
Vulnerability, Dependence, and Risk  Very High  High  Medium  Low 
Resilience (inverse of vulnerability)  Very Low  Low  Medium  High 
 
Table 2.15 gives the baseline vulnerability figures for households in the SIMVA study. The data indicates 
Cambodia is the highly vulnerable to poverty, infant mortality, and access to basic services such as clean 
water and sanitation. Lao PDR also scores highly vulnerable with Viet Nam and Thailand showing medium 
and low levels of baseline vulnerability, respectively.  
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Figure 2.18: Population Sensitivity in the Mekong Corridor. Source: MRC SIMVA Study and MRC 2010b. 
High population densities sensitive to hydro-development reside in Viet Nam and Tonle Sap.  
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Table 2.15: Baseline Vulnerability Indicators of Households in Mekong Corridor. Data source: Adapted from 
Hall and Bouapao 2010, 131. 
Baseline Vulnerability 
Cambodia 
Study 
Sites 
Lao PDR 
Study 
Sites 
Thailand 
Study 
Sites 
Viet Nam 
Study 
Sites 
Incidence of rural poverty (national)  40  41  13  36 
Infant Mortality Rate (death rate in first year/1,000) - LMB   86  73  10  41 
Dependency Ratio - LMB  84  94  47  69 
No access to sanitation - LMB  80  29  6  22 
No access to electricity - LMB  86  77  14  22 
Sub-total score and rank  Very High  High  Low  Medium 
 
Table 2.16 below gives the results for dependence on fishing – the natural resource most likely to be 
adversely impact by dams. Again, Cambodia scores very highly dependent on fishing resource to maintain 
livelihoods in the Mekong corridor followed by Lao PDR scoring high, Thailand medium and Viet Nam low 
– a very different result than baseline vulnerability. It is clear from the data that Cambodia and Lao PDR 
both use the mainstream for the fishing needs more often than Thailand and Viet Nam. Thailand has 
other inland fisheries to draw upon and Viet Nam has access to aquaculture, other inland fisheries, and 
fish markets that have rapidly developed for the last 10 to 15 years.  
Table 2.16: Sensitivity Indicators of Households on Fishing - Sensitivity to Change. Data source: Adapted 
from SIMVA Pilot Study; Hall and Bouapao 2010, 132. 
Sensitivity  
Cambodi
a Study 
Sites 
Lao PDR 
Study 
Sites 
Thailand 
Study 
Sites 
Viet Nam 
Study 
Sites 
% of adults whose main occupation is fishing  22  2  2  3 
% of HHs whose most important occupation is fishing  25  3  1  3 
% of HHs whose 2nd most important occupation is fishing   28  57  5  2 
% of HHs who fished in last 12 months  65  76  46  14 
% of HHs that get cash income from fish sales  42  39  9  9 
% of income from fish and OAAs  35  6  1  3 
Mean monthly income (US$) from fish  54  13  1  7 
% of HH engaged in fish processing   8  50  18  2 
% of HH engaged in fish marketing  7  30  6  2 
% of HHs ranked 'highly' dependent on fish and OAAs  37  14  11  12 
% of fishers using mainstream/T.Sap in dry season  58  60  10  44 
Sub-total score and rank  Very High  High  Medium  Low 
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2.8.2.  Community-Scale Resilience  
Table 2.17 below shows the results from resilience indicators to changes on the Mekong mainstream. The 
results  are  inverted  compared  with  Table  2.15  and  2.16  indicating  again  that  Cambodia  is  the  most 
vulnerable, or lacks resilience in access to income not related to fishing or fisheries. Lao PDR gives a more 
mixed reaction with higher expenditures per year but still very poor even though many indicate they have 
alternative livelihood options. Both Thailand and Viet Nam score highly resilient in both incomes and 
access to other options other than fishing or fisheries. 
It is noteworthy to see that all four countries show relatively low involvement in aquaculture. Viet Nam 
has spent the last decade developing its aquaculture industry and figures show that approximately a 
quarter of households are involved in it. Aquaculture has been suggested a possible alternative to the 
projected  decline  in  fisheries  due  to  mainstream  development  yet  Cambodia  and  Lao  PDR,  both 
potentially the most affected by declines to mainstream fisheries, show only a six and five percent (6, 5%) 
involvement in the industry, respectively.  
Table 2.18 below shows trends in household survey data from the Mekong corridor. The data indicates 
that fishers from households in Lao PDR and Viet Nam have experienced reduced amounts of fish in the 
last five years. Viet Nam shows the highest percentage of households that have changed occupations due 
to a decline in natural resources. And interestingly, Cambodia households indicate they experience less 
the lowest incidence of food security and lowest personal income in the last five years, followed by 
Thailand.  
Table 2.17: Resilience Indicators to Change of Households on the Mekong. Data source: Adapted from 
SIMVA Pilot Study; Hall and Bouapao 2010, 133. 
Resilience  
Cambodia 
Study 
Sites 
Lao PDR 
Study 
Sites 
Thailand 
Study 
Sites 
Viet Nam 
Study 
Sites 
% of HHs ranked 'low' vulnerability to changes in water 
resources 
16  32  40  48 
Mean expenditure per capita per year  178  241  440  371 
% of population in top income quintile  10  16  37  17 
Mean monthly income from non-aquatic sources  103  229  390  202 
% of expenditure on non-food items  46  57  64  65 
% of HHs engaged in aquaculture  6  5  12  24 
% saying they have alternative livelihood options  22  94  62  88 
Resilience score  Very Low  Medium  High  High 
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Table 2.18: Trends in Households in the Mekong Corridor. Data source: Adapted from SIMVA Pilot Study; 
Hall and Bouapao 2010. 134. 
Trends 
Cambodia 
Study 
Sites 
Lao PDR 
Study 
Sites 
Thailand 
Study 
Sites 
Viet Nam 
Study 
Sites 
% of fishers reporting 'much less' fish than 5 yrs earlier  32  42  19  48 
% of HHs who changed occupation due to decline in NR  11  9  9  28 
% of HHs reporting less food security than 5 yrs earlier   42  24  30  15 
% of HHs reporting less income than 5 yrs earlier  49  17  35  21 
 
Table 2.19 below displays the overall results of vulnerability, sensitivity, resilience, and trends from the 
SIMVA Pilot Study.  
Cambodia 
It clearly indicates that Cambodia has a VERY HIGH risk to development and changes on the river basin 
occurring 20 times in the weakest quartile and only twice in the strongest. Cambodia scored VERY HIGH 
on  baseline  vulnerability  and  sensitivity  to  fishing,  and  scores  VERY  LOW  on  the  baseline  resilience 
indicators. It also had VERY HIGH trending incidence of food insecurity and VERY LOW incomes in the 
Mekong corridor. 
Lao PDR 
Overall results are similar for Lao PDR but to a lesser degree appearing in the weakest quartile eleven 
times and six times in the strongest, ranking HIGH or having the second highest risk. Lao PDR score HIGH 
in baseline vulnerability (except for sanitation) and HIGH for sensitivity to fishing. It scored MEDIUM for 
resilience indicators showing that some households have access to other sources of incomes besides 
fishing. Lao PDR also showed a MEDIUM experience of negative trends in the corridor particularly with 
the reduction of fish stocks. 
Thailand 
Thailand scores LOW of the four countries with no data occurring in the weakest quartile and 16 results in 
the strongest quartile. It has LOW baseline vulnerability, a MEDIUM sensitivity to fishing (particularly high 
over access to fishing) and a HIGH baseline resilience containing the highest non-aquatic income of all 
four counties. Thailand does experience a relatively HIGH trend in fisheries losses but overall has much 
more capacity to cope (access to other services) than the other three counties.  102 
 
Viet Nam 
Viet Nam overall score is MEDIUM compared with the other four countries with three results occurring in 
the weakest quartile and 14 items in the strongest quartile. Viet Nam as a MEDIUM baseline vulnerability 
except for dependency ratio which is very high, LOW sensitivity to fishing (except for the dry season it is 
HIGH), and HIGH baseline resilience although its mean monthly expenditure is quite high. A caveat to this 
is that Viet Nam experiences HIGH tends of fishery depletion forcing a reliance on other resources for 
food and economic security.  
Table 2.19: Summary of Results from Vulnerability, Sensitivity, and Resilience Indicators. Data source: 
Adapted from SIMVA Pilot Study; Hall and Bouapao 2010, 133-4. 
RESULTS 
Cambodia 
Study 
Sites 
Lao PDR 
Study 
Sites 
Thailand 
Study 
Sites 
Viet Nam 
Study 
Sites 
Overall Score Ranking  63  62  45  47 
Number of times in weakest quartile  20  11  0  3 
Number of times in the strongest quartile  2  6  16  14 
 
2.8.3.  Provincial Resilience –Spatial Distribution 
The Basin maps below give the spatial distribution of key provincial resilience indicators in the Lower 
Mekong Basin (LMB). Figure 2.19 shows district-level population density is the highest in the Viet Nam 
delta and in the upper Lao PDR regions. Figure 2.20 shows the provincial rural and urban population 
densities for the LBM indicating the most of the vulnerable population at risk live in rural areas. Figure 
2.21 shows provincial poverty rates, child malnutrition, and infant mortality rates. At risk are areas around 
the Tonle Sap, upper Lao PDR (Bokeo), and Issan region of Thailand where poverty levels are greater than 
50 percent.  
Figure 2.22 shows the location of proposed mainstream projects and zones of the LMB. The map displays 
red dots indicating the percentage of districts affected by the proposed mainstream dams, indicating that 
Cambodia  and  upper  Lao  PDR  (Pak  Beng)  projects  affect  the  great  number  of  local  districts  and 
unfortunately, these districts are some of the most vulnerable having high sensitivity and low resilience. 
Figure’s 2.23 and 2.24 show the provincial distribution of access to resources such as education and 
employment (Figure 2.23) and water and sanitation (Figure 2.24). Again, the maps indicate that provinces 
in Cambodia and upper Lao PDR fall well behind the other LMB countries in terms of baseline.  103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
District-Level Population Density in 
the Lower Mekong Basin 
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Density 
Figure 2.20: Rural and Urban Provincial Population Density in the 
LMB. Sources: Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC; SIMVA Pilot Study.  
Figure 2.19: District Level Population Density in the LMB. Sources: 
Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC; SIMVA Pilot Study. 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Poverty, Child Malnutrition, 
Infant Mortality Rates 
Figure 2.22: Populations Directly and Indirectly Affected by LMB 
Mainstream Dams. Source: ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Figure 2.21: Poverty, Child Malnutrition, and Infant Mortality Rates in 
the LMB. Sources: Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC; SIMVA Pilot Study. 105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to Resources: Employment 
and Secondary Education 
Access to Resources: Electricity, 
Sanitation, Safe Water 
Figure 2.24: Access to Resource - Electricity, Sanitation, and Safe 
Water in the LMB. Sources: Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC; SIMVA 
Pilot Study. 
Figure 2.23: Access to Resources – Employment and Secondary 
Education in the LMB. Sources: Hall and Bouapao 2010; MRC; SIMVA 
Pilot Study. 106 
 
The data links well with the tables above and gives a clear and visible indication of where the most 
vulnerable  and  least  resilient  populations  are  located  in  the  LMB  and  their  proximity  to  proposed 
mainstream projects. The next section estimates the potential impacts of the projects. 
2.8.4.  Provincial Resilience – Proximity and Variation 
The question arises whether or not those living in districts or provinces affected by dam sites are more or 
less resilient than those not affected by dams. I created a list of 14 provinces that would affected by the 
proposed  12  mainstream  dams  in  Table  2.20.  Provincial  resilience  data  suggest  that  there  is  little 
significant difference between those provinces potentially affected by dams and those not affected.
10 The 
data was put into quartiles and only one  resilience parameter, poverty, was significantly worse in dam 
affected provinces than non-affected provinces. This is highlighted in red in  Table 2.21. This is explained 
by the usually high poverty rate in the Kratie province in Cambodia of 97 percent (97%). Other noticeable 
distinctions between dam-affected provinces and not are the child mortality rate in Cambodia and access 
to electricity, both one quartile apart. It is notable that all three areas where  resilience  is  lower 
(vulnerability higher) are in Cambodia where country-level resilience is the lowest.  
Conversely, there were four areas where resilience was higher in provinces where dam s are planned. In 
Cambodia, the population density is much higher in provi nces where dams are not planned  due to the 
high population density (3,447 per person capita, ppc) in Phonm Penh. For Lao PDR, the rural population 
percent is slightly larger in provinces without dams however, this is because the Vientiane municipality is 
included in affected provinces (36.9%) –there is no real difference. In Thailand, there seems to be higher 
employment in dam affected regions. This is not real, and is explained by the unusually high female 
unemployment rate (30% unemployment, 38% female unemployment) in Nong Bua Lamphu province in 
Northeast Thailand on the Khorat Plateau in the Issan region.  
Therefore, there is no real increase or decrease in provincial resilience between provinces where dams 
could be built except for the Kratie province, which has very low resilience due to very high poverty rates. 
It is important to note that provincial data for the Tonle Sap Province was not available, an area critically 
affected by water resource development.  
Regarding the question of scale and resilience, it is clear from the basin map shown in Figure 2.25 that 
resilience varies tremendously across provinces in the LMB. Resilience varies from an average high rank of 
3.71 in Chiang Mai, Thailand to a low rank of 1.71 in Banteay Meanchey, Cambodia. The map shows that 
                                                                 
10 Full table of provincial vulnerability and resilience data can be found in Table 6.3 in Appendix C.  107 
 
Cambodia has a low national average provincial resilience, followed by Lao PDR, Viet Nam, and Thailand 
with the highest resilience. However, the map shows Thailand has the largest range in provincial resilience 
(1.14 points out of 4, or 28%) followed by Viet Nam (0.93, or 23%), then Cambodia (0.86, 22%), and Lao 
PDR (0.64, 16%). Thailand’s large range is explained by the fact that Northeast Thailand, or the Isaan 
region, is one of the least developed in the Kingdom containing high provincial poverty rates and is part of 
the Mekong Basin. The map also shows clearly that provinces surrounding the northern Tonle Sap Lake 
are the least resilient. This is troublesome as this region are highly dependent on fishing are also the most 
likely to be affected by changes in the flood pulse due to regulation of monsoonal variations by dams. 
Maps showing the relationship between provincial resilience and dependence on fishing are provided in 
Appendix C. Also the SIMVA study reported earlier noted that Cambodian sites, indicated as green dots in 
Figure 2.25, are the most vulnerable in the basin. Full figures for provincial vulnerability are available in 
Table 6.3 in Appendix C.  
2.8.5.  Exposure and Impact of Development Scenarios 
Table 2.20 gives the estimated populations affected and potentially needing relocation if mainstream 
dams are built (ICEM/MRC 2010, 108). The impact of Pak Beng, Stung Treng, and Sambor are of highest 
concern  not  only  because  they  affect  the  greatest  number  of  persons  but  they  are  also  located  in 
provinces that are the most vulnerable. 
Table 2.20: Estimates of Villages, Households, and Persons Affected and Resettled by Mainstream Dams. 
Source: Adapted from ICEM/MRC 2010, 108. 
Project #  Dam Name 
Total 
Affected 
Villages 
Total 
Affected 
HHs 
Total 
Affected 
Persons 
Resettled 
Villages 
Resettled 
HHs 
Resettled 
Persons 
1  Pak Beng  57  6,831  35,365  28  774  6,700 
2  Louang Prabang  36  2,516  12,966  36  2,516  12,699 
3  Xayaburi  29  1,988  4,378  10  391  2,130 
4  Pak Lay  27  1,079  19,046  16  n/a  6,129 
5  Sanakham  10  800  4,000  10  800  4,000 
6  Pak Chom  2  107  535  2  107  535 
7  Ban Koum  4  187  935  4  186  935 
8  Lat Sua  0  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
9  Don Sahong  4  14  66  4  14  66 
10  Thakho  0  0  0  0  0  0 
11  Stung Treng  21  2,059  10,617  21  2,059  10,617 
12  Sambor  n/a  1,020  19,034  n/a  n/a  19,034 
Totals 
 
190  16,601  106,942  131  6,847  62,845 
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Table 2.21: Provincial Resilience by Dam Site. Data source: See Table 2.2 –Provincial Data. Red boxes indicate differences between provinces where 
dams are planned and those without. Poverty rate is the only real difference discovered.  
 
 
Country
Provinces Affected by 
Proposed Dams
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Cambodia Kratie 606903 28.5 2.49 0 70.9 97.2 71 5 1361 16.5 5.7 13.1 36.9 23.2
Cambodia Preah Vihear 125274 8.6 2.49 81.9 90.8 29.1 117 2.6 1361 12.1 2.6 17.7 18.4 3.7
Cambodia Siem Reap 731265 67.6 2.49 82.8 91.7 53.7 76 4.6 1361 7.9 5.3 13.4 10.7 9.4
Cambodia Stung Treng 85162 7.3 2.49 69.8 87.9 16.4 122 2.7 1361 12.1 2.8 19.3 18.4 14.1
Lao PDR Bokeo 129600 18.3 3 94.8 85.6 38.9 82 1.5 1471 32.6 1.4 45 18 8
Lao PDR Champasak 571900 32.5 3 87.3 90.8 37.4 91 2.6 1471 32.6 2.5 58 14 20
Lao PDR Luang Phabang 416100 12.3 3.1 82.9 82.3 51.1 119 0.7 1471 31.25 0.8 27 29 7
Lao PDR Oudomxay 239800 13.7 3 84.9 94.2 66.1 88 2.1 1471 18.5 2.2 32 16 14
Lao PDR Vientiane 326900 18 3 82.5 90.8 27.8 102 3.5 1471 50.65 3.6 61 45 53
Lao PDR Vientiane Mun 597800 133.7 3 36.9 70.4 13.5 72 7.2 1471 66.05 7.5 89 70 100
Lao PDR Xayaboury 332800 17.8 3 92.8 94 17.7 130 1.4 1471 30.85 1.5 33 70 15
Thailand Chiang Rai 1111752 96.7 0.67 82.3 44 10.32 10.8 2272 55.43 85.3 97.4 92.3
Thailand Loei 570105 53.1 1.2 83 44.8 36.75 15.1 4.7 2073 55.43 3.2 97.4 99 87
Thailand Ubon Ratchathani 1686300 107.4 0.89 84.1 53.2 18.06 9.2 0.9 1741 55.43 0.8 81.2 96.3 85.8
Country Dam Site (yes/no)
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Cambodia No 548492 287.0 2.49 83.2 88.0 26.1 88.6 5.7 1361 13.9 6.6 23.9 20.8 14.7
Cambodia Yes 387151 28.0 2.49 58.6 85.3 49.1 96.5 3.7 1361 12.2 4.1 15.9 21.1 12.6
Lao PDR No 203260 15.0 3.04 91.0 99.6 47.9 107.6 1.6 1471 26.3 1.6 40.4 19.3 18.3
Lao PDR Yes 373557 35.2 3.01 80.3 86.9 36.1 97.7 2.7 1471 37.5 2.8 49.3 37.4 31.0
Thailand No 870910 119.9 0.93 82.4 48.2 26.6 8.5 6.8 2169 55.4 8.9 90.2 97.8 88.9
Thailand Yes 1122719 85.7 0.92 83.1 47.3 21.7 11.7 2.8 2029 55.4 2.0 88.0 97.6 88.4
Viet Nam No 875274 309.7 1.79 79.9 67.0 40.3 41.6 4.1 1269 40.2 4.6 57.7 79.3 53.0
RANKS
Cambodia No 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
Cambodia Yes 3 3 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
Lao PDR No 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 4 2 2 2
Lao PDR Yes 3 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 2
Thailand No 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 1 4 3 1 4 4 4
Thailand Yes 1 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4
Viet Nam No 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 3 3109 
 
 
Figure 2.25: Provincial Resilience Rank by Province and Country (1=Very Low, 2=Low, 3=Medium, 4=High). 
Data source: See Table 2.2 – National/Provincial Data. No significant difference in resilience between 
provinces where dams are planned and those without. Thailand has the highest provincial resilience.   110 
 
2.8.5.1.  People Directly Affected 
Estimates of total people directly affected amounts to 106,942. These estimates are conservative and 
would likely increase given more detailed information from developers and from Resettlement Plans. Pak 
Beng, Luang Prabang, Pak Lay, Stung Treng and Sambor account for the majority of the directly affected 
populations (ICEM/MRC 2010, 100). The Upper Lao cascade of six dams will directly affect the largest 
number of people of all Zones, totaling an estimated 76,290 people, the majority of whom are ethnic 
minorities  in  Lao  living  below  the  poverty  line  and  highly  dependent  on  the  natural  resource  base 
(ICEM/MRC  2010).  Resettlement  is  the  largest  direct  impact  facing  Mekong  communities  affecting  a 
minimum of 63,112 people or approximately 60 percent (60%) of those directly affected. Sambor, Luang 
Prabang and Stung Treng account for most of the required resettlement (ICEM/MRC 2010). 
2.8.5.2.  People Indirectly Affected 
More than two million people in 47 districts living within the head ponds, dam sites and immediately 
downstream of the 12 LMB mainstream projects are at highest risk of indirect impacts from the LMB 
mainstream projects.  
Indirect impacts are also likely to affect those people living or working within access (i.e. 15 km corridor) 
of the Mekong mainstream, its tributaries and wetlands, but who are not expected to be resettled, or to 
lose land or housing: 
  29.6 million people are at risk in a 15km Mekong impact corridor in Lao PDR, Thailand and 
Cambodia 
  14 million people (13,849,801) are at risk of indirect impacts in the Vietnamese delta 
  Poor management of dams and erratic water releases would increase numbers of affected 
people, e.g. an additional 76,368 population in Pakse at risk of Lat Sua or Ban Koum failures 
(ICEM/MRC 2010, 120). 
Local  riparian  communities  are  normally  the  most  exposed  to  indirect  impacts,  namely  district 
populations within a 5 km reach of the Mekong mainstream. Cumulative impacts may take some time to 
make  themselves  known,  e.g.  erosion  in  the  Vietnamese  delta  and  consequences  for  agriculturally-
dependent  households.  Also,  if  health,  drainage,  and  sanitation  programs  are  not  implemented 
adequately by developers, there would be higher numbers of people affected. 
2.8.5.3.  Upper Lao PDR Impacts (PAK BENG – PAK CHOM) 
The six projects in Upper Lao (upstream of Vientiane) would affect ten provinces and 32 districts in 
Thailand  and  Lao  PDR.  Zonal  population  totals  just  over  1.3  million  people  (1,351,350),  of  which  77 111 
 
percent (77%) is rural. The majority of directly affected population is Lao, many ethnic minorities living 
below the poverty line and highly dependent on the natural resource base (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
Projects in districts with higher incidences of poverty would have a more severe impact than in relatively 
prosperous districts. Pak Beng has the highest potential to adversely affect the poor.  This dam would 
affect eight Lao districts, of which seven are officially classified as poor or very poor. Pak Beng would also 
directly affect a much higher proportion of district population than any other dam in Zone 2, at 15.8 
percent (15.8%). Luang Prabang would affect 8.1 percent (8.1%) of total affected district populations, and 
Pak Lay 6.7 percent (6.7%), Sanakham 2.5 percent (2.5%), Xayaburi 2.1 percent (2.1%), and Pak Chom an 
estimated 0.1 percent (0.1%) of district population (ICEM/MRC 2010, 108). 
2.8.5.4.  Middle and Lower Lao PDR Impacts (BAN KOUM – THAKHO) 
The three projects in the middle and lower Lao clusters would directly affect small populations (in the 
order of a few thousand). The major direct impact would be resettlement of people living within the 
reservoir zone of the Ban Koum and Lat Sua project.  Ban Koum is estimated to directly affect 0.6% of 
district populations (0.6%) (ICEM/MRC 2010, 109). Communities are almost entirely of Lao and Thai-Lao 
ethnicity.  The  three projects  would have  some  of  the largest  indirect  impacts  on the Mekong  social 
system, affecting almost 1million people between them. Loss in capture fisheries would have a severe 
impact on local livelihoods given the high dependence on commercial and subsistence fisheries in this 
zone (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
2.8.5.5.  Cambodian Impacts (STUNG TRENG and SAMBOR) 
Stung  Treng  and  Sambor  would  create  a  situation  of  extreme  crisis  for  the  populations  of  affected 
provinces, and could provoke an emergency food security situation for the poor. These two dams have 
the highest potential to seriously worsen the incidence of poverty in Cambodia.  
Stung Treng at 17.5 percent (17.5%) and Sambor at 13.1 percent (13.1%) of district populations would 
have the highest direct impacts on the largest percentage of affected district populations than any of the 
other 12 dams, with the exception of Pak Beng (ICEM/MRC 2010, 110). Some 30,000 Cambodians would 
be resettled as a direct consequence of Sambor and Stung Treng dams. This is particularly worrying for 
Cambodia,  as  these  two  dams  would  have  a  proportionately  higher  impact  on  the  poor  in  the  two 
provinces of Stung Treng and Kratie, both of which have the highest poverty rates in the country at 46 
percent (46%) each (ICEM/MRC 2010, 111). 
More than one million fisheries-dependent people could lose their livelihoods, including in the Tonle Sap 
where an estimated 14 percent (14%) of surveyed households defined their main occupation as fishing, 112 
 
but where the vast majority of its population derives secondary or associated livelihoods, as well as 
subsistence, from fisheries (Hall and Bouapao 2010, 113). Fisheries losses would disproportionately affect 
the poor. Poor households have a higher dependence on fisheries than better-off households. Moreover, 
fisheries losses would disproportionately affect minority groups: the Cham (Muslim Khmer) is almost 
totally dependent on fisheries for their livelihoods. Cambodia is clearly in the worst position compared 
with other LMB countries due to its high sensitivity, very low resilience, very high vulnerability, and high 
exposure rate to development. 
2.9.  ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AT THE NATIONAL AND BASIN SCALE 
Given a high vulnerability and low resilience, how can Cambodia cope with the pressures of development? 
Since basin resilience is a measure of the system’s capacity to absorb stress and retain structure and 
function, one side of the equation is to determine how much capacity there is in the system to absorb 
stress. As discussed in Section 2.3, Berkes, Colding, and Folk (2003) among others emphasize that building 
resilience and adaptive capacity in social-ecological systems comes down to integrating flexibility, self-
organization and learning, and capital into management structures. In Table 2.22, I give scores for each of 
the LMB countries and the Mekong River Commission. 
Table 2.22: Adaptive Capacity Scores for the Mekong Basin.  
Adaptive 
Function 
Adaptive 
Activity 
Cambodia  Lao PDR  Thailand  Viet Nam 
Region 
(MRC) 
Total 
Flexibility 
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
1.64  1.45  2.45  1.73  1.82  1.82 
Learning from 
Crises 
1.18  1.18  2.00  1.45  1.36  1.44 
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
2.18  1.18  2.36  1.45  1.82  1.80 
Total Flexibility  1.67  1.27  2.27  1.55  1.67  1.68 
Self-
Organization 
& Learning 
Evidence of CPs 
or MSPs 
1.09  1.00  1.64  1.18  1.55  1.29 
Support for WSM  1.18  1.36  2.36  2.18  1.91  1.80 
Total Learning  1.14  1.18  2.00  1.68  1.73  1.55 
Capital 
Planning 
Documents 
2.18  1.45  2.45  2.45  2.55  2.22 
National funding  1.82  1.55  2.91  2.64  2.73  2.33 
Outside funding  2.18  2.09  1.55  2.09  2.45  2.07 
Total Capital  2.06  1.70  2.30  2.39  2.58  2.21 
Grand Total  1.68  1.41  2.22  1.90  2.02  1.85 
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The first obvious result is that Thailand has the highest adaptive capacity in the LMB, higher than the MRC 
(Figure 2.26). The MRC is next followed by Viet Nam, Cambodia, and then Lao PDR. Thailand scores highly 
due  to  high  levels  of  flexibility  and  self-organization  and  learning  activity  –  driven  particularly  by  its 
support for watershed management institutions. It also scores well due to its highly vertical management 
structure which, conversely, has been criticized for being highly inefficient (WEPA 2009). The MRC scores 
highly in capital and self-organization but is fairly weak in flexibility – matching with Cambodia. Lao PDR is 
weakest in adaptive capacity with a score of only 1.41. Lao PDR suffers from lack of public funds (its 
justification for building dams and earning revenue), lack of support for decentralized learning, and an 
inflexible institutional structure. Unlike the vulnerability data, Lao PDR scores below Cambodia in adaptive 
capacity, where Cambodia earns points in its flexible approach and many organizations involved in water 
management. Of the four LMB countries, Viet Nam scores highest in Capital providing consistent domestic 
support for water management problems while attracting significant international funding for projects, 
particularly in the Mekong Delta region and Central Highlands (VNMC 2003).  
 
Figure 2.26: Adaptive Capacity by Scale. Capacity is highest in capital followed by flexibility and SOL. Lao 
PDR is particularly weak in SOL and flexibility. Thailand and the MRC have nearly equivalent adaptive 
capacity. Cambodia does better in adaptive capacity than it does in vulnerability due to its institutional 
diversity, planning process, and access to capital. 114 
 
2.10.  ASSESSING BASIN RESILIENCE 
In Step 3 (Figure 2.1) of this paper, I integrate feedbacks, thresholds, and vulnerability data collected 
previously. To determine resilience from the SES model, the feedbacks and thresholds from Table 2.10 are 
analyzed and ranked against system characteristics. Referring back to Table 2.10a, feedbacks are grouped 
into system elements as shown in Figure 2.16. Each feedback is scored against the following variables: 
  Issue area 1 (Ecosystem Health, Fish Production, Floods, Governance, Hydro, Water Quality, 
Water Quantity) 
  Issue area 2 (Ecosystem Health, Fish Production, Floods, Governance, Hydro, Water Quality, 
Water Quantity) 
  Threshold risk (High, Medium, Low) 
  Fast or slow variable (Fast, Slow) 
  Stressor 1 (Climate Change, Development (Energy), Population, Governance)
11 
  Stressor 2 (Climate Change, Development (Energy), Population, Governance) 
  Vulnerability by Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam (High, Medium, Low) 
  Adaptive Capacity by Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam (Low, Medium, High) 
  Adaptive Capacity Regional (Low, Medium, High) 
  Average Rank (Very Low, Low, Medium-Low, Medium, Medium-High, High) 
Issue area is assigned based on the feedback mechanism from Table 2.10a-d). Likewise, Threshold Risk 
and Variable Speed are also taken from Tables 2.10a-d. Stressors are chosen based on data from Section 
2.4  and  the  relationship  to  biophysical,  socio-economic,  and  political  stressors  in  Figure  2.16.  The 
vulnerability rank was given based on results presented from Section 2.8. The default vulnerability score 
was taken from Table 2.19. While applying scores to feedbacks (see Table 2.22 below), vulnerabilities 
were biased based plus or minus around the baseline score from Table 2.19 and Table 2.21 to provide 
higher resolution across the model elements. Adaptive Capacity was evaluated using national-level water 
resource planning documents on water management and institutional support from the previous section. 
The complete data and sources are outlined in Appendix D.  
It is noteworthy to distinguish between the ranking system used in Section 2.8 on vulnerability and the 
ranking system in Section 2.9 and 2.10. For example, a LOW ranking for vulnerability is the inverse of a 
LOW ranking for adaptive capacity. In other words, a HIGH vulnerability score (1) equates to a  LOW 
adaptive response (1). Vulnerability is scored HIGH (1), MEDIUM (2), and LOW (3) whereas Adaptive 
                                                                 
11 Here “Development” is substituted for “Energy” from Figure 2.16. While development is not itself an external 
stressor, the energy (among others) is driving states in the basin to rapidly develop the hydropower sector. 
Therefore rapid development is a threat in terms of resilience.  115 
 
Capacity is scored LOW (1), MEDIUM (2), and HIGH (3). Likewise, Variable Speed is scored FAST (1) and 
SLOW (3) and Threshold Risk is scored HIGH (1) and LOW (3). The scales and ranks used are as follows: 
  Parameter    Level  Score (1,2,3)  Percentile Rank (1,2,3,4)
12 
Vulnerability  HIGH  1  1 
Adaptive capacity  HIGH  3  4 
Resilience  HIGH  3  4 
Table 2.23 gives an example of how the matrix was constructed and scored. The basic elements in the 
left-most column link directly to the model elements from the SES model in  Figure 2.16. Some basic 
assumptions were made during the scoring process. First, it  was assumed that the thresholds had either 
low, medium, or high effects on the feedback mechanism. This was a judgment based on the  critical 
characteristics of the Mekong Basin identified in Section 2.7, e.g., fisheries, livelihoods, etc.   A high 
corresponded to a negative effect and was scored a value of (1). A value judgment was also made 
regarding the speed of variable, assuming a FAST (1) variable is less desirable than a SLOW (3) variable. In 
some cases this might not be the case, for example the rapid onset of the wet season causes flooding that 
triggers fish migrations can also cause flooding and damage to residents.  The full data table is found in 
Appendix E.  
Table 2.23: Example of Resilience Matrix for Feedback Mechanisms on the Lower Mekong Basin 
 
 
 
                                                                 
12 Score equals an absolute value, i.e., 1=low, 2=medium, and 3=high. Rank is based on quartiles of the data and is 
therefore relative, i.e., for resilience 1=very low (lower 25
th percentile), 2=low (25-50
th percentile), 3=medium (50-
75
th percentile), and 4=high (>75
th percentile). 
R-R
Resource to 
Resource
(1) Ecosystem changes and fish 
stocks
Ecosystem Health Fish Production Low Slow Climage Change
R-R
Resource to 
Resource
(2) Wet/dry season flood and 
fish stocks
Floods Fish Production Med Fast Climage Change
Feedback 
Code
Type of 
Feedback
Feedback Mechanism Issue Area 1 Issue Area 2
Threshold 
Risk
Fast/ 
Slow
Stressors 1
Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam
Development H H L M L L M L M 1.966
Development H M L M L L M L M 1.864
Avg Rank Stressors 2
Vulnerabilities Adaptive Response by Country Adaptive 
Response 
Regional116 
 
2.10.1.  Vulnerability by Feedback Group and Country 
The results follow from Section 2.8 on Vulnerability. Figure 2.27 and 2.28 show that both Cambodia and 
Lao  PDR  lack  resilience  (high  vulnerability)  in  the  basin.  In  particular,  the  relationship  between  the 
Resource Users to Public Infrastructure (RU-PI) for Cambodia and Lao PDR is problematic. Viet Nam has 
higher resilience with respect to resource users and public entities however the Resource to Resource (R-
R)  resilience  is  low  due  to  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  Mekong  Delta  and  the  Resource  to  Public 
Infrastructure (R-PI) scores are low due to issues with previous hydroelectric projects in the 3S region. 
Thailand displays good resilience (compared to the others) in most areas partly due to the fact that it is 
only marginally affected by mainstream feedback mechanisms.  
Figure 2.28 shows the relationship between vulnerability (lack of resilience) and stress in the basin. Again, 
Cambodia and Lao PDR show low levels of resilience particularly to development and governance while 
Viet Nam has somewhat improved scores for resilience in governance and Thailand shows good resilience 
in  all  areas  of  stress.  Of  particular  importance  are  the  consistently  low  scores  in  Development  and 
Governance. Both have implications on how institutions manage rapid changes in the basin. It must be 
noted that Viet Nam has improved its relationship between Resource Users and Public Infrastructure in 
recent years due to the evolution of Water User Associations (WUAs), Water User Committees (WUCs) 
and  Irrigation  and  District  Management  Companies  (IDMCs)  that  interact  and  manage  water 
infrastructure on the ground (Biltonen 2003; VNMC 2003). 
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Figure 2.27: Vulnerability of Feedbacks to SES Element by Scale (Low 
score = high vulnerability). Thailand is clearly the least vulnerable 
next to Viet Nam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia. The Resource, or 
ecosystem, is the least vulnerable part of the system [LOW=3]. 
Figure 2.28: Vulnerability of Basin Feedbacks to Stressors by Scale 
Cambodia is the more vulnerable to stress followed by Lao PDR. 
Countries are most vulnerable to Development and Governance 
feedbacks [LOW=3]. 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2.29: Adaptive Capacity of Feedbacks to SES Element by 
Scale. Thailand and the MRC have the highest adaptive capacity 
in the system while Lao PDR contains the least capacity followed 
by Lao PDR. The MRC lacks specific capacity with respect to 
Resource and Public Infrastructure [HIGH=3].   
Figure 2.30: Adaptive Capacity of Feedbacks to Stressors by 
Scale. Again Lao PDR has the least adaptive capacity followed 
by Cambodia. Lao PDR is particular weak to Population and 
Climate Change. Interesting to note that Cambodia is nearly 
equal to Viet Nam is adaptive capacity [HIGH=3]. 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.31: Vulnerability by Issue Area and Country. Thailand 
is least vulnerable in the basin except in Fisheries and Forests. 
All LMB countries are particularly vulnerable to Fisheries and 
Ecosystem Health [LOW =3]. 
Figure 2.32: Adaptive Capacity by Issue Area and Scale. Lao 
PDR is the least capable of responding particularly to issues in 
Ecosystem Health and Forest Management. Thailand and the 
MRC have the most adaptive capacity in the basin but are 
weak in Water Quality and Hydro, respectively [HIGH=3].  120 
 
2.10.2.  Adaptive Capacity by Feedback Group and Scale 
Figures 2.29 and 2.30 give the adaptive capacity to feedbacks on the basin by scale. In this case, rather 
than  Cambodia  being  the  least  resilient,  Lao  PDR  is  least  adaptable  to  basin  feedbacks  followed  by 
Cambodia and Viet Nam. Thailand has the highest adaptive capacity  and in some cases is has more 
capacity than the Mekong River Commission.  
Lao PDR shows little (nearly zero) ability to respond to significant stressors based on the feedback data. It 
is particularly weak in capital allocated to natural resource management and suffers from a somewhat 
dependent relationship on the MRC. It scores low in self-organizing and learning capacity due to the 
country’s  slow  move  towards  a  more  open  society  and  a  very  centralized  political  system.  Weak 
governance combined with upstream riparian position and narrow focus on development projects has 
placed Lao PDR into a very vulnerable position if significant stress hits the basin.  
Cambodia is still low on the adaptability scale followed by Viet Nam In this case, Cambodia is in a slightly 
better position as it has focused on sector-wide basin planning and designation of protected areas (MRC 
BDP  2005).  Viet  Nam  still  struggles  with  is  high  population  density  and  hydropower  projects  in  the 
highlands however, it is making progress in climate change and governance issues. Thailand is again the 
most  resilient  country  in  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  due  to  a  highly  developed  and  diversified  water 
resource  system in the country and a complicated diversified yet  institutional framework to manage 
water that exists in the country (Bunnara et al. 2004; MRC BDP 2005).  
Regional adaptive capacity is included on this chart and it is interesting that Thailand seems to have 
greater adaptive capacity to feedback mechanisms in basin than the dominant regional body, the MRC. 
The  lack  of  response  of  regional  players  in  Resource  to  Public  Infrastructure  (R-PI)  and  Resource  to 
Resource Users and Resource Users to Public Infrastructure (R-PI, R-RU) is a function of the MRC’s limited 
mandate  and  lack  of  influence  over  national  development  agendas.  In  this  regard,  Thailand  has  the 
greatest adaptive capacity, and potentially, influence over river basin management in the Lower Mekong 
Basin. This has been demonstrated in the recent negotiations over the mainstream Xayaburi Dam being 
proposed in Lao PDR (MRC Website 2012) where Thailand who is building and receiving power from the 
dam was instrumental is delaying it until further studies are completed.  
2.10.3.  Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity by Issue Area and Scale 
Figures 2.31 and 2.32 illustrate vulnerability and adaptive capacity by issue area and scale, respectively. 
Again, a LOW score means low adaptive capacity. In this chart, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam all score 
low  in  ecosystem  health,  fish  production,  and  flooding.  Cambodia  shows  some  resilience  to  forest 
management as it has slowly expanded restoration and protection areas over the last 10 years (ICEM 121 
 
2003). Thailand shows the lowest vulnerability across a range of issue areas, although it is vulnerable in 
forest management, fish production, and flooding primarily in tributaries located in Northeast Thailand’s 
Isaan region.  
The first and obvious result is that Cambodia and Lao PDR both highly vulnerability and lack adaptive 
capacity in all issue areas, particularly in fisheries, ecosystem health, and hydropower. This is troublesome 
for Lao PDR as it has plans for nearly 100 tributary and mainstream projects. Viet Nam shows slightly 
better adaptive response in  irrigation, flood control, and  agriculture however, it suffers from lack  of 
capacity in hydropower and ecosystem health, governance, and water quality. All four LMB countries have 
issues with water quality. Additionally, note of concern is all four LMB countries lack sufficient capacity in 
hydropower and fish production despite the recent activity to prevent mainstream dams from being built. 
The exception might be Thailand. It shows fairly good adaptive capacity in hydropower - higher than the 
MRC. This might suggest that Thailand is emerging as regional leader in the Lower Mekong Basin and may 
have greater influence than the MRC in water management of the basin in the medium to long-term.  
The MRC scores low in hydropower, forest management, and agriculture due to their inability to allocate 
resources at the national level other than conducting technical studies and commissioning reports. The 
MRC is stronger in flood management and water quality due to well-developed monitoring programs and 
community involvement and in contains the highest adaptive capacity in the area of governance across 
the basin. 
2.10.4.  Overall Basin Resilience 
Finally, overall basin resilience score is evaluated in the Mekong Basin. Feedbacks were evaluated against 
the system variables listed above and an overall basin resilience score was found to be 1.80. On a scale of 
Low-Med-High (1-2-3) this equates to a basin resilience of Medium-Low. This can be compared with the 
Medium-Low color designation in Figure 2.25. The results are shown in the radar chart in Figure 2.33 and 
line chart in Figure 2.34.  
The  Mekong  Basin  is  most  resilient  in  feedbacks  between  Resource  and  Resources  (R-R)  due  to  the 
extremely resilient biophysical system in the Mekong Basin. This means that the natural Mekong system 
has sufficient capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt  to shocks while still retaining its structure and 
function. Other parts of the basin system have low or medium low resilience except for Resource Users to 
Public Infrastructure Providers (RU-PIP) which has medium resilience. Figure 2.34 shows the distribution 
of scores across the system indicating that most are low resilience, i.e., between 1 and 2. Resource Users 
and Public Infrastructure Providers (RU-PIP) have moderate resilience scores for examples such as the 
MRC, NMCs, NGOs, etc. (see Table 2.9 for a list of elements under each Entity). This is not surprising as 122 
 
many international and NGO organizations are working in the Mekong Basin to enhance capacity and 
build resilience.  
 
Figure 2.33: Total Resilience of Feedback Type (SES Element). Mekong Basin resilience is Medium-Low. 
Ecosystems are most resilient but also progress has been made between users and infrastructure providers 
where dialogue and stakeholder participation has improved resilience. The basin still lacks resilience in 
understand infrastructure effects on ecosystems and infrastructure management.  
The basin lacks resilience in the areas of Resource to Resource Users (R-RU), Resource Users to Public 
Infrastructure (RU-PI), Public Infrastructure Providers to Public Infrastructure (PIP-PI), Resource to Public 
Infrastructure (R-PI), and Resource to Public Infrastructure Providers (R-PIP).  
(R-R): This refers to the interaction between Resource and Resource – or feedbacks among the ecosystem 
itself. The ecosystem in the Mekong basin is resilient to change. This is not surprising and it has been 
reported earlier that basin is vast and has a high capacity to absorb disturbances. This is at basin level – at 
sub-basin scales there is evidence that the resource base is less resilient and more vulnerable to change.  
(R-RU): Lack of resilience between Resource and Resource Users represents a general lack of capacity of 
local  and  community  riparians  to  manage  the  Mekong  system  sustainability.  Due  in  part  to  lack  of 
resources, knowledge, and capacity, fishers, irrigators, and river gardeners are managing resource on a 123 
 
day-to-day basis while still over fishing, polluting with boats, and dumping untreated sewage into the 
river. Feedback mechanisms represent these issues. 
(RU-PIP):  This  part  of  the  system  refers  to  the  relationship  between  Resource  Users  and  Public 
Infrastructure Providers and scored medium on resilience due to the increased effort to engage public 
participation and dialogue on basin development – driven mainly by the MRC and NMCs. It contains the 
highest resilience score (2.17) due to the organization of regional dialogues on basin development. Other 
resilient activities in this group include employing local knowledge in management of water resources, 
stakeholder involvement in the design of development alternatives, and local monitoring water quality 
and impact programs.  
(RU-PI): This deals with the relationship between Resource Users and Public Infrastructure such as dams, 
canals,  markets,  etc.  Resilience  is  low  in  this  area  due  to  lack  of  participation  and  ownership  of 
infrastructure projects. Most infrastructure projects are managed by large international companies and 
transferred to government ownership with little or no consultation with local users and stakeholders. 
Efforts are being made to improve on this (Nam Theun 2) however, given the rapid rate of development in 
the basin, there has been little progress or it has been too late in coming.  
(PIP-PI):  Results  indicate  that  the  relationship  between  Public  Infrastructure  Providers  such  as 
development organizations, private companies, and private partnerships and national governments, and 
their  infrastructure  is  weak  and  lacks  resilience.  The  design  of  projects  lacks  sufficient  planning  and 
mitigation for impacts of infrastructure on resources as thresholds in tributary and mainstream systems 
continue to cause unplanned displacements and impacts that are not managed sustainably and equitably. 
Efforts to improve this on Nam Theun 2 are not clear. The World Bank promised that this project would be 
managed differently but it is unclear whether their claims have been realized. 
(R-PI): The low scores on Resource to Public Infrastructure are due to the lack of understanding and 
capacity on how infrastructure affects natural resource management. This is demonstrated by continued 
conflicts  in  tributary  projects  where  fish  populations  are  depleted  or  livelihoods  are  affected  by 
mismanagement of development projects (Yali Falls, Pak Mun, Nam Theun 2). There is a persistent lack of 
understanding how thresholds in tributary projects affect resilience on mainstream feedback systems –
this was discussed in Section 2.6. This is also explained by weak line agencies that management natural 
resources – particularly in Cambodia and Lao PDR.  
(R-PIP): This part of the Mekong basin contains the lowest resilience and lowest score (1.41) between the 
Resource and Public Infrastructure Providers illustrates the lack of motivation, political will, and general 
malaise by developers to government agencies to properly account for social and environmental impacts 124 
 
on  water  resources  and  ecosystems  due  to  development  (Vanclay  2003).  This  is  illustrated  by  the 
complete  lack  of  comprehensive  EIA  completed  by  the  Thai  developer  on  the  Xayaburi  mainstream 
project in Lao PDR (Baran et al. 2011). The study contained more gaps than analysis and completely failed 
to account for the impact of the structure on local fish migration and local livelihoods.  
Table 2.24 below summarizes the feedbacks with the lowest resilience and their associated issue area and 
stressors. It is interesting to note that development appears in nearly every grouping – not a surprising 
finding.  
Table 2.24: Feedbacks of Mekong System with VERY LOW Resilience. 
Feedback Area  Issue Area  Stressors 
Number of 
Feedbacks 
VERY LOW 
Resilience 
Score 
Floods and Timing of Fish 
Migrations 
Floods/Fishing 
Development, Climate 
Change 
12  1.58 
Illegal Fishing  Fishing 
Development, 
Population 
Logging and Mining  Water Quality 
Development, 
Governance 
EIA/SEA during planning 
Hydro 
Development 
Development, 
Governance 
Public Participation 
Hydro 
Development 
Development, 
Governance 
Transparency/Relocation 
Hydro 
Development 
Development, 
Governance 
Institutional Capacity 
(National) 
Governance  Governance 
 
In general, resilience across the basin is medium-low averaging around 1.8 (Figure 2.34). A basin with 
medium to high resilience would contain an average score of 2 or above. Data from Figure 2.34 would 
indicate that while the biophysical characteristics of the basin are resilient, the social components, or 
institutional components of the basin, are lacking resilience. Given the definition in Section 1.2.2, if any 
part of the system not resilient and loses function or structure, the system lacks resilience.  Table 2.24 
would indicate that many parts of the basin system lack resilience and an overall score of 1.8 would 
indicate more work needs to be done to improve basin capacity in the face of rapid development and 
outside stressors.  
2.10.5.  Threshold Resilience 
A  question  that  emerges  from  the  analysis  is  how  does  the  basin  respond  to  thresholds?  While  an 
inventory of thresholds was not compiled, each feedback in the model contains a score on threshold risk. 
In reality, each feedback is connected to many thresholds. A typical threshold behaves in a predictable 125 
 
fashion until a certain point, or cliff, is reached, where it then either changes rapidly or transforms to an 
alternative  state.  The  relationship  between  threshold  and  resilience  then,  should  look  like  a  curve 
approaching a potential cliff. Steeper curves would represent higher sensitivity to thresholds, or weaker 
resilience  to  thresholds,  while  flatter  curves  would  be  less  sensitive,  or  more  resilient  to  threshold 
behavior. In Figure 2.35, Mekong Basin resilience is plotted again threshold risk. Note that threshold risk is 
defined as 1=High, 3=Low in the aforementioned analysis in order to synchronize with resilience, e.g., the 
risk of breaching a threshold is proportional to low resilience. This seems counterintuitive but synchs with 
resilience scores – low is weak, high is strong. In Figure 2.35, threshold risk on the x-axis is inverted to 
better  represent  it  for  intuitive  purposes.  The  term  threshold  resilience  is  defined  as  the  amount  of 
change a system can absorb without breaching a critical point in the process relationship. 
This curve looks like complex system. Thresholds drop off at very low resilience indicating a potential 
resilience threshold for different sectors in the Mekong Basin. The overall basin curve is in black. Flatter 
curves represent more resilient sectors, for example, floods. In the equations, the exponent represents 
the slope of the curve, i.e., the higher the value, the steeper the curve and the less resilient the sector. 
Hydro  and  Ecosystem  Health  show  sensitive  relationships  to  basin  resilience  and  illustrate  potential 
threshold behavior. Alarmingly, the Governance sector shows similar behavior as the entire Basin. I would 
have hoped to see Governance less sensitive to thresholds – i.e., a flatter Governance curve than the 
Basin curve. This would have indicated Governance is less sensitive to thresholds and more resilient than 
other parts of the basin. However, this is not the case. In Figure 2.35, it appears that Governance is 
slightly more sensitive and slighter more resilient (higher on the chart) than the entire Basin. Ecosystem 
Health and Hydro are the least resilient to thresholds, and Floods are fairly resilient.  
At first this result might seem inconsistent with the result previously that the ecosystem is the most 
resilient part of the Mekong Basin. However, this is not inconsistent. While the Mekong ecosystem is 
resilient to changes, it is highly sensitive to thresholds. As stated earlier, this behavior has been seen in 
tributaries. Thus, if the system is pushed too far, in too many locations, resilience could be threatened, or 
reach a “cliff.”  
Other sectors such as Irrigation, Water Quality, Fish Production, Agriculture, and Forest Management are 
also included but data were not spread across enough of a range to develop a threshold curve. All values 
in  Fish  Production,  Water  Quality,  and  Water  Quantity  occur  with  high  threshold  risk.  If  there  were 
enough data to generate curves, they might look similar, or steeper than Hydropower and Ecosystem 
Health  threshold  curves.  A  well-developed  threshold  inventory  would  allow  a  range  of  curves  to  be 
generated across many sectors in the basin, giving a view of threshold resilience behavior across all 
sectors in the Mekong Basin. 126 
 
 
Figure 2.34: Average Resilience of Feedbacks in the Mekong River Basin. The ecosystem and relationship between resource users and public 
infrastructure providers are the most resilient in the basin. The least resilient parts of the system are the management and relationship to 
public infrastructure.  127 
 
 
Figure 2.35: Threshold Resilience in the Mekong Basin. As basin resilience decreases sectors approach a threshold “cliff” indicated by the red 
circle. Flat threshold resilience indicates a more resilient basin. Floods are fairly resilient to thresholds, whereas hydro and ecosystem health 
are less resilient (steeper curve) to changes. Water quality, fish production, and water quantity were all low resilience but did not contain 
enough points to generate a threshold curve – only high threshold risk in these areas Note: The scale of threshold resilience on the x-axis was 
reversed for intuitive representation, i.e., 1=Low, 3=High. In basin resilience, threshold risk was scored as 1=High, 3=low. 128 
 
2.11.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Addressing Part A in Figure 1.2 of the dissertation, this chapter addresses the research questions of how 
to model Mekong River Basin as an SES and determine basin resilience. Referring back to the working 
hypotheses for this chapter: 
  The basin is dysfunctional (non-resilient) at some scales while remaining functional 
(resilient) in others, reducing basin resilience of the entire system. 
Research questions from Section 2.2 are addressed below: 
(2a)  Is a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model an appropriate tool to evaluate basin 
resilience? 
The systems model provided a useful and insightful method for understanding the complex relationships 
between stressors, thresholds, and feedbacks (structure) on the Mekong River Basin. Preserving structure 
and essential function is essential to the definition of system resilience. The model enabled a step-by-step 
assessment of feedbacks and associated thresholds and functions which eventually led to an assessment 
of resilience and adaptive response identifying both weak and strong parts of the entire basin system. 
Basin resilience was measured compared with adaptive capacity across various sectors in the basin.  
Basin resilience is distinguished from institutional resilience due to the fact if one part of the basin system 
lacks resilience, the whole system could collapse. Institutional resilience deals primarily with flexible, self-
organization, and capital resources – which allows for responses to system perturbations. The advantage 
of the systems model was that it identified the specific feedback mechanisms that lacked resilience, and 
likewise the feedbacks that lacked institutional adaptive capacity. In other words, taking a systems theory 
approach pointed to weakness in the system and identified areas where the institution could  fail to 
adequately respond to stress.  
There  are  limitations  of  an  SES  approach.  The  process  is  difficult  to  implement  and  not  all  system 
feedbacks and thresholds are included in the assessment. An inventory of feedbacks and thresholds for 
the basin would greatly improve the accuracy of the system model. Additionally, more local-level data is 
needed to assess vulnerability and resilience as sub-basin scales. While taking a multi-scalar approach, my 
research was limited by access to and the scale of data available at local levels. Incorporation of national 
politics is somewhat missing although it is somewhat incorporated to population pressure and energy 
demands. Pure political influence needs to be incorporated into the model.  129 
 
(2b)  Is the Mekong Basin resilient?  
Current threats to the Mekong Basin were outlined in Section 2.5. Most river basins face common threats 
such as climate change, intensive agriculture affecting water quality, and population pressures such as 
urbanization and habitat degradation. However, the Mekong faces rapid development of water resources 
with nearly 100 new hydropower projects planned for the basin by 2030. Is the Mekong Basin resilient to 
these new threats? The research would indicate that it is not resilient.  
Understanding of thresholds in the basin is still elementary although some progress is being made at 
limiting transboundary impacts of tributary projects. If past experience is a guide, the dramatic impacts on 
fisheries and social livelihoods of Pak Mun, Yali Fall, Nam Theun and Nam Theun 2, and Theun-Hinboun 
dams, and the lack of comprehensive EIA completed for the mainstream Xayaburi dam (Baran et al. 2011) 
being planned in Lao PDR are examples of lack of resilience and adaptive capacity to shifting thresholds in 
the social-ecological system (SES).  
The  impact  of  new  projects  on  fisheries  alone  would  cause  major  collapse  (nearly  40%  loss)  of  the 
freshwater ecosystems that support over 60 million people. Cambodia would be the most affected as it 
has  over  eight  million  people  living  the  basin,  over  25  percent  occupations  are  fishing,  and  over  80 
percent of their protein needs coming from inland fisheries. Cambodia will suffer greatly if dams are built 
on the mainstream there, affecting nearly 20 percent of districts in the country where poverty rates are 
over 40 percent.  
So how resilient is the Mekong to development? Cambodia and Lao PDR, geographies worst affected by 
development schemes, are also the least resilient. With respect to institutional resilience to feedbacks, 
Cambodia and Lao PDR have the highest vulnerability and lowest adaptive capacity. Additionally, both 
countries have little capacity in the areas of development and struggle in fish production, flooding, and 
ecosystem health – areas all potentially affected by hydro development.  
Overall basin resilience determined at Medium-Low (1.8). The basin is weak in the area of resource to 
public infrastructure (R-PI), suggesting there is still little resilience or adaptive response capacity over how 
dams  and  natural  resource  development  affects  the  environment  and  stakeholders.  Likewise,  the 
relationship between PIPs and PIs lacks resilience suggesting that the governance and management of 
large public infrastructure projects is still problematic.  
There are signs of improvement in the RU-PIP and R-RU areas supporting largely by the MRC stakeholder 
forums  and  interaction  with  the National Mekong  Committees,  and  efforts  to  encourage community 
monitoring support for relocations on the Nam Theun 2 dam and Lao PDR and Pak Mun dam in Thailand. 
Current  response  to  mainstream  development  has  been  to  delay  for  10  years  however,  the  first 130 
 
mainstream project in Lao PDR has only been delayed for one year suggesting that plans will go ahead 
later in 2012.  
Threshold  resilience in the Mekong  Basin is extremely  sensitive in the ecosystem health, hydro, and 
fisheries sectors, and water quality is approaching problematic levels (Figure 2.35). While the ecological 
system in the basin remains resilient, its sensitivity to thresholds,  some of them biophysical  such as 
agricultural runoff, bank erosion, extreme dry seasons, others institutional such as urban runoff, over 
fishing, and rapid development on tributaries, suggest that some sectors are experience heavy stress.  
(2c)  Is the basin resilient at some scales and not others? 
Basin resilience is not uniform across all scales. Section 2.9 on vulnerability found that both vulnerability 
and resilience vary from district to district, province to province, and nation to nation across the Mekong 
Basin. The data in Section 2.10 also supports this finding particularly where Thailand has great adaptive 
capacity in several issues area than regional organizations that are thought to have resilient institutions. 
In addition, the impact of Stung Treng and Sambor hydropower projects in Cambodia and Pak Beng and 
Pak Lay projects in upper Lao PDR have a disproportionate effect on basin stakeholders . The vulnerability 
and resilience data from Section 2.9 confirm that those areas are the least resilient of the entire basin.  
At  the  provincial  scale,  there  is  substantial  variability  in  resilience  across  provinces  in  the  basin, 
particularly  in  Thailand  in  Viet  Nam.  However,  Cambodia  and  Lao  PDR  continue  to  have  the  lowest 
average provincial resilience and are the most senstivive to changes in fisheries as shown in Figure 2.36 
and 2.37.  
Are sub-basin scales more vulnerable to stress and more prone to conflict than larger scales? This is a 
difficult question to answer definitively. First, there is not a method (yet) to measure a single resilience 
score across several scales. The aforementioned analysis confirms that smaller scales such as district and 
provincial levels are more acutely affected by hydropower projects than larger scales. In some of these 
areas, particularly Pakse in Lao PDR due to very high rates of poverty, this province could experience 
higher vulnerability to dam development. Other than this, there data suggests there is no real difference 
in baseline resilience between provinces with and without potential dam impacts. It must be noted here 
that Tonle Sap provincial data was not available and this province is highly dependent on fishing for 
occupational livelihoods and protein intake.  131 
 
 
Figure 2.36: Provincial Resilience and Per Capita Dependence on Fishing in the Mekong Basin. GIS source: 
MRC; Fisheries data source: Hortle 2007. Provincial resilience is lowest while FWAE IFC and AIFC rates are 
highest in the per capita (kg/capita/year) around Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia. FWAE IFC (Fresh Whole 
Animal Equivalent weight Inland Fish Consumption) and AIFC (Actual Inland Fish Consumption). 132 
 
 
Figure 2.37: Provincial Resilience and Yearly Dependence on Fishing in the Mekong Basin. GIS source: MRC; 
Fisheries data source: Hortle 2007. FWAE IFC and AIFC yearly totals (tons/year) are highest in Viet Nam 
where provincial resilience is medium-low. 133 
 
Second, country level vulnerability clearly indicates that Cambodia and Lao PDR are highly vulnerability 
lacking fundamental resilience to rapid changes in freshwater ecosystems. Their adaptive capacity was 
also much lower than the regional response to ecosystems, hydropower, and fish production. 
In the Chapter 1 and Part A of the dissertation methodology, Chapter 2 applied a SES to the Mekong Basin 
and  determined  basin  resilience  (Figure  1.2).  In  the  next  Chapter  3,  I  will  evaluate  two  methods  to 
enhance basin resilience in the Mekong. This constitutes Part B of the dissertation methodology given in 
Figure 1.2.  
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3.  CHAPTER 3: BUILDING RESILIENCE ACROSS SCALE: REGIONAL 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT PREVENTION, AND COLLABORATIVE 
LEARNING IN THE MEKONG BASIN 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses enhancing resilience and capacity building across multiple scales in the Mekong 
basin through principles of conflict prevention and management, regional cooperation, and collaborative 
systems learning. There are processes that are claimed to enhance resilience in social-ecological systems 
(Berkes et al. 2003; Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 1990; Gunderson et al. 1995; Folk 2006).  
Water management is effectively conflict management (Postel and Richter 2003; Wolf 2007). Balancing 
competing  uses  is  the  foundation  of  Integrated  Water  Resource  Management  (IWRM).  How  can 
competing uses over water be managed while preventing and managing conflicts, particularly in regions 
where even the word “conflict” is not welcome? Some would take a security point of view (Dimitrov 2002; 
Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 2001; Toset et al. 2000) while others would advocate a more cooperative and 
collaborative approach to water management (Badenoch 2002; Buxton et al. 2003; Gerlak and Heikkila 
2006; Jaspers 2003; MacQuarrie et al. 2008; Margerum and Witall 2004; Wolf 1998, 2002; Yoffe et al. 
2003;  Zeitoun  and  Mirumachi  2008)  that  involves  stakeholders  as  part  of  the  participatory  process 
(Alaerts 2003; Daniels and Walker 2001; Hirsch  and Phanvilay 1998; Janprasart 2008). New forms of 
collaborative processes such as Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are emerging to address conflicts at 
the provincial and community scale (Jaspers 2003; Dore 2007; Warner 2007). Regardless of considerable 
progress  using  this  processes,  there  is  still  uncertainty  over  how  effectively  these  processes  address 
potential conflicts and whether or not they build capacity and resilience across multiple scales of water 
management in the Mekong Basin.  
Huitema et al. (2009) has reviewed research and literature in the water management sector and has 
found  that  collaborative  processes,  while  not  proven  definitively,  enhance  resilience  in  management 
social-ecological systems (Huitema et al. 2009). Collaborative Learning processes not only enhance and 
engage  stakeholders  in  the  water  management  process  they  increase  flexibility  and  crease  adaptive 
capacity  across  several  scales  in  basins  under  stress  (Berkes  et  al.  2003).  I  will  address  this  aspect, 
particularly the building of resilience in the Mekong Basin in this chapter.  
After laying out relevant details of the Mekong Agreement, I critically review the protections and conflict 
resolution aspects of the Agreement and document its vulnerability in the current institutional framework 
at the MRC. I also describe work ongoing to promote cooperation at the regional scale. This work is then 
used to evaluate conflict prevention and management activity at the MRC. I review the MRC’s strategy 
and articulate changes that strengthen the MRC conflict prevention and management strategy in the 150 
 
Basin, improving institutional resilience at the regional and sub-regional scales. This section is supported 
by work published in the GMSARN Journal in 2008 (MacQuarrie et al. 2008).  
In the next section, I design a pilot study to implement a collaborative decision-making process to manage 
environmental conflict at the sub-basin, or provincial scale. Working with Eco-Asia and the Environment 
Programme at the MRC, I apply a Collaborative Learning framework to specific environmental conflicts at 
provincial and community levels in the basin. 
This chapter addresses Part B of the dissertation methodology in Figure 1.2. A systems approach threads 
the two components of this chapter using a multi-scalar approach to cooperation, conflict prevention, and 
collaboration and learning. The previous paper developed a methodology for assessing basin resilience 
with much of the work focused on the substance, or substantive dimensions of basin resilience. This paper 
focuses on the process of building resilience at multiple scales in the Mekong Basin. 
3.2.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This  chapter  addresses  Part  B  in  Figure  1.2  of  the  dissertation  methodology.  It  studies  practical 
dimensions of systems and resilience theory in the Mekong River Basin. Its primary aim is to analyze 
Conflict Prevention and Management strategies across multiple in the basin in the context of building 
resilience, and apply the principles of Collaborative Learning to manage environmental conflicts.  
Therefore, the research questions for this study are: 
(3a)  Does the region (MRC in particular) have an effective Conflict Prevention and 
Management strategy that builds resilience across several scales?  
(3b)  Does Conflict Management and Collaborative Learning enhance resilience at sub-
basin scales? 
The research questions address capacity building and building resilience relating back to Part B in Figure 
1.2. In the final section, the results of the work are reviewed and research questions revisited.  
3.2.1.  Hypothesis 
The working hypothesis for this paper is: 
  Conflict Management and Collaborative Learning processes enhance basin resiliency and 
cooperation at the sub-basin scale.  
These processes have worked in North America and Europe but have not been tested in Southeast Asia. 
Another form of collaborative processes named Multi-stakeholder Platforms, or MSPs, have emerged in 
Asia. A review of activity in this area follows.  151 
 
3.3.  METHODOLOGY 
Referring back to Step 2 in Figure 1.2 of the overall dissertation methodology, in this chapter I address 
research questions (3a) and (3b) of how to build resilience across scales in the Mekong Basin outlined in 
Figure 3.1 below. First, in Step 1 in Figure 3.1, resilience at the regional scale is assessed in the context of 
Conflict Prevention and Management (CPM). I critically review the ecosystem protections in the current 
Mekong Agreement by looking at the presence or lack of, ecosystem protections in the 1995 Agreement 
followed by the MRC’s conflict resolution mechanisms. I then look at the cooperative mechanisms present 
at the regional level. Regional cooperative mechanisms are often implemented due to the lack of capacity 
either within the MRC or at the National scale. Finally, I complete an in depth analysis of the MRC’s CPM 
strategy and make recommendations for strengthening a multi-scalar approach to Conflict Prevention and 
Management in the Basin addressing research question (3a). 
 
Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 methodology applies a Collaborative Learning process to sub-basin environmental 
conflicts in the Mekong Basin. It addresses resilience across scales by using collaborative learning theory 
and conflict management strategies at the MRC. 
Second, in Step 2 in Figure 3.1, addressing conflicts at the district and provincial scale, a Collaborative 
Learning (CP) process pilot study is designed for two specific conflicts in the basin: bank erosion in the 
Chiang Rai/Bokeo region and transboundary issues in wetlands between Cambodia (Stung Treng) and Lao 
PDR  (Campassak).  Limitations  for  the  data  and  methods  used  are  addressed.  The  chapter  addresses 152 
 
resilience at the regional, provincial, and district scales by applying CPM and CP processes in the Mekong 
Basin.  
3.4.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The  following  section  briefly  outlines  work  on  Collaborative  Learning  theory  and  Multi-Stakeholder 
Platforms  in  the  Mekong  Basin.  The  two  processes  have  similarities  and  draw  upon  similar  public 
participation activities to build resilience and enhance capacity at sub-basin scales.  
3.4.1.  Collaborative Learning Theory 
Collaborative Learning is a combination of three related  theories that have overlapping yet mutually 
exclusive conceptual origins of thought. The first is conflict management (Deutsch 1973; Fisher 1997; 
Lederach 2003; Pruitt 1981; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Susskind and Field 1996). The field of conflict 
management  is  very  broad  and  covers  everything  from  interpersonal  relations  to  public  policy  and 
diplomacy.  
The second theory is learning theory (Dewey 1938; Kolb 1984; Knowles 1980; Senge 1990). This approach 
identifies  the  procedural  attributes  and  sequencing  of  Collaborative  Learning  activities  that  leads  to 
creative and inspiring thought. A subset in this field also deals with organizational learning and how to 
learn effectively and efficiently.  
The third thread in Collaborative Learning theory is systems theory or systems thinking (Churchman 1968, 
Checkland 1981, Wilson and Morren 1990). This discipline assumes that situations are characterized by a 
complex set of relationships that often occur simultaneously. This is in direct contrast with most rational 
deduction-based thought that uses a linear reductionist thinking process. In this type of thinking, many 
mutually related issues may crop up within a current situation at the same time, and solutions to complex 
problems often have unintended consequences. Collaborative Learning comes from a strong foundation 
in contemporary thinking about how people think, process information, deal with different viewpoint and 
goals, and how best to organize their thinking about complex and dynamic situations (Daniels and Walker 
2001).  
Collaborative Learning seeks to help stakeholders generate a set of improvements in a situation of mutual 
concern. It seeks and sets a group on cycle of improvements through creativity and engagement. A key 
aspect  of  Collaborative  Learning  is  that  the  process  requires  involvement  of  all  stakeholders  in  the 
process. The primary focus is to get outcomes – it is not a talking shop. The process stresses improvement 
rather than solutions, it emphasizes situation rather than problem or conflict, it focuses on concerns and 
interests rather than positions, it targets progress rather than a solution, it encourages system thinking 153 
 
rather than linear or reductionist thinking, it recognizes the importance of considerable learning before 
improvements  can  be  made,  and  it  incorporates  learning  and  progress  through  communication  and 
negotiation interaction (Daniels and Walker 2001). It uses a five or six stage process and this is covered 
later in Section 3.7.9.  
3.4.2.  Multi-Stakeholder Platforms in Southeast Asia 
A new trend in stakeholder engagement has emerged over the last ten years having similar attributes to 
Collaborative Learning, it is called Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, or MSPs. MSPs appear as networks for 
cooperation  and  negotiation  involving  multiple  sectors  or  actors  within  a  watershed.  Warner  (2007) 
describes MSPs as a “decision-making body (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders 
who perceive the same resource management problem, realize their interdependence for solving it, and 
come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem” (Warner 2007, 2).  
MSPs are new and there is still effort to apply them in specific situational settings. The literature focuses 
on three main objectives for MSPS, 1) MSPs as a mechanism of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2) a tool 
for adaptive management, and 3) a vehicle for democratization and emancipation. Jaspers (2003) agrees 
that  MSPs  play  a  vital  role  in  conflict  prevention  and  resolution.  This  sounds  very  similar  to  the 
Collaborative  Learning  process  and  MSPs  embrace  complexity  and  systems  thinking  as  part  of  its 
structure.  
There has been progress with MSPs in the Mekong Basin over the past few years. In Northeast Thailand, 
an academic research group named M-POWER, have been working with of Multi-Stakeholder Platform 
meetings on the Mekong Basin (Dore 2007). Dore has been involved with the facilitation of MSPs for a few 
years  and  has  termed  the  process  as  “water  governance”  indicating  that  decisions  over  water 
management are considered and made during MSP meetings.  
His  analysis  of  the  MSP  process  has  evolved  into  four  “tracks.”  Track  1  is  a  more  formal  process 
recognized by officials outside the process. Track 2 is semi-official and widens the scope to include civil 
society, UN agencies, IGOs, etc. Track 3 is unofficial and focuses on research, dialogue and advocacy 
efforts led by civil society and is largely activist. And Track 4 is unofficial civil society (and locally) led 
governance processes that are activist and outside the traditional power structure.  
Examples  of  Track  1  water  governance  forums  include  the  MRC  intergovernmental  process  and 
negotiation of new Navigation Agreement between China, Burma, Lao PDR, and Thailand in 2000. Track 2 
type forums have included ESCAP technical meetings about water allocation policies and a review of ADB 
policy on decision-making about large-scale water resources projects 2000. Track 3 forums have included 
the  Mekong  Learning  Initiative  1998+  and  forums  of  the  Oxfam  Mekong  Initiative  and  the  Mekong 154 
 
Regional water governance network 2003+. This includes an IUCN-convened Mekong Region roundtable 
at the World Conservation Congress in Bangkok 2004 (Dore et al. 2010). Finally, Track 4 forums are mostly 
led by civil society such as the International Rivers Network advocacy against projects such as Nam Theun 
2 dam in Lao PDR, meetings of the Dam Affected People and their Allies in 2003, and the Thai Baan 
Research and dialogue groups that were led by villagers boost the understanding of communities and 
government officials on the links between rivers, wetlands, and rural livelihoods (Dore 2007, 214-221).  
The work in this chapter supports and builds upon capacity building work already going on the Mekong 
Basin. Collaborative Learning is a process that fits nicely into the MSP framework taken root in much of 
the basin.  
3.5.  REGIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE MEKONG BASIN 
This section addresses Step 1 in Figure 3.1 by first giving a historical perspective of cooperation in the 
Mekong Basin. It then critically reviews the 1995 Agreement that creates the Mekong River Commission 
and  the  organization’s  strategy  for  sustainable  management  of  the  basin,  particularly  looking  at 
protection of ecosystem provisions. The section then looks at regional cooperation and management 
institutions that exist in the basin.  
3.5.1.  History of Cooperation on the Mekong 
Beginning at over 4500 meters elevation in the Tanggula mountain range in Qinghai province, the Mekong 
flows for over 4800 km through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam, terminating in 
the South China Sea, draining some 795,000 square kilometers (Figure 3.2). Thailand and Laos both share 
the highest percentage of area in the basin with 23 and 25 percent, respectively, while Laos contributes 
the greatest amount of flow (35 percent) (MRC 2005). Viet Nam has the highest population density at 236 
persons per square kilometer and the lowest percent of basin area at only eight percent, posing potential 
concerns with respect to its political influence (TFDD 2004). The Mekong’s annual flow vary widely based 
on the monsoon season, ranging from 78.8 to 475 cubic kilometers dry to rainy seasons, respectively 
(UNEP et al. 2006).  
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Figure 3.2: Topographic Map of the Mekong. Source: USGS. 
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The Mekong faces some monumental challenges in the years to come. Over 21 percent (21%) of the basin 
is eroding with only 31 percent (31%) of its original forests left intact and only 5 percent (5%) under 
protection (UNEP et al. 2006). Two percent (2%) population growth over the next 50 years combined with 
increasing environmental degradation leads the UNEP to predict severe and negative impacts in the areas 
of stream flow, pollution, loss of habitat, fish populations, and community health to those who rely on the 
Mekong for their livelihoods (UNEP et al. 2006). What is needed to prepare for these changes? 
The Mekong River Basin has one of the most significant institutional histories of river management with 
regional  dialogue  on  transboundary  water  cooperation  dating  back  to  the  early  1950s.  In  1957,  the 
Mekong Committee was established with assistance from the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The Committee brought together Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and (then) 
South Viet Nam (Nguyen 1999). The 1957 Agreement was shaped by the political goals of the emerging 
nation-states, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, following the withdrawal of France. It was motivated by a 
general consensus on the benefits that could be gained from developing the waters of the Mekong, 
particularly in the areas of hydropower, navigation and irrigation. The Committee continued to negotiate 
throughout  the  Viet  Nam-America  war,  during  which  time  South  Viet  Nam  and  Laos  maintained  a 
generally cooperative relationship with Thailand. However, the war halted development initiatives and 
many of the planned projects were never put into effect (Hirsch et al. 2006). 
Before the Agreement was signed, a 1952 ECAFE study, undertaken with the cooperation of the four 
lower riparians - Cambodia , Laos , Thailand , Viet Nam - noted the Mekong 's particular potential for 
hydroelectric  and  irrigation  development.  As  a  result  of  that  study,  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation 
completed  a  report  on  planning  and  development  on  the  lower  basin  in  1955-56,  urging  joint 
management in developing the river. The study noted that data was needed for river basin planning and 
emphasized the importance of data collection and analysis and coordination of activities (TFDD 2008). To 
facilitate coordination, the report suggested the establishment of an international body for exchanging 
information and development plans between the riparian states. Ultimately, the report suggested, such a 
body might become a permanent agency responsible for coordinating joint management of the Mekong 
basin. When the report was presented in the tenth-anniversary meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok in March 
1957,  representatives  from  the  four  lower  riparian  states  themselves  adopted  resolution  calling  for 
further study. The report also noted that harnessing the main stem of the river would allow hydropower 
production, expansion of irrigated land, a reduction of the threat of flooding in the delta region, and the 
extension of navigability of the river as far as northern Laos (Diokno and Chinh 2006; Nguyen 1999).  
In 1975, still under the auspices of the Mekong Committee, the Joint Declaration of Principles for the 
Utilization  of  the  Waters  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  was  signed  in  Bangkok.  The  Joint  Declaration 157 
 
emphasized “resources of common interest” and effectively gave riparian states a veto power over plans 
by other nations to divert water from the mainstream. However, implementation of the 1975 Agreement 
was impeded by conflict and political reform. Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos all underwent changes in 
political regime following the end of the Viet Nam-America war. As a result, in 1976 and 1977 the Mekong 
Committee did not meet, and looked set to fail (Nguyen 1999). 
In 1978, Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam established an interim body (the Interim Mekong Committee) to 
encourage  the  continuation  of  dialogue.  Cambodia,  under  the  rule  of  the  Khmer  Rouge,  did  not 
participate  in  the  Interim  Committee,  and  the  Committee  was  therefore  limited  in  its  capacity  to 
undertake Basin-wide planning. This partial collaboration continued until 1991 when Cambodia resumed 
negotiations with the other Lower Basin countries. However, they could not reach agreement on a draft 
Mekong Committee Declaration, primarily due to a disagreement between Viet Nam and Thailand over 
the diversion of water by the upstream state as part of the planned Khong-Chi-Mun project. Thailand 
pushed for a review of the 1975 Joint Declaration, the principles of which had guided cooperation in the 
Interim Committee (Diokno and Chinh 2006). 
The UNDP intervened in the early 1990s, establishing a Working Group to investigate future collaboration. 
It was during Working Group meetings in 1993 and 1994 that the draft Agreement on the Cooperation for 
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement) was developed.  
3.5.2.  The Mekong Agreement 
The Mekong River Basin has one of the most significant institutional histories of river management. On 5 
April  1995,  the  Mekong  Agreement  was  signed  by  Thailand,  Lao  PDR,  Viet  Nam  and  Cambodia.  The 
Agreement codified principles of regional cooperation and established the Mekong River Commission. 
Under  the  Agreement,  MRC  member  countries  agree  to  cooperate  in  all  fields  of  sustainable 
development, and in the utilization, management and conservation of water and related resources in the 
Mekong  River  Basin  –  for  example,  navigation,  flood  control,  fisheries,  agriculture,  hydropower,  and 
environmental protection.  
The emergence of the Mekong Agreement and the MRC in 1995 was “win” for international peace and 
cooperation in a region plagued by geopolitical conflict throughout the preceding decades. This unique 
cooperative relationship has been  characterized as the “Mekong Spirit”  – defined by mutual respect 
between  riparian  states  and  a  willingness  to  engage  in  dialogue  towards  cooperative  river  basin 
management (Hirsch et al. 2006). Dialogue between riparian states continued in one form or another 
from the early 1950s through to the present day. The Mekong Agreement includes many of the provisions 158 
 
of the previous Mekong Committee Rules for Water Utilization and reflects the principles and wording of 
international watercourse law.
13 
The Mekong Agreement and the MRC represent a new initiative, with governments working to  develop 
new territories for cooperation that supersede past antagonisms and build on succes sful initiatives in 
regionalism. While not diminishing the significance of historical cooperation in the region, it is important 
to recognize that inter-governmental negotiations within the Mekong cooperation framework have been 
shaped by the area’s recent emergence from a history of ideological dispute and violent regional and 
internal conflict. 
3.5.3.  Agreement Framework 
The framework of the Mekong Agreement, the MRC, has a three-tiered institutional structure comprising 
a Ministerial Council, a Joint Committee and a Secretariat. The Council is the highest body within the 
organization  and  is  responsible  for  overseeing  MRC  activities  and  directing  MRC  policies.  The  Joint 
Committee  is  responsible  for  implementing  Council  initiatives  and  supervising  the  activities  of  the 
Secretariat (MRC 2005b). 
The Secretariat, currently based in Vientiane, is responsible for the day to day administration of MRC 
affairs and for the development and implementation of MRC programs. For reasons of neutrality, the 
Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the  Secretariat  is  of  non-riparian  nationality.  In  order  to  maintain  a 
representative number of riparian staff, the Secretariat has a policy of employing equal numbers of staff 
from each member state. Under MRC policy, to enable a greater number of riparian staff to benefit from 
working within a river basin management organization, staff tenure is limited to six years. 
The Secretariat is intended to provide the knowledge base and river science that is necessary to support 
planning and decisions that are in the Basin’s best interests. To this end, the Basin Development Plan 
(BDP)  is  emerging  as  the  overarching  framework  for  integrating  river  knowledge  into  development 
decision-making.
14 The BDP has been instrumental in transforming the Secretariat from an  organization 
                                                                 
13 For example the definition of “reasonable and equitable utilization” found in the Mekong Agreement is taken from 
the Helsinki Rules developed by the International Law Association; see Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, 
Helsinki, 1966, International Law Association, London 1966. The Helsinki Rules were replicated to a large extent in 
the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
14 Article 2 of the Mekong Agreement obliges members “To promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the 
development of the full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of 
Mekong River Basin waters, with emphasis and preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and 
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(under  the  old  Mekong  Committee)  that  essentially  presented  a  menu  of  infrastructure  projects  to 
donors,  into  a  process-oriented  river  basin  organization  that  could  plan  the  development  and 
management of the river in a truly sustainable and equitable way (MRC 2008a). 
In support of the BDP came two other core programs. The Water Utilization Program has been charged 
with  developing  a  sophisticated  hydrological  modeling  system  to  enable  agreement  on  and 
implementation of water-sharing rules. The Environment Program enables the MRC to understand the 
implications of different development scenarios for the ecology of the river and therefore also for the 
diverse agricultural and fisheries-based livelihoods that depend on it.  
In addition to these two programs, Fisheries and Flood Mitigation and Management (FP, FMMP) were 
established to develop expertise in key sectors, both to support line agency management in riparian 
member countries, and to feed into the core programs so that collective governance decisions by the 
Joint Committee and Ministerial Council could be well informed. 
In  parallel  with  the  intergovernmental  governance  structure  of  the  MRC  are  the  National  Mekong 
Committees (NMCs). Although the NMCs are not mentioned in the Mekong Agreement and thus have no 
legal  status  at  a  regional  level,  they  nevertheless  play  an  important  role.  They  are  responsible  for 
coordinating the work of the MRC within each of the riparian member states. They also coordinate the 
representation of each member state at the MRC. The composition, capacity and effectiveness of NMCs 
vary considerably from one country to another.  
3.5.3.1.  Basin Development Plan (BDP) 
The  1995  Agreement  charges  the  Mekong  River  Commission  Joint  Committee  (MRC-JC)  with  the 
formulation of a Basin Development Plan (BDP) in order to: 
“promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the full potential of 
sustainable benefits to all riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of the 
Mekong Basin waters, with emphasis and preference on joint and/or basin-wide 
development projects and basin programmes” (MRC 2008).  
Using the principles of Integrated Watershed Resource Management (IWRM), the BDP process promotes 
the coordinated development and management of water and related resources, in order to maximize 
economic  and  social  welfare  in  a  balanced  way  without  compromising  the  sustainability  of  vital 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
basin programs through the formulation of a basin development plan, that would be used to identify, categorize 
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ecosystems  (GWP,  2002).  This  requires  the  preparation  of  information  that  informs  discussion  and 
decisions on achieving an acceptable balance between development of the basin and maintenance of its 
ability to sustain livelihoods and environmental values. 
The IWRM-based BDP comprises three elements: 
  Development Scenarios, which assess the potential and constraints for the further 
development of some of the water resources in the various parts of the Mekong Basin. 
The results will guide the formulation of the IWRM-based Basin Strategy and the project 
portfolio. 
  An IWRM-based Basin Strategy, which provides a long-term view of how the Mekong 
Basin may be developed in a sustainable manner for poverty reduction. The strategy will 
also guide the implementation of the IWRM at basin, national and sub-basin levels, and 
assist line agencies with preparation of plans and projects that are sensitive to resource 
protection issues. 
  A project portfolio of structural (investment) projects and supporting non-structural 
projects, as envisioned in the 1995 Agreement, to develop some of the Mekong Basin’s 
water and related resources and minimize harmful effects that might result from natural 
occurrences and man-made activities (MRC 2008a). 
It is therefore, the mandate of the MRC-JC, who delegates this responsibility to the Secretariat (MRCS), to 
development the BDP process using IWRM principles. Importantly, these lead up to issue of collaborative 
management. First, IWRM principles must be applied at all scales of water governance – basin, sub-basin, 
and community levels. Secondly, the list of structural projects must be evaluated against the Basin’s water 
related  resources  to  minimize  harmful  effects  from  natural  or  man-made  occurrences.  Third,  the 
development scenarios, which assess the impacts of future development on the Basin, will use IWRM 
principles, most notably public participation and stakeholder involvement in the development process as 
well as the application and understanding of costs and benefits of water uses across the Basin. Due to the 
complexity  of  the  decisions  that  need  to  be  made,  the  collaborative  learning  model  approach  is 
recommended to engage stakeholders in the planning process. (MRC 2008b). 
The overall purpose of the BDP is therefore to identify, categorize, and prioritize projects and programs at 
the basin level, upholding the Agreement by vetting the water project such that no harm comes to the 
Basin.  By  using  IWRM,  the  economic  and  social  welfare  is  protected  in  a  balanced  way  without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. Reaching this balance is looking to be problematic. 
The  economic  development  and  poverty  alleviation  element  is  closely  linked  with  environmental 
protection.  Some  have  said  that  hydropower  development  on  the  Mekong  and  environmental 
stewardship  are  incompatible  (SEARIN  2004;  Lebal  et  al.  2007).  Issues  over  the  calculation  of 
environmental flows have come up often and were on the agenda at the BDP Stakeholder Consultation 161 
 
Forum  in  March  2008  (MRC  2008c).  While  the  section  on  freshwater  ecosystems  gives  mention  to 
maintenance of flows, water quality, aquatic ecosystems, and protection of watershed functions, the 
program lacks specifics in these areas. It does indicate that development scenarios, currently being fast-
tracked,  must  assess  the  costs  and  benefits  of  these  services  (MRC  2008d).  This  section  could  be 
strengthened  considerably  by  using  methods  and  rules  established  by  the  IUCN  on  instream  flow 
calculations (Dyson 2003). The Mekong Agreement is vague on this point, stating: 
“to protect, preserve, enhance and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions 
and maintenance of the ecological balance exceptional to this river basin” (MRC 2005b: 
Chapter 1) 
The agreement does state that it is the responsibility of the JC to maintain a minimum monthly natural 
flow, however, how this is calculated is vague (MRC 2005b: Chapter 3, Articles 3, 5-7).  
3.5.3.2.  Ecosystems Protections within the Mekong Agreement 
The following are specific references to ecological balance and/or environmental conditions found in the 
1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
Chapter 1: Preamble: REAFFIRMING “…protect, preserve, enhance and manage the environmental and 
aquatic  conditions  and  maintenance  of  the  ecological  balance  exceptional  to  this  river  basin”  (MRC 
2005b). 
Article 3: Protection of the Environment and Ecological Balance. “To protect the environment, natural 
resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or 
other harmful effects resulting from any development plans and uses of water and related resources in 
the Basin” (MRC 2005b). 
Article 5: Reasonable and Equitable Utilization.   “To utilize the waters of the Mekong River system in 
a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective territories, pursuant to all relevant factors and 
circumstances, the Rules for Water Utilization and Inter- basin Diversion provided for under Article 26 and 
the provisions of A and B below:  
A.  On tributaries of the Mekong River, including the Tonle Sap, intra-basin uses and inter-
basin diversions shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee. On the mainstream 
of the Mekong River:  
1.  During the wet season: 
a)  Intra-basin use shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee. 
b)  Inter-basin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at 
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2.  During the dry season: 
a)  Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at 
an agreement by the Joint Committee.  
b)  Any inter-basin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee 
through a specific agreement for each project prior to any proposed diversion. 
However, should there be a surplus quantity of water available in excess of the 
proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, verified and unanimously 
confirmed as such by the Joint Committee. An inter-basin diversion of the 
surplus could be made subject to prior consultation” (MRC 2005b, 3-4). 
Article 6: Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream. “To cooperate in the maintenance of the flows on 
the mainstream from diversions, storage releases, or other actions of a permanent nature; except in the 
cases of historically severe droughts and/or floods:  
A.  Of not less than the acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each month of 
the dry season; 
B.  To enable the acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take place during the 
wet season; 
C.  To prevent average daily peak flows greater than what naturally occur on the average 
during the flood season.  
The Joint Committee shall adopt guidelines for the locations and levels of the flows, and monitor and take 
action necessary for their maintenance as provided in Article 26” (MRC 2005b, 4). 
Article 7. Prevention and Cessation of Harmful Effects. “To make every effort to avoid, minimize and 
mitigate harmful effects that might occur to the environment, especially the water quantity and quality, 
the aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and ecological balance of the river system, from the development 
and use of the Mekong River Basin water resources or discharge of wastes and return flows. Where one 
or more States is notified with proper and valid evidence that it is causing substantial damage to one or 
more riparians from the use of and/or discharge to water of the Mekong .River, that State or States shall 
cease immediately the alleged cause of harm until such cause of harm is determined in accordance with 
Article 8” (MRC 2005b, 4). 
It seems that the Agreement has plenty references to ecosystems, three to “ecosystems balance,” four on 
“environment,” seven on “flow,” and three on “protect.” The Agreement attempts to address concerns 
over the naturally functioning ecosystems. But does it? It is a challenging task and requires the preparing 
and  synthesizing  information  that  informs  discussion  and  decisions  on  drawing  a  balance  between 
development  of  the  basin  and  maintenance  the  variety  of  uses  on  the  basin,  such  as  fisheries 
management, promotion of safe navigation, irrigated agriculture, watershed management, environment 
monitoring, flood management and hydropower options, while also maintaining the ability to sustain 163 
 
livelihoods and environmental values. What are the treats facing freshwater ecosystems on the Mekong? 
How does the institutional process control the proposal of “new” uses by member countries? 
3.5.3.3.  Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement 
After  development  a  set  of  guidelines  for  the  utilization  of  water  in  1999,  called  the  Mekong  River 
Commission (MRC) Council’s Resolution of the Water Utilization Programme, and later the decisions of 
the MRC Joint Committee in 2003 to form the Establishment of the Technical Drafting Group 4 for the 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement, the Procedures for Notification, Prior 
Consultation,  and  Agreement  was  signed  and  put  into  force  in  2003.  In  addition,  institutional 
arrangements for the monitoring and maintenance of flows and water quality on the main stream were 
approved  in  2006.  These  instruments  define  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  MRC  Council,  Joint 
Committee, and Secretariat in the dissemination of data and information pertaining to sustainable use of 
the Mekong waters (MRC 2008e).  
Of particular interest are the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA). In 
the 1995 Agreement, any proposed use for inter-basin diversions or intra-basin diversions during the dry 
season. Proposed run-of-the-river dams are considered intra-basin uses, and if characterized only to affect 
the wet season, could only require “Notification” to get approved (agreement). PNPCA stipulates that 
“Notification”  includes  feasibility  study  reports,  implementation  plans,  or  schedules  and  data.  “Prior 
Consultation” on the other hand, includes the requirements for “Notification” in addition to providing 
additional technical data and information on the proposed use of waters with respect to evaluation of 
impacts on the other riparian States. Therefore the primary distinction between “Notification” and “Prior 
Consultation” is that  
1)  Proposed Intra-basin or Inter-basin uses or transfers on Tributaries of the Mekong only require 
“Notification,” and therefore don’t mandate transboundary impact assessments 
2)  Proposed Intra-basin uses, for example run-of-the-river dam projects, only stipulate a 
“Notification” process, thereby avoiding transboundary environmental or social impact 
assessments 
3)  The “notification” procedure lacks the requirement of transboundary environmental or social 
impact assessments, directly conflicting with Article 7: Prevention and Cessation of Harmful 
Effects. 
The institutional mechanisms in the agreement leave same gaps that the MRC and the Water Utilization 
Programme have attempted to address with the Procedures listed above however, the jury is out on 
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3.5.3.4.  Effects of Agreement on Tributaries 
One of these gaps is the development gap on tributaries of the Mekong. Firstly, it is clear that tributaries 
of the basin affect the mainstream, albeit some more than others. Together, the Se San, Se Kong, and Sre 
Pok bains contribute 25 percent of the mean flow volume of the Mekong mainstream at Kratie. The case 
of the Yali Falls Dam on the Sesan River, a tributary of the Mekong, is a case where a transboundary 
impact environmental assessment (EIA) was not carried out until it was too late. And when it was, it was 
not shared with the Cambodians, who were directly downstream of the project. The EIA was funded by 
the Swiss government, who probably should have known better. Even though the project began in 1993 
before the 1995 Agreement on the Mekong, it was under the watch of the Interim Mekong Committee 
and the hydrological impacts downstream were known in 1996 before the project went into operation in 
2000. As a result of the lack of notification and prevention of harm downstream, the Yali Falls project had 
significant and large-scale environmental, social, and economic impacts on riparian communities living in 
Viet Nam and Cambodia. Attempts at mitigation and compensation for harm done are still unsolved 
(Wyatt and Baird 2007). The region is shown in Figure 3.3. 
The Yali Falls project exposes another deficiency in the 1995 Agreement. The lack of EIA requirements in 
the  Notification  Procedure  puts  tributary  and  potentially  wet-season  mainstream  projects  in  direct 
conflict with Article 7 in the 1995 Agreement (Bruch et al. 2007). Wyatt and Baird (2007) summarized 
impact data collected from a number of NGOs. They indicate that over 55,000 people from 90 villages 
were adversely affected by the Yali Falls project due to unusual flooding events resulting in the loss of 
property,  crops,  livestock,  including  deaths.  Due  to  the  unusually  flows,  the  fishery  and  terrestrial 
ecosystems are declining, and reports indicate that larger species are declining at a faster rate. Villagers 
have reported that less fish are affecting their food sources. The causes of this are thought be increased 
sediment  load  and  turbidity  (Wyatt  and  Baird  2007).  Along  these  lines,  monthly  household  incomes 
dropped from US$ 109 in 1996 to US$ 46 in 1999, a 137 percent reduction in monthly household income. 
Similarly, household property losses were conservatively estimated at US$ 800,000 and probably much 
higher (Wyatt and Baird 2007).  
Another noticeable downstream impact of the Yali Falls dam is bank erosion resulting  in  the loss of 
riverbank agriculture. Many communities rely on fishing and agricultural production from crops such as 
tobacco, eggplant, chilies, etc. Diurnal fluctuations in the water levels have significantly affected these 
crops on the Sesan River.  165 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Projects on Mekong Tributaries. Yali Falls is situated in the Viet Nam highlands on the Sesan 
River that drains downstream into Cambodia. 
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3.5.3.5.  Lack of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms in the Agreement 
Having said all that, the MRC has attempted to respond as per its 1995 mandate. It helped to set up the 
Cambodia-Viet Nam Joint Committee for the Management of the Sesan River in 2000. This falls under the 
Article 34, 18C, and 24F provisions (Art34-18C-24F) in the 1995 Agreement. Under Article 34, the MRC 
drives the process of reaching agreement. If the parties cannot come to an agreement, Article 35 is 
invoked and the issue goes back to the governments for bilateral negotiations, if they so desire. This takes 
the process completely out of the hands of the MRC and its institutional mechanisms (Hirsh and Wyatt 
2004).  
There has been criticism of this method of dispute resolution mainly due to the fact that it does not 
continue to press the governmental actor to resolve the process should they not find it in their interests 
to do so. The process is also is unclear if a third party is involved, as is the case in many transboundary 
issues, particularly in the 3S (Sesan, Sre Pok, and Sekong) River Basins. It looks as though the institution 
mechanisms to prevent or manage conflict imbedded in the Mekong Agreement are not entirely robust. 
And based on the increasing threats facing the region, they may need to be overhauled. 
3.5.4.  Emerging Threats to the Mekong Basin System 
The Mekong faces monumental challenges in the years to come. Over 21 percent (21%) of the basin is 
eroding  with  only  31  percent  (31%)  of  its  original  forests  left  intact  and  only  5  percent  (5%)  under 
protection (UNEP et al. 2006). Two percent population growth over the next 50 years combined with 
increasing environmental degradation leads the UNEP to predict severe and negative impacts in the areas 
of stream flow, pollution, loss of habitat, fish populations, and community health to those who rely on the 
Mekong for their livelihoods (UNEP et al. 2006). What is needed to prepare for these changes? 
Water management is, by definition, conflict management. There is no such thing as managing water for a 
single purpose as all water management is multi-objective and based on navigating competing interests. 
Within  a  nation  these  interests  include  domestic  users,  agriculturalists,  hydropower  generators, 
recreation enthusiasts, and environmentalists - any two of which are regularly at odds, and the chances of 
finding  mutually  acceptable  solutions  drop  exponentially  as  more  stakeholders  are  involved.  Add 
international boundaries and the chances decrease exponentially yet again (Wolf 2007). 
With a flow of over 475 million cubic meters in the wet season, the Mekong has massive hydropower 
potential. The MRC estimates that up to 30,000 MW can be attained from the Mekong Basin, 13,000 MW 
on the mainstream, another 13,000 MW from Lao tributaries, and the remainder from Cambodian and 
Vietnamese sources. China has already built two dams on the mainstream of the river, producing 2,850 167 
 
MW, and has 12 more dams planned. Current projections indicate power demands in excess of 70,000 
MW by 2020, placing power as a large development constraint in the Mekong region (MRC 2001) 
As  many  developed  rivers  have  found,  large  hydropower  schemes  can  have  drastic  implications  on 
freshwater ecosystems. As development of the Mekong River’s water resources continue, the flow regime 
of the river will change, triggering changes in the river ecosystem and in the lives of people living in the 
Basin. The great dependence by the majority of the Basin’s people on the products and services from the 
natural ecosystem necessitates that development decisions require balancing of the economic and social 
benefits of development with the environmental and social costs. A wide range of data is needed to 
inform  these  decisions.  This  is  where  the  Integrated  Basin  Flow  Management  (IBFM)  work  being 
undertaken by MRC is focused, aiming to provide information and knowledge to decision makers of flow 
changes and their consequences (MRC 2006a).  
3.5.5.  Regional Scale: cooperative activities toward conflict prevention at the 
MRC 
As the Mekong sub-region develops, riparian countries have been constructing dams, dikes, irrigation 
infrastructure,  and  navigational  waterways  that  potentially  impact  river  livelihoods.  A  challenge  for 
countries in the Mekong region is the adoption and implementation of policies and practices that enable 
participatory  and  collaborative  engagement  for  planning  and  development,  that  support  sustainable 
development, and that both protect vital ecosystems and promote economic and social prosperity, while 
ensuring prevention, management and mitigation of conflict. Regional institutions in the Mekong region 
are working to enhance regional cooperation through several mechanisms such as strategic partnerships, 
conflict  management  training,  public  participation,  stakeholder  involvement,  and  institution  building 
(Hackett 2007). 
The  Mekong  River  Commission  (MRC)  fosters  inter-governmental  cooperation  among  the  four  lower 
Mekong  countries  of  Cambodia,  Lao,  Thailand,  and  Viet  Nam.  The  MRC  and  the  National  Mekong 
Committees (NMCs) have a mission to preserve the natural resources and environmental quality of the 
river basin while promoting the interdependent and economic growth of the Mekong region. The MRC’s 
goal is to achieve this mission through participatory and collaborative decision-making within and among 
the Mekong countries (MRC 2006b). 
3.5.5.1.  Cooperative Partnerships 
The  MRC  Strategic  Plan  for  2006-2010  includes  Goal  2  for  the  MRC  to  enhance  effective  regional 
cooperation. One objective under this goal is, “To identify potential transboundary issues for negotiation, 
mediation  and  conflict  prevention,  and  develop  mediation  and  conflict  management  capacity”  (MRC 168 
 
2006b).  To  achieve  this  objective, the  MRC  is  working  to  develop  new  mechanisms  and  institutional 
arrangements for addressing transboundary issues and differences in cooperation with international and 
regional  development  partners.  One  such  partner  is  Planning  and  Development  Collaborative 
International,  or  PADCO,  which  implements  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development 
(USAID)  Environmental  Cooperation-Asia  (ECO-Asia)  Governance  project  (PADCO  2007).  The  MRC’s 
strategic partnership with ECO-Asia aims to promote collaboration by the adoption of improved conflict 
prevention policies, plans, and mechanisms at regional and national levels. Cooperative arrangements 
between partners such as the MRC and ECO-Asia serve to provide a foundation to enhance regional 
cooperation in Basin activities and increase capacity for joint planning, cooperation, and resolution of 
transboundary water-related issues in the Mekong region (MRC 2006b). 
3.5.5.2.  Water Conflict Prevention and Management Training 
Joint MRC and ECO-Asia workshops on conflict prevention and management are aimed at strengthening 
human and institutional capacity, including facilitating the identification of potential transboundary issues 
across  the  wide  range  MRC  program  activities  including  the  environment,  flood  management  and 
mitigation,  agriculture,  irrigation,  forestry,  and  watershed  management,  navigation,  fisheries,  basin 
development planning, and water utilization. In addition to helping develop capacity at the MRC in the 
prevention and resolution of transboundary issues, training activities also promote cooperation between 
the MRC Secretariat and National Mekong Committees (NMCs) in each of the four member countries and 
line agencies. These activities are designed to dovetail into existing MRCS and NMC programs. Feedback 
from  stakeholders  and  partners  has  indicated  that  training  should  be  focused  on  general  conflict 
prevention and resolution tools and techniques (Viriyasakultorn 2007). 
Water conflict prevention management  training aims to enhance regional cooperation  through three 
levels of learning objectives. The first type of training encompasses introductory training in transboundary 
water conflict prevention, management and cooperation. It provides a broad overview of transboundary 
water issues, basic knowledge, principles and practices in cooperation, and prevention and management 
of  conflict.  This  type  of  training  is designed  specifically  to  build  awareness  and  improve  the general 
understanding of conflict prevention and management practices for several target stakeholder groups 
within the Basin (Viriyasakultorn 2007). 
The second type of training focuses on building skills in facilitation and mediation at the national and line 
agency level. In the Mekong region, training is aimed at NMCs and line agencies, which may be called 
upon  to  assist  with  potential  transboundary  issues  or  differences.  Their  responsibilities  include 
information  sharing  and  facilitation  of  meetings,  activities  requiring  key  skills  essential  to  effectively 
address potential conflict involving shared water. In this setting, the training is designed to assist staff to 169 
 
carry out these tasks effectively, employing exercises and practices aimed at developing practical skills 
rather than concepts. Examples of skills emphasized in this area include communication, negotiation, 
facilitation, and mediation (Viriyasakultorn 2007).  
The third type of training being conducted is directed toward policy makers and senior water managers. It 
is critical that these participants have some knowledge of national, regional, and international legal issues 
relating to water. Policy implications are best understood using real life examples, and case studies and 
event analysis play a large role in developing these skills with policy makers (Viriyasakultorn 2007).  
Finally, all the water conflict prevention and management material is combined into a cohesive package. 
Training programs need to be modular so that skills and concepts can be delivered in bite-size, digestible, 
and practical chunks. Hydropolitics and transboundary water are included in the conceptualization of 
international water, stages of water conflict transformation, water use and international law, and the 
effect  of  boundaries  on  basin  management  (Lederach  2003).  The  states  of  negotiation,  a  critical 
component to managing water conflict, are put in the context of environmentally-based disputes. The 
training then moves to the concept of benefit sharing and institutional capacity, an active ingredient in 
preserving  peace  and  cooperation  in  transboundary  waterways.  Moving  to  more  practical  training, 
specific skills in water conflict prevention and management are taught, including but not limited to public 
and stakeholder participation, collaboration, alternative dispute resolution, negotiation, mediation, and 
other conflict management methods. These concepts, combined with collaboration, communication, and 
negotiation skills, have the potential to yield significant transformations in participants involved. Initiating 
shifts in the thinking and attitudes of participants is an integral part of a complete and successful conflict 
prevention management training program. Additionally, tools such as databases, GIS, and other mapping 
tools provide systematic ways of understanding transboundary water conflict prevention and help to 
furnish current and legitimate data for making accurate situational assessments. Using data in addition to 
case  studies  provides  powerful  examples  of  how  conflict  can  be  transformed  into  cooperation  and 
reinforces  cooperative  approaches  to  resolving  water  issues  (Wolf  1998;  Hackett  2007;  MRC  2006b; 
PADCO 2007; Viriyasakultorn 2007; Lederach 2003; Jaspers 2003; Alaerts 2003). 
3.5.6.  Cooperative management institutions and collaborative processes - 
examples 
Much of the research internationally confirms that cooperative management organizations emphasizing 
collaborative processes can reduce potential conflict by including conflicting interests in decision-making, 
providing  forums  for  negotiation  and  discussion,  building  trust  and  confidence  through  stakeholder 
collaboration,  and  encouraging  stakeholder  and  participatory  involvement  in  basin  planning  and 
development projects (Alaerts 2003; Jaspers 2003). Examples of basins employing these methods include 170 
 
the Nile and Columbia River Basins, among others. Some of these principles and approaches may be 
developing in the Mekong region. 
Civil society has a potential role in these institutions, although its role is not fully being realized in the 
Mekong region. Badenoch (2002) makes the point that the lack public involvement in national planning 
activities permeates into regional institutions, suggesting that the role of stakeholders and civil society in 
organizations  such  as  the  MRC  is  limited  (Badenoch  2002).  Compared  with  European  and  American 
standards this may be the case, however regional organizations such as the MRC are involving civil society 
directly through integrated basin development planning (Janprasart 2008). 
Phase  II  of  the  MRC’s  Basin  Development  Plan  (BDP)  facilitates  various  degrees  of  stakeholder 
participation through a number of mechanisms, ranging from public hearings, consultations, sub-area 
forums, to multi-stakeholder forums or “regional multi-stakeholder dialogues” *Janprasart 2008, 33+. The 
forums provide an ongoing mechanism for civil society to provide input into the planning process while 
Regional Technical Working Groups (RTWGs) involve the academic community in basin planning details. 
BDP  has  also  created  its  own  training  program  aimed  at  capacity  building  at  regional,  national,  and 
community groups. In this respect, the MRC is tapping into civil society, NGOs, and the NMCs through its 
regional  planning  process  despite  the  absence  of  stakeholder  involvement  at  the  national  level  – 
championing a regional-based collaborative approach to basin planning. 
Some observers are critical of collaborative approaches to decision-making in river basins, and fear they 
complicate  regional  cooperative  approaches  to  water  governance.  They  think  that  these  local-based 
efforts may exacerbate tensions and strain relations between riparians (Margerum and Witall 2004). The 
problem with these claims is similar to the water wars debate already  discussed; there is simply an 
overwhelming amount of credible evidence to the contrary.  
3.5.6.1.  Nile basin 
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an example of collaborative management of a river basin at a regional 
level.  Its  mission  is  to  cooperatively  share  the  river,  share  substantial  socioeconomic  benefits,  and 
promote regional peace and security in the Nile Basin. The NBI started its organizational development 
with a participatory process of dialogue among the riparians (10 countries), resulting in an agreement on 
a shared vision to “achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, 
and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources” (NBI 2007). In addition to providing security 
and peace among Nile riparians, the NBI also ensures that cooperation and action is taken jointly. The NBI 
contains the NBI Strategic Action Program, which has two main legs: the Shared Vision Program (SVP) and 
Subsidiary  Action  Programs  (SAP).  The  SVP  contains  the  primary  coordination  component,  focusing 171 
 
activities on stakeholder involvement, capacity building, and training, including on-the-ground activities. 
By 2004, more than US$35 million dollars had been allocated toward these activities by donor countries 
(Metawie 2004). Outside funding has been a key component to the NBI’s success in building institutions 
that are long-standing, stable, and well-defined resulting in cooperation rather than conflict in the basin 
(Jägerskog  et  al.  2007).  The  evolution  of  cooperation  has  been  largely  process  focused,  building 
collaborative structures and sustainable institutions at both the national and regional levels, expanding 
capacity in water uses, and importantly, building trust amongst riparian states. 
3.5.6.2.  Pacific Northwest 
Conflict resolution through collaborative management is actively working in the Pacific Northwest on the 
Columbia  River  Basin.  The  Northwest  Power  and  Conservation  Council  (NPCC),  is  an  example  of  an 
institution that is responding to ecological and institutional dilemmas, bringing together federal, regional, 
state, local and tribal actors. It was authorized by the 1980 Northwest Power Act (NPA) that prompted 
Oregon,  Washington,  Idaho,  and  Montana  to  enter  an  interstate  agreement  for  devising  basin-wide 
planning for energy conservation and fish and wildlife protection and restoration in the Columbia River 
Basin (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). Federal, regional, state, county, tribal, and local agencies are working 
together to integrate recommendations for fish and wildlife management while considering the region's 
needs for efficient, economical, and reliable power. The Bonneville Power Administration operates most 
of the dams on the Columbia River and is tasked by the NPA with funding the majority of costs for the 
NPCC’s Fish and Wildlife Program. Other federal agencies involved in managing the basin's dams and 
hydropower, like the Corps of Engineers, are responsible for acting in accordance with the plans devised 
by the council. Importantly, the NPCC also cooperates with the BPA and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
in managing the Columbia Basin Treaty (CBT) between the United States and Canada (Muckleston 2003).  
In  the state of Oregon, local watershed councils are working with agencies to restore the ecological 
integrity of the Columbia River Basin as well as other basins in Oregon. While also motivated by federally 
mandated Endangered Species Act (ESA), local stakeholders and private landowners are making decisions 
and taking actions on the ground, improving the quality of their respective watersheds, and interacting 
with agencies at many scales of governance. Communities are developing social and institutional capacity 
at multiple scales, involving local, tribal, state, and regional and federal stakeholders in the process. 
The  contemporary  trend  in  river  basin  management  is  to  organize  into  integrated  units  –  around 
hydrological  boundaries.  Many  communities  in  river  basins  are  seeking  new  ways  to  cooperate  and 
participate  to  avoid  conflict,  resulting  in  the  emergence  of  new  and  innovative  governance  models. 
Throughout  this  important  but  at  times  erratic  process,  a  few  lessons  are  available.  Stakeholder 
participation is critical to institutional effectiveness. Institutions that plan and carry out significant water 172 
 
resources  management  measures  without  stakeholder  involvement  often  end  up  reworking  major 
projects  or  paying  large  (legal)  mitigation  costs.  In  fact  cost  recovery  is  proving  to  be  elusive  when 
stakeholders are left out of the planning process of many water projects (Jaspers 2003).  
Alaerts (2003) lists a number of distinctions that separate water management necessities from other 
resources. Importantly, he provides an analytical framework to model successful river basin institutions 
and  institutional  frameworks,  placing  cooperative  and collaborative decision-making  with  stakeholder 
involvement firmly in the center of the model. Moreover, his analysis shows that “smaller is better,” 
meaning that decisions made at the lowest levels have the greatest chance of success (Alaerts 2003). 
3.6.  A MULTI-SCALAR CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR THE MRC 
The purpose of this section is to provide a framework for a conflict prevention and management strategy 
at the MRC, including activity endorsed by the NMCs and MRCS, and supported by Eco-Asia and MRCS 
Programmes. This document scopes current activity within the MRC providing a future strategic focus for 
conflict prevention and management at the MRC. This section is based on work done while working at the 
MRCS in 2008. This section also addresses Step 1 of the chapter methodology from Figure 3.1. 
3.6.1.  Drivers and Need 
Global drives to reduce poverty and increase the supply of safe, sufficient, and affordable water supplies 
to Southeast Asia are driving the needs for improved regional services and infrastructure. Many regional 
organizations, such as the GMS, ASEAN, ESCAP, and others, are promoting regional integration through 
supporting projects that improve economic development in the region, many involving water supply and 
sanitation for smaller communities. The water sector is gaining more and more attention in each of these 
regional cooperative organizations.  
In addition to regional development in SE Asia, recently water resources development in the Mekong 
Basin has been accelerated, in particular, in the hydropower and irrigation water sectors. The primary 
drivers behind this development include high oil and natural gas prices that make hydropower projects 
more financially attractive, sharp rises in the price of rice that make irrigation from economically feasible, 
and the hydrological potential of the Mekong River Basin, a reality that upstream riparians, primarily 
China, have already began to realize and develop.  
Population in the Mekong region is expected to reach over 90 million by 2025, growing at between 2 and 
2.5 percent per year in the Basin. With a population of only 55 million currently, demographic shifts such 
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minorities,  will  put  new  a  pressing  needs  on  water  priorities  and  development  (Mekong  River 
Commission, 2003).  
With a flow of over 475 million cubic meters in the wet season, the Mekong has massive hydropower 
potential, with estimates of up to 30,000 total MW available in the Basin, 13,000 MW on the mainstream, 
13,000 MW from Lao tributaries, and the remainder from Cambodian and Vietnamese sources. China has 
already built four dams on the mainstream of the river, producing over 3,000 MW, and has up to eight 
more  dams  planned.  Current  projections  indicate power  demands  in excess  of  70,000  MW  by  2020, 
placing power as a large development constraint in the Mekong region. Laos, Viet Nam and Cambodia all 
want to develop their hydropower potential as well.  
3.6.2.  MRC Mandate 
Given these drivers and their implications on basin development, the MRC Strategic Plan 2006-2010 Goal 
2  “To  enhance  effective  regional  cooperation”  involves  and  seeks  to  implement the  development  of 
dispute  resolution  and  compromise  mechanisms  such  as  co-management,  public  involvement,  and 
institution building – establishing links at various scales across the MRC with existing and emerging sub-
basin organizations. As a result, Programmes within the MRCS are responding to basin conditions that 
have the potential produce conflicts between water sectors and among countries share the costs and 
benefit of current and planned water development projects in the Basin.  
The 1995 Mekong Agreement provides a full range of options for promoting and facilitating cooperation 
and coordination, and addressing contentious issues, differences and disputes through Articles 7, 8, 10, 
18C, 24F, 34, and 35.  There is no mandate in the 1995 Agreement for MRCS or the CEO to mediate or 
otherwise be directly involved in addressing and resolving differences and disputes, unless and until the 
Joint Committee (JC) may so direct; however, activities and capabilities of MRCS to provide timely data 
and information, and analyses, and perhaps even forecast potential problems to avoid differences or 
disputes are available (ECO-Asia, 2007). 
Articles 34 and 35 expressly provide for the resolution of inter-State disputes. Article 34 provides that the 
Commission “shall make every effort to resolve the issue” in accordance with the MRC Council’s dispute 
resolution function under Article 18C and JC’s dispute resolution role under Article 24F. Rule 18 of the 
Rules of Procedure of Council and Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the JC provide further detail on the 
respective  dispute  resolution  functions  of  each  MRC  body.    Article  35,  which  applies  where  the 
Commission is unable to resolve the dispute in a timely manner, suggests that the Governments may, “by 
mutual agreement, request the assistance of mediation through an entity or party mutually agreed upon, 
and thereafter to proceed according to the principles of international law” (ECO-Asia, 2007).  174 
 
The underlying rational for the MRC to address conflict issues is based on its 1995 mandate – to promote 
cooperation of the development of shared resources in the Mekong River Basin. As understood by FMMP 
Working Paper 1 on enhancing cooperation in addressing transboundary flood and related issues, the 
MRCS  has  no  clear  mandate  or  role  to  directly  engage  in  dispute  resolution  through  mediation, 
negotiation, conciliation, or arbitration unless specifically requested by the JC. The MRCS does, however, 
have an important role to support the Council, Joint Committee (JC), and Member States by gathering, 
assessing, and analyzing data and information and report preparations (Mekong River Commission, 2007).  
Therefore, it is critical at this stage in the development of the Mekong Basin that the MRC, in particular, 
the MRCS, take an active role in facilitating the enhancement of cooperation and prevention or mitigation 
of incidents that may give rise to differences and disputes in the Mekong Basin. The Basin Development 
Plan is designed to embody this active role by leading the Basin in an IWRM ethos and present a number 
of development scenarios for the Basin.  
3.6.3.  Recent Progress toward a Basin-Wide Strategy 
In order to help facilitate cooperation and enhance conflict prevention at the MRC, Eco-Asia and EP co-
organized an Inception Workshop in June 2006 with both NMCs and MRCS representatives. The objective 
of the workshop was to identify potential areas for cooperation in support of implementing Goal 2 of the 
MRC Strategic Plan 2006-2010. Following the Inception Workshop and as part of the joint program on 
conflict prevention and management, the MRCS and Eco-Asia had a brainstorming meeting in February 
2007 that outlined current and potential activities relating to conflict prevention and management within 
the MRCS. Results from this meeting are shown in Table 3.1. A complete list of these activities is listed in 
Appendix F. 
Since 2007, significant progress has been completed on commitments made between Eco-Asia and MRCS 
Programmes. While not all activities listed in Table 3.1 have been undertaken and completed, activities 
that have been accomplished and are ongoing are 
  Development of terminology related to conflict prevention and management 
  Development of a hotspots map that identifies existing or potential transboundary issues 
  Development of an inventory of transboundary case studies and best practices 
  Assessment of historical events and trends in the Mekong River Basin (not undertaken) 
  Development of tools and capacities on awareness-raising and skills development (ongoing) 
  Transitioning of skills development to the country level  
  Development of a Collaborative Learning Process (CLP) Pilot study to address conflict prevention 
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In  addition,  MRCS  Programmes  have  intensified  their  activities  towards  conflict  prevention  and 
management. Their broad goals and activities are outlined in the next section. The Flood Management 
and Mitigation Programme (FMMP) and Basin Development Programmes (BDP) are taking active roles in 
this regard.  
At  the  time of  the brainstorming  meeting  in 2007,  there  was  only marginal  support  for  institutional 
strengthening activities at the MRC due to a number of factors, NMC support, MRCS executive priorities, 
and MRCS Programme activity. As a result, Eco-Asia directed its efforts primarily on situational analysis, 
capacity building, and training activities, suspending its work on institutional strengthening.  
Table 3.1: MRC/ECO-Asia Conflict Management Program Focus Areas Identified by NMCs. Source: Eco-Asia 
2007. 
MRC-ECO-ASIA CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (2007) 
Focus Areas  Potential Activities 
Situational 
Analysis 
Develop inventory of existing or potential transboundary issues in the basin 
Prepare needs assessments (both institutional and capacity) 
Assess historical events and trends of transboundary issues in the basin 
Institutional 
Strengthening  
Develop MRC Conflict Management Strategy (joint work program for implementing Goal 2 and/or 
operational approach linked to MRC public participation strategy) 
Support development of institutional analysis of MRC and Member Country relationships – identify 
roles and responsibilities, key challenges, etc. 
Strengthen existing or develop new mechanisms for implementing 1995 Mekong Agreement 
Capacity 
Building 
Develop common terminology and materials in local languages 
Assign national focal points 
Provide regional tools and training (awareness raising and skills development – joint fact finding, 
mediation, etc.) 
Help transition skills development to country level 
Support development of river basin committees 
 
In the last two years, the situation at the MRC has changed dramatically. MRC Programmes have begun to 
engage in conflict prevention activity, albeit not labeled as such, both BDP and the Executive at the MRCS 
have new staff, the Joint Committee have requested that the MRCS become more engaged in conflict 
prevention  activity,  and  country  hydropower  development  activity  has  increased  substantially.  These 
factors, among others, have placed the MRC into a completely new paradigm – one not seen before in its 
history. The prospect of rapid development in the basin with virtually no barriers to its implementation 
puts the MRC in a unique position to not only plan for sustainable development, but also enable and 
management development activities and implementation at the basin scale. This includes taking action to 
prevent potential barriers to development, as explicitly requested by the countries.  176 
 
3.6.4.  Flood Management and Mitigation 
Component 3 of FMMS focuses on conflict prevention and management toolbox development for floods. 
Analysis of the 1995 Mekong Agreement implies that the Agreement not only provides a mandate but 
also  a  general  guidance  to  MRC  for  addressing  differences  and  disputes  that  might  arise  between 
members of the MRC as a result of operation of the Agreement. A set of administrative tools is suggested 
to complete the modalities of the Agreement. Administrative tools offered to the Member Countries, on a 
voluntary basis, provide a guidance process in addressing differences and disputes (MRC 2007). 
In  addition  to  the  administrative  tools,  a  set  of  technical  tools  for  exploring  the  cause-and-effect 
relationship between human interventions and flood conditions, the consequently the impacts on socio-
economic and environmental conditions is essential for MRCS to support and facilitate any fact-finding 
processes. These are considered core tools for the process of addressing differences and disputes in trans-
boundary flood issues under the MRC framework. Furthermore, the international, regional and national 
“best” practices, instruments and case studies as well as training material compiled and disseminated in 
Output 1 are also formed as an important part of the toolbox (MRC 2007). 
3.6.5.  Basin Development – BDP2 
BDP2 is leading a comprehensive effort to strengthen institutional capacity at the MRC by implementing 
its Basin Development Plan Programme 2. BDP2 conceptualizes basin planning; namely as consisting of a 
planning process, a knowledge basis and assessment tools, and capacity to run the process by applying 
the knowledge base and the tools. Its four programme components are to: (C1) Programme management 
and communication, which umbrellas over all subsequent components; (C2) Rolling IWRM-Basin BDP; (C3) 
Knowledge base and assessment tools; and (C4) IWRM-Basin planning capacity (MRC 2008). 
Under  C1  the  BDP2  strategy  tactically  supports  Components  C2-4  and  specifically  supports 
communication, coordination, and information exchange with various stakeholder groups, including MRC 
programmes, NMCs, national line agencies, RBOs, civil society, the private sector, development banks, 
and other international and regional organizations. Activities directly supporting conflict prevention and 
management  under  C1  include  enhancing  methodologies  and  practices  for  public  participation, 
interaction  with  national  planning  and  line  agencies  through  MRC/NMC/BDP  working  groups,  and 177 
 
improved dialogues on shared development opportunities and transboundary issues with stakeholders 
(MRC 2008).
15 
3.6.5.1.  IWRM 
As part of C2, BDP2 solicits input from stakeholders on basin-wide development scenarios through various 
shared  visioning,  meetings,  reports,  and  consultations.  This  process  will  yield  an  IWRM-basin  based 
strategy, of which a draft has already been circulated, which includes stakeholders and the JC in the 
approval  process.  The  purpose  of  the  IWRM  strategy  is  to  lay  out  the  long-term  goals  and  specific 
objectives of basin development and management, provide strategic directions for further development 
of the basin (tributary and mainstream), provide a planning framework for the basin, relating regional, 
national, and sub-basin levels, and to allocate responsibilities for implementation of the strategy to key 
target groups (MRC, member countries, etc.).  
3.6.5.2.  Basin Development Scenarios 
A  key  aspect  to  the  IWRM-basin  based  plan  is  the  design  and  evaluation  of  scenarios  for  basin 
development,  in  particular,  the  construction  and  implementation  of  dams  on  the  mainstream  and 
tributaries of the Mekong Basin. In concert with the 1995 Agreement, the evaluation of scenarios follows 
a  triple  bottom  line:  environmental  protection,  social  development,  and  economic  development  – 
measured  against  an  equitable  distribution  of  benefits  model.  Using  tools  such  as  DSF,  consultants, 
stakeholder consultations, and others, the scenarios and stakeholder feedback, or Project Portfolio, and 
facilitation of trade-offs will be presented to the JC for consideration (end of 2010) (MRC 2008).  
Scenario formulation consists of a series of hydropower scenarios and their representative physical and 
management characteristics. The first is the Baseline Situation, which represents development conditions 
in the year 2000. The Definite Future Situation contains two scenarios, the Chinese Dam Scenario, which 
includes  the  Baseline Scenario  plus  the hydropower  cascade  being  developed  in  the  Lancang (Upper 
Mekong Basin), and the Definite Future Scenario, which comprises of the Chinese Dam Scenario plus 
significant water development projects in the LMB tributaries, such as Nam Theun 2, Nam Ngum 2, and 
others. The Planned Development Options contains three development scenarios, the first of which is the 
LMB  Tributary  Dam  Scenario,  which  comprises  of  the  Definite  Future  Scenario  plus  the  tributary 
hydropower projects that may be developed in the next 20 years (there are over a 100 on the books 
among Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Viet Nam). The second is the LMB Mainstream Dam Scenario, which 
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contains the Definite Future Scenario plus the currently studies mainstream dams on the Mekong (there 
are 9 dams being studied for the mainstream). The third is the Twenty-Year LMB Plan Scenario which 
includes the LMB Tributary Dam Scenario plus the LMB Mainstream Dam Scenario plus any diversions 
planned for the mainstream, plus any other development planned for the Mekong tributaries within the 
next 20 years.  
The BDP2 process uses a combination of stakeholder involvement, knowledge base and assessment tools, 
and  IWRM  principles,  importantly,  development  scenarios,  to  prevent  and/or  manage  conflict  over 
development choices in the Mekong Basin. Consequently, activities supporting and strengthening this 
process are activities that contribute to institutional resilience and conflict prevention and management 
capacity at the MRC. 
3.6.6.  Capacity Building at the MRC 
This strategy focuses on a broad range of activities aimed enhancing capacity building through conflict 
prevention  and  management  development  at  regional,  national,  and  local  levels  within  the  MRC. 
Activities include developing a common terminology and materials in local languages, assigning national 
local  focal  points,  providing  regional  tools  and  training  (skills  development  and  awareness  training), 
providing transition skills development to the country level, and supporting development of river basin 
committees.  
Institutional strengthening involves the development of a MRC Conflict Management Strategy that would 
support a joint working program for implement Goal 2 and/or an operational approach linked to the MRC 
public participation strategy. Secondly, this strategy supports development of institutional analysis of 
MRC and Member Country relationships and seeks to identify roles and responsibilities and key challenges 
for the same. Lastly, the strategy strengthens existing or develops new mechanisms for implementing the 
1995 Mekong Agreement in the context of conflict prevention and management.  
3.6.6.1.  Training Activity across Multiple Programmes 
Eco-Asia has developed a comprehensive training program on conflict prevention and management for 
NMCs, line agencies, and MRC programme staff. Topics of the program include transboundary water 
issues; conflict management approaches; public involvement; consensus building; and collaboration and 
dispute  resolution  tools  and  techniques.  Skills  emphasized  in  the  training  include  communication, 
negotiation, facilitation, and mediation (Eco-Asia 2008).  179 
 
In 2008, Eco-Asia delivered two, two-day introductory courses for approximately 30 persons. In 2009, a 
five-day  skills-based  course  will  be  delivered  for  approximately  30  persons,  linked  closely  to  the 
collaborative decision-making pilot activities described below.  
Eco-Asia has also been exploring the potential of developing longer-term training program on conflict 
management within the MRCS, including an implementation role by ICBP. This includes train-the-trainers 
(TOT) programs, which would include taking training to individual NMCs in official riparian languages (Eco-
Asia 2008). 
These training activities are cooperating widely with MRC programmes, including EP, FMMP, BDP, FP, NP, 
WSMP, and ICBP. It is clear that various MRCS programmes, such as EP, FMMP, FP, and WSMP, are all 
seeking  enhanced  knowledge  and  skills  in  similar  aspects  of  conflict  prevention  and  management 
capacity. Eco-Asia’s training program applies well across many if not all of these programme objectives. In 
addition  to  designing  and  delivering  the  CPM  training,  Eco-Asia  will  provide  resource  persons  and 
workshop  facilities  support,  including  providing  resource  personnel  from  the  U.S.  Army  Corps  of 
Engineers, Oregon State University, and UNESCO (Eco-Asia 2008).  
3.6.6.2.  BDP Specific Capacity Building 
Components  3  and  4  (C3  and  C4)  both  support  the  IWRM-based  basin  development  plan  (C2).  In 
particular,  IWRM-based  planning  capacity  (C4)  has  been  designed  to  build  capacity  for  basin-wide 
planning activities, resulting in BDP2 regional training program (draft TOR circulated). The plan addresses 
three main components of C4:  
1)  Development Scenarios, including the development of the Project Portfolio,  
2)  An IWRM-based basin strategy, which provides a long-term strategy on how the 
Mekong Basin may be developed and managed, and importantly, a framework within 
which the Project Portfolio will be designed and implemented, and  
3)  A Project Portfolio of large-scale water resources development projects and supporting 
non-structural projects that would continue to develop in the basin.  
These trainings and associated activities support conflict prevention and management through a variety 
of methods. Firstly, they enhance knowledge and skills in scenario-based river planning, and combined 
with stakeholder participation, reduce or possibly eliminate the occurrence of disputes over proposed 
water uses within the Basin. Secondly, they help to integrate IWRM principles and approaches at the 
MRCS and NMC levels, emphasizing the multi-functional uses of water across various national planning 
sectors, and defining the roles of regional, national, and local and sub-basin institutions and stakeholders 
in the planning and decision-making process of water development. Finally, the training will build capacity 180 
 
within BDP specifically, and enable the MRC to participate in the facilitation of basin trade-offs during the 
scenario-based decision-making process.  
The proposed training presents introductory skills on scenario-based planning and assessment tools, the 
application of these tools to BDP2, application of IWRM principles and planning approaches, with some 
training of trainers at the sub-area level, and understanding, facilitation, and negotiation of trade-offs in 
the basin development planning process.  
3.6.7.  SEA – A BDP Planning Framework 
The BDP plan follows a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) approach – a range of “analytical and 
participatory  approaches  that  aim  to  integrate  environmental  considerations  into  policies,  plans  and 
programs and evaluate the inter-linkages with economic and social considerations” (OECD 2006, 17). The 
relationship between SEA, EIA, and other environmental assessment tools is shown in Figure 3.4 below. 
Applying SEA to development co-operation on the Mekong could produce benefits for both decision-
making procedures and development outcomes.  
 
Figure 3.4: Relationship between EA, SEA, CEA, and EIA. Source: Environmental Resources Management 
2002, 9. Environmental Assessments are new to the Mekong Basin. The relationsihp between SEA, CEA, 
and EIA is not always clear in planning and practise.  
It potentially offers environmental evidence to support more informed decision making, and identifies 
new opportunities by encouraging a systematic and thorough examination of development options. SEA 
also helps to ensure efficient and sound management of natural resources and the environment in an 
effort to provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth and development – a goal of the 1995 
Mekong Agreement. Critically important for the Mekong Basin, SEA can assist in building stakeholder 181 
 
engagement for improved governance, facilitate trans-boundary co-operation over shared environmental 
resources, and contribute substantially to conflict prevention activities at the MRC (OECD, 2006). 
3.6.8.  Environment Programme Activity 
The EP has been asked by the JC to address hotspots (already completed) and in 1998 was mandated by 
the Council to prepare guidelines for a Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (TbEIA) system. 
The TbEIA guidelines were envisaged to complement EIA procedures for the MRC Member States in 
relation  to  transboundary  issues,  thereby  taking  further  steps  towards  preventing  conflict  over 
environmental  issues  in  the  Basin.  The  TbEIA  Framework  is  triggered  when  a  proponent  proposes  a 
development project which requires EIA under national legislation of the member state of origin and 
which  has  the  potential  to  cause  significant  transboundary  environmental  impacts  within  another 
member state. The Framework is designed to be triggered no later than when the need for an EIA under 
national legislation of the member state of origin is identified. The development of TbEIA procedures have 
not been approved by the JC and are still under revision. 
As part of the ongoing effort to address transboundary hotspots, having already identified geographical 
identified potential areas of concern, Eco-Asia in cooperation with EP is implementing a collaborative 
learning pilot study. As a next step in the hotspot mapping process, the Collaborative Learning Process 
(CLP)  is  a  managed  and  proven  response  to  potential  conflicts  over  geographical  and  substantial 
environmental issues. The CLP pilot is the first of its kind in the Mekong River Basin and will provide 
crucial guidance for other Programmes working on conflict prevention and management at local scales, 
such as FMMP, Fisheries, BDP, Navigation, and the Watershed Project.  
An important contribution to conflict prevention and management on the Mekong is the Integrated Basin 
Flow Management (IBFM) program. This effort produced some important findings, the first significant 
attempt quantify potential costs and benefits of development options in the basin. An important finding 
was  an  economic  assessment  providing  a  first  approximation  of  the  value  of  all  the  major  present 
attributes and beneficial uses of the river system and of how these could change with a changing river. 
Some beneficial uses (e.g. fisheries) could be expected to decline and others (e.g. hydro‐electric power) to 
increase. The study also conducted a social assessment of how the changing river could impact both 
positively and negatively ‐ people living near the river and in the Basin. The study identified significant 
shortcomings in the IBFM process, particularly the failure in addressing  the distribution of costs and 
benefits of development options. These opportunities are addressed further in the section on Gaps.  182 
 
EP has also taken on the role of informal secretariat for the Working Group on Transboundary Conflict 
Prevention and Management (TCPM-WG) at the MRCS. Activities include co-organizing meetings with 
Eco-Asia and coordinating and sharing best practices across MRC programmes and projects.  
3.6.9.  Conflict Prevention and Management Working Group 
As a result of the increased cooperation over conflict prevention and management, the MRCS established 
a  Working  Group  on  Transboundary  Conflict  Prevention  and  Management  (TCPM-WG)  composed  of 
representatives from range of MRC programmes, including EP, ICCS, FMMP, FP, BDP, NP, WSMP, and 
ICBP.  EP  hosts  the  informal  secretariat  function  for  the  Working  Group,  coordinating  with  all  MRC 
programmes and NMCs and line agencies (Eco-Asia Work Plan 2008).  
3.6.9.1.  WUP – Conflict Management Procedures 
The Water Utilization Programme (WUP) hosts the Decision Support Framework (DSF) and five sets of 
procedures  with  supporting  technical  guidelines  –  all  providing  a  cornerstone  of  cooperation  and 
prevention of conflictive issues linked to other key programmes at the MRC. The DSF provides technical 
and scientific models for analyses of data and information for the MRC programmes and projects, and is 
relevant to addressing key issues, differences, and applications of procedures. The five sets of procedures 
agreed under the WUP and member countries and the World Bank are: 
  Procedures for Information and Data Exchange and Sharing (PDIES 11/01) 
  Procedures for Water Use Monitoring (PWUM 11/03) 
  Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA 11/03) 
  Procedures for Maintenance of the Flows on the Mainstream (PMFM 12/05) 
  Procedures for Water Quality (PWQ 2007) 
3.6.9.2.  Fisheries – Working with Stakeholders 
Fisheries are involved with stakeholders at the local scale. As many transboundary issues are local in 
nature, Fisheries are interested in applying conflict prevention and management concepts and skills at the 
local level with the objective of preventing conflicts over resource uses, promoting capacity building and 
strengthening  local/community  co-management  and  problem  solving  on  local,  national,  and  some 
regional issues. The collaborative decision-making process is designed particularly for this purpose. In 
addition, Fisheries need skilled people in this area, and the collaborative process could help provide an 
“active” process to achieve these goals.  183 
 
3.6.10.  Gaps 
There are a number of potential gaps in the current conflict prevention and management strategy at the 
MRC. The first and most obvious gap is the lack of a comprehensive conflict prevention and management 
strategy at the MRC. This document hopefully addresses this issue.  
3.6.10.1.  Trade-off Facilitation Process  
There  is  recognition  by  BDP  that  trade-off  facilitation  capacity  is  needed  at  the  MRC  however,  the 
methods for achieving this are not identified specifically. A clear process of how to manage development 
trade-offs, or the distribution and differences between costs and benefits, with stakeholders, NMCs, and 
the MRC structure, i.e., use of the Council and JC is needed. While there are various consultations and 
reviews as part of the formulation of the assessment of basin development scenarios, the process of how 
stakeholders  will  influence  the  trade-off  outcomes  is  not  yet  well  understood.  The  MRC,  and  BDP 
specifically, may want to increase engagement with the JC on decisions affecting development trade-offs.  
Capacity building/training activities are currently being planned for BDP – however it is too early to tell 
whether or not these activities will translate into process improvements. Plans to use a simulated trade-
off facilitation session may be a useful method to anticipate potential conflict zones surrounding decisions 
between water sector trade-offs. 
In order to ensure development scenarios are equitable and sustainable, it is important to thoroughly 
understand  and  model  the  potential  for  unequal  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits.  The  draft  IWRM 
strategy addresses these issues, but more clarification is needed to ensure an optimal balance between 
economic,  environmental,  and  social  outcomes  (triple  bottom  line)  in  the  LMB  and  each  country 
individually. It is unclear if the Sub-area Forums or BDP/Transboundary meetings will adequately address 
these issues. BDP should coordinate with other Programmes and take the lead on collecting this data. 
3.6.10.2.  Trade-off Facilitation tools 
There a host of tools available for trade-off facilitation between BDP, NMCs, and stakeholders. More 
clarity  is  needed  on  what  tools  will  be  used  and  when  they  will  be  implemented  in  the  trade-off 
facilitation process. For example, modeling or forecasting environmental effects, only a few new tools are 
available,  such  as  network  analysis  or  GIS,  and  EP’s  environmental  ‘toolbox,’  and  IBFM’s  suite  of 
economic,  social,  and  environmental  indicators  –  which  are  meant  to  simulate  and  evaluate  natural 
resource livelihoods and national economics – are still not well developed and not accepted by NMCs.  184 
 
Additionally, the tools for analyzing scenario alternatives such as multi-criteria analysis, risk assessments, 
cost/benefit analysis, etc., are need further refinement in order to accurately reflect the gravity of the 
decisions made enabling successful facilitation of policy decisions made by member countries.  
For example, vulnerable communities, such as subsistence fishers and farmers that rely on traditional and 
natural  functioning  of  the  river  will  most  likely  benefit  from  mainstream  hydrological  modeling 
predictions. Most development scenarios now predict a severe negative social impact due to a decline in 
fish production on the Mekong (MRC 2006). Without well informed pre-assessment information from 
these sectors and groups, the effects of development scenarios will not be well understood or accepted. 
3.6.10.3.  Trade-off data format 
In addition to a better defined trade-off facilitation process, the format of trade-off data needs to be 
explicitly defined. Results from the IFBM study highlighted shortcomings in the distribution of costs and 
benefits  from  development  scenarios.  In  addition  to  calculating  the  net  annual  value  of  the  various 
beneficial uses and changes in employment and subsistence livelihoods for each of the various water 
sectors and countries in the LMB, experience in other basins have shown that the spatial and geographic 
distribution  of  costs  and  benefits  are  equally  important  when  developing  the  water  sector.  An 
unfavorable response to development by some disadvantaged groups coupled with bearing the costs of 
development could easily become a source of conflict.  
3.6.10.4.  Tributary and Sub-basin Focus 
Essential to the implementation of a conflict prevention and management strategy, is the appropriate 
geographic scope. Much of the emphasis on basin development scenarios is focused on the mainstream 
and  the  prevention  of  transboundary  conflict  –  i.e.,  prevention  or  mitigation  of  events  that  cross 
international boundaries. However, increasingly, the MRC is involved with issues on tributaries – while 
still most having transboundary implications – the future development scenarios suggest that potential 
conflict over development issues will be located on tributaries rather than mainstream projects. In the 
case  with  Yali  Falls,  the  MRC  acted  to  help  setup  the  Cambodia‐Viet  Nam  Joint  Committee  for  the 
Management  of  the  Sesan  River  in  2000.  As  the  basin  develops  and  countries  build  hydrologic 
infrastructure  within  their  own  boundaries,  the  impact  of  water  releases  and  flows  are  increasingly 
interconnected.  
In response to this reality, management of potential impacts from tributaries needs to be well understood 
at not only the basin level, but also the country scale. Appropriate tools to enable this understanding, 
such as country-level DSF capability, currently being developed at the MRC and implemented to NMCs, 
are  critical  to  building  this  multi-scalar  conflict  prevention  and  management  capacity.  The  Sub-area 185 
 
analyses  and  Sub-area  Forums  are  a  step  in  the  right  direction  with  regard  sub-area  planning  and 
Transboundary meetings for and conflict mitigation, however, more tools are needed to enable the NMCs 
and stakeholders to fully understand economic, environmental and particularly social consequences of 
water development at the sub-basin scale. 
3.6.11.  Conflict Prevention and Management Strategy for the MRC 
Given the context and development scenarios facing the MRC, a joint strategy to prevent and manage 
conflict  in  the  Mekong  Basin  is  now  critical.  The  Mekong  is held  up  as  a  model  for  cooperation  for 
international basin organization, and now faces the many challenges of rapid development for the first 
time in its history. While development has been planned in the past, these plans were not implemented. 
Research into the basin development suggests that rapid development can produce conflict between 
riparians. Therefore, it is important that the MRC take appropriate measures within the mandate of 1995 
Agreement to avert potential conflicts in the basin. See Figure 3.5 below. 
Surveys  of  the  past  and  recent  activity  at  the  MRC  suggest  three  vectors  of  focus  for  a  joint  Eco-
Asia/EP/BDP  conflict  prevention  and  management  strategy.  These  are  Tool  Development,  Process 
Strengthening, and Capacity Building shown in Figure 3.5.  
Tool Development encompasses procedural/administrative and technical tool development and 
application. Examples include the use of Decision Support Framework (DSF), SIA, EIA, PDIES, PNPCA, and 
others. These tools enable the MRC to provide timely and relevant technical and procedural information 
to the member countries – aiding in the prevention and management of potential conflicts over water.  
Process Strengthening encompasses process related activities such as Collaborative Learning Processes 
(CLP) activities, such as the pilot study being planned by Eco-Asia and EP, trade-off facilitation processes 
undertaken by BDP under BDP2, and other decision-making processes that have as yet to be documented 
or defined. 
Capacity Building generally refers to knowledge and skills development – including training and 
knowledge databases- but can also include institutional development such as the streamlining or 
refinement of institutional mechanisms, overlapping with Tool Development and Process Strengthening 
areas. A list of strategic focus activities for the MRC is given in Table 3.2.  
3.6.12.  BDP Conflict Prevent and Management Focus Areas and Activities 
The MRC should take an active role in facilitating the enhancement of cooperation and prevention or 
mitigation  of  incidents  that  may  give  rise  to  differences  and  disputes  in  the  Mekong  Basin.  BDP  is 186 
 
designed to embody this active role by leading the Basin in an IWRM ethos, presenting a suite of water 
resource development scenarios and their costs and benefits across the basin.  
There are several strategic areas of opportunity for strengthening conflict prevention strategies at the 
MRC and throughout the basin. Several of these areas are listed below and importantly, are organized and 
address issues across several scales.  
Trade-off facilitation (Basin/Sub-basin) 
  Process development 
  Appropriate tools 
  Data format and presentation 
  Distribution of costs and benefits (basin, sub-basin, communal) 
Scenario assessment process (Sub-basin) 
  Social assessments 
  Livelihoods studies 
  Feedbacks are technical, identify critical stakeholder feedback loops 
Sub-basin and tributaries 
  Extending DSF into sub-basins 
  Sharing data and forecasting 
  Capacity building and planning capability 
Impact of Development Scenarios on Fisheries (Basin/Sub-basin) 
  Migration effects 
  Livelihood of fishers 
  Adaptability capacity 
These  areas  span  across  several  programmes  and  organizations  at  the  Mekong  River  Commission 
Secretariat. Many of these recommendations have already been addressed in the MRC Strategic Plan 
2011-2015 (MRC 2011). A summary of these recommendations were given the MRCS BDP Programme is 
given below in Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.5: Conflict Prevention and Management Components. The key strategic areas needed for a 
comprehensive multi-scalar CPM strategy are Tool Development, Process Strengthening, and Capacity 
Building.  
   
Conflict Prevention and Management Strategy 
Multiple Scales - Basin to Sub-basin to Watershed 
Tool Development 
• Technical 
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Administrative 
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• Collaborative Learning 
• Trade-off Facilitation 
• Stakeholder Consultation  
Capacity Building 
• Regional 
• National 
• Local 
Collaborative Learning Pilot (EP), FMMP 
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BDP shared visioning, BDP 
transboundary dialogues, Trade-off 
facilitation, Pre-Assessment social 
analyses, Social assessment “hotspot” 
DSF, SWAT, IQQM, ISIS, URBS, 
WUP-FIN1, MRCS-DSF-IAT, IBFM, 
RAM, SIA, EIA, TbEIA, 1995 
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Procedures, PDIES, PWUM, 
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Conflict prevention and management 
development training: 2-day, 5-day training, 
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etc.), terminology standards, CLP trainings at 
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making, IWRM planning principles and 
approaches, value of water and 
cost/benefits sharing, trade‐off facilitation 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Proposed MRC-USAID Conflict Prevention and Management Strategy. 
PROPOSED MRC-USAID CONFLICT PREVENTION and MANAGEMENT (CPM) STRATEGY 
Strategic 
Focal Areas 
Activities to Implement Strategy 
Tool 
Development 
Develop inventory of existing or potential transboundary issues in the basin (done) 
Prepare intuitional needs assessments (coordinate with FMMP) 
Assess historical events and trends of transboundary issues in the basin and link to ongoing 
conflict prevention and management activity results 
Identify existing or develop new mechanisms and/or procedures for implementing 1995 Mekong 
Agreement (coordinate with FMMP) 
Work with BDP and NMCs to conduct Social Pre-Assessment (SPA) to support assessment of 
development scenarios (coordinate with BDP) 
As a companion activity to the SPA, support BDP to identify potential social “hotspots” and 
indicators at the basin, sub-basin, and project level (coordinate with BDP) 
Process 
Strengthening 
(multi-scalar) 
Develop MRC Conflict Management Strategy (joint work program for implementing Goal 2 and/or 
operational approach linked to MRC public participation strategy) 
Development of a IWRM-based basin plan using development scenarios as a planning tool for 
assessment of basin development alternatives 
Conduct a pilot simulation to strengthen scenario decision-making processes and trade-off 
facilitation skills 
Co-organize, leverage, and co-facilitate collaborative decision-making pilot projects across relevant 
MRC programmes 
Co-organize information development, consultative meetings, stakeholder workshops, process 
development, analyses, assessment, and reporting of collaborative pilot studies 
Capacity 
Building     
(multi-scalar) 
Strengthening trade-off decision-making facilitation capacity within the MRCS  
Develop common terminology and materials in local languages 
Assign national focal points 
Provide regional tools and training (awareness raising, skills development, joint fact finding, 
mediation, etc.) 
Help transition skills development to country level 
Support development of river basin committees 
Provide regional, national, and local awareness and skills-based training on collaborative processes 
 
The strategy focused on capacity building across scales particularly at the sub-basin  and local levels. 
Strategies were given on how to include stakeholders early in the consultation process. IT was suggested 
to  include  the  distribution  and  timing  of  costs  and  benefits  should  be  included  in  the  scenarios  for 
hydropower impacts as the current scenarios address only total costs and benefits. The Collaborative 
Learning process was suggested for address local, district, and provincial environmental conflicts and to 
be  led  by  the  Environment  Programme.  It  was  suggested  to  include  a  more  robust  methodology  of 
assessing social and livelihood impacts due to development and scenarios, using predictive tools such as 
Social Impacts Assessments and vulnerability and resilience estimates.  189 
 
 
Figure 3.6: BDP- Strategic Focus and Recommendation for Implementation of a Conflict Prevention 
Strategy. This graphic contains key areas of CPM focus for the Basin Development Plan Programme. 
And finally, caution was urged with the over-reliance on technical assessments tools such as the Decision 
Support  Framework  (DSF)  and  other  analytical  tools  that  give  the  impression  to  stakeholders  that 
decisions are made in a “black box.”  
Finally the statement delivered to include into the IWRM strategy read: 
“The MRC should pursue a dispute prevention and management strategy aimed firstly to 
prevent,  secondly,  to  effectively  manage  potential  disputes  by  actively  engaging 
stakeholders  into  a  world-class  water  resources  development  planning  process,  also 
facilitating water resource development alternatives by developing technical and procedural 
tools,  strengthening  processes,  and  building  capacities  at  the  basin,  sub-basin,  and 
watershed scales.” 
The  next  section  focuses  on  Step  2  of  the  Chapter  3  methodology  (Figure  3.1).  It  focuses  on  the 
procedural aspect of collaborative processes to address resilience at sub-basin scales.  
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3.7.  CONFLICT PREVENTION AT THE SUB-BASIN SCALE:  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROCESS PILOT STUDY  
This work was completed as part of a collaborative project supported and funded by Eco-Asia which is 
funded and mandated by USAID. While funded and supported by Eco-Asia, the project was based at the 
Mekong River Commission Secretariat in Vientiane, Lao PDR. This section addresses Step 2 of the chapter 
methodology from Figure 3.1. 
3.7.1.  Background and Need 
External drivers and institutional trends in the Mekong regional are moving more towards a focus on sub-
regional, sub-basin activity – both in institutional, governance, and environmental sectors. While rapid 
basin-wide water resources development lurks on the horizon, means to prevent and manage conflict is 
lacking and needed at the sub-basin and local scales.  
One potential  solution  to  conflict  prevention  and  management  at  the  local  level  is  the  collaborative 
decision-making  process.  A  five-stage  process,  the  collaborative  decision-making  process  effectively 
addresses complex environmental conflict among multiple parties and issues – characteristics common in 
the Mekong region. 
Due to these challenges, the MRC should adopt and implement a comprehensive conflict prevention and 
management strategy throughout the organization. This strategy would address existing and potential 
new tools for conflict prevention and management, strengthen processes at the MRC, and institutionalize 
capacity building at watershed, sub-basin, and basin scales.  
A project was developed to address this need. The outputs for the project were: 
  Collaborative Learning Process orientation to EP and Eco-Asia 
  Collaborative Learning Process stages document 
  Collaborative Decision-making process Pilot Study design for the EP/MRC 
  Conflict Prevention and Management –Collaborative Learning Process Implementation 
Document (Final Report) 
  Re-design of 5-day training to incorporate Collaborative Learning material 
  Identification of synergies between Eco-Asia and BDP’s role in conflict prevention and 
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3.7.2.  Objectives of Internship with Eco-Asia 
The objectives of the internship with Eco-Asia were to: 
  Assist EP and ECO-Asia with the development of a concept note and other working 
documents on the development of a pilot project for developing a collaborative 
decision-making process for addressing one transboundary waters critical area 
  Assist in development of conceptual framework and steps for collaborative decision-
making process (e.g., issue definition, stakeholder identification, issue assessment, 
collaborative decision-making, etc.) for addressing the critical area through regional 
cooperation 
  Assist with identifying pilot area and including joining consultative meetings with 
participating country representatives and other stakeholders to discuss the 
collaborative decision-making process 
  Support implementation of pilot workshops and other activities. 
  Summary of internship findings. 
Deliverables 
  Concept note and other working documents on collaborative decision-making pilot 
project  
  Conceptual framework and steps for collaborative decision-making process 
  Summary of findings for internship 
 
3.7.3.  Laying the Foundation for Collaboration: Mapping “hotspots” 
The MRCS was asked by the Joint Council (JC) to take a further role in preventing conflicts over the 
development and the environment by addressing and identifying potential “hotspots” for conflict in the 
Mekong Basin. The MRCS, specifically, the Environmental Programme (EP) has proceeded,  with NMC 
support, to select and provide summaries for seven “hotspot” areas, each with unique and challenging 
issues. As part of the MRC and ECO-Asia joint program, representatives from MRC Secretariat, NMCs and 
line  agencies  met  and  identified  potential  transboundary  issues  in  an  effort  to  raise  awareness  and 
provide a foundation for capacity building and tools development. As part of this effort, stakeholders 
developed criteria that could be used to identify issues and to identify an illustrative list of potential 
transboundary issues. The criteria discussed were well-defined, existing or potential activities that could 
result in significant impacts across national boundaries. Hotspots were designated as geographical or non-
geographical. Defining hotspot criteria is an important step in building institutional capacity within the 
MRCS, the national committees, and line agencies, engaging local stakeholders and NGOs in the capacity 
building process (PADCO 2007; Viriyasakultorn 2007). 192 
 
The identification of potential transboundary issue areas, or “hotspots” and historical events through a 
collaborative participatory process contributes to the transformative initiative to strengthen capacity in 
the Mekong transboundary basin. The theoretical benefits of identifying transboundary issues are that 
prevention is more effective and inexpensive than fixing a problem or issue after an event. In fact, the 
process of cooperation in addressing the operative issues may identify options and opportunities not 
previously  realized.  Because  the  MRC  is  fundamentally  aimed  at  promoting  cooperation  and  the 
sustainable development of Mekong River Basin, cooperation requires capacities to address constraints, 
impacts,  priorities,  and  opportunities,  and  directly  addressing  issues  contributes  to  these  goals.  The 
process of addressing issues allows the MRCS to focus energy on the prioritization of the most critical 
issues.  Developing  clear  criteria  in  this  process  allows  for  early  issue  identification  and  proactive 
management of issues (Viriyasakultorn 2007).  
Following the an arduous selection process, each of the selected “hotspot” areas were summarized into a 
case study format containing details on background, key issues, conflict prevention and management 
practices, outcomes and impacts, and lessons learned for each issue.  
Having  selected  and  summarized  each  of  the  seven  “hotspots,”  or  “areas  of  concern”  or  AOC,  the 
question was asked “what now?” Presuming that each AOC was indeed a potential conflict in the making, 
what should be done about it? The method selected to help prevent and possibly manage conflict at the 
community (local scale) level is the Collaborative Learning Process. This process was designed and has 
evolved to prevent and manage environmental conflict at multiple scales. Three of the AOCs are outlined 
below in Figure 3.7, and are addressed in this paper. The bank erosion and wetlands issues are outlined 
below in the collaborative learning pilot study. 
3.7.4.  Collaborative Learning Process 
Walker  and  Daniels  (1997)  have  studied  a  number  of  natural  resource  collaborative  processes  and 
conclude that collaborative processes all exhibit traits that accept new players, promote joint learning, 
explore  value  differences,  key  on  mutual  gains,  and  share  implementation,  and  focus  on  shared 
leadership, among others.(Walker and Daniels 2005). They contend a collaborative learning framework is 
a  set  of  techniques  intended  to  bring  about  multiparty  decisions  by  means  of  creative  thought, 
constructive debate, and effective implementation of proposals generated by stakeholders (Daniels and 
Walker 2001). Barbara Grey synthesizes their definition as: 
“Collaboration involves a process of joint decision making among key stakeholders of a 
problem domain about the future of that domain. Five features are critical to the process: 1) 
the stakeholders are interdependent, 2) solutions emerge by dealing constructively with 
differences, 3) joint ownership of decisions is involved, 4) stakeholders assume collective 193 
 
responsibility for the future direction of the domain, and 5) collaboration is an emergent 
property” (Gray 1989, 11). 
This definition is directly applicable in the Mekong – particularly how it relates to IWRM. A key point is 
that all stakeholders have a stake in the solution, have influence, whether via governance or soft power, 
and are participants in the process, whether it be a resolution or management process. 
 
Figure 3.7: Mapping of Hotspots in the Mekong Basin. Map Source: MRC 2003. Three “hotspots” were 
chosen to apply the pilot project, but Yali Falls was dropped leaving just two study sites. 
Relating the collaborative learning process to environmental conflict is a matter of process. Environmental 
conflict is defined as when “one or more parties involved in a decisions-making process disagree about an 
action that has potential to have an impact on the environment” (Daniels and Walker 2001, 40).  
A definition of environmental conflict arises when “one or more parties involved in a decisions-making 
process disagree about an action that has potential to have an impact on the environment” (Daniels and 
Walker  2001, 40). In reality, the issues in question are often substantially “complex”, as are the parties’ 
interests in outcomes of the situation. Often, the parties have vastly different value systems relating to 
the environment. Many environmental conflicts are complex, and in the case of the Mekong, several fall 194 
 
into this category. An environmental issue does not have to contain all dimensions of complexity to be 
complex,  in  fact  just  one  or  two  factors  can  render  the  issue  complex.  The  case  of  transboundary 
management of wetlands between Cambodia (Stung Treng) and Lao PDR (Champassak) provinces fall into 
the “complex” category as does the Bank Erosion Case Study in the Chiang Rai – Bokeo Region (see Tables 
3.3 and 3.5). 
3.7.4.1.  Collaborative Potential 
Collaborative Potential (CP) can be defined as the opportunity for parties to work together assertively in 
order  to  make  meaningful  process  in  the  management  of  controversial,  complex,  and  conflict-laden 
environmental  issues  (Walker  and  Daniels  2005,  190).  In  this  regard,  perception  is  key.  If  a  party 
determines  that  there  is  a  high  need  for  collaboration,  a  possibility  of  meaningful,  respective 
communication, and a mutual gain or integrative outcome is possible, there is a very good chance of high 
CP. Collaboration and its potential differs from other processes in that it is less competitive and is more of 
a fact-finding process. It also allows for value differences to be explored, focusing on interests rather than 
positions.  Another  characteristic  of  collaboration  is  that  it  allocates  responsibility  across  parties  and 
evolves  its  conclusions  through  an  iterative,  reflexive  process.  In  many  cases,  it  brings  capacity  to 
communities in need of conflict prevention, leadership, management, and decision-making (Walker and 
Daniels 2005, 190).  
In the Mekong region, the need for collaborative processes has long been accepted. Development in the 
basin has the potential to not only affect stakeholders along the mainstream, but also those that live and 
rely on tributaries of the basin. In many areas, institutional, social, and governance capacities are lacking. 
The Command and Control (CAC) or technical and regulatory approaches are less effective, and difficult to 
implement. Therefore, an effective method of assessing collaborative potential is needed. 
3.7.5.  Progress Triangle Framework 
The  Progress  Triangle  represents  a  visible  and  workable  framework  to  conceptualize  conflictive  or 
environmental  disputes.  The  Progress  Triangle  portrays  three  dimensions  to  the  conflict:  Substance, 
Procedure, and Relationship (see Figure 3.8 below). The Substantive issues are issues dealing with the 
tangible aspects of the conflict. 
In the case of Stung Treng – Champassak (ST-C) wetlands dispute, the substantive issues are the illegal 
takings  of  fish,  the  threat  to  freshwater  dolphins,  the  income  of  local  fisher  families  and  their 
communities, etc. They can also include non-physical items such as “rights to fish” or cultural traditions 
are what are referred to as “symbolic” issues. In many cases, symbolic issues can become more important 
than tangible ones. In the case of ST-C, a substantive issue may be the right of fishers to historic takings 195 
 
from the wetlands, or that traditional or indigenous knowledge leads to sustainable management (Daniels 
and Walker  2001; Walker and Daniels 2005). 
The Procedural dimension represents those elements that pertain to the process or procedural aspects of 
how disputes are managed – including decision-making methods.  
Table 3.3: Complex Environmental Conflict: Mekong Case Study. Transboundary Management of Wetlands 
between Cambodia and Lao PDR (Stung Treng –Champassak). 
Issue 
MEKONG CASE STUDY 
Transboundary Management of Wetlands between 
Cambodia and Lao PDR 
(Stung Treng – Champassak) 
Multiple parties 
Local communities dependent on wetland resources at Stung Treng and Champassak, 
Governments of Lao PDR and Cambodia, LNMC, CNMC, IUCN, MRCS 
Multiples issues 
• Illegal and destructive harvesting activities 
• Increased pressure on wetlands due to increasing human population  
• Threat to dolphins 
• Change in flow and hydrological patterns from the upper stream 
Cultural 
differences 
Communities along the borders of Cambodia (Stung Treng) and Lao PDR (Champassak) heavily 
utilize and depend on wetland products from this area for both subsistence and income. This 
conflicts with predominant Western values to preserve wetlands (Stung Treng province has a 
Ramsar site, No 999) and the involvement of conservation groups (ICLARM, now World Fish 
Center (2002-2003), Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Program (MWPB) (2004-2006), and WWF. 
Deeply held 
values 
The major feature of the Stung Treng - Siphandon is the presence of a unique type of open and 
flooded forest growing on the sandy islands within the Mekong River channel.  The area contains 
a unique habitat – deep pools for (freshwater) animals and fish at critical stages. As a result, 
communities from both Cambodia and Lao PDR have become heavily dependent on wetland 
products for their subsistence. 
Scientific and 
traditional 
knowledge 
Lessons learned from the “wetland approach” project indicated that heavy dependency of local 
communities of both Cambodia and Lao PDR on wetlands may lead to transboundary conflicts, if 
not managed well. Started early 2002, MRC initiated consultation processes at provincial, 
national and regional levels to provide a forum for exchange of important lessons learned on 
wetlands management in dealing with trans-boundary wetlands management issues. 
Legal 
requirements 
Local – Lao and Cambodian traditions; National - LNMRC, CNMC, Lao PDR, Cambodia; Regional - 
MRCS, MWPB; International - IUCN, ICLARM, WWF 
Conflict industry 
Not an immediate factor. Historical conflict in region has securitized some landholdings and 
associated fishing rights. 
 
This includes rules, and/or laws that prevent or govern the rights to work together. Some of the questions 
that arise in this dimension are who has jurisdiction? What is the decision space? Who has decision 
authority? In a hierarchal culture, these questions are crucial. In the case of ST-C, it may be well to 
understand who has legal jurisdiction in the waters, and where is the decision space of the collaborative 196 
 
group? It is important that in this dimension the process is seen as fair and equitable (Daniels and Walker 
2001; Walker and Daniels 2005). 
A critical factor in the Procedural dimension is Decision Space. Power sharing and participatory access are 
not mutually exclusive. The greater the decision space, the greater collaborative potential. Agencies or 
governments that are willing to share power and decision authority create a larger space for collaborative 
solutions. The expansion of decision authority by the Department of Fisheries in Northeast Thailand has 
allowed for creative solutions to emerge in the issue over destructive fishing gear in the Songkhram River 
Basin. 
 
Figure 3.8: The Environmental Conflict Progress Triangle Framework. Environmental conflicts are analyzed 
in three dimensions: substantial, procedural, and relational. 
The Relationship dimensions naturally deals with the interplay between relationships between parties and 
stakeholders. It can quite often be the most difficult to attain results in at first, particularly if there is a 
long history of conflict between groups in the collaborative process. Importantly, this dimension contains 
the “intangibles,” or issues such as trust, respect, or face. Examples of the type of questions that may 
arrive during this portion are what are the parties’ positions? What are the parties’ interests, or concerns? 
What are the parties’ incentives to participate? What are the parties’ BATNAs  (Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement)? It is critically important in a collaborative process to address the distinction 
between a stakeholder’s position and their interests. A stakeholder’s position may represent a particular 
stance on an issue, and may not represent the stakeholder’s interests, goals, or willingness to collaborate 
on an issue (Daniels and Walker  2001; Walker and Daniels 2005).  
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3.7.6.  Applying the Framework to the Mekong 
It is important to examine the sources of tension carefully. Sometimes this can take a period of time to 
development enough trust to allow parties’ to even talk about sensitive issues. Daniels and Walker (2001) 
break  up  controversial  substantive  issues  into  these  categories:  Facts,  Values,  Interests,  Jurisdiction, 
Persons/Parties, History, and Culture (Daniels and Walker 2001, 161-2). 
An analysis of the complexity of an environmental issue will give clarity to many of these factors. An 
analysis of conflict in Stung Treng – Champassak between Cambodia and Laos PDR can be summarized in 
this way. However, care must be taken to not oversimplify details – as these can cause tensions. The 
collaborative process should process these results as much as possible  – avoiding making sometimes 
disastrous assumptions for other parties. 
Table 3.4: Progress Triangle Framework. Source: Daniels and Walker 2001, 85. Applying the Progress 
Triangle Framework to the Chiang Rai – Bokeo Region. This includes both Issue Assessment and 
Stakeholder Analysis Stages as defined for the Mekong. 
RELATIONSHIP  PROCEDURE  SUBSTANTIVE 
1. Who are the 
parties/stakeholders? 
(primary, secondary, media) 
1. At what stage is the conflict? 
(constructive action, de-escalation) 
1. What are the issues? 
(tangible, symbolic, historical) 
2. Do any parties have unique 
status? 
(tribes, ministers, etc.) 
2. What are the legal constraints? 
2. What are the sensitive issue areas? 
(facts, culture, history, values, 
interests) 
3. What are the parties’ 
(stated positions; interests, values) 
3. Who has jurisdiction? 
3. Are the issues complex? Technical? 
Why? 
4. What are the parties’ relational 
histories? 
4. What is the procedural history? 
4. Is information needed? Where can it 
be found? 
5. What are the parties’ incentives? 
(collaborate, compete, learn) 
5. Is mutual learning desired? 
5. Are meanings or interpretations and 
understandings varied across the 
parties 
6. What are the parties’ BATNAs? 
6. What is the decision space? 
(shared with parties, shared power) 
6. Are learning opportunities 
available? 
7. Is trust sufficient? Can it be built? 
7. Are resources sufficient 
(time, money, people) 
7. What are the mutual gain options? 
(expanding pie, compensation, 
logrolling, cost cutting, bridging, etc.) 
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3.7.7.  Using the Progress Triangle of Assess Collaborative Potential 
Given the collaborative process outlined we can assess environmental disputes given a structured method 
that  invites  parties’  to  participate  in  the  process.  Again  Daniels  and  Walker  (2001)  provide  a  useful 
Worksheet to apply this technique (Daniels and Walker 2001, 164).  
STEP 1:  Describe the situation, history, and context 
STEP 2:  Evaluate the Relationship dimension of the dispute (see Table 3.4)  
  R1:Identify all stakeholders and parties R2-R10. (Daniels and Walker 2001, Table 8.2) 
STEP 3:  Evaluate the Procedural dimension of the dispute (Table 3.4) 
  P1: Agree on the method – collaboration, mediation, consultation, etc. 
  P2-P8. (Daniels and Walker  2001: Table 8.2) 
STEP 4:  Evaluate the Substantial dimension of the dispute (Table 3.4) 
  S1-2: What are the important issues across the parties?  
  S3-4: Are they tangible or symbolic? 
  S5-8. (Daniels and Walker 2001, Table 8.2) 
STEP 5:  Connections 
What are the major connections and interactions among relationships, procedure, and substance? Which 
of these areas can be improved to increase CP? 
3.7.8.  Issues Areas in the Mekong 
The environment program at the MRC has been working with the National Mekong Committees, partners, 
and line agencies and riparian stakeholders to select six to seven environmental “issue areas,” formerly 
known as “hotspots.” These are geographic and issue areas and contain known environmental issues that 
could  produce  potential  disputes.  During  the  summer  of  2008,  I  worked  with  Eco-Asia  and  the 
Environmental Programme at the MRCS to choose one of these two projects to run a pilot study. The area 
that was chosen was the Chiang Rai – Bokeo bank erosion issue. Table 3.5 summarizes details of the 
conflict.  
It would have been a great asset to determine the collaborative potential of each of the issue areas 
attached to this report. However, more information was needed to accurately do this assessment, and 
quite possibly it was only possible to do this with interaction with the stakeholders themselves. Therefore, 
the  Progress  Triangle  was  used  to  do  a  preliminary  Collaborative  Potential  analysis  on  each  of  the 
prospective case studies to determine priority ranking collaborative potential.  
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Table 3.5: Complex Environmental Conflict: Bank Erosion in Chiang Rai – Bokeo Region. 
Issue 
MEKONG CASE STUDY 
Bank Erosion (one of multiple issues) 
(Chiang Rai – Bokeo) 
Multiple 
parties 
Local communities of Chiang Rai and Bokeo provinces 
Provincial Governments of Chiang Rai and Bokeo  
Governments of Lao PDR and Cambodia 
TNMC and LNMC 
MRCS  
Private Industry:  riverboat operators, fishing and agricultural industry 
Multiples 
issues 
The issues can be complex even if they are not tangible issues. Perceived issues can sometimes be 
more powerful than tangible ones. 
Perceived threats 
Sewage and storm water discharged from Chiang Rai to the Kok River, and from Chiang Saen, 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xai to the Mekong River.  
Pesticides and herbicides, nutrients, suspended sediment and organic matter from agricultural 
runoff  
Spills of chemicals and oil from ships  
Overfishing 
Flow changes due to reservoirs upstream in the Chinese section of the Mekong River 
Industrial pollution from China 
Perceived hazards 
Potential for Navigation accidents due to low water levels and rapid changes in water levels 
Habitat loss / degradation  
Bank Erosion 
Fisheries losses, especially for Mekong Giant Catfish  
Degradation of the Aquatic Ecology of the river 
Potential human health issues due to consumption of unsafe food and water 
Loss of tourist income due to boat groundings 
Cultural 
differences 
There are established differences between local fishers, river boat operators, local governments, 
and environmentalists on how the land and river system should be managed. In particular, the 
clash between fish management, protection of the Giant Catfish, public health (water quality), and 
recreation (boat operators).  
Deeply held 
values 
Those local fishers who have been fishing for catfish for many years and some cases generations 
feel that it is their right to fish the Mekong for these fish, and that they do it in a sustainable 
fashion. They blame the commercial fisherman for the demise of the Giant Catfish. Many who use 
the river, including river tour operators, believe that the river is there for their benefit and any 
attempt to keep them from using it is unjust. 
Scientific and 
traditional 
knowledge 
There seems to be a general lack of sound and reliable knowledge regarding catfish populations, 
size distribution, habitat degradation, and causes of the aforementioned issues. Gaps also exist in 
traditional knowledge on the effect of dams upstream, their effect on bank erosion, and water 
quality. Traditional methods of handling sewerage is another gap between traditional and scientific 
knowledge, the latter calling for effective treatment of sewage and the former resorting to 
traditional “spill” methods. 
Legal 
requirements 
Legal require the harmonization of environmental regulations over sewerage and pollution 
discharge by both Thailand and Laos, as well as local and regional administrative regulations.  
Conflict 
industry 
Not an immediate factor although the blaming of one side of the river for damage to the other may 
have discouraged good faith attempts at better environmental management 
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3.7.9.  Collaborative Learning Process Stages for the Pilot Study 
The  Collaborative  Learning  Process,  or  CLP,  has  five  primary  stages:  Assessment,  Training,  Design, 
Implementation/Facilitation,  and Evaluation  (ATDIFE).  In  the case  of  the  Pilot  study  designed  for the 
Mekong region with specific relevant to one of the seven identified areas of concern, these five stages 
where  renamed  to:  Issue  Assessment,  Stakeholder  Analysis,  Process  Design,  Implementation,  and 
Evaluation. These stages form the framework from which a constructive and meaningful process can be 
achieved  in  the  Collaborative  Decision-making  Pilot  conducted  in  the  Mekong  region.  Conflict 
management  processes  in  environmental  and  natural  resource  policy  issues  need  to  be  tailored  for 
complex, diverse, and the systematic nature of those situations. This is certainly the case with regard to 
conflict prevention and management of water resources.  
3.7.9.1.  Issue Assessment 
The purpose of the assessment stage is to better understand the diverse and complex natural resource 
management situation, begin assembling relevant stakeholders and parties interested in the issue, and 
provide a framework for gathering and analyzing information about the conflict. It is essential at this stage 
to determine the Collaborative Potential (CP) of the issue – ensuring that both process and outcomes are 
attained through collaborative means. There are many conflict assessment frameworks available, such as: 
the Conflict Analysis Chart and Dynamics Continuum, the Conflict Map, Conflict Assessment Guide, and 
the one used here called the Progress Triangle.  
The Progress Triangle evaluates the substantive, procedural, and relational dimensions of the conflict. 
Normally,  these  three  factors  are  analyzed  in  the  Assessment  stage.  However,  for  the  Collaborative 
Decision-making Pilot in Mekong region, we have split the Assessment stage into Issue Assessment and 
Stakeholder Analysis. This effectively places greater emphasis on the substantive (and procedural) issues 
at first, then focusing on Stakeholders. In reality, these two stages could be re-arranged, conducting the 
Stakeholder Analysis first and Issue Assessment second.  
This would depend on the nature of the relationships between stakeholders in the selected region. If 
relations are well adjusted, focusing on substantive issues first works well. If relations among stakeholders 
are not in good shape, Stakeholder Analysis should be done as a first priority. Activities conducted at the 
Issue Assessment stage for the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot in the Mekong region include but are 
not limited to: 201 
 
Procedural:  
  Consultation meeting with selected parties and stakeholders 
  Mapping of projected outcomes with parties 
  Consensus on roles and responsibilities for process design 
Substantive:  
  Fact-finding and evaluation through compilation of data, published materials, 
interviews, site visits, and other methods defined 
  Issue assessment of facts and myths of the dispute or disputes  
3.7.9.2.  Stakeholder Analysis 
As noted in the aforementioned section on Issue Assessment, this stage could and might want to be 
conducted before the Issue Assessment stage.  
An extremely important activity at this stage of the CL process is Role Assessment (found under Relational 
dimension of the Progress Triangle framework). A Role Assessment Grid (RAG) can be used to capture this 
information, providing the Intended Role, Expected Role, Goals, and Interests of the Parties involved in 
the conflict. For the Chiang Rai – Bokeo region, it might look something like Table 3.6. Activities conducted 
at the Stakeholder Analysis stage for the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot Study in the Mekong region 
include but are not limited to: 
Relational:  
  Identification of stakeholder interests, positions, and roles (completion of RAG) via 
consultation meetings 
  Conducting stakeholder incentives/barriers activities 
  Knowledge and skills building linked to Eco-Asia training program 
There  is  an  extensive  stakeholder  analysis  project  being  currently  undertaken  within  BDP2  and  a 
consultant will be hired to conduct it. There is an opportunity to prioritize this activity to focus first on 
potential areas of concern. This could and would feed directly into the Pilot Study undertaken by Eco-Asia. 
This is a point of nexus between Eco-Asia and BDP2 where effective coordination would benefit BDP, EP, 
and Eco-Asia’s conflict prevention and management work.  
3.7.9.3.  Process Design 
The Design Stage of the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot study designed for the Mekong generates the 
overall plan of the collaborative learning process, laying out the strategy and tactics for implementing the 
conflict  management  or  decision-making  approach,  taking  care  to  produce  a  responsive  strategy  for 
involving  participants  in  a  meaningful  process.  The  purpose  is  for  the  Conveners,  usually  the  party 202 
 
selected to design this stage of the process, to identify their process and outcome goals and products. 
Outputs are taken directly from work completed from the Issue Assessment and Stakeholder Analysis 
stages.  
Care should be taken at this stage to make sure all stakeholders agree to the design process – and if 
Conveners are selected for this purpose, that the process is transparent and communicated effectively. 
The design that is selected must be designed to implement, not instruct, with particular emphasis on 
involvement rather than expediency.  
Table 3.6: Example Role Assessment Grid for the Chiang Rai – Bokeo Region Case Study. 
Stakeholder  Intended Role  Goals  Interests 
Local community – Chiang 
Rai (may be many) 
Knowledge sharing and 
participation 
Resolve problem. 
Food and water 
security 
Preserve face, increase 
security. Fishing 
Local community – Bokeo 
(may be many) 
Knowledge sharing and 
participation 
Resolve problem. 
Food and water 
security 
Preserve face, increase 
access to river. Farming. 
Provincial Gov of Chiang Rai 
Data gathering, support, 
participation 
Resolve problem.  
Avoid conflict. Manage 
fishing. 
Provincial Gov of Bokeo 
Data gathering, support, 
participation 
Avoid problems 
Stabilize banks along 
river 
Gov of Lao PDR (several 
agencies) 
Support, authority, decision-
making 
Prevent conflict  Enforce law regulations 
Gov of Thailand (several 
agencies) 
Support, authority, decision-
making 
Resolve conflict 
Protect fisheries 
Enforce regulations 
TNMC 
Data gathering, technical 
support, participation 
Coordinate activities  Promote cooperation 
LNMC 
Data gathering, technical 
support, participation 
Coordinate activities 
Promote cooperation 
among agencies 
MRCS 
Coordination, information 
support, communication 
Provide technical 
assistance 
Prevent conflict 
escalation 
River Boat Operators (may 
be many) 
Knowledge sharing, participation  Keep status quo.  Preserve access to river 
Local Fishers (may be many)  Knowledge sharing, participation  Fix problems  Preserve fishing rights 
Agriculturalists (may be 
many) 
Knowledge sharing, participation  Stop erosion 
Allow farming along 
river banks 
 
Activities conducted at the Process Design stage for the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot Study in the 
Mekong region include but are not limited to: (see Table 3.6) 
  Participatory planning meetings on design of the collaborative process 
  Determination and publication of goals, activities, milestones, outputs, timeframes and 
resources 
  Workshop on process design with selected stakeholders. 203 
 
3.7.9.4.  Implementation 
The  purpose  of  this  stage  in  the  Pilot  Study  is  to  promote  mutual  learning,  innovative,  constructive 
dialogue, and decision-making through direct conduct of meetings, field trips, workshops, and forums. 
Proper design and facilitation is critical for success at this stage. Effective meeting design and facilitation, 
style, language, sharing of information, trust, and sequence are a few key concerns. Situation mapping, or 
systems  diagrams,  will  be  generated  at  his  stage,  if  they  have  not  been  created  earlier  in  the  Issue 
Assessment stage. Note this can be a useful relationship building exercise, and may be more effective in 
the  Issue  Assessment  or  Stakeholder  Analysis  stages.  An  important,  yet  not  exclusive  tool  is  the 
Improvements  Worksheet  (IW).  The  worksheet,  after  completing  the  situation  map,  allows  the 
participants to develop and convey their ideas about the complexity of the situation at hand. Multiple 
worksheets using several workshops will be used to effectively execute this stage. Additional tools used to 
analyze and process collaborative learning improvements are the Critical Concerns Analysis Grid (CCAG) 
and the Improvements Analysis Grid (IAG).  
Activities conducted at the Implementation stage for the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot Study in the 
Mekong region include but are not limited to: 
  Consultations with stakeholders to develop improvements on issues already defined 
  Consultation/alignment meetings with selected parties and stakeholders 
  Identification of crucial concerns/issues in region 
  Development of situation map of issues. 
3.7.9.5.  Evaluation 
The evaluation step is the fifth and final stage of the Collaborative Learning Process cycle, although it may 
not  final  step  in  the  process  to  management  the  conflict.  Collaborative  learning  activities  should  be 
evaluated should be evaluated by those who participate in, convene, design, and facilitate them. While it 
may  seem  contrary,  it  may  be  more  effective  if  the  entire  collaborative  process  is  evaluated  by  an 
impartial  party,  though  one  that  has  been  familiar  and  part  of  the  methodological  process.  The 
evaluations should include all stages in the process, including processes and tools used during these 
stages, such as stakeholder workshops or forums, dialogue sessions, field trips, and exercises. Surveys 
should  be  used  to  assess  participants’  views  on  the  outputs  and  goals  generated  from  the  Progress 
Triangle framework.  
Figure 3.9 shows a conceptual diagram of the Collaborative Decision-making process designed specifically 
for the Pilot study in the Mekong region. 204 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Collaborative Decision-making Process Stages. The six essential process stages of the 
Collaborative Learning Process. Source: Adapted from Daniels and Walker 2001. 
 
3.7.9.6.  Training – The Sixth Stage 
The  Training  Stage  provides  people  involved  with  the  Collaborative  Decision-making  process  the 
opportunity to learn about the collaborative process. Material covered in the CL training could include: 
nature of conflict, environmental policy, collaborative learning principles, collaborative potential, systems 
thinking, conflict management and negotiation, the Progress Triangle, community sustainability, public 
participation,  relationship  dynamics,  individual  and  collective  objectives,  assessment  frameworks 
(environmental  and  social),  public  policy,  collaborative  stewardship,  public  policy,  environmental 
sustainability, and more. Typical training methods use workshops, field trips, in-class and home exercises, 
and interactive activities. 
For the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot study, it was determined that the Training Stage be separate 
and incorporated into Eco-Asia’s training schedule. This resulted in re-designing the 5-day training module 
to include the Collaborative Learning material, Stakeholder analysis techniques, BATNAs, and facilitation 
skills.  205 
 
However, the 5-day training alone would be insufficient to address participants’ needs in a collaborative 
learning process. Many of the participants in the 5-day training may not be able to participate in the 
Collaborative Decision-making process Pilot study, even though every attempt is made to get individuals 
involved in both training modules. Therefore there is still a need for specific training on the Collaborative 
Learning process that will accompany the Pilot Process.   
3.7.10.  Eco-Asia’s Role in The Pilot 
Table 3.7 shows the sequence of Collaborative Decision-making stages designed for the Pilot study in the 
Mekong. Colors in the first column “Process Stages” relate to Process Stages in Figure 3.9 above. Eco-Asia 
plays a critical role in each of the process stages. During the Issue Assessment stage, Eco-Asia will develop 
information, coordinate support and analysis of the issues, and help with facilitation of the stakeholders, 
many of who know Eco-Asia staff. Throughout the remaining stages, Eco-Asia will provide coordination 
support and technical assistance through its contacts with Universities and technical experts. Eco-Asia will 
support bringing expert facilitators and consultants in as needed to conduct the Pilot study.  
The Pilot will consist primarily of workshops, meetings, consultations, and training activities, including 
field trips and relationship building events to improve stakeholder relations.  
As indicated in Table 3.7, the Pilot study will endeavor to be complete in 40 weeks. This is ambitious, and 
may need to be adjusted to a more realistic timeframe. In this model, it will take 8 weeks for Issue 
Assessment,  8  weeks  for  Stakeholder  Analysis,  4  weeks  for  Process  Design,  16  weeks  for  the 
Implementation Stage, and 4 weeks for Evaluation.  
Eco-Asia,  coordinating  with  EP  at  the  MRCS,  has  a  leadership  role  in  designing,  communicating,  and 
facilitating the Pilot study. Other programmes at the MRCS are also interested in doing similar activities to 
help mitigate and manage conflict at the local scale, such as the FMMP and Fisheries programmes. Eco-
Asia can help share and coordinate with these programmes as well.  
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Table 3.7: The Collaborative Decision-making Process Pilot Study for the Mekong Region. 
Process Stages  Activities  Partner Roles  Outputs 
Time 
Frame 
Resources 
Issue 
Assessment 
  Fact finding and evaluation through 
compilation of data, published 
materials, interviews, site visits, etc. 
  Issue assessment of facts and myths of 
dispute 
  Consultation meeting with selected 
parties and stakeholders 
  Mapping of projected outcomes with 
parties 
  ECO-Asia: information 
development, coordination 
support and analysis 
  MRC Programmes: coordination 
and information support; 
dissemination of findings 
  NMCs and line agencies: data 
gathering, technical support, 
etc. 
  Local communities: knowledge 
sharing and participation 
  Agreement on key 
issues 
  Issue assessments 
completed 
  Report 
summarizing key 
findings 
8 wks 
(wk8) 
  Coordination 
support 
  Technical 
assistance 
  Workshop 
support 
Stakeholder 
Analysis 
  Identification of stakeholder interests, 
positions and roles via consultation 
meetings, including conducting 
stakeholder incentives/barriers 
activities 
  Knowledge and skills building linked to 
ECO-Asia training program 
  Develop consensus on roles and 
responsibilities for design process 
  ECO-Asia: coordination support 
and technical assistance 
  MRC Programmes: coordination 
and information support 
  NMCs and line agencies: activity 
participation 
  Local communities: activity 
participation 
  Analysis of 
stakeholder 
interests, 
positions and 
roles 
  Enhanced 
stakeholder 
capacity 
  Identification of 
process design 
team 
8 wks 
(wk16) 
  Coordination 
support 
  Technical 
assistance 
  Workshop 
support 
Process Design 
  Participatory planning meetings on 
design of collaborative process (goals, 
activities, milestones, outputs, 
timeframe, resources) 
  Workshop on process design with 
selected stakeholders 
  ECO-Asia: coordination support 
and technical assistance 
  MRC Programmes: coordination 
and information support 
  NMCs and line agencies: activity 
participation 
  Local communities: activity 
participation 
  Participatory 
strategy 
  Process plan 
(goals, activities, 
milestones, 
outputs, 
timeframe, 
resources) 
4 wks 
(wk20) 
  Coordination 
support 
  Technical 
assistance 
  Workshop 
support 
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Table 3.7: (Continued): The Collaborative Decision-making Process Pilot Study for the Mekong Region. 
Process Stages  Activities  Partner Roles  Outputs 
Time 
Frame 
Resources 
Implementation 
  Consultations with stakeholders 
to develop improvements on 
issues 
  Consultation/alignment meeting 
with selected parties and 
stakeholders  
  Identification of critical concerns 
  Development of situation map of 
issue(s) 
  ECO-Asia: coordination 
support and technical 
assistance 
  MRC Programmes: 
coordination and 
information support 
  NMCs and line agencies: 
activity participation; 
implementation support 
  Local communities: activity 
participation 
  Short and long-
term 
improvement 
plan with 
implementation 
strategy, and 
budget 
  Stakeholder 
agreement on 
planned 
interventions 
12-16 wks 
(wk36) 
  Coordination 
support 
  Technical 
assistance 
  Workshop 
support 
Evaluation 
  Evaluation of process, design, 
and improvements cycle through 
stakeholder survey  
  Lessons learned workshop with 
all stakeholders and other MRC 
countries and programmes 
  Final report 
  ECO-Asia: coordination 
support and technical 
assistance 
  MRC Programmes: 
coordination and 
information support 
  Evaluation report 
  Final report on 
process 
outcomes and 
recommendation
s for replication 
4 wks 
(wk40) 
  Technical 
assistance 
  Workshop 
support 
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3.8.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter addresses Part B of the dissertation methodology found in Figure 1.2. It focuses on building 
resilience across sub-basin scales in the Mekong Basin. It documents field work that was done in the 
Mekong Basin over the course of 2007 to 2009. The aim of the field work was to apply the principles of 
collaboration, systems thinking, and conflict management to activities in the Mekong River Basin.  
The working hypothesis was: 
  Collaborative processes enhance basin resiliency and cooperation at the sub-basin scale.  
Going back to the research questions: 
(3a)  Does the MRC have an effective conflict prevention strategy that manages conflict 
and builds capacity across several scales?  
The answer to question (3a) is both YES and NO. The Mekong River Commission and particularly the Basin 
Development  Plan  Programme’s  Phase  II  was  extensive  and  reached  out  to  a  large  number  of 
stakeholders, national line agencies, and professional and academics and environmental organizations. 
The work done on scenario planning was well received and included a host of hydropower schemes used 
for hydrological modeling and impact estimates. However, there were opportunities for improving the 
MRC’s approach to multi-scalar conflict management due partly to its still new institutional mandate and 
also to its political reality as a regional intergovernmental organization.  
First, the trade-off facilitation tools were largely scaled to the basin level. Process development and tools 
to  analyze  the  costs  and  benefits  of hydropower  schemes  needed  to  be  expanded  to  sub-basin  and 
tributaries addressing the spatial and temporal distribution of costs and benefits in the basin.  
Second, the scenario assessment process was limited and needed to include developmental effects on 
tributaries. The scenarios were only focused on mainstream projects and mainstream effects. In addition, 
the  social  assessments  were  basic  and  did  not  include  social  livelihoods,  resilience,  and  vulnerability 
assessments in high risk zones.  
Third,  many  of  the  decision-making  and modeling  tools  used  at  the  MRCS  (and NMCs)  address  only 
mainstream and transboundary issues. The MRC which focuses on building technical and social capacity 
was missing an opportunity to build technical and decision-making capacity at the provincial level. There 
was  some  feeling  in  the  organization  that  this  was  the  responsibility  of  NMCs  and  national  support 
agencies however, national institutions were not filling the gaps. The MRC had a number of useful tools 
that were not getting out to sub-basin scales.  209 
 
A case in point was that during July of 2008, the Mekong experienced massive flooding. The Mekong River 
Commission has a state-of-the-art flood forecasting system that monitors river levels throughout the 
basin. Despite this, stakeholders and business owners along the banks of the river in Vientiane, just blocks 
from the MRC, did not have access to the forecasts. I printed several copies and distributed them myself! 
Finally, in 2008, there was little data on the effect of dams on migrations of fisheries in the Lower Mekong 
Basin. Since then, there has been an explosion of studies predicting the impact of hydropower projects on 
fisheries. The pilot study that was used to calculate vulnerability in Chapter 2 was commissioned in 2009 
to partly address this issue. Again, there are opportunities to address wider scales of impacts particularly 
in tributaries. The pilot study made a good beginning at this effort but many questions remain on how 
resilient communities are to rapid changes in the freshwater ecosystem.  
The MRC has a limited strategy to prevent and manage conflict in the Mekong Basin. The strategy lacks 
sufficient focus on sub-basin scales and is directly primarily at developing tools for decision-makers. More 
effort could be put on making these tools available at sub-basin scales and investing in or supporting 
national efforts to build capacity and resilience off the mainstream. 
The second question is: 
(3b)  Can collaborative learning prevent and/or manage environmental conflicts at sub-
scales in the basin?  
Yes it can. It was found that the Collaborative Learning process specifically addressed environmental 
conflicts at the local level thus increasing capacity and strengthening resilience at sub-basin scales. It did 
this in a number of ways. 
First, it addressed relevant complex environmental conflicts that involved a number of stakeholders that 
have express interest in address issues. Second, it gets stakeholders  involved in the process of issue 
assessment and stakeholder analysis. Third, the process step is designed by the stakeholders themselves. 
The process invokes learning – it is not just about finding an answer. Forth, the improvement process step 
is about coming up with options, not solutions. Stakeholders who have already been working together for 
several weeks come up with improvements that can make an impact, hopefully a positive one, on the 
environmental conflict at hand. The emergence of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) in the basin lends 
support  to  the  collaborative  learning  process.  MSPs  are  essentially  formed  around  the  process  of 
collaborative learning, and use a very similar (if not identical) series of process steps as the Collaborative 
Decision-making process.  210 
 
The Collaborative Learning process was introduced to Eco-Asia in late 2007. At that time, Eco-Asia was 
working with the Environment Programme at the MRCS to manage environmental conflict in the basin. A 
list of “hotspots” was assembled and both agencies were looking for path forward – what to do next? 
Much of the focus was on the substantive issues of the basin – water quality, bank erosion, over fishing. 
However, not much effort was put on the process of solving or managing conflicts.  
The  Collaborative  Learning  Process  (CLP)  designed  in  this  study  addressed  the  bank  erosion  issues 
between the Chaing Rai province in Thailand and Bokeo province in Lao PDR. The processed was modified 
to  specially  address  the  needs  and  institutional  framework  within  the  two  provinces.  The  training 
component was pulled from the process and managed as a separate activity.  Table 3.7 contains the 
details of process steps and roles for partners and implementing agencies. A number of findings came out 
of efforts to develop the Collaborative Decision-making process.
16  
First, I found the Collaborative learning process to be a potential conflict prevention and management 
tool to address sub-basin environmental conflict at the sub-basin and watershed scales. The process has 
similarities with the Multi-stakeholder Platforms (MSP) activity already in process in the basin and fits in 
nicely into ongoing activities such as issue assessment and stakeholder analyses. The process only needed 
slight modification to emphasize activities on Issue Assessment and Stakeholder Analysis. 
Second, the Process Design was to be done by a group selected by the stakeholders which had already 
been  identified  during  the “hotspot”  selection process. This meant  that  the group had already been 
working together which increased the chances of success of the process. 
Third, the training component of the Collaborative Learning process was pulled out as a separate but 
companion activity. Eco-Asia already had a conflict management training program in place and training for 
the Collaborative Decision-making process was folded into existing training classes. Eco-Asia’s training 
would include Collaborative Learning material and should seek to select a cohesive group of professionals 
that attend the majority of training sessions. 
Forth, the process was renamed from Collaborative Learning process to “Collaborative Decision-making” 
process. There was a great deal of frustration among stakeholder groups that meetings and forums were 
just “talking shops” and that no action was being taken. This was in part due to the fact that decision 
                                                                 
16 The name of the process was changed from “Collaborative Learning Process” to “Collaborative Decision-making 
Process” to better address needs and perceptions of the stakeholders. 211 
 
space for some groups was limited due to lack of line agency involvement. Nevertheless, there were 
perceptions that these processes were meaningless that yielded no change in their situational outcomes.  
Fifth, the Collaborative Decision-making Pilot study was scheduled to be completed in an ambitious 40 
weeks and it was decided that Eco-Asia will co-facilitate the Pilot with EP and a chosen expert facilitator. 
The NMCs would decide on the location of the Pilot before the process can begin. This had the express 
support from the TNMC and LNMCs in the basin. The timing was ambitious but deemed possible if all the 
pieces were in place to execute.  
Sixth,  it  was  thought  the  MRC,  particularly  the  Environment  Programme  (EP),  would  be  in  a  better 
position to support a Conflict Prevention and Management Strategy (CPM) across the organization. Eco-
Asia could co-lead supporting a MRC CPM Strategy by working to articulate and coordinate activities 
supporting it.  
Seventh, more conflict prevention and management focus will go into sub-basin and watershed level 
activities, addressing environmental conflicts at sub-scales, at community, district, and provincial levels. A 
primary goal of implement this process was to address conflict at local scales and it was accomplishing 
that aim.  
And finally, Eco-Asia could use this support process to strengthening activities at the MRC by working with 
BDP on trade-off facilitation simulation training and cost/benefit analysis of water resource development 
scenarios. The process fits well within Eco-Asia’s suite of tools and it also leverages nicely into the MRC 
Environment Programme’s mandate.  
Having applied a social-ecological system in to the Mekong Basin in Chapter 2 (Part A in Figure 1.2), 
evaluated processes to build resilience in the basin in Chapter 3 (Part B in Figure 1.2), the next Chapter 4, I 
addresses Part C in the dissertation methodology in Figure 1.2. This step involves comparing the Mekong 
and Columbia River Basins within a resilience framework. 
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4.  CHAPTER 4: RESPONSES TO WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: 
COMPARING RESILIENCE OF THE MEKONG AND COLUMBIA RIVER BASINS 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Mekong River Basin is facing intense development pressure to build hydropower projects never seen 
before in the region (Grumbine et al. 2012). The Columbia Basin has already developed and has been 
responding to the effects of rapid development for past three decades. There is a pressing need for a 
better  understanding  how  basins  respond  and  manage  rapid  physical,  social-economic,  and  political 
changes.  
Resilience  is  an  emerging  theory  in  the  area  of  freshwater  ecosystems  management  and  analysis. 
Influenced largely by the last decade of climate change work, resilience and adaptive approaches are 
being used to understand and characterize the behavior of complex social ecological systems (SESs) such 
as river basin systems (Bisson et al. 2008; Cosens 2010; Gunderson and Walters 2002; Hanna 2008; Iyob 
2010; Janssen et al. 2006; Kirby et al. 2010; Lebel et al. 2006; McClanahan 2002; Wolf 2007). Studies using 
resilience methodology as a comparative framework are harder to find. Cumming (2011) is one of the first 
to  compare  large  river  basins  (10)  using  a  conceptual  framework  and  social-ecosystems  thinking 
(Cumming et al. 2011).  
This chapter addresses Part C in the dissertation methodology in Figure 1.2. I compare the Mekong and 
Columbia  River  basins  utilizing  a  resilience  approach.  The  basins  are  compared  using  physical 
characteristics, developmental pressures, and political arrangements. Conflict and cooperation over water 
management is assessed and compared using the BAR scale developed at Oregon State University (Wolf 
et al. 2003; Yoffe et al. 2004). An analysis of institutional frameworks follows focusing on, in particular, 
development pressure, flexibility, and adaptive capacity of the Mekong River Commission and Columbia 
River Treaty institutions. These three components are then used comparatively to assess the state of 
resilience of the two basins by identifying potential threats and strengths within each river basin.  
4.1.1.  Definition of Basin Resilience 
The amount of change a system can absorb and still function depends to large extent on how well the 
system can adapt to stimulus. Therefore, adaptation, or the adjustment to ecological, social-economic, or 
political changes, is the companion to resilience. Based on the definitions given in Chapter 2, integrating 
both hydro-institutional (social) and ecological resilience definitions, the resilience of a complex river 
basin system is defined as 219 
 
“A river basin system’s capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt to biophysical, social-
economic, and political changes (or stressors) while still maintaining its essential structure, 
feedbacks, and functional integrity.” 
This  definition,  termed  hydro-systematic  resilience,  or  more  simply,  basin  resilience,  will  be  used 
throughout this paper. Notice that the basin not only needs to absorb, but manage and adapt to changes 
to the system. Doing this is not an easy task, particular if the basin variables are changing rapidly – so-
called fast variables verses slow variables. The term basin resilience makes the important assumption that 
the basin is complex and linked to both social and ecological systems.  
4.2.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In  Chapter  2,  I  created  a  foundation  for  the  application  of  resilience  theory  to  large  river  basins, 
particularly the Mekong. This chapter is devoted to using that foundation for the basis of a comparison 
between the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. There are some general questions that remain to be 
answered:  
(4a)  Is a resilience framework an effective tool for making comparisons of large river 
basins? 
(4b)  Can large river basins rapidly develop while still remaining resilient? 
The issue of development is of particular concern in  this comparison  as the Columbia River Basin  is 
already largely developed in terms of surface water utilization. The Mekong River Basin is just beginning a 
period of rapid development with potentially catastrophic consequences. The analysis that follows hope 
to shed some useful insight on the resilience of river basins – insight for both Mekong and Columbia River 
Basin inhabitants, stakeholders, water professionals, and academics.  
4.2.1.  Hypothesis 
The working hypothesis for this paper is: 
  The basin is dysfunctional (non-resilient) at some scales while remaining functional 
(resilient) in others, reducing basin resilience of the entire system. 
The Mekong and Columbia Basins are by definition, as described in Chapter 2, complex river basins with 
complex interrelationships. This paper shall test the hypothesis by applying the basin resilience definition 
used in Chapter 2 to the Mekong and Columbia River Basins – in a modern context. This means that rather 
than use an economic approach that traditionally sums and subtracts costs and benefits, alternatively the 
basin  will  be  evaluated  as  a  complex  socio-ecological  system.  In  that  process,  there  is  a  role  of 220 
 
institutional frameworks in the analysis of basin resilience and adaptive management (Bisson et al. 2008; 
Lebel  et  al.  2006).  There  is  increasing  evidence  that  the  Columbia River  Basin  is moving  towards  an 
adaptive ecological systems approach (FCRPS AMIP 2010) however the costs associated with it are large 
and largely unknown to the public.  
4.3.  METHODOLOGY 
In Part C of the dissertation methodology in Figure 1.2, I will apply a resilience framework to the compare 
resilience of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. The methods I use to accomplish this are illustrated 
in Figure 4.1. First, in Step 1, the basins are compared against physical, developmental, and political 
(institutional) factors. Physical and hydrological characteristics are compared using ratios to normalize 
and rank parameters relating to runoff, discharge, and variability. Developmental factors are compared 
such as the number of dams in the basin, the rate at which they were built (or being planned), and the 
degree  of  modification  of  the  river  hydrology  and  impact  on  fisheries  and  human  settlements. 
Additionally, political factors are considered such as international entities sharing the basin, indigenous 
stakeholders, and conflict and cooperation event data.  
 
Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 methodology compares the Mekong and Columbia Basin using a resilience 
framework. It evaluates resilience of physical, political, and institutional dimensions against the rate of 
development in each basin. 221 
 
Second, in Step 2, conflict and cooperation water event data is updated and compared for the Mekong 
and Columbia River Basin up through June 2011. For the Columbia Basin, Native American (United States) 
and First Nations (Canada) were included as sovereign nations – thereby more than doubling the number 
of relevant water events qualifying as “international” events. Previous event data for the Columbia only 
included events between the United States and Canada and possibly an international actor. The addition 
of  Native  American  and  First  Nation  tribal  nations  has  significant  impact  on  the  nature  of  water 
management  in  the Columbia  Basin, and  is  discussed  in  detail.  Water  event  data by  issue  areas are 
compared in the context of pre and post-development regimes for each basin.  
Third,  in  Step  3,  institutional  frameworks  for  each basin  are compared  to their  response  to,  for  the 
Mekong, management the development of mainstream development projects, and for the Columbia, the 
future of the Columbia River Treaty. Institutions are evaluated against a set of criteria developed over 
years of river basin management published by Wolf (2007).  
Finally,  a  combined  analysis  of  physical,  developmental,  and  political  factors  is  conducted  through  a 
resilience lens – taking particular note of significant trends and adaptive responses studies in both basins. 
It is notable that a detailed economic analysis of river basin development is not conducted here. While 
important to the motivation for developing the basins, and impacting mitigation effects during and after 
development, economic costs and benefits of basin development are simply factored into the cost and 
benefits of socio-ecological systems management and not used as the dominant model in a resilience 
framework. This completes Part C in the overall dissertation methodology. 
4.4.  THREATS AND STRESSORS FACING BOTH BASINS 
Common threats facing the Mekong and Columbia River Basins are shown in Figure 4.2. The basins see 
substantial population growth with over 50 and 100 million expected in the Mekong and Columbia River 
Basins by 2050, respectively, placing pressures on landscape management, resource use, and riparian 
habitat (MRC 2010, ICEM/MRC 2010). Rapid development on the Columbia has already led to severe 
environmental  degradation  and  fisheries  losses  costing  stakeholders  over  US$  7  billion  while  similar 
development schemes are planned for the Mekong, threatening to significantly alter one of the most 
diverse and productive river basins in the world (King et al 2007; ICEM/MRC 2010; Ferguson et al. 2010).  
Growing energy needs in China, Thailand, and Viet Nam are driving needs for “renewable” energy in 
Southeast Asia while residents in the Pacific Northwest are already “addicted” to inexpensive hydropower 
and electricity rates (Barton 2008; MRC 2010). Climate change threatens to increase flooding and intensify 
droughts  in  the  Mekong  giving  justification  for building  some dams that  could  regulate  wet  and  dry 
season flows, while in the Columbia climate changes are forcing earlier spring runoffs that reduce storage 222 
 
capacity and lower summer flows important for agriculture which is a large percentage of the economies 
in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho (ICEM/MRC 2010; MRC 2009; USACE 2008).  
 
Figure 4.2: Common Stressors to the Mekong and Columbia Basins: Data sources: Barton 2008; Ferguson 
et al. 2010; ICEM/MRC 2010; King et al. 2007; McKinney et al. 2010; MRC 2010; MRC 2011; USACE 2008. 
The two basins face remarkably similar stressors albeit in vastly different geographic, social-economic, and 
political settings.  
While the Columbia Basin ponders expanding the existing Treaty with Canada to include Native American 
treaty  and  fishing  rights,  ecosystem  protection  and  restoration,  improved  water  quality,  and  more 
involvement with stakeholders and public participation (McKinney et al. 2010). Similarly, the Mekong 
River Commission faces the first serious test of the newly formed agreement in 1995 in attempts to 
sustainably development the basin while facing an onslaught of hydropower development plans from 
China and downstream riparians (Cosens 2010; ICEM/MRC 2010; McKinney et al. 2010).  
Finally, the goal in balancing competing uses for water is sustainability and resilience of the resource. The 
Triple Bottom Line (TBL) or environmental, social, and economic sustainability is at risk in complex river 
basins.  
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4.5.  CHARACTERISTICS OF BOTH BASINS 
This  section  will  outline  and  discuss  the  physical,  developmental,  and  political,  or  institutional, 
characteristics of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins and use these data for the basin of trends and 
comparison analysis. 
4.5.1.  Physical Characteristics 
The physical characteristics of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins are could not be any more different. 
The Mekong River Basin (MRB) flows through Southeast Asia, beginning at over 4500 meters elevation in 
the Tanggula mountain range in Qinghai province (Figure 4.3), it flows for over 4,800 km through China, 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam, terminating in the South China Sea, draining over 
795,000 km
2 (MRC 2005a). Thailand and Laos both share the highest percentage of area in the basin with 
23 and 25 percent, respectively, while Laos contributes the greatest amount of flow at 35 percent (TFDD 
2004). Viet Nam has the highest population density at 236 persons per square kilometer and the lowest 
percent of basin area at eight percent, posing potential concerns with respect to its political influence in 
the basin (UNEP et al. 2006). The Mekong’s annual flow varies widely and is driven by a monsoonal 
season, ranging from 78.8 to 475 km
3 dry to rainy seasons, respectively (MRC 2005a). The MRB covers a 
range  of  climatic  zones  from  a  polar  tundra  climate  on  the  Tibetan  plateau  in  China,  to  a  tropical 
monsoonal delta system in Viet Nam.  
The Columbia River Basin (CRB) drains a 670,017 km
2 (259,500 square-miles) basin that includes territory 
in seven states in the United States (Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming) and one 
Canadian Province, British Columbia. Flowing for over 1,920 km (1,200 miles), the Columbia stretches 
from the base of the Canadian Rockies to the Oregon coast where it empties into the Pacific Ocean – the 
basin includes peoples from 10,000 years past, 14 officially recognized Native American Tribes from the 
United States and four First Nation Tribes in Canada, and over 7.4 million current inhabitants from both 
the USA and Canada (CCRH 2011; TFDD 2008). The river originates from two lakes that lie between the 
Continental Divide and the Selkirk mountain range in British Columbia, and flows north and then south – 
15 percent of the basin is in Canada (102,399 km
2) and 85 percent in the USA (567,618 km
2) – spanning a 
range of climatic zones from temperate rain forest to semi-arid plateaus (TFDD 2008).  
Table 4.1 offers a set of comparison between the two basins. It is interesting to note that in terms of 
drainage area, the basins are nearly equal (Mekong/Columbia ratio 1.11) however, in terms of length and 
discharge at the mouth, the ratios are nearly 2 to 1 (2.14, 1.86 respectively) - the Mekong being the larger 
of the two basins (Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3: Map of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. Sources: Mekong: USGS GIS Database Digital Alas of South Asia; Columbia: USDA Forest 
Service, Boise Aquatic Sciences Laboratory. 225 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins.  
Property 
Mekong Basin 
(M) 
Columbia Basin 
(C) 
Ratio 
(M/C) 
Geographic location  SE Asia  North America   
Countries sharing  6  2 (19)
a  3 (0.29) 
Countries sharing (% area) 
b 
25% Lao PDR; 
23% Thailand; 
21% China; 
20% Cambodia; 
8% Viet Nam; 
3% Myanmar 
85% USA 
15% Canada 
 
Max elevation (m)
b  5,224  3,901  1.34 
Min elevation (m)  0  0  --- 
Drainage (km
2)
b  760,000  669,300  1.11 
Length (km)b  4,800  1,954  2.14 
Annual runoff @ Kratie/Dalles (km
3) 
b  418  165  2.53 
Annual runoff @ mouth/mouth  (km
3) 
b  457  244  1.87 
Average annual discharge @ Kratie/Dalles (m
3/s)
b  13,200  5,038  2.62 
Average annual discharge @ mouth/mouth (m
3/s)
b  14,500  7,790  1.86 
Natural wet/dry season average monthly flow ratio, % 
1,2  4.21 (81)  2.91 (68)  1.44 
Modified wet/dry season average monthly flow ratio, % 
1,2 
3.37 (77)  1.35 (49)  2.50 
Dams operating in the basin 
b,c,d  25
c  373
d  0.07 
Annual hydropower production operating (TWh) 
c,e  9.9
c  105
e  0.09 
Mainstream dams (planned and operational)
b  20  15  1.33 
Dams in the basin (planned and operational) 
c,d  135
c  373
d  0.36 
Annual hydropower production potential (TWh) 
c,e  134
c  105
e  1.28 
 
a  There are 15 Native American tribes from the United States and 4 First Nations from Canada sharing the basin with 
Canada and the US, accounting for 21 nations (19 tribes, 2 nation-states) sharing the basin. Source: NPCC 2010.  
b  Based on figures from 2008. Source: USCE 2008; MRC 2009, 2010; NPCC 2010. Figures include Chinese dams on the 
Lancang (upper Mekong). 
c  List of dam projects operating, under construction, and projected from MRC’s SEA and ministry sources from four 
lower basin countries. Source: ICEM/MRC 2010. 
d  Accounts for small, medium and large dams – taken from BPA, USACE and BoR accounts (BPA 2001). The NPCC puts 
the number at 274 noting an additional 200 dams for other purposes such as irrigation and flood control, giving 474 in 
total. Source NPCC 2010. 
e  Data from USACE 2008.  
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It is important to recognize that the monsoonal season accounts for over 80 percent of annual flow on the 
Mekong Basin or 4.21 times dry season flow, whereas in the Columbia basin, the wet season which occurs 
in spring and early summer, accounts for only 68 percent of annual flow or approximately 2.91 times dry 
season flows.
17 The ratios from wet to dry season change dramatically as dams and reservoirs flatten the 
hydrographs – 77 percent (3.37:1) on the Mekong and 49 percent (1.35) on the Columbia River Basin.
18  
The Columbia Basin system depends primarily on  snow melt for its runoff  – augmented by spring rains 
that occur from March to June – accounting for the bulk of the flows (Figure 4.4). Peak flows occur in June 
as snow melt combined with end-of-spring rains dominate runoff. This unfortunately does not coincide 
with energy demands in the region which peak in winter (December-January) and therefore requires a 
hydropower strategy utilizing large storage potential.  
 
Figure 4.4: Hydrographs of the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. Sources: USACE 2008; MRC 2005; 
Mekong 20-Year Plan taken BDP scenarios adapted by author. The Mekong hydrograph is relatively 
unchanged (modeled data) due to dams with flow increases in the dry season and less peak flow in the wet 
season. Conversely, the Columbia hydrograph is flattened by regulated flows (actual data). 
                                                                 
17 Wet season in the Mekong Basin is calculated as May to October where the wet season for the Columbia is March 
to July. Data sources taken from MRC and USACE respectively, and values were summed over mean monthly flows 
(m
3/s).  
18 Percentages calculated based on average monthly flow rates averaged by season while ratios were calculated by 
summing average monthly flow rates by season.  
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Average annual runoff at The Dalles is 165 km
3 (134 maf) and the total usable storage potential in the 
basin is 51.8 km
3 (42 maf) (USACE 2008; BPA, BoR and USACE 2001).
19 This means only 30 percent of 
Columbia Basin runoff is capable of being held for storage whereas other major rivers in the United States 
such as the Colorado and Missouri have two or three times storage potential (USACE 2008).
20  
During normal years Canada contributes 25 to 40 percent of the basin’s runoff and 50 percent during peak 
floods (USACE 2008). This and devastating floods in 1948 prompted the US to seek the Columbia River 
Treaty (CRT) with Canada that created additional storage by constructing dams and storage reservoirs in 
Canada rather than in the US. Implementation and management of the treaty and associated projects on 
US tributaries significantly “flattened” the hydrograph such at projects added the flood protection and 
hydropower positive benefits that treaty partners, the United States and Canada, wanted while having 
negative impacts on fish production, water quality, indigenous treaty rights, and land use along the river 
basin in the US and Canada (Wilson 2000).  
4.5.2.  Development of the Basins 
This section reveals and analyzes the effects of development on the Columbia and Mekong River Basins. A 
timeline of water resources development is presented and compared between basins. This is followed by 
analyzing the effects on the river hydrology, impacts on fisheries, and implications for human populations. 
Figure 4.5 gives a combined timeline of water resource development in the two basins. 
The United States began building dams on the Columbia Basin after 1900 and the last large dam was 
completed in the 1970s. Two major dams built on the mainstream were Bonneville and Grand Coulee, 
both having significant effects on fisheries. The first, Bonneville, required the first fish passage facility 
allowing fish to navigate past the structure, while the latter, Grand Coulee cut off fisheries to the upper 
regions of the Basin completely (BPA, BoR, USACE 2001). The Columbia River Treaty signed in 1964 added 
one dam on the US side of the basin and three additional dams in Canada (Muckleston 2003). The final 
cascade of major dams constructed on the Snake River Basin was completed in the late 1970s. A complete 
list of projects on the Columbia and Snake River Basins is given in Appendix G.  
                                                                 
19 Runoff at the mouth is closer to 246 km
3 (200 maf) however, since Bonneville dam contains no reservoir upstream, 
most storage capacity and management capability on the Columbia lies upstream of the Dalles with an annual 
average runoff of 165 km
3.  
20 This figure includes 19.1 km
3 (15.5 maf) storage that was built as part of the Columbia River Treaty with Canada. 
Pre-treaty storage was only 32.7 km
3 (26.5 maf) or only 20% of average annual runoff at the Dalles. Most US rivers 
contain more storage than average annual runoff. The Columbia Basin System actually contains 67.8 km
3 of storage 
however, only 51.8 km
3 is useable due to dead storage.  228 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Basin Development History and Forecast for the Mekong and Columbia River Basins.  
Sources: ICEM/MRC 2010; MRC 2010; USACE 2008; BPA 2001; USACE NID 2010. The Columbia developed 
over a 70-year timeframe while the Mekong plans to develop in 30-40 years.  
Later  in  the  1980s,  the  Pacific  Northwest  Electric  Power  Planning  and  Conservation  Act  in  1980 
established the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (NPCC) which became 
responsible for Salmon mitigation measures on the Columbia River Basin (NPCC 2010).  
Meanwhile,  the  Mekong  River  Basin  only  just  had  begun  its  development  in  the  1971  with  the 
construction of Nam Ngum hydroelectric facility with wide scale development hampered by wars in Indo 
China. With the help of the Bureau of Reclamation and US Army Corps of Engineers, plans to develop the 
Mekong were drawn up in the 1960s only to resurface in the 1980s and again in 2000 with plans for the 
first mainstream dam, Xanaburi dam in Lao PDR, and construction already in progress. A key challenge for 
the Mekong River Commission and National Mekong Committees is whether or not they can live up to the 
key aim for the 1995 Treaty that created the MRC, namely to develop the river sustainably. Results from a 
large study completed at the end of 2010 indicated recommended that the four countries in the LMB wait 
for  10  years  before  building  mainstream  dams  due  to  the  serious  impacts  on  fisheries,  freshwater 
ecosystems, livelihoods, and local economies in the basin (ICEM/MRC 2010).  
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4.5.3.  Effects on River Hydrology 
While the basins are quite different in their physical geography and hydrology, there are some striking 
similarities  in  the  way  the  basins  are  being  developed.  Referring  back  to  Figure  4.4,  it  displays  the 
hydrographs for both the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. For the Mekong Basin, the monsoonal 
season, starting in May and June and ending in October, is responsible for a majority of discharge. Unlike 
the Columbia, the Mekong River only gains a modest amount of runoff (at Kratie) from snow melt from 
the upper basin in China – only 16 percent in the wet season and up to 40 percent during the dry season 
(MRC 2005).  
These  contributions  increase  significantly  when  measured  at  Vientiane  –  approximately  45  and  70 
percent, respectively, having greater implications on mainstream dam projects considered in Laos since 
China is not part of the Mekong River Commission. Predictions of the impact of dam development are 
seen in Figure 4.4 (dashed red line) – indicating a modest reduction in peak floods during the wet season 
and increased flows in the dry season from November to April (MRC 2010; MRC 2005). 
The “flattening” of the hydrograph is typical of highly developed river basins and is also seen on the 
Columbia  Basin.  The  development  of  the  river  has  led  to  irreversible  changes  to  the  ecological  and 
hydrologic  flow  regime  reducing  peak  flows  during  the  wet  season  by  more  than  100  percent,  and 
increasing flows in the dry season by 167 percent. The high degree of modification is obvious by the large 
variation is seasonal flows. Understandably, peak seasonal flows are attenuated to prevent devastating 
flooding downstream (Figures 4.4 and 4.6). 
The  Columbia  figures  are calculated  based  on  summing  monthly  flow  differences from  natural  flows 
against seasonal averages as depicted in Equation 4.1.  
         
√∑ (           )      
    
           
 
Equation 4.1: Coefficient of Variation for Columba River Flow. 
Over the course of the year, monthly flows are “flattened” by storing water upstream during the wet 
season and releasing same during the dry seasons. The Mekong Basin shows a 26 percent (26%) reduction 
in base flow in the monsoonal (wet) season and a 54 percent increase (54%) in flows in the dry season 
These effects are depicted in Figure 4.6. 
While some reduction in peak flows can prevent destructive flooding downstream, there is debate over 
how much to reduce flows while still maintaining the flood pulse regimes of the river which is essential for 230 
 
fish breeding and production in the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia. Likewise, some increase in flows during 
the dry season provided primarily by Chinese dams on in the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) is considered 
beneficial  to  downstream  riparians  enabling  greater  water  withdrawals  for  irrigation  during  the  dry 
season.  
 
Figure 4.6: Changes to Mekong and Columbia Hydrographs due to Development. Data Sources: USACE and 
MRC.
21 The Columbia is highly augmented (102-167%) whereas the Mekong will have moderate 
augmentation (26-54%). 
The effect of dams clearly changes the hydrologic regime of both rivers – the changes evident on the 
Columbia. Referring again to Table 4.1, 25 dams are currently in operation on the Mekong, giving a ratio 
of Mekong to Columbia River dams currently operating of 0.07, or approximately 15 Columbia River dams 
for every Mekong dam. This might suggest a low level of development and hence minor impacts on the 
Mekong. However, adding planned and operating mainstream dams, the ratio increases to 1.33, or four 
Mekong dams for every three Columbia dams, reflecting the high level of development currently being 
installed  and planned  in the upper Mekong Basin (Lancang  in Yunnan  Province), and 12 mainstream 
projects planned on the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) (MRC 2010). This is the heart of concern since the 
Mekong River contains over 900 species if freshwater fish (Valbo-Jørgensen et al. 2009, 164-5) feeding 
                                                                 
21 Percentages calculated from Equation 1 based on the monthly sum of squares differences (coefficient of variation) 
between developed and natural flows divided by average flows for the season. 231 
 
over 70 million people with an estimated value of over US$ 3.6-6.5 billion dollars (Horte 2009, 208; MRC 
2010, 98).  
If development on the tributaries is included, that ratio of Mekong to Columbia dams becomes 0.36 or 
nearly 3 Columbia dams to every Mekong dam, indicating that the Columbia would still more developed 
than the Mekong – in terms of number of dams. But caution is needed in making conclusions purely off 
this number. This is only a rough calculation. In reality, size, location, rate of development, and adaptive 
capacity of the ecosystem are critical in the determination of impacts of building dams in social-ecological 
systems (Dugan et al. 2010; McCartney 2009; WCD 2000).  
4.5.4.  Rate of Water Resource Development 
Water resource development is not new and the Columbia Basin is not an exception. The Mekong River 
Basin (MRB) however, has been until now, an exceptional river, as it has largely escaped water resource 
development. There are many reasons for this but times are changing and development in the Mekong 
has rapidly begun and quickly progressing. The Columbia River Basin (CRB) development began, on a large 
scale, in the late 1920s, however, some smaller scale development began around the turn of the century 
after the River and Harbors Act of 1899 which tasked the Corps of Engineers to regulate and control all 
navigable rivers in the United States (Cech 2005).  
Though there were already over 70 large dams installed on the CRB by the late 1920s, dam building did 
not accelerate until after passage of the Flood Control Act in 1928, many dams arriving in the early 1940s 
during WWII (Cech 2005; USACE NID 2010). Two of the most significant and largest dams on the Columbia 
mainstream, Bonneville and Grand Coulee, began construction in 1933 and were completed in 1937 and 
1941, respectively. The last large dam completed in the mainstream of the CRB was John Day Dam in 
1968,  and  Lower  Granite  Dam  and  American  Falls  Dams  on  the  Snake  River,  in  1975  and  1978, 
respectively. American Falls Dam was a replacement dam for the one built in 1927 (USACE NID 2011). See 
Appendix G. 
The  rate  of  change,  or  speed,  of  development  in  river  basins  is  an  important  variable  to  determine 
sustainable management and resilience of the basin. To do a legitimate comparison, the number of dams 
built in the Columbia Basin is compared with those being built or planned in the Mekong Basin. Data for 
the Columbia Basin was taken from the National Inventory of Dams managed by the USACE and data for 
the Mekong Basin from MRC and World Bank. The results are displayed in Figure 4.7.  
The  dip  in  the  1920s  was  largely  due  to  the  great  depression  and  lack  of  public  funds  for  large 
infrastructure projects. By 1940, public works projects had resumed. Motivated by large unemployment 
and the war economy the US government commission several large projects such as the Grand Coulee 232 
 
Dam and Hoover Dam. The first large mainstream dam on the Columba River, Rock Island Dam, was 
started in 1932 followed by Bonneville Dam in 1937. Mainstream development of large dams continued 
until 1968 with the completion of Wells and John Day dams. There were several more dams built on the 
Snake River in the 1970s, the last being Lower Granite Dam in 1975. The four large downstream dams on 
the Snake River have been responsible for serious declines in salmon migrations and have been targeted 
for potential removal by many environmental and restoration groups.  
Figure  4.7  also  illustrates  the  effects  of  water  resources  development  on  salmon  populations  in  the 
Columbia River basin. The fall in Salmon populations was due solely to dams. Intensified agriculture, 
unsustainable commercial fishing practices, and climate and ocean conditions also had impacts (Ferguson 
et al. 2010; NRC 2004). It has been only since 2000 and later than salmon populations have started to 
return due in a large part to the production of hatchery fish. Of the returning populations, it is estimated 
that less than 20 percent are wild and approximately 30 percent of the historic populations have been 
extirpated  and  75  percent  of  the  evolutionarily  significant  units  (ESU)  are  listed  as  threatened  or 
endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) (Ferguson et al. 2010, 149; USACE, BoR, and 
BPA 2010).  
Lackey (2003) reviews numerous studies presents the best yet estimate of estimated historic and current 
run sizes of pacific wild salmon in several Pacific Northwest geographies in Table 4.2. Meengs and Lackey 
(2006) go further to include the effects of the ocean on “good” and “poor” years (Meengs and Lackey 
2006). Their figures predict average runs for Oregon Coho with “good” ocean conditions at 11-19 percent 
of historical and for “bad” conditions 3-6 percent of historical runs, agreeing well with Lackey (2003) and 
figures in Table 4.2 for the Oregon Coast (Meengs and Lackey 2006, 63).  
Estimating the rate of development in the Mekong Basin was more difficult as there are many estimates 
and they are continually being revised. Data was taken from hydropower assessments from King, Bird and 
Haas (2007) and the recent ICEM/MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment (2010) conducted to assess 
the  impact  of  mainstream  dams.  Additionally  data  was  compared  with  national  databases  such  as 
Powering Progress hosted by the  Department of Energy Promotion and Development (EPD), which is 
under the mantle of the Ministry of Energy and Mines in Lao PDR (Powering Progress 2011).  
Of the 133 dams listed for development in the Mekong Basin including Chinese dams in the upper basin, 
45  (34%)  are  completed  which  includes  four  mainstream  Chinese  dams,  6  projects  (5%)  are  under 
construction, 44 projects (33%) have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), 26 projects (20%) 
have plans developed but no MOUs, 9 projects (7%) are ambiguous or no data exists (TBD), and 3 projects 
(2%) have been cancelled. A completion schedule for hydropower development is displayed in Figure 4.8.  233 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Rate of Water Resource Development in the Columbia and Mekong River Basins. Sources: 
USACE NID 2011; ICEM/MRC 2010; King, Bird and Haas 2007; Powering Progress 2011; Ferguson et al. 
2010.
22 The first peak in dam building on the Columbia corresponds to the initial decline is salmon stocks – 
the decline continuing and exacerbated by continued development rate. The proposed Mekong 
development rate is 23% greater than the highest rate of development on the Columbia.  
Decade  includes  everything  in  the  previous  ten  years.
 23 A  complete  table  of  Mekong  dams  and 
completion estimates is given in Table 6.10, Appendix G. 
The difficulty in project the development rate in the Mekong Basin for dams is the extreme variability in 
signing of agreements and construction schedules. In order to estimate it, data from the status of projects 
were  assembled  and  correlated  with  estimated  completion  date  based  on  the  size  of  the  project  in 
Megawatts (MW). Of those projects that were completed, there was found to be a relationship between 
the size of the project (MW) and date of completion (DOC).  
   
                                                                 
22 Only large dams by ICOLD standards, or those 15 meters in height or over 3 MCM in storage, were included for the 
Columbia Basin figures.  
23 Two dams, Theun-Hinboun NG8 and Thakek were excluded due to the fact that no information could be found on 
them. The decadal axis includes the past 10 years, i.e., 2010 includes dams built or planned from 2001-2010. 234 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated Historic (late 1800s) and Current (late 1900s) Run Sizes of Wild Salmon in Western 
North America. Source: Modified from Gresh el al. 2000; Lackey 2003). 
Geographic Area 
Historic (late 1800s) 
Run Size (millions) 
Current (late 1900s) 
Run Size (millions) 
Percent (%) of Historic 
Run Size 
Alaska  150-200  115-259  106.7 
British Columbia, Canada 
(outside Columbia Basin) 
44-93  24.8  36.2 
Puget Sound, US  13-27  1.6  8.0 
Washington Coast, US  2-6  0.07  1.8 
Columbia Basin, Canada 
and US 
11-15  0.11-0.33  1.7 
Oregon Coast, US  2-4  0.10-0.32  7.0 
California, US  5-6  0.28  5.1 
California, Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, US 
33-58  2.16-2.6  5.2 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Dam Completion Schedule on the Mekong River Basin. Source: MRC; ICEM/MRC 2010; King, 
Bird and Haas 2007; Powering Progress 2011. The bulk of Mekong projects are planned for a 10-15 year 
period. Many are MOUs where schedules are not fixed. 235 
 
The relationship between MW and DOC (R
2 = 0.214) was regressed and used to estimate DOCs for projects 
with  signed  MOUs.  There  is  error  in  estimating  the  date  of  completion  not  only  in  the  relationship 
between MOUs and size of project, but also the signing of projects, parties involved, contractor, funding 
sources, and of course political and environmental factors that can affect project schedules as is the 
currently the case with Xayaburi dam in Lao PDR. However, this method serves as a rough guide to the 
development schedule in the basin. 
The obvious concern from the standpoint of sustainability and basin resilience are the plans to build and 
complete 91 dams in the 2020 decade, or from 2011 to 2020. That equates to a rate of 9.1 dams per year. 
Referring back to Figure 4.7, this rate exceeds (23%) the highest rate of development on the Columbia 
Basin, from 1950 to 1970, a rate of 7.4 dams per year, shown had significant impacts on freshwater 
ecosystems and in particular fisheries in the basin (Figure 4.7). The number of dams built alone is not a 
complete measure of water resources development. Irrigation development and reservoir storage are 
also important factors. However, for this study, the due to the extreme sensitivity of the basin to fisheries, 
the presence of dams alone is used as a proxy for water resources development in the basin.  If the 
Mekong Basin proceeds with this rate of development, basin ecosystems, social structures, and local, 
provincial, national, and regional institutions will very likely not have sufficient capacity to cope with the 
effects of the rapid changes in the system, possibly leading to conflict, environmental degradation, and 
collapse the extinction of many species of migratory fish in the Mekong Basin.  
4.5.5.  Political Differences 
Politically, the ratio is 3:1 (see Table 4.1) where the Mekong shares with six countries compared with only 
two on the Columbia. However, if tribal nations are considered, many now sovereign nations, the ratio 
becomes 0.29 meaning the Columbia Basin shares its waters with 3.45 times as many more sovereign 
nations than does the Mekong. The implications of this statistic on basin resilience are discussed and 
analyzed at depth under the Conflict and Cooperation Section which features next.  
4.6.  CONFLICT AND COOPERATION ON THE MEKONG AND COLUMBIA RIVER BASINS – 
ANALYSIS OF WATER EVENT DATA 
In their work to identify international basins at risk of conflict, Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano (2003) created a 
BAR scale to identify how effectively international basins where managing water resources (Wolf, Yoffe, 
and Giordano 2003). Their framework for measuring the level of conflict and cooperation in international 
river basins provides a useful tool not only to assess of the state of the basin management system, but 
also to assess basin resilience. The following analysis uses the Basins at Risk (BAR) scale conflict and 
cooperation method to compare institutional resilience on the Mekong and Columbia basins. In particular, 236 
 
with  respect  to  the  Columbia  Basin,  the  effect  of greater  status of Native  American  Tribes  on  basin 
resilience is incorporated.
24 
Water event data was collected through the same process  and used to populate  the Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) Event Database located at Oregon State University.
25 The data was 
updated from 2008 to 2011 and tribal nations were added. The basic structure of the data consists of a 
date, basin name, countries or parties involved, the BAR scale (explained below), a summary of the event, 
the issue area (hydropower, irrigation, etc.), and the source of the news story. Searches were conducted 
online using Lexis-Nexis Academic search engine.
26 The search terms are listed in Table 6.12 in Appendix 
H. The search returns thousands of records. Only events involving the management of freshwater water 
resources were retained. This often involved reading the headline to determine if the article or news item 
was relevant.  
In previous updates to the TFDD Events Database only interactions between sovereign nations were 
included in the coding of events. This meant that interactions within a country, say between States in the 
United States, were not included in the d ataset. This was due to the focus on international interactions 
and intuitions. For the U.S., a domestic data base created to investigate State to State Compacts (TFDD 
2012a).
27 Since the database was created however, the political and institutional environ ment in the 
United States and progressed and Native American Tribes have gained sovereign nation-state status. This 
means that Tribes can sign treaties (they have always done so) with the United States, but more 
importantly, it means that the U.S. has to g ive Tribes a seat at the diplomatic table when signing 
agreements. Therefore, the update to Mekong and Columbia Event data included adding Tribes to the 
Columbia River Basin (for 3 years only).  
Once the final list of events was selected, the events are scored based on the conflict/cooperation scale 
(Yoffe et al. 2003). The scale ranges from ( -7) which denotes war or armed conflict over water to (+7) 
where nations join as one entity. A cooperative event such as signing an international freshwater treaty is 
coded as a (+6), whereas a conflictive event such as political or hostile military actions due to water would 
be scored a (-4). As yet, there have never been a (+7) or (+7) recorded in the database. The data follows a 
                                                                 
24 The methodology of the BAR study can be found in study cited above by Wolf, Yoffe and Giordano 2003, pp.32-38. 
25 Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University.  
Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu.  
26 Access to the search engine was gained through the Valley Library 
(www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.oregonstate.edu/hottopics/lnacademic).  
27 This is found in TFDD (www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu) under U.S. Interstate Freshwater Compacts Database.  237 
 
typical binomial distribution most of the events falling in the (+1) category, which denotes minor official 
exchanges and mild verbal support. A table with descriptions of the BAR scale is included in Table 6.16, 
Appendix H. Additionally, event codes are added to each event to tie it to sectors common in water 
management such as joint management, hydropower, irrigation, etc. A description of these is found in 
Table 6.17, Appendix H. 
4.6.1.  Conflictive Trends in Both Basins 
Analysis  of  event  data  shows  that  both  Mekong  and  Columbia  River  Basin  water  events  are  on  a 
downward trend (Figure 4.9), indicating a significant reduction in cooperative water management activity 
in both basins. The trends are significant to 95 percent confidence, for the Mekong (slope = -0.052, R
2 = 
0.148) and for the Columbia (slope = -0.054, R
2 = 0.160, see Appendix H). This means that for both basins, 
the BAR scale has lost approximately 1.0 point over the last 20 years.
28 This might indicate a growing lack 
of institutional resilience in both basins.  
 
Figure 4.9: Water Conflict and Cooperation Trends on the Mekong and Columbia. Source: Updated water 
event data from TFDD. Event data from both basins, evaluated separately, indicate a significant 
decreasing trend toward more conflictive relations over water management. 
                                                                 
28 See Figure 6.1 in Appendix H for bar charts with full event dataset.  238 
 
Data was analyzed by year and decade and in both cases trend toward more conflict were statistically 
significant. See Figures 6.2 and 6.3 in Appendix H for the statistics and box plots. 
4.6.2.  Conflictive Events – The Mekong Basin 
The question becomes what is responsible for the decrease in cooperative events? Figure 4.10 displays an 
increasing percentage of negative events in both basins in the 2000 and 2010 decade, or over the last 20 
years, particularly in the Mekong Basin. In that basin, Figure 4.10 below shows that “Hydro-power/Hydro-
electricity”  is  responsible  for  nearly  half  (49%,  dams)  of  all  conflictive  events,  followed  by  “Water 
Quantity”  (18%,  dry  season  shortages),  and  “Infrastructure/Development”  (8%,  water  resources 
development projects). It is noteworthy that there are issue areas that have been largely cooperative in 
the past particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. The current negative trend in cooperation signals a shift in 
activities in the basin and maybe be an indication that development is progressing at an unsustainable 
rate. 
Historically, events on the Mekong Basin are mostly positive with 73 percent (73%) of the events greater 
than zero, eight percent (8%) neutral, and 19 percent negative (19%). However, the negative trends are 
worrisome. Negative events have increased 5 to 6 times since the 1990s (6%) reaching as high as 35 
percent (35%) in the 2010s. And there seems to be no indication of the trend reversing at the time of this 
writing. 
In fact, of the 49 negative events in the Mekong Basin, 73 percent (73%) are related to the building of 
dams or development of hydropower (see Figure 4.10). The remaining 27 percent (27%) relate to water 
shortages in the dry season and flood issues in the wet season. Ironically, mainstream dams will increase 
flows in the dry season and attenuate floods in the wet season. The three “-3s” on the Mekong Basin in 
the 2010s and 2011 relate to the building of Xayaburi Dam in Lao PDR and the withdrawal of funding from 
the US as a result of the planned rapid development (building of dams) in the Basin. And while the 
majority of events from 2000-2009 (2000s decade) in the Mekong basin are +1’s (24), the second most 
frequent are -1’s (15) shown in Figure 4.11. 239 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Distribution of BAR Event Data by Decade for Mekong and Columbia Basins. The increasing 
tend of conflictive (negative) events are seen in the last 20 years. In particular, the presence of 3 (-3)’s in 
the Mekong Basin is problematic.  
The  continued  pressure  to  build  dams  is  threatening  resilience  in  local,  national,  and  regional 
organizations  and  institutions  making  it  increasing  difficult  to  manage  the  basin  sustainability  and 
cooperatively.  
4.6.3.  Negative Cooperation Trends - Columbia 
Historically, events on the Columbia Basin are still mostly positive with 66 percent of the events greater 
than zero (66%), seven percent (7%) neutral, and 27 percent negative (27%). However, the basin has also 
seen an increase in conflictive events on water management in the last 20 years (Figures 4.9 and 4.10). 
The number of negative events has gone from zero percent (0%) in the 1990s to 33 percent (33%) in the 
2000s to 26 percent (26%) in the 2010s (see Figure 4.11). Most of the negative events are related to issues 
over “Fishing” (32%, salmon and fishing rights), “Hydro-power/Hydro-electricity” (21%, dams and effects 
on rivers, fish), and “Water Quality” (21%, water quality due to mining practices) – Figure 4.10.  
While there has been also a significant trend in decreasing BAR score (increasing conflict), there has been 
some indication this is reversing in the last 3-5 years (see Figure 4.12). The uptick in cooperation is partly 240 
 
due to agreements signed with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes in Montana and the Ktunaxa 
Nation in British Columbia with the State of Montana to protect the Flathead River Basin in February 
2011, the awarding of over US$ 8 million to Tribes and Boundary Dam in Northeastern Washington State, 
and the decision by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) to fund of the Chief Joseph fish hatchery in 
Okanogan County in Washington State. Increases in cooperation are reflected the over US$ 750 million 
cooperative  awards  to  the  Shoshone-Bannock  Tribe,  Confederated  Tribes  of  the  Umatilla  Indian 
Reservation, and Nez Perce Tribes by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department in 2009 as part of the Lower 
Snake River Compensation Plan.  These events and other influences by Tribal nations in the management 
process have increased cooperation in the basin.  
 
Figure 4.11: Pareto of Negative BAR Events for Mekong and Columbia Basins. Most conflictive issues in the 
Mekong are on hydropower and water quantity, whereas in the Columbia they are fishing, hydro, and 
water quality. 
4.6.4.  Effect of Native American Tribes on Cooperation 
Previous  versions  of  the  conflict/cooperation  BAR  scale  included  only  water  management  actions 
involving foreign countries, i.e., the United States and Canada, or Thailand and Lao PDR. However, on the 
Columbia Basin, over the last decade, Native American Tribes have become sovereign entities with many 241 
 
Tribes joined into Confederated groups. A list of the federally recognized tribes and their groupings are 
listed in Table 4.3 below. 
Tribes were included in the Event data from 2008 to 2011 and totaled 38 events averaging almost 10 
events per year. The country to country data without Tribes has 33 events ranging from 1960 to 2011, or 
averaging 0.64 events per year, or one event every 1.5 years. The average BAR score without Tribal 
influence comes to 1.27; with Tribes it rises to 1.60. This difference is not significant (95%, =0.05) when 
looking at the entire 51 years of data which is understandable as Tribal data only goes back four years. 
However, when comparing the data by decade (2000s = 2000-2009, 2010s = 2010-2011), the differences 
are significant to 95 percent confidence and the data passes a two-sided t-test. See the T-test Table 6.15 
and Figure 6.5 in in Appendix H.  
Table 4.3: US and Canadian Tribal Nations Involved in Water Management on the Columbia Basin. Source: 
NPCC 2010. 
Federally 
Recognized (USA) 
Location of 
Recognized Tribes 
Number of 
Tribes in Event 
Data 
Tribes Appearing from 
USA 
Tribes 
Appearing 
from Canada 
Colville  WA, USA  1 
Burns Paiute 
Cayuse 
Chinook 
Coeur d'Alene 
Colville 
Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes 
Confederated Tribes of 
Warm Springs 
Cowlitz 
Grande Ronde 
Kalispel 
Nez Perce 
Palus 
Shoshone-Bannock 
Spokane 
Umatilla 
Yakama 
Sinixt First 
Nations 
Secwepermc 
First Nations 
Ktunaxa First 
Nations 
Blackfoot First 
Nations 
Okanagan First 
Nations 
Kalispel  WA, USA  2 
Spokane  WA, USA  3 
Yakama  WA, USA  4 
Kootenai  ID, USA  5 
Coeur d'Alene  ID, USA  6 
Nez Perce  ID, USA  7 
Shoshone-Bannock  ID, USA  8 
Shoshone-Paiute  ID, USA  9 
Salish  MT, USA  10 
Kootenai  MT, USA  11 
Grand Ronde  OR, USA  12 
Warm Springs  OR, USA  13 
Umatilla  OR, USA  14 
Burns Paiute  OR, USA  15 
Okanagan  BC, Canada  16 
Ktunaxa  BC, Canada  17 
Kinbasket  BC, Canada  18 
Sinixt  BC, Canada  19 
 
The results indicate a cooperative influence on BAR score due to the involvement of Native American 
Tribes in the water management process. The BAR indicates a 1.54 point increase in the BAR score for the 
2000s decade (2000-2009) and a 1.15 point difference in the 2010s decade, or from 2010 to 2011. Both 
differences are significant at the 95 percent confidence (α<0.05) level and the data suggests that the two 
populations may also have different variations – the population including Native Americans has only half 
the variance as the non-Tribal population (see Appendix H for Tribal statistics). This suggests not only an 242 
 
increase  in  cooperative  water  management,  but  more  consistent  cooperation  than  the  non-Tribal 
interactions.  The  average  difference  in  BAR  score  between  water  events  including  Tribes  and  those 
without are shown below in Figure 4.12. The Tribal data only goes back to 2008. Extending the analysis 
back further could show a greater influence of the Tribes on the cooperation scale. 
 
Figure 4.12: Effect of Tribes on Bar Score - Columbia Basin. BAR Events are partitioned into Tribal and non-
Tribal effects. Although only having 4-years of data, Tribes have a significant cooperative effect on water 
management. 
Additionally, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the event data shows significant relationships between 
decade, tribal influence, the number of parties, and issue area. In the decadal model (using decade as the 
primary unit of time), the decadal variable explains 28.2 percent of the variance in the data, the presence 
of tribes explains five percent, the number of countries/tribes in the event explains 9.7 percent (9.7%), 
and  the  issue  area  (hydro,  water  quantity,  etc.)  explains  22.2  percent  (22.2%),  leaving  34.9  percent 
(34.9%)  explained by error (unexplained by the variables included). Therefore in this model, decade, 
tribes, number of parties, and issue area ALL have significant effect (α<0.05, Adj. R
2 = 47.64) on the BAR 
scale (see Table 6.13 in Appendix H).  
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Looking at yearly data (Table 6.14 in Appendix H), the significance levels change likely due to lack of 
enough data present in each calendar year. The yearly model which includes year as the primary unit of 
time, number of countries/tribes, tribal influence, and issue code produces a greater fit (>95% confidence, 
R
2  =  52.48)  and  leaves  less  error  (29%  error  as  opposed  to  34.9%)  however,  the  number  of 
countries/tribes is not significant. In this model, year has a much great impact on the data at 44.7 percent, 
(44.7%) countries/tribes 7.9 percent (7.9%) (though only significant to 88%), Tribal influence 3.2 percent 
(3.2%), and issue area 15.2 percent (15.2%) leaving 29 percent (29%) of error to unexplained variables. 
The greater influence of year is probably due to lack of data in some years and large gaps in the times 
series.  
 
Figure 4.13: Tribal Influence by Issue Area. Tribes have a significant cooperative effect on Joint 
Management, Technical Assistance, and Territorial issues. They have less favorable effects on Water 
Quality and Quantity issues. 
In either model the data suggests that the trends are significant, Tribes have a cooperative (positive) 
impact  on  BAR  score,  a  greater  number  of  parties  raises  BAR  score,  and  issue  code  is  important  in 
predicting  the  outcome.  The  areas  where  Tribes  have  the  most  influence  appear  to  be  in  Technical 
Cooperation and Assistance, Joint Management, Territorial Issues and Irrigation in addition to impacts in 
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Hydro-power/Hydro-electricity (Figure 4.13). The Tribes have the greatest number of issues in Fishing (16) 
however the BAR score in this area is relatively low suggesting that little progress is made in achieving 
results in this area. It is notable that are no Tribal events in the area of Flood Control and Infrastructure 
Development  as  these  are  largely  controlled  by  the  Columbia  River  Treaty  and  US  Army  Corps  of 
Engineers. It is also notable that little progress has been made by either Tribes or Countries on Water 
Quality, Water Quantity, and Fishing indicating a potential lack of resilience to manage these areas.  
The next section addresses the institutional capacity and responses to development challenges in both 
the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. First in the Mekong Basin, the process to approve or disapprove 
the  first  mainstream  dam  is  analyzed.  Second  in  the  Columbia  Basin,  negotiations  over  revising  the 
Columbia River Treaty are assessed in an adaptive capacity framework.  
4.7.  INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE AND FLEXIBILITY - THE MEKONG AND COLUMBIA BASINS 
The Mekong River Basin has one of the most significant institutional histories of river management with 
regional  dialogue  on  transboundary  water  cooperation  dating  back  to  the  early  1950s.  In  1957,  the 
Mekong Committee was established with assistance from the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The Committee brought together Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and (then) 
South Viet Nam (Nguyen 1999). The 1957 Agreement was shaped by the political goals of the emerging 
nation-states, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, following the withdrawal of France. It was motivated by a 
general consensus on the benefits that could be gained from developing the waters of the Mekong, 
particularly in the areas of hydropower, navigation and irrigation. The Committee continued to negotiate 
throughout  the  Viet  Nam-America  war,  during  which  time  South  Viet  Nam  and  Laos  maintained  a 
generally cooperative relationship with Thailand. However, the war halted development initiatives and 
many of the planned projects were never put into effect (Hirsch et al. 2006). 
Before the Agreement was signed, a 1952 ECAFE study, undertaken with the cooperation of the four 
lower riparians - Cambodia , Laos , Thailand , Viet Nam - noted the Mekong 's particular potential for 
hydroelectric  and  irrigation  development.  As  a  result  of  that  study,  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation 
completed  a  report  on  planning  and  development  on  the  lower  basin  in  1955-56,  urging  joint 
management in developing the river. The study noted that data was needed for river basin planning and 
emphasized the importance of data collection and analysis and coordination of activities (TFDD 2008). To 
facilitate coordination, the report suggested the establishment of an international body for exchanging 
information and development plans between the riparian states. Ultimately, the report suggested, such a 
body might become a permanent agency responsible for coordinating joint management of the Mekong 
basin. When the report was presented in the tenth-anniversary meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok in March 
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further study. The report also noted that harnessing the main stem of the river would allow hydropower 
production, expansion of irrigated land, a reduction of the threat of flooding in the delta region, and the 
extension of navigability of the river as far as northern Laos (Diokno and Chinh 2006; Nguyen 1999).  
In 1975, still under the auspices of the Mekong Committee, the Joint Declaration of Principles for the 
Utilization  of  the  Waters  of  the  Lower  Mekong  Basin  was  signed  in  Bangkok.  The  Joint  Declaration 
emphasized “resources of common interest” and effectively gave riparian states a veto power over plans 
by other nations to divert water from the mainstream. However, implementation of the 1975 Agreement 
was impeded by conflict and political reform. Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos all underwent changes in 
political regime following the end of the Viet Nam-America war. As a result, in 1976 and 1977 the Mekong 
Committee did not meet, and looked set to fail (Nguyen 1999). 
In 1978, Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam established an interim body (the Interim Mekong Committee) to 
encourage  the  continuation  of  dialogue.  Cambodia,  under  the  rule  of  the  Khmer  Rouge,  did  not 
participate  in  the  Interim  Committee,  and  the  Committee  was  therefore  limited  in  its  capacity  to 
undertake Basin-wide planning. This partial collaboration continued until 1991 when Cambodia resumed 
negotiations with the other Lower Basin countries. However, they could not reach agreement on a draft 
Mekong Committee Declaration, primarily due to a disagreement between Viet Nam and Thailand over 
the diversion of water by the upstream state as part of the planned Khong-Chi-Mun project. Thailand 
pushed for a review of the 1975 Joint Declaration, the principles of which had guided cooperation in the 
Interim Committee (Diokno and Chinh 2006). 
The UNDP intervened in the early 1990s, establishing a Working Group to investigate future collaboration. 
It was during Working Group meetings in 1993 and 1994 that the draft Agreement on the Cooperation for 
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement) was developed.  
4.7.1.  The Mekong Agreement 
The Mekong River Basin has one of the most significant institutional histories of river management. On 5 
April  1995,  the  Mekong  Agreement  was  signed  by  Thailand,  Lao  PDR,  Viet  Nam  and  Cambodia.  The 
Agreement codified principles of regional cooperation and established the Mekong River Commission. 
Under  the  Agreement,  MRC  member  countries  agree  to  cooperate  in  all  fields  of  sustainable 
development, and in the utilization, management and conservation of water and related resources in the 
Mekong  River  Basin  –  for  example,  navigation,  flood  control,  fisheries,  agriculture,  hydropower,  and 
environmental protection.  
The emergence of the Mekong Agreement and the MRC in 1995 was “win” for international peace and 
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cooperative relationship has been  characterized as the “Mekong Spirit”  – defined by mutual respect 
between  riparian  states  and  a  willingness  to  engage  in  dialogue  towards  cooperative  river  basin 
management (Hirsch et al. 2006). Dialogue between riparian states continued in one form or another 
from the early 1950s through to the present day. The Mekong Agreement includes many of the provisions 
of the previous Mekong Committee Rules for Water Utilization and reflects the principles and wording of 
international watercourse law.
29 
The Mekong Agreement and the MRC represent a new initiative, with governments working to forge new 
territories  for  c ooperation  that  supersede  past  antagonisms  and  build  on  successful  initiatives  in 
regionalism. While not diminishing the significance of historical cooperation in the region, it is important 
to recognize that inter-governmental negotiations within the Mekong cooperation framework have been 
shaped by the area’s recent emergence from a history of ideological dispute and violent regional and 
internal conflict. 
4.7.1.1.  Agreement Framework 
The framework of the Mekong Agreement, the MRC, has a three-tiered institutional structure comprising 
a Ministerial Council, a Joint Committee and a Secretariat (see Figure 4.14). The Council is the highest 
body within the organization and is responsible for overseeing MRC activities and directing MRC policies. 
The Joint Committee is responsible for implementing Council initiatives and supervising the activities of 
the Secretariat (MRC 2005b). 
The Secretariat, currently based in Vientiane, is responsible for the day to day administration of MRC 
affairs and for the development and implementation of MRC programs. For reasons of neutrality, the 
Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the  Secretariat  is  of  non-riparian  nationality.  In  order  to  maintain  a 
representative number of riparian staff, the Secretariat has a policy of employing equal numbers of staff 
from each member state. Under MRC policy, to enable a greater number of riparian staff to benefit from 
working within a river basin management organization, staff tenure is limited to six years. 
The Secretariat is intended to provide the knowledge base and river science that is necessary to support 
planning and decisions that are in the Basin’s best interests. To this end, the Basin Development Plan 
                                                                 
29 For example the definition of “reasonable and equitable utilization” found in the Mekong Agreement is taken from 
the Helsinki Rules developed by the International Law Association; see Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, 
Helsinki, 1966, International Law Association, London 1966. The Helsinki Rules were replicated to a large extent in 
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(BDP)  is  emerging  as  the  overarching  framework  for  integrating  river  knowledge  into  development 
decision-making.
30  
 
Figure 4.14: MRC Institutional Structure. BDP is the primary planning group for sustainable basin planning 
– including interactions with stakeholders and development scenarios.  
The  BDP  has  been  instrumental  in  transforming  the  Secretariat  from  an  organization  (under  the  old 
Mekong  Committee)  that  essentially  presented  a  menu  of  infrastructure  projects  to  donors,  into  a 
process-oriented river basin organization that could plan the development and management of the river 
in a truly sustainable and equitable way (MRC 2008a). 
In support of the BDP came two other core programs. The Water Utilization Program has been charged 
with  developing  a  sophisticated  hydrological  modeling  system  to  enable  agreement  on  and 
implementation of water-sharing rules. The Environment Program enables the MRC to understand the 
                                                                 
30 Article 2 of the Mekong Agreement obliges members “To promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the 
development of the full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of 
Mekong River Basin waters, with emphasis and preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and 
basin programs through the formulation of a basin development plan, that would be used to identify, categorize 
and prioritize the projects and programs to seek assistance for and to implement at the basin level” (MRC 2005b). 248 
 
implications of different development scenarios for the ecology of the river and therefore also for the 
diverse agricultural and fisheries-based livelihoods that depend on it. In addition to these two programs, 
Fisheries and Flood Mitigation and Management (FP, FMMP) were established to develop expertise in key 
sectors, both to support line agency management in riparian member countries, and to feed into the core 
programs so that collective governance decisions by the Joint Committee and Ministerial Council could be 
well informed. 
In  parallel  with  the  intergovernmental  governance  structure  of  the  MRC  are  the  National  Mekong 
Committees (NMCs). Although the NMCs are not mentioned in the Mekong Agreement and thus have no 
legal  status  at  a  regional  level,  they  nevertheless  play  an  important  role.  They  are  responsible  for 
coordinating the work of the MRC within each of the riparian member states. They also coordinate the 
representation of each member state at the MRC. The composition, capacity and effectiveness of NMCs 
vary considerably from one country to another. 
4.7.1.2.  Basin Development Plan (BDP) 
The  1995  Agreement  charges  the  Mekong  River  Commission  Joint  Committee  (MRC-JC)  with  the 
formulation of a Basin Development Plan (BDP) in order to 
“promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable 
benefits  to  all  riparian  States  and  the  prevention  of  wasteful use  of the Mekong  Basin  waters, with 
emphasis and preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and basin programmes” (MRC 
2008).  
Using the principles of Integrated Watershed Resource Management (IWRM), the BDP process promotes 
the coordinated development and management of water and related resources, in order to maximize 
economic  and  social  welfare  in  a  balanced  way  without  compromising  the  sustainability  of  vital 
ecosystems  (GWP,  2002).  This  requires  the  preparation  of  information  that  informs  discussion  and 
decisions on achieving an acceptable balance between development of the basin and maintenance of its 
ability to sustain livelihoods and environmental values. 
The IWRM-based BDP comprises three elements: 
  Development Scenarios, which assess the potential and constraints for the further 
development of some of the water resources in the various parts of the Mekong Basin. 
The results will guide the formulation of the IWRM-based Basin Strategy and the project 
portfolio. 
  An IWRM-based Basin Strategy, which provides a long-term view of how the Mekong 
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also guide the implementation of the IWRM at basin, national and sub-basin levels, and 
assist line agencies with preparation of plans and projects that are sensitive to resource 
protection issues. 
  A project portfolio of structural (investment) projects and supporting non-structural 
projects, as envisioned in the 1995 Agreement, to develop some of the Mekong Basin’s 
water and related resources and minimize harmful effects that might result from natural 
occurrences and man-made activities (MRC 2008a). 
It is therefore, the mandate of the MRC-JC, who delegates this responsibility to the Secretariat (MRCS), to 
development the BDP process using IWRM principles. Importantly, these lead up to issue of collaborative 
management. First, IWRM principles must be applied at all scales of water governance – basin, sub-basin, 
and community levels. Secondly, the list of structural projects must be evaluated against the Basin’s water 
related  resources  to  minimize  harmful  effects  from  natural  or  man-made  occurrences.  Third,  the 
development scenarios, which assess the impacts of future development on the Basin, will use IWRM 
principles, most notably public participation and stakeholder involvement in the development process as 
well as the application and understanding of costs and benefits of water uses across the Basin. Due to the 
complexity  of  the  decisions  that  need  to  be  made,  the  collaborative  learning  model  approach  is 
recommended to engage stakeholders in the planning process. (MRC 2008b). 
The overall purpose of the BDP is therefore to identify, categorize, and prioritize projects and programs at 
the basin level, upholding the Agreement by vetting the water project such that no harm comes to the 
Basin (Figure 4.15). By using IWRM, the economic and social welfare is protected in a balanced way 
without  compromising  the  sustainability  of  vital  ecosystems.  Reaching  this  balance  is  looking  to  be 
problematic. 
Firstly, the economic development and poverty alleviation element is closed linked with environmental 
protection.  Some  have  said  that  hydropower  development  on  the  Mekong  and  environmental 
stewardship  are  incompatible  (SEARIN  2004;  Lebal  et  al.  2007).  Issues  over  the  calculation  of 
environmental flows have come up often and were on the agenda at the BDP Stakeholder Consultation 
Forum  in  March  2008  (MRC  2008c).  While  the  section  on  freshwater  ecosystems  gives  mention  to 
maintenance of flows, water quality, aquatic ecosystems, and protection of watershed functions, the 
program lacks specifics in these areas. It does indicate that development scenarios, currently being fast-
tracked, must assess the costs and benefits of these services (MRC 2008d).  250 
 
 
Figure 4.15: MRC Basin Development Plan Tools. Source: MRC 2008b. The MRCS focuses on legal, 
simulation, and technical planning tools. 
This section could be strengthened considerably by using methods and rules established by the IUCN on 
instream flow calculations (Dyson 2003). The Mekong Agreement is vague on this point, stating: 
“To protect, preserve, enhance and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions 
and maintenance of the ecological balance exceptional to this river basin” (MRC 2005b: 
Chapter 1). 
The agreement does state that it is the responsibility of the JC to maintain a minimum monthly natural 
flow, however, how this is calculated is vague (MRC 2005b: Chapter 3, Articles 3, 5-7).  
4.7.1.3.  Agreement Protections of the Ecosystem 
The following are specific references to ecological balance and/or environmental conditions found in the 
1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
Chapter 1: Preamble:  
REAFFIRMING “…protect, preserve, enhance and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions and 
maintenance of the ecological balance exceptional to this river basin” (MRC 2005b). 
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Article 3: Protection of the Environment and Ecological Balance 
“To protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and ecological 
balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from any 
development plans and uses of water and related resources in the Basin” (MRC 2005b). 
Article 5: Reasonable and Equitable Utilization 
A.  “On tributaries of the Mekong River, including Tonie Sap, intra-basin uses and inter-
basin diversions shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee. 
B.  On the mainstream of the Mekong River: 
a.  During the Wet season 
i.  Intra-basin use shall be subject to notification to the Joint 
ii.  Committee. 
iii.  Inter-basin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at 
arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee 
b.  During the dry season:  
i.   Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving 
at an agreement by the Joint Committee” (MRC 2005b).  
ii.  Any inter-basin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint 
Committee through a specific agreement for each project prior to any 
proposed diversion. However, should there be a surplus quantity of water 
available in excess of the proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, 
verified and unanimously confirmed as such by the Joint Committee, an 
inter-basin diversion of the surplus could be made subject to prior 
consultation” (MRC 2005b). 
Article 6: Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream 
“To cooperate in the maintenance of the flows on the mainstream from diversions, storage releases, or 
other actions of a permanent nature; except in the cases of historically severe droughts and/or floods: 
A.  Of not less than the acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each month of 
the dry season 
B.  To enable the acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonie Sap to take place during the 
wet season 
C.  To prevent average daily peak flows greater than what naturally occur on the average 
during the flood season.  
The Joint Committee shall adopt guidelines for the locations and levels of the flows, and monitor and take 
action necessary for their maintenance as provided in Article 26” (MRC 2005b). 
Article 7. Prevention and Cessation of Harmful Effects 
“To make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to 
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conditions, and ecological balance of the river system, from the development and use of the 
Mekong River Basin water resources or discharge of wastes and return flows. Where one or 
more States is notified with proper and valid evidence that it is causing substantial damage 
to one or more riparians from the use of and/or discharge to water of the Mekong .River, 
that State or States shall cease immediately the alleged cause of harm until such cause of 
harm is determined in accordance with Article 8” (MRC 2005b). 
It seems that the Agreement has plenty references to ecosystems, three to “ecosystems balance,” four on 
“environment,” seven on “flow,” and three on “protect.” The Agreement attempts to address concerns 
over the naturally functioning ecosystems. But does it? It is a challenging task and requires the preparing 
and  synthesizing  information  that  informs  discussion  and  decisions  on  drawing  a  balance  between 
development  of  the  basin  and  maintenance  the  variety  of  uses  on  the  basin,  such  as  fisheries 
management, promotion of safe navigation, irrigated agriculture, watershed management, environment 
monitoring, flood management and hydropower options, while also maintaining the ability to sustain 
livelihoods and environmental values. What are the treats facing freshwater ecosystems on the Mekong? 
How does the institutional process control the proposal of “new” uses by member countries? 
4.7.1.4.  Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA) 
After  development  a  set  of  guidelines  for  the  utilization  of  water  in  1999,  called  the  Mekong  River 
Commission (MRC) Council’s Resolution of the Water Utilization Programme, and later the decisions of 
the MRC Joint Committee in 2003 to form the Establishment of the Technical Drafting Group 4 for the 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement, the Procedures for Notification, Prior 
Consultation,  and  Agreement  was  signed  and  put  into  force  in  2003.  In  addition,  institutional 
arrangements for the monitoring and maintenance of flows and water quality on the main stream were 
approved  in  2006.  These  instruments  define  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  MRC  Council,  Joint 
Committee, and Secretariat in the dissemination of data and information pertaining to sustainable use of 
the Mekong waters (MRC 2008e).  
Of particular interest are the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA). In 
the 1995 Agreement, any proposed use for inter-basin diversions or intra-basin diversions during the dry 
season. Proposed run-of-the-river dams are considered intra-basin uses, and if characterized only to affect 
the wet season, could only require “Notification” to get approved (agreement). PNPCA stipulates that 
“Notification”  includes  feasibility  study  reports,  implementation  plans,  or  schedules  and  data.  “Prior 
Consultation” on the other hand, includes the requirements for “Notification” in addition to providing 
additional technical data and information on the proposed use of waters with respect to evaluation of 
impacts on the other riparian States. Therefore the primary distinction between “Notification” and “Prior 
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1)  Proposed Intra-basin or Inter-basin uses or transfers on Tributaries of the Mekong only 
require “Notification,” and therefore don’t mandate transboundary impact assessments 
2)  Proposed Intra-basin uses, for example run-of-the-river dam projects, only stipulate a 
“Notification” process, thereby avoiding transboundary environmental or social impact 
assessments 
3)  The “notification” procedure lacks the requirement of transboundary environmental or 
social impact assessments, directly conflicting with Article 7: Prevention and Cessation 
of Harmful Effects. 
The institutional mechanisms in the agreement leave same gaps that the MRC and the Water Utilization 
Programme have attempted to address with the Procedures listed above however, the jury is out on 
whether these “gaps” have been sealed. 
4.7.1.5.  Effects of Agreement on Tributaries 
One of these gaps is the development gap on tributaries of the Mekong. Firstly, it is clear that tributaries 
of the basin affect the mainstream, albeit some more than others. Together, the Se San, Se Kong, and Sre 
Pok bains contribute 25 percent of the mean flow volume of the Mekong mainstream at Kratie. The case 
of the Yali Falls Dam on the Sesan River, a tributary of the Mekong, is a case where a transboundary 
impact environmental assessment (EIA) was not carried out until it was too late. And when it was, it was 
not shared with the Cambodians, who were directly downstream of the project. The EIA was funded by 
the Swiss government, who probably should have known better. Even though the project began in 1993 
before the 1995 Agreement on the Mekong, it was under the watch of the Interim Mekong Committee 
and the hydrological impacts downstream were known in 1996 before the project went into operation in 
2000. As a result of the lack of notification and prevention of harm downstream, the Yali Falls project had 
significant and large-scale environmental, social, and economic impacts on riparian communities living in 
Viet Nam and Cambodia. Attempts at mitigation and compensation for harm done are still unsolved 
(Wyatt and Baird 2007). 
The Yali Falls project exposes another deficiency in the 1995 Agreement. The lack of EIA requirements in 
the  Notification  Procedure  puts  tributary  and  potentially  wet-season  mainstream  projects  in  direct 
conflict with Article 7 in the 1995 Agreement. Wyatt and Baird (2007) summarized impact data collected 
from a number of NGOs. They indicate that over 55,000 people from 90 villages were adversely affected 
by the Yali Falls project due to unusual flooding events resulting in the loss of property, crops, livestock, 
including deaths. Due to the unusually flows, the fishery and terrestrial ecosystems are declining, and 
reports indicate that larger species are declining at a faster rate. Villagers have reported that less fish are 
affecting their food sources. The causes of this are thought be increased sediment load and turbidity 
(Wyatt and Baird 2007). Along these lines, monthly household incomes dropped from US$ 109 in 1996 to 254 
 
US$ 46 in 1999, a 137 percent reduction in monthly household income. Similarly, household property 
losses were conservatively estimated at US$ 800,000 and probably much higher (Wyatt and Baird 2007). 
Another noticeable downstream impact of the Yali Falls dam is bank erosion resulting  in  the loss of 
riverbank agriculture. Many communities rely on fishing and agricultural production from crops such as 
tobacco, eggplant, chilies, etc. Diurnal fluctuations in the water levels have significantly affected these 
crops on the Sesan River.  
4.7.1.6.  Conflict Prevention Mechanisms 
Having said all that, the MRC has attempted to respond as per its 1995 mandate. It helped to set up the 
Cambodia-Viet Nam Joint Committee for the Management of the Sesan River in 2000. This falls under the 
Article 34, 18C, and 24F provisions (Article 34-18C-24F) in the 1995 Agreement. Under Article 34, the MRC 
drives the process of reaching agreement. If the parties cannot come to an agreement, Article 35 is 
invoked and the issue goes back to the governments for bilateral negotiations, if they so desire. This takes 
the process completely out of the hands of the MRC and its institutional mechanisms (Hirsh and Wyatt 
2004).  
There has been criticism of this method of dispute resolution mainly due to the fact that it does not 
continue to press the governmental actor to resolve the process should they not find it in their interests 
to do so. The process is also is unclear if a third party is involved, as is the case in many transboundary 
issues, particularly in the 3S (Sesan, Sre Pok, and Sekong) River Basins. It looks as though the institution 
mechanisms to prevent or manage conflict imbedded in the Mekong Agreement are not entirely robust. 
And based on the increasing threats facing the region, they may need to be overhauled. 
4.7.2.  MRC High Level Visit to the Columbia River Basin 
Knowing that major development has significant and sometimes irreversible impacts on river basins, the 
Mekong River Commission came to visit the Columbia River Basin in 2008. Their aim was the better 
understand the lessons learned due to rapid and large hydropower development on complex basins. The 
main lessons learned are summarized below, based on the back-to-office Report of the four participating 
Member  Countries  (MRC  2008f).  Lessons  learned  are  all  relevant  to  the  BDP  planning  process,  in 
particular the formulation of assessment of development scenarios and the IWRM-based basin strategy. 255 
 
At least as important, the lessons offer immediate food for thought for the assessment and development 
of national priority projects in the LMB.
31 
1.  Current hydropower plans, if implemented, will transform the Mekong Basin. 
The construction of the dams dramatically altered the quality of life of the basin’s population, as well as 
the  landscape  and  ecosystem  of  the  river.    Because  of  the  many  positive  and  negative  impacts  of 
hydropower on the economy, society and environment, it has been impossible to date to make a useful 
cost/benefit analysis of dam construction. Currently, a shared vision is absent due in part to the significant 
impacts  of  the  dams  on  salmon  and  trout  stocks  (see  Section  7.3)  and  other  environmental  effects. 
Environmental and tribal values are now much more important than 50 years ago, and a considerable part 
of civil society supports dam decommissioning. 
Similarly, it may be expected that ongoing and planned dam construction in the Mekong Basin will have a 
significant impact on the economy, society and environment in the basin. As in the Columbia River Basin, 
the cost and benefits will be hard to determine. An important difference between the two basins is the 
much higher number of poor people in the Mekong Basin who rely on the river’s natural system than was 
the case 50 years ago in the Columbia River Basin. Much depends on how the revenues of hydropower in 
the LMB will “trickle down” to alleviate poverty and maintain good ecological conditions. This in turn 
depends on the policies of the Governments and the abilities of civil society to have a “voice” in these 
policies. 
2.  Dams built are there to stay.  
In the 1990s, large and costly studies were undertaken in the Columbia River Basin to assess the benefits 
and  costs  of  decommissioning  some  of  the  dams  that  were  perceived  as  particularly  damaging  to 
anadromous salmonid fish. The studies were non-conclusive; depending of the choice of indicators used, 
costs would outweigh benefits or vice versa. It also emerged that decommissioning of dams can result in 
significant adverse environmental effects, some of which cannot be assessed with confidence.  
Thus decisions on possible dams on the LMB must be based on the best possible information, which for 
mainstream dams would include their effects on migratory fish and the wider (distributional) economic 
and social impacts. If the necessary reliable information is not available, the Governments may have 
                                                                 
31 The following list is taken directly from Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2008f. “High Level Study Visit to the 
Columbia River Basin. Back-to-Office Report. June 2008. Basin Development Plan Programme Phase 2. Vientiane: 
Mekong River Commission, pp. 4-10. 256 
 
reason to consider postponing dam construction. Once a dam is built, it is there to stay, even when new 
information  suggests  that  the  dam  causes  considerable  adverse  effects.  A  precautionary  approach  is 
therefore prudent.  
3.  Mitigation of the barrier effect of dams on migrating fish is a large and costly 
undertaking.  
The operators of the dams in the Columbia River Basin are being increasingly successful in the mitigation 
of the barrier effect for both upstream and downstream migratory fish. The near-term targets set for fish 
bypass systems for some of the individual dams are above 90 percent. However, even with these high 
levels, the system survival rate would only be 60 percent in a cascade of 5 dams. In the Colombia River 
system, fish populations are now approximately 10% percent of pre-dam conditions.  
An entire scientific and manufacturing industry has been developed, driven by regulations and financed 
from hydropower revenues (financed by the Bonneville Power Company) to invent and test the best 
technologies  for  fish  passing,  including  fish  ladders,  fish  friendly  turbines,  screens  to  guide  fish  to 
bypasses, trap-and-transport systems, and others. The Grand Coulee Dam in the northern portion of the 
basin and several storage dams on the tributaries entirely block fish migration, and there are no migrating 
fish  on  the  river  above  these  dams.  Some  migratory  species,  like  sturgeon,  have  flexible  life  history 
patterns that enabled them to live upstream of these dams. Approximately 5% of annual hydropower 
revenues of the Bonneville Power Administration (USD 300 to 400 million per year) have been used for 
fish and wildlife protection during 1970-2007. The USACE expects to spend USD 1.3 billion during the next 
10 years to retrofit hydropower facilities and increase fish survival rates.  
In  the Mekong  Basin, the barrier effect of the currently  studied mainstream dams on migratory fish 
populations is much more difficult to mitigate. Traditional fish ladders to enable fish to migrate upstream 
are not effective for non-salmonid fishes on dams higher than 5 to 10 meters. It maybe that the current 
high energy prices permit the development of more innovative and complex solutions, such as fish locks 
and fish elevators, if they are suitable for the range of species in the Mekong region. Existing technologies 
that  enable  fish  to  migrate  downstream  seem  more  promising  for  application  in  the  Mekong  Basin. 
Experiences in the Columbia River Basin demonstrate that a massive research programme is needed to 
learn  more  about  the  behavior  of  migratory  fish  species,  identify  a  range  of  available  options  for 
mitigating the barrier effect, and to predict the effectiveness of the individual mitigation options. As 
demonstrated in the Columbia River Basin, the mitigation costs may amount to more than USD 100 
million per year. 257 
 
4.  Use policy relevant and measurable criteria to assess alternative development 
scenarios.  
One of the reasons why the aforementioned large planning studies in the Columbia River Basin were not 
conclusive has to do with the definition of assessment indicators for the evaluation of alternative plans or 
scenarios. The study shows that many indicators can be defined but not all of them are policy relevant or 
can  be  determined  within  acceptable  limits  of  certainty.  Many  of  the  indicators  used  need  to  be 
interpreted by professionals. Moreover, the use of too many indicators obscures the understanding of the 
big picture and paralyze decision-making. 
Also the MRC has tested over one hundred impact indicators during the last several years to assess the 
impacts  of  hypothetical  changes  of  the  flow  regime.  The  results  are  informative  and  facilitate  the 
selection of useful indicators for the assessment of basin-wide development scenarios. Therefore, in BDP2 
a  relatively  small  number  of  policy  relevant,  user  driven,  sensitive,  and  measurable  economic, 
environmental  and  social  and  equity  indicators  have  been  defined  in  addition  to  a  few  qualitative 
indicators. Most of these indicators are derived from current regional and national policies, strategies and 
plans, and can be readily understood by decision-makers and other stakeholders.    
5.  IWRM does not always require River Basin Organizations (RBOs).  
RBOs  are  useful  organizations  to  coordinate,  steer  and  monitor  water  resources  within  significant 
hydrological units. This is particular so if water resources development is accelerating or in situations with 
serious water scarcity, sectoral competition for water, or water quality problems. Although in its history 
there has  been  such  a need  in  the  Columbia  River  Basin,  RBOs,  as promoted  by  many  international 
organizations and emerging in Southeast Asia, do not exist in the Colombia River Basin. Instead, water 
resources are managed by a network of collaborating agencies, civil society groups, NGOs and others, 
driven by regulations (such as the Northwest Power Act,  the Endangered Species Act, and the Federal 
Green Regulation Commission), and funded by the revenues from hydropower (thus by the Bonneville 
Power Administration). There are also incentives for stakeholder groups to collaborate. More recently, 
local watershed councils are being established that are working with various agencies to restore the 
ecological  integrity  of  their  watersheds.  In  the  process,  communities  have  developed  social  and 
institutional capacity to work with federal, state, local, tribal stakeholders.    
In the Mekong Basin, the experiences with RBOs are mixed. As in most countries, it may take more than 
one  or  two  decades  for  RBOs  to  gain  the  respect  from  traditional  sector  agencies  and  become  the 
authority for water resources management within their area of jurisdiction.  It would be timely to make 
an assessment of the status of existing RBOs, as well as the pros and cons of other sub-basin management 
mechanisms. Meanwhile, BDP2’s sub-basin activities will support existing RBOs and develop useful sub-258 
 
basin management mechanisms to produce IWRM-based guidelines and checklists that will assist the long 
established sector agencies (agriculture, navigation, hydropower, etc.), do the on-the-ground planning 
and project development, but in a way that is sensitive to the environmental and other sub-basin needs. 
MRC’s watershed programme supports the pioneering watershed councils at the community level.   
6.  IWRM does require the assessment of multi-purpose projects.  
The concept of IWRM holds the promise of reconciling goals of economic efficiency, social equity, and 
environmental sustainability. However, experiences in many river basins show that there is no  consensus  
on  how to weigh  these goals, or  how  best  to  ensure  their  realization. Since more than 50 years ago, 
some of these goals are being achieved in the Columbia River Basin through the development of multi-
purpose projects and the subsequent balancing of the multiple water demands in the seasonal planning 
and daily operation of these projects. The process is underpinned by appropriate regulations. However, a 
challenge has been applying cost/benefit analysis to ecosystem services. 
In  general,  the  hydropower  locations  in  the  LMB  have  been  identified  and  assessed  solely  for  the 
development of hydropower in a rather single sector oriented approach. Therefore, these projects offer 
less opportunity for traditional multi-purpose operation for flood control, irrigation and environmental 
flow  requirements.  As  a  result,  the  single-purpose  projects  may  be  economically  less  beneficial  and 
efficient, and may conflict with other projects or beneficial uses. The experiences in the Columbia River 
Basin suggest that there is a need for better coordination and data exchange between national sector 
agencies,  the  formation  of  multi-disciplinary  project  teams,  and  enhanced  public  participation.  This 
coordination should include the viable and ecologically sound modes of upland watersheds to the benefit 
of the hydropower plants (less sedimentation) and other usages.  
7.  On the importance of transparent public consultation and civil society participation.  
Various mechanisms have been developed by the USACE for public hearings and consultation on the 
impacts of water resources development on different population groups, including the Native American 
tribes in the Columbia River Basin. Partnerships have been built with civil society organizations such as the 
Nature Conservancy, tribal organizations and others for researches and establishing the most appropriate 
compensation and mitigation measures.  
The critical challenge for the promotion of similar mechanisms in the Mekong Basin, where Member 
states have different political systems, is whether emerging public consultation and participation of civil 
society organizations will in fact influence the national decision making on water resources development, 
especially on developments with transboundary implications. 259 
 
8.  On the importance of upstream storage and the size of the management area.    
In the Columbia River Basin, significant mutual advantages were gained by increasing the size of the 
management area through inclusion of an entire drainage area in Canada by the signing of the Columbia 
River Treaty (CRT). The CRT created upstream storage capacity in Canada that resulted in major flood 
protection benefits in the US and hydropower benefits in both countries. Practical mechanisms were 
agreed by the two countries to share the costs and benefits of the upstream storages. The CRT was able 
to capitalize on the large seasonal variation in river flow (as in the Mekong Basin) and the preexisting 
downstream development of hydroelectric generating capacity in the US that lacked adequate upstream 
storage capacity. On the other hand, these positive  effects regarding hydropower and flood control in the 
Columbia River system caused further harm to anadromous salmonids and impinged on Native American 
Treaty obligations, the consideration of which were not included in the CRT. 
Similarly, the development of water storages in the Upper Mekong Basin by China make the currently 
studied “run-of-river” mainstream dams in the LMB more attractive to private developers (the completion 
during the next ten years of the Xiaowan and the Nuozhadu hydropower projects on the mainstream in 
China, with 9,800 and 12,400 million cubic meters of active storage, respectively, are likely to cause the 
most significant seasonal redistribution of flow of any of the foreseeable water resources developments 
in the Mekong Basin). Until now, collaboration between China and the LMB countries on the planning and 
design of these projects has been limited. To seize the downstream advantages, while avoiding potential 
negative externalities stemming from upstream water storage, data and information exchange between 
China and the LMB countries on the design and  operation of the hydropower cascade in the Upper 
Mekong Basin needs to be enhanced.  
9.  On the principle of equality and equity in the evaluation of alternative development 
scenarios.  
The CRT is based on the principle of equality, instead of broader consideration of equity, despite the 
historic  asymmetry  of  population  and  economic  power  between  Canada  and  the  US.  Downstream 
hydropower and flood-control benefits from upstream storage are equally shared. On the other hand, 
there have been cases whereby downstream benefits were not shared across the international border by 
either Canada or the  US. It is problematic,  however,  whether this results in an  inequitable situation 
between co-riparians. Differences between Canada and the US on this issue may play out during the 
upcoming re-negotiation of the CRT, which may put more emphasis on the principle of equity, including 
equity related to societal values (fisheries, tribal, and environment) in addition to hydropower and flood 
control. 260 
 
The  1995  Mekong  Agreement  suggests  that  each  member  state  must  benefit  from  the  further 
development of some of the basin’s resources. Also, the Agreement requires the LMB countries to utilize 
the basin’s water resources in a reasonable and equitable manner. Previous preliminary studies indicate 
that Thailand and Viet Nam currently obtain the greatest economic value-added from the water resources 
in the Mekong Basin. The studies also suggest that some countries may benefit more than others from 
future water resources developments. This may open debate on the concept of equitable development, 
which is usefully elaborated in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International  Watercourses.  If  needed,  MRC  could  organize  a  structured  debate  with  stakeholder 
participation on this issue.  
10.  International water management agreements should have some flexibility.  
International  water  management  agreements  should  have  some  flexibility,  containing  provisions  for 
periodic review and assessment so that emergent societal values, changing market conditions, and other 
unforeseen circumstances may be addressed. The CRT does not contain such provisions and has a sixty 
year life; although it has provided effective and stable implementation, it also resulted in occasional 
dissatisfaction  among  treaty  participants  or  non-participating  stakeholders.  The  CRT’s  near  exclusive 
concern for hydropower and flood control, and the associated setting of flow rules at the border between 
the two countries, has made it difficult to address the increased societal value placed on endangered 
biota, leisure time uses of water, and environmental quality. While innovative management by the CRT 
parties has allowed some accommodation for values outside of hydropower and flood control, solving 
emerging issues will be challenging within the existing CRT framework. 
The  1995  Mekong  Agreement  offers  sufficient  flexibility.  It  encourages  rather  than  commands 
transboundary cooperation for the development and management of the basin. Perhaps, the challenge is 
to  implement  the  1995  Agreement  in  ways  that  capture  the  advantages  of  “harder”  agreements  or 
treaties, such as the CRT. This would require that the LMB countries are willing to accept for specific 
operations under specific conditions some limitations on sovereignty over water flowing through their 
territories to ensure that the mainstream is managed as a common good. 
11.  Agreements over water development should provide means for compensating affected 
communities.  
Such communities may be located in the mountainous headwaters of river systems, where favorable sites 
are found for storage reservoirs or downstream areas that may have to cope with the degeneration of 
wetlands and river margins. Plans for adequate compensation were not considered in the US and Canada 
at the time of early basin development. The Columbia Basin Trust, the Oregon Water Trust and other 
mechanisms, founded less than fifteen years ago, now derive an important part of their funds from the 261 
 
hydropower revenues (for Canada under benefit-sharing provisions of the CRT). Among the trusts’ goals 
are  training,  education,  economic  stimulation  and  diversification,  in  addition  to  improving  the 
environmental quality of the region. 
Similar benefit sharing mechanisms could be considered related to hydropower development in the LMB. 
Funding could be provided to watershed councils or organizations that represent the local population and 
can play a useful role in protecting watersheds and the restoration of habitats for fish.    
12.  Basin development dramatically increases transboundary cooperation at the technical 
level.  
The objectives of the CRT and other international, federal and state agreements have been largely met by 
intensive collaboration between like-minded technical staff with common technical backgrounds. They 
are employed by many different organizations and sit on various technical committees that perform the 
day-to-day  management  of  the  river  system.  Staff  from  the  two  countries  communicate  through 
conference calls, telecommunications and transboundary meetings to remain abreast of changing hydro-
meteorological and demand phenomena in a well-informed and coordinated manner. Depth of snowpack, 
accumulated  precipitation,  and  probable  future  temperatures  and  precipitation  are  assessed  and 
frequently  reassessed  by  sophisticated  models.  The  hydro–meteorological  phenomena  and  data  on 
reservoir storage are meshed with forecasts and models incorporating electric power requirements and 
system capabilities, which are coordinated by operating plans. The problems that arise in implementing 
the CRT and other agreements are virtually all solved at the technical level. Only on rare occasions do 
senior government officials who sit on overseeing treaty councils, need to become involved. 
In the LMB, similar levels of collaboration will have to be developed if the current plans of the countries, 
including for the mainstream, would be implemented. Collaboration with technical staff from China would 
be needed to make optimal use of the storage releases from the Upper Mekong Basin. Also systems, 
methods, procedures, standards and tools have to be harmonized to: 1) monitor and forecast weather 
and water resources, 2) plan the multiple use of water use of the available water resources, and 3) design, 
operate and maintain water infrastructure. This would create additional building blocks for transboundary 
water management and the goodwill among the MRC, line agencies, and others to work together. 
4.7.3.  Implementation of the PNPCA Process: Xayaburi Dam, Laos PDR 
The first real test of the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA) process 
has been seen with the Xayaburi Project proposed to be built on the mainstream Mekong in Lao PDR. The 
process started on the day the last Joint Committee Member receives the submission from the MRCS 
which was 20 Sept 2010. The process of the events is shown below in Figure 2.16. 262 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Outline of the PNPCA Process to Consider the Xayaburi Mainstream Project on the Mekong. 
Source: Adapted from MRC 2012. The process gives only 6-months for parties to contest or give input to 
new mainstream projects. 
A detailed account of the PNPCA process for the Xayaburi Dam is given below (MRCS 2011): 
  1 Oct 2010: The PNPCA procedure was implemented by signing off documents and 
circulating the project documents to the MRCS, JC, and Member States (MS).  
  4 Oct 2010: The MRCS circulated a draft PC Road Map for the PNPCA Working Group 
(WG) and the MRCS PNPCA Task Group (PNPCA TG) competed the first screening and 
scoping of the received documents.  
  26 Oct 2010: The 1
st PNPCA WG meeting was held to consider the PC Road Map and to 
discuss the MRCS role in the facilitation process, technical review, and submission and 
reporting. They also outlined the public participation process and made arrangements 
for a field visit 
  27 Oct 2010: A special session of the MRC Joint Committee was held 
  28 Oct – Nov 2010: The MRCS began its technical review of the PC documents in relation 
to the Preliminary Design Guidance for Mainstream Dams (PDGMD) published earlier. 
The expert sector groups also convened to discuss fish migration, mitigation measures, 
and social/livelihood impacts. Plans were also made for public participation and 
publishing on the web. 
  30 Nov 2010: The 2
nd PNPCA WG meeting was held with a presentation of the MRCS 
scoping assessment, discussion of national review findings, and the TOC of the MRC PC 
Review Report.  263 
 
  1 Dec-28 Jan 2011: The continuation of the technical PC review by the MRCS. The 
detailed review of documents (EIA, SEA, etc.) was done including the PDGMD document 
produced by international experts. A draft report of the MRC PC Review Report was 
agreed. 
  Jan-Feb 2011: Public consultations were held as agreed in the PNPCA procedures. Two 
meetings were held in Cambodia (10 Feb and 28 Feb), three meetings in Thailand (22 
Jan, 10 Feb and 12 Feb), and two meetings in Viet Nam (14 Jan and 22 Feb). Reports of 
all consultations were made available on the MRC website. 
  14 Feb 2011: The 3
rd PNPCA WG meeting was held presenting the draft PC Review 
Report, discussing the findings from the national reviews, and preliminary findings from 
the public participation process.  
  28 Feb 2011: The final draft of the MRC PC Review Report was published and 
consolidation of the PNPCA WG comments. 
  24/5 March 2011: The Final Draft of the MRC PC Review Report was submitted to the 
preparatory meeting of the Joint Commission and a report on the NMC organized 
consultation meetings. This is to provide the JC with decision-making information from 
the NMCs, MRCS, and international experts. 
  19 Apr 2011: A special Joint Committee meeting is held in Vientiane, Lao PDR. The JC is 
expected to make a final conclusion (BBC 2011a). 
  8 Dec 2011: The MRC Council considers the proposed Xayaburi hydropower project (BBC 
2011b). 
The results from the process were mixed with Cambodia, Thailand, and Viet Nam agreed that process 
should be extended for further consideration, while Lao PDR thought the process was thorough and 
complete. Cambodia and Viet Nam both pushed to extend based on the fact that a more comprehensive 
study and assessment of transboundary and cumulative environmental impacts was needed. Cambodia 
added that countermeasures and impact responses were not known and that other measures to share the 
benefits  of  affected  countries,  such  as  transboundary  environmental  management  and  social  funds 
needed  to  be  fully  developed.  Cambodia,  Thailand,  and  Viet  Nam  all  agreed  the  developer’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was grossly insufficient (Baran et al. 2011) in light of the potential 
upstream and downstream impacts on fisheries, social livelihoods, and hydrology. 
Results  from  national  consultations  with  the  public  revealed  there  were  serious  concerns  with 
environmental degradation and losses to fisheries and the livelihoods of people dependent on the river. 
Thailand and Viet Nam had concerns with the sustainability of the project and that the prior consultation 
process  was  too  short  and  should  be  extended.  Viet  Nam  also  expressed  concern about the  lack  of 
transboundary  studies  over  the  impact  on  the  Mekong  Delta  and  stated  that  mainstream  hydro-
development should be delayed for at least 10 years.  
The project has officially been halted for one-year while a more comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment  (EIA)  can  completed.  The  new  EIA  will  be  completed  and  funded  by  the  developer,  Ch 264 
 
Karnchang  Plc.  (CK),  one  of  Thailand’s  largest  contractors.  However,  there  have  been  protests  and 
allegations  that  construction  has  continued  despite promises  by  Ch  Karnchang  Plc  that  activities  has 
stopped (Bangkok Post 2012). 
4.7.4.  The Columbia River Basin (CRB) 
Revisiting Section 2.7, the Columbia River Basin covers 259,500 square miles (672,017 km
2) spanning the 
United States (85%) and Canada (15%). Seven US States share the basin along with the province of British 
Columbia and 15 recognized Native American and First Nations Tribes (NPCC 2010). During normal years 
Canada contributes 25 to 40 percent of the basin’s runoff and 50 percent during peak floods (USACE 
2008) and is thus completely integrated with the United States and Canada.  
In 1805 when Lewis and Clark traversed down the Columbia River there were rapids, migratory birds, and 
no dams. Celilo Falls located above what is now the Dalles Dam created a partial barrier to migrating 
salmon however, many made it upstream to spawn in Canada, Idaho, Montana, and even Wyoming. Since 
the time of Lewis and Clark, the use of the river has expanded and development progressed to the point 
that the Columbia River now is largely a series of stagnant lakes. Salmon populations have dwindled to 
less than 5 percent of their historic numbers, and water quality and contaminates in the basin have 
reached critical limits.  
How can communities, agencies, and stakeholders cope with changes now and in the future? What is the 
current state of resilience, ecological and institutional, in the basin and what can be perceived about the 
future?  Having  looked  at  the  ecological  system  earlier,  the  next  section  discusses  the  institutional 
resilience in the basin and looks at current efforts to reshape the basin in part by writing the Columbia 
River Treaty which could end in 2024. 
4.7.4.1.  The Columbia River Treaty (CRT) 
The Columbia River Basin (CRB) Treaty signed in 1964 between the United States and Canada is due for 
renewal  in  2014.  The  Columbia  River  Treaty  (CRT)  regime  is  a  successful  example  of  cooperative 
development of an international watercourse, incorporating the water law principles of “reasonable and 
equitable utilization” codified in Article 5 of the 1997 United Nations Non-Navigational Watercourses 
Convention (Jones 2001; UN Watercourses Treaty 1997). The CRT creates upstream storage in Canada to 
enable  more  efficient  downstream  power  potential  and  flood  control  in  the  U.S.  The  benefits  for 
downstream power generation and flood control were shared equally (50/50) between Canada and the 
United States. The U.S. paid Canada for derived benefits it gained by increased hydropower production 
and assessed flood control gained downstream. The downstream flood control benefits, calculated at US$ 
64.4 million for 60 years, were paid by the U.S. to Canada in 1968/1969 in advance. The hydropower 265 
 
benefits, amounting to US$ 254.4 million over 30 years, were paid in October 1964 during the ratification 
of the Columbia River Treaty (Muckleston 2003, 31). A continuation of Canada’s downstream hydropower 
benefits was enacted by the signing of the 1999 Sale Protocol, extending the sale and disposal of Canada’s 
entitlements embodied in the 1964 CRT to 2024 (Jones 2001).  
Some  might  argue  that  signing  of  the  1999  Sale  Protocol  would  indicate  that  a  potential  CRT 
renegotiation,  which  requires  10  years  notice  beginning  in  2014,  will  be  avoided.  However,  many 
institutional professionals, such as the Columbia Basin Trust in Canada and the Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council (NPCC) in the U.S., are concerned that the CRT is outdated. Crafted primarily to 
optimize  “fixed”  benefits  of  hydropower  and  flood  control,  the  treaty  falls  short  in  dealing  with 
increasingly important values of the ecosystem restoration, tribal entitlements and other stakeholder 
concerns (Santelmann et al. 2007). Current developments on rethinking the CRT are underway and are 
outlined below. 
4.7.4.2.  Canadian Perspectives 
From a Canadian perspective, there are many academics and professionals concerned about the future 
status  of  water  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Canada.  An  excellent  documentary  series 
produced by CBS Newsworld offers a number of critical perspectives on where Canada (and the U.S.) is 
heading with respect to transboundary water institutions and the Columbia River Basin (Canada - New 
American Empire 2006). Some of the questions posed are: 
  Are Canadians satisfied with the methods by which rights to diverse water resources are 
defined and allocated?  
  How can the governance of water resources be improved at all levels?  
  To what extent, and through which processes are Canadians prepared to anticipate and 
to resolve domestic and bilateral issues of inter-jurisdictional cooperation over water 
resources?  
  What do Canadians view as the appropriate role and influence of civil society and 
community groups in the governance of water resources (Horbulyk
  2004, 4-5)?  
The issues Canadians are currently facing are numerous and list is onerous, including: pricing, water 
rights, compensation, governance, public-private partnerships, accountability, water banks, regulation, 
water courts, local watershed groups, basin-wide organizations, technical data collection and sharing, 
relations between bordering districts and states, and conflict resolution strategies The Canadian concerns 
in the near term are centered on some key U.S-Canadian flashpoints: 
  Value of hydropower (de-commissioning of dams) 
  Inter-jurisdictional water issues between the U.S. and Canada (including surface and 
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  Climate change (increased probability of droughts and floods) 
  Local, regional and international management techniques (how to balance the 
competing uses and share benefits of water) 
  Terrorism and water security (threats to domestic and industrial supplies) (Horbulyk
  
2004, 5-6). 
Some Canadians believe there is equity in the CRT, yet there are others who believe the current CRT is 
one-sided and unequal, claiming (in some truth) that anadromous salmon runs have been completely 
wiped out by U.S. dams and that considerable damage has been done to Canadian agricultural lands, rural 
society and forests. Those in opposition are calling for a renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty with 
an emphasis on equalizing benefits (Schindler 2006). 
In many areas of concern the United States, particularly in the Northwest, is leading the way in advancing 
proactive  water  technology,  societal  involvement  and  watershed  management  techniques.  This  is 
particularly true with Tribal rights, the U.S. being more proactive in recognizing Indigenous water rights 
and complete autonomy than exists for First Nations people in Canada (Walkem 2006). However, greater 
interaction between countries, in the form of institutions, professional interaction and dialogue, can help 
foster greater cooperation and learning for both sides. 
4.7.4.3.  United States Perspectives 
In the United States, stakeholders on the Columbia River Basin are concerned about salmon restoration in 
the  Northwest.  They  represent  a  vocal  and  politically  active  coalition  of  local,  regional  and  national 
interests. One such coalition is Save our Wild Salmon (SOS), which represents dozens of member groups 
throughout the United States. Some of these groups have quite a large representation, such as American 
Rivers, which contains a Citizen’s Agenda for Rivers comprising over 500 groups across the nation with 
head offices in Washington D.C. Save our Wild Salmon submitted a report in November of 2006 indicating 
a net savings from the removal of four hydroelectric facilities on the Snake River, the largest tributary of 
the Columbia in the U.S (Revenue Stream 2006). This group took much of its data from government 
agencies, such as the Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Other important stakeholders include various tribal organizations such 
as Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), the Native American Fish and Wildlife Society 
and individual tribal nations that now have unique sovereign status as independent nations. These groups 
and others, such as grain farmers in the Palouse in Eastern Washington State, all have significant but 
sometimes competing interests in the benefits from water on the Columbia River Basin (Ortolano and 
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Regardless  of  the  likely  forthcoming  renegotiation  of  the  CRT,  there  are  concerns  among  various 
stakeholders as to how the treaty addresses equitable and reasonable utilization among riparians. These 
issues  combined  with  pressing  environmental  restoration  concerns  formulate  an  array  of  drivers  for 
change.  In  addition  to  these  factors,  population  growth,  changing  demography,  climate  change,  and 
increased demand for energy are demanding urgent attention by institutions. One key link for institutions 
of the CRB is energy generation (Santelmann et al. 2007).  
Hydropower has been one of the main policy focal points of development on the Columbia River Basin. 
Links with the southwest and their energy dependence has increased the acuity of northwest hydropower 
production. However, competing with ecological restoration is requiring a rethink on governance models 
and  has  some  questioning  who  will  pay  the  costs.  The  advancement  of  multi-level  participatory 
governance structures such as the NPCC and the Columbia Basin Trust organization have made it possible 
to address issues such as the ‘perpetrator pays’ principle while allowing stakeholders in the Columbia 
River Basin to continue enjoying the benefits of its development (Muckleston 1990). 
4.7.4.4.  Institutional Perspectives and the Columbia River Basin 
A  review  of  institutions  reminds  us  that  a  nation’s  institutions  comprise  of  “laws,  customs,  and 
organizations  and  all  that  is  associated”  that  form  a  framework  from  which  society  is  constructed 
(Frederiksen 1992, 2). Jaspers expands this a bit and contends that institutions are “organizations or 
establishments  founded  for  a  specific  purpose  based  on  a  set  of  working  rules  originating  from  an 
established custom, law or relationship in a society or community” (Jaspers 2003, 79). Likewise he defines 
institutional arrangements as sets of working rules that determine who will make decisions in a particular 
arena, using  rules to describe the procedural action.  Landovsky then refines the distinction between 
institutions and frameworks by defining a transboundary water institution as a persistent and predictable 
arrangement incorporating treaties, laws, or organizational structures pertaining to transboundary waters 
(Landovsky et al. 2007; Landovsky 2006, 5). The institutional framework then comprises of all institutions 
connected to a transboundary water basin. These definitions are also consistent with Wolf and Giordano 
and Wolf et al. and their work on the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) indicating that 
institutions  are  principles,  joint  commissions,  shared  water  agreements,  treaties,  and  international 
agreements and relations between states, significantly widening the definition of water institutions (Wolf 
and Giordano 2003; Wolf et al. 2003). Efforts to expand the definition of institutions further to include 
individuals,  private,  public,  subnational,  intranational,  supranational,  international,  coalitions,  groups, 
transnational  communities,  networks  and  regimes  are  receiving  attention  in  the  water  governance 
literature (Alaerts 2003; Blatter and Ingram 2001; Conca 2006; Conca, Wu and Mei 2006; Finger, Tamiotti 
and Allouche 2006; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005). Jaspers 2003; Lipschutz and Conca 1993; Ostrom et al. 
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Specific to the Columbia River Basin, Muckleston (2001) describes the major institutional players in the 
framework on the Columbia River Basin (Muckleston 2001, 1990). Jones takes a wider look at how the CRT 
applied the principles of reasonable and equitable utilization among all institutions and stakeholders on 
the CRB, putting the treaty in an international context with regard to its relationship with the UN Non-
navigational Watercourse Convention (Jones 2001). Sullivan analyzes the discursive practices of discourse 
over the transboundary salmon resources on the Columbia, including competing institutional interests in 
her methodology (Sullivan 2001). Ortolano and Cushing’s paper discuss the effects of Grand Coulee Dam 
on  institutions  and  stakeholders  on  the CRB  (Ortolano and  Cushing  2002),  while  Heikkila  and  Gerlak 
importantly look at the collaborative arrangement of the innovative Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council’s (NPCC) Fish and Wildlife program (Heikkila and Gerlak 2006). These sources all make significant 
contributions to understanding the complexity of institutional effectiveness on the Columbia River Basin 
however,  they  fall  short  of  accurately  conceptualizing  and  characterizing  the  significance  of  roles 
institutions play in determining the resilience of basin level outcomes, preserving functional integrity and 
structure. If the current institutional framework in the Columbia River Basin does not work and should be 
replaced, or improved, what would it look like? What should it be replaced with? 
4.7.4.5.  Would a New Columbia River Treaty be More Resilient? 
There has been much analysis of the Columbia River Treaty in recent times due to a 10-year deadline to 
give notice before 2024 when it could be terminated. A series of symposiums on the existing and potential 
resilience of a new treaty have uncovered some very interesting proposals and fostered a dialogue on 
potential options. The United States’ and  Canadian  entities have already started to prepare baseline 
scenarios based on whether the treaty is continued, abandoned, or continued with a subset of provisions 
such as the Flood Control Operating Plan (USACE 2010). Interestingly, the Review by the USACE fails to 
mention the possibility of renegotiating the CRT. So if a new treaty is fashioned, what would it need to 
contain to improve resilience on the basin? 
Barbara Cosens (2010) takes an administrative law approach and suggests that the Columbia Basin needs 
the following components to improve resilience and adaptive capacity: 
a)  “Multiple overlapping levels of control with one level of either control or 
coordination at the scale of the social-ecological system 
b)  Horizontal and vertical transfer of information and coordination of decision-making 
among entities and individuals with a decision-making role 
c)  Meaningful public participation 
d)  Local capacity building 
e)  Authority to respond (adapt) to changes in circumstances across a range of 
scenarios 
f)  Environmental law reform and implementation” (Cosens 2010, 256). 269 
 
These principles are similar to those found by a review of international river basin treaties by Wolf (2007). 
Looking at over 50 years of treaties on international river basins, he found that the critical components for 
institutional capacity are: 
1)  “Adaptable management structure 
2)  Clear and flexible criteria for water allocations and water quality management 
3)  Equitable distribution of benefits 
4)  Concrete mechanisms to enforce treaty provisions, and 
5)  Detailed conflict resolution mechanisms” (Wolf 2007, 3.19). 
Some would argue the Columbia River Basin contains an adaptable management structure. For example 
the implementation of new rules for spilling water to enhance salmon spawning runs and to mitigate 
mortality of downstream migrations of salmon, or the creation of the Northwest Power and Conservation 
Council (NPCC), an example of an institution that is responding to ecological and institutional dilemmas, 
bringing together federal, regional, state, local and tribal actors. Other examples would be the creation of 
Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission (CRITFC) in 1977 to united the efforts of the lower Columbia 
Basin tribes and their consolidate their newly acquired authority in fisheries management. The problem 
with this argument is that these rule changes are forced upon the Entities due a number of federal laws 
such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 and the Northwest Power Act (NPA) in 1980 which 
required the States in the Columbia Basin to plan for energy conservation and fish and wildlife protection 
and restoration with funds from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) (MacQuarrie et al. 2008). 
“Adaptable management structure” on the Columbia River Basin has traditionally come at an incredible 
cost and over a long period of time.  
Clear and flexible criteria for water allocations and water quality management are principles that are 
again debated on the Columbia River Basin. The CRT has a solid reputation of setting clear targets for 
flood control and hydropower production however, flexibility is more ambiguous. Shurts (2010) argues 
that some entities believe there is sufficient flexibility in the treat as it exists now – in particular the ability 
to  amend  or  add  protocols  to  it  as  was  done  with  the  Assured  Operating  Plans  and  supplemental 
operating agreements in 2008 and 2009 on Libby Storage and the Non-power Uses Agreement signed in 
2008 (Shurts 2009). Shurts goes on to illustrate that efforts to improve conditions for white sturgeon on 
the Kootenai River was another example of flexibility in the CRT framework – although it must be said that 
Libby Dam is not part of the treaty giving it inherently more flexibility in management operations. Again, 
the  counter  argument  against  flexibility  in  the  current  treaty  is  that  the  current  arrangement  only 
mandates coordination on hydropower and flood control – other arrangements need to be innovated on 
an as-needed basis or mandated from higher authorities (i.e., the federal government). A refashioned 
treaty could have provisions to manage fisheries and ecosystems as part of the operational structure 270 
 
taking  into  account  the  existing  set  of  rules,  laws,  state,  and  federal  and  tribal  requirements  and 
responsibilities.   
Regarding the equitable distribution of benefits, the Columbia River Treaty is touted as an innovative 
water institution because it shares the benefits equally (50/50) between the United States and Canada. 
This is true to the extent that other treaties allocate fixed benefits and the CRT allocates percentages. 
However, there are many tribal nations and stakeholders that do not share in the benefits of the treaty at 
present. A reformed treaty could account for these parties by enabling a structure that allowed for public 
participation in the decision-making process – promising a more equitable distribution of benefits.  
There is little argument over the presence of concrete mechanisms that exist in the CRT. The treaty itself 
articulated little in terms on fixed numbers but it did create the entities and institutions that would 
implement the treaty on both sides. The Canadian Entity was designated as a British Columbian Entity – 
B.C. Hydro, a provincial entity that acts on behalf of British Columbia’s interests and generates and sells 
most of the electricity in the province (Muckleston 2003). The US Entity is shared between the Bonneville 
Power Administration (BPA) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)  in Portland, Oregon. Both 
Entities  appointed  Treaty  “Coordinators”  and  a  “Secretary”  and  established  a  joint  Treaty  Operating 
Committee from agency personnel to implement the treaty provisions (Muckleston 2003; Shurts 2009). 
The organizational structure is shown in Figure 2.17 below. 
The Columbia River Treaty also laid out clear procedures for conflict resolution. This was due to the fact 
that the Boundary Water Treaty (BWT) of 1909 and which created the International Joint Commission (IJC) 
which as six commissioners – three appointed by each country, the United States and Canada. The IJC had 
a  significant  role  determining  the  details  of  the  CRT  by  commissioning  and  conducting  studies 
(Muckleston 2003). Any conflicts that cannot be resolved by the Entities involved in the CRT  
McKinney et al (2010) have explored several options available for the future of the Columbia River Treaty. 
The first is to simply maintain the status quo which means the treaty will essentially stay in place after 
2024. The second is to terminate the treaty which would then default to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 
1909 and would make the IJC the legal Entity responsible for authorizing any changes of flow at the 
international boundary. The third option is to revise and update the treaty which has several possibilities 
(McKinney et al. 2010). 
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Figure 4.17: Columbia River Treaty Organization and Entities. Source: Adapted from Muckleston 2003. 
Possible additions to the CRT organization could be to add NPCC and CRITFC as US Entities and US 
Coordinators in addition to adding a Fisheries Committee. 
The first would be to renegotiate the treaty using formal methods – a process similar to the method used 
to create the CRT. The disadvantage of this method is it takes a long time to complete (the CRT took 14 
years  to  complete)  and  may  not  include  all  the  relevant  stakeholders.  Another  option  would  be  to 
negotiate a partner treaty which would be used in conjunction with the CRT. This could raise potential 
conflict with the existing treaty and through formal channels could take a long time to develop. Yet 
another option would be to negotiate formal amendments to the CRT which would again go through a 
formal amendment process (McKinney et al. 2010). The current CRT does not prohibit this. This method 
has been used on the treaty with Mexico on the Colorado River Basin (TFDD 2012).  
Less  formal  methods  to  revise  the  CRT  could  use  Protocols  to  augment  the  treaty  and  would  not 
necessarily  need  the  formal  agreements  required  in  the  aforementioned  processes.  A  number  of 
Protocols could trigger a formal negotiation however, which would require approval from the respective 
governments. Additionally, the incorporation of new Entities or advisors, or adjustments to operating 
plans, such has been already done via the Operating Committee and “non-treaty interests” can be used to 
adjust the treaty provisions (McKinney et al. 2010; Shurts 2009). It might be obvious that less formal 272 
 
methods provide the most flexibility however, they may also be weaker on enforcement mechanisms and 
provide less clarity on allocation methods.  
One possibility would be to amend the treaty to include new entities such as the NPCC and CRITFC and 
create a Fisheries Committee to oversee habitat, mortality, and migration issues. This is current not part 
of the CRT framework. Although fisheries work is mandated through the NPA and ESA, formally adding 
the responsibility would give the treaty more legitimacy and potentially reduce conflicts over jurisdiction 
and priorities over competing uses. There is no one answer for how to refashion a resilient Columbia River 
Treaty that provides something for everyone. Like most things there tradeoffs and compromises in each 
approach being considered. However, the theory suggests that social-ecological systems require three 
essential components to be resilient (Berkes et al. 2003; Kirtin and Ashton 2008; Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 
1990; Gunderson et al. 1995; Folk 2006):  
1)  Flexibility 
2)  Self-organization and learning 
3)  Capital. 
Whatever the institutional framework looks like, it would need to be flexible, self-organizing, have the 
ability to learn, and contain access to capital to be resilient. And importantly it would need to possess 
these characteristics in the short, medium and long-term at multiple scales. As I have shown, the CRT has 
some of these resilient traits but also lacks the flexibility and public participation to adapt to changing 
conditions in the short-term. It has had to access the political will to make changes happen. A sustainable 
and resilient future would see the basin operating without appearing in newspapers or on the desk of a 
Federal Judge in Portland.  
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4.8.  RESILIENCE COMPARISONS 
This paper uses a comparative approach to assess the resilience of the Mekong  and Columbia River 
Basins.  Three  areas  were  analyzed:  physical  characteristics  and  development  rate,  the  conflict  and 
cooperation scales, and the flexibility of the institutional framework of each basin. The results of the first 
two components are shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.18.  
Table 4.4: Ratios of Physical, Development, and Political Characteristics of the Basins. Source: Table 4.1. 
Sector  Property 
Mekong 
Basin 
Columbia 
Basin 
Ratios 
(M/C) 
Ratio 
Indices 
(M/C) 
Sum of 
Square 
Indices 
(M/C) 
Physical 
Max elevation (m)  5,224  3,901  1.34 
1.88  1.96 
Drainage (square km)  760,000  669,300  1.14 
Length (km)  4,800  1,954  2.46 
Annual runoff at Kratie/Dalles 
(cu km) 
418  165  2.53 
Annual runoff at 
mouth/mouth  (cu km) 
457  244  1.87 
Annual discharge at 
Kratie/Dalles (cu km) 
13,200  5,038  2.62 
Annual runoff at 
mouth/mouth  (cu km) 
14,500  7,790  1.86 
Natural wet/dry season avg. 
monthly flow ratio, % 
81  68  1.19 
Development 
Developed wet/dry season 
avg. monthly flow ratio, % 
77  49  1.57 
0.85  1.04 
Dams operating in the basin 
(o) 
25  373  0.07 
Annual hydropower 
production (o)  (TWh) 
9.9  105  0.09 
Mainstream dams (p & o)  20  15  1.33 
Total dams in the basin (p & o)  135  373  0.36 
Annual hydropower 
production (p & o)  (TWh) 
134  105  1.28 
Development Rate 
(dams/year) 
9.1  7.4  1.23 
Political 
Countries sharing  6  2  3 
0.74  0.79 
Countries sharing (incl. Tribes)  6  19  0.32 
Avg. Conflict/Coop (Bar Scale)  1.40  1.45  0.97 
Negative Cooperation Trend 
(slope, BAR score/year) 
-0.0526  -0.0538  0.98 
Percent Negative Events (of 
total) 
19%  27%  0.70 
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Figure 4.18: Mekong/Columbia Ratios. The Mekong stands out physically as a resilient basin. In terms of 
development, the basins are equally matched if all projects go ahead in the Mekong. 
The Physical characteristics of the Mekong River are larger and more powerful than the Columbia. It is 
over twice the length and discharges almost two times the flow at the mouth of the river than the 
Columbia River.  
In terms of Development, the Columbia contains many more operating dams in the basin (373) although if 
all mainstream development plans are realized on the Mekong, it would put the Mekong near (12) to the 
Columbia (15) in terms of mainstream projects. One of the key indicators is development rate. If the 
Mekong plans go ahead, the rate of development would be 1.23 times the Columbia Basin.  
This point is critical in determining whether or not the basin can remain resilient. Given the historically 
well  documented  and  publicized  issues  facing  the  Columbia  Basin  due  to  rapid  and  intensive 
development, the plans to build over nine dams per year in the next decade in the Mekong Basin is very 
problematic. This characteristic alone could understand basin resilience in the Mekong.  
Politically,  the  data  shows  the  ratios  in  favor  of  the  Columbia  Basin  in  terms  of  number  of  shared 
countries and tribes. The BAR scores are nearly equal over the last 60 years however, the Columbia Basin 
contains  a  greater  number  of  negative  events.  Analysis  of  the  Conflict  and  Cooperation  Event  data 275 
 
suggests both basins are experiencing declining cooperation particularly in the area of hydropower and 
infrastructure projects. This trend may be slowing on the Columbia Basin most likely due to the influence 
of new actors in water management, the Native American Nations from the United States and First Nation 
Tribal Nations from Canada. Both basins are showing an increasing number of negative events which may 
indicate a lack of institutional resilience in managing changes on the basins. For the Mekong, over 70 
percent of the negative events are due to hydropower projects. On the Columbia, most of the negative 
events are in fisheries and water quality both  of which have the lowest cooperation scores and are 
directly related to the effects of hydropower projects.  
The declining trend on the Mekong is very worrisome particularly faced with such a rapid development 
agenda. So the question is – are these basins resilient or not?  
A key characteristic of a resilient system is flexibility of the institutional framework in the basin. The 
Mekong  basin  has  strong  regional  leadership  from  the  Mekong  River  Commission.  However,  the 
organization  is  constrained  through  limited  sovereignty  as  written  into  its  mandate.  The  MRC’s 
institutional resilience is being tested for the first time since its inception in 1995 over the proposed 
development of the Xayaburi dam in Lao PDR - the first of 12 proposed mainstream projects in the Lower 
Mekong Basin. The MRC’s primary mandate – to sustainably develop the Mekong Basin is under threat 
and if construction of the dam is allowed to continue it could signal a withdrawal of downstream nations, 
namely Cambodia and Viet Nam, from the MRC. This would certainly threaten resilience in the basin and 
potentially allow unfettered development of water resources severely impacting fisheries and livelihoods 
of millions of those dependent on the basin for survival.  
The MRC has formally recommended a 10-year moratorium on mainstream hydropower projects in an 
effort to study and better understand the impacts of intensive development. The current work on the 
Xayaburi project has been formally delayed for one year after following the MRC’s 6-month Procedures 
for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA) procedure where the developer was tasked 
to complete a fully comprehensive EIA and SIA. Reports indicate construction is continuing despite the 
moratorium issued by the MRC and Cambodia, Thailand, and Viet Nam, threatening wider protests and 
undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Mekong River Commission.  
On the Columbia Basin, preparations are continuing to review and possibly revise the Columbia River 
Treaty.  The  current  institutional  framework,  which  is  not  formally  organized  into  a  regional  basin 
commission or organization, has been slow to adapt to ecological changes and has, for the most part, only 
responded to changes due to federal judicial pressure. The CRT focuses only on hydropower and flood 
control  in  the  Columbia  Basin.  But  it  has had  to  evolve  to  address  several  federal,  state,  and  Tribal 
requirements to mitigate impacts over fisheries. There seems to be little confidence that a full treaty 276 
 
renegotiation will occur –many influential stakeholders are engaged in dialog to remake the Columbia 
River Treaty and are pushing for a full range of options to craft a more relevant and flexible treaty.  
Going  back  to  the  definition  of  basin  resilience,  a  basin’s  capacity  to  absorb,  manage,  and  adapt  to 
changes and stress while still maintaining its essential structure, feedbacks, and function is under threat in 
both the Mekong and Columbia basins.  
The Mekong Basin is planning to develop at a rate that reduces the ecosystem’s ability to absorb change, 
threatening fisheries and millions of livelihoods that have only limited ability to manage and adaptive to 
stress. The primary source of adaptive capacity lies within the MRC and its ability to cope and retain its 
structure and essential function faced with growing development and political pressure. The primary 
threats to undermine resilience in the basin are development rate, the impact of project on fisheries, 
declining cooperation over water management, and institutional flexibility and legitimacy.  
In the Columbia Basin, one of the largest potential threats to resilience is the future of the Columbia River 
Treaty. Work is continuing on restoration of salmon in the basin however, cooperation has been largely 
negative. Encouragingly, recent empowerment and involvement of Native American Tribes in the water 
management process have added resilience to the system by increasing cooperation. If the CRT can adapt 
to  this  development,  the  basin  may  be  able  to  secure  its  newly  found  resilience  and  adapt  to  new 
challenges such as climate change and development pressure. If not, the basin may continue to suffer 
from lack of public participation and inflexible institutional capacity and faced with a shock, such as a 
severe drought or the loss political support and funding or both, the Columbia Basin could continue to 
lose resilience over the next decade or longer. 
4.9.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Part  C  in  the  overall  dissertation  methodology  illustrated  Figure  1.2  compares  the  effects  of  basin 
development on institutional resilience between the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. At the beginning 
of this chapter, the hypothesis was stated as: 
  The basin is dysfunctional (non-resilient) at some scales while remaining functional 
(resilient) in others, reducing basin resilience of the entire system. 277 
 
Referring back to Figure 4.1 and Section 4.2, the research questions in this chapter are addressed below. 
(4a)  Is a resilience framework an effective tool for making comparisons of large river 
basins? 
The resilience framework provides a systematic method for evaluating the vulnerability and resilience of 
large river basins to stress. One of the difficulties in comparing large basins with different biophysical, 
socio-economic, and political settings is how can one compare “apples to apples” when you have apples 
and oranges? The resilience framework provides a way around this dilemma.  
First, if both basins are complex systems, they exhibit similar characteristics under stress. This provides a 
similar starting point when applying a framework. Second, many river basins are impacted by similar 
stressors  –  development,  climate  change,  population  growth,  weak  governance,  environmental 
degradation – and therefore share similar effects and consequences to stress. The resilience framework 
provides a method to characterize these effects through feedbacks and thresholds across multiple basins. 
And finally, other theoretical frameworks usually focus at one particular scale of analysis whereas the 
resilience framework takes multi-scalar approach.  
There are issues with the resilience framework. More refinement is needed to identify a comprehensive 
list of parameters, such as a threshold and feedback inventiory, that can be used to quantify resilience. 
Much of the work to date was been on identifying vulnerability indicators (Hamouda et al. 2009). Recently 
there have been efforts by the Resilience Alliance to quantify thresholds by creating a threshold database 
(Resilience Alliance 2012). However, there is very little data on freshwater social-ecological systems and 
even less on large river basins.  
As has been done with vulnerability assessments, more work is needed to  refine and apply practical 
resilience frameworks on river basins making the assessments available at all levels of expertise. The 
methods that exist at present are intensive and complicated to apply in practice. Resilience Workbooks 
produced by the Resilience Alliance are a good start but are too complicated for the general practitioner 
or water user (Resilience Alliance 2012).  
(4b)  Can large river basins rapidly develop while still remaining resilient? 
This  is  a  difficult  question  to  answer  definitively.  In  the  case  of  the  Columbia  River  Basin,  if  one  is 
measuring basin resilience as a metric, the answer would be a resounding “no.” While the flood and 
hydropower have maintained resilience through the implementation of the Columbia River Treaty and a 
state and federal system to support it, other sectors such as fisheries, Native American rights, ecosystem 
health,  public  participation,  irrigation,  and  water  quality  have  suffered  and  are  often  appearing  as 278 
 
conflicts in the analysis (Section 4.8). This has had large impacts on social-ecological resilience in terms of 
social unrest, massive costs to the taxpayer, and impacts on natural resources – some that may never be 
recovered.  It  has  taken  nearly  as  long  to  develop  methods  to  preserve  and  return  salmon  to  the 
ecosystem as it did to build the dams that destroyed them. This is an expense learning cycle. The question 
here is probably how can basins be sustainably developed? The assumption is of course that sustainable 
development retains social-ecological resilience. 
In the case of the Mekong Basin, the comparison with the Columbia reveals that the current rate of 
development is beyond and greater than the highest period of development experienced in the Columbia 
Basin. Taking into account that the Mekong has been shown to contain a highly resilience biophysical 
system, this raises large concerns whether or not the basin can sustainably manage the changes while 
retaining social-ecological resilience. Both water event data and institutional analysis suggest that the 
basin is already losing resilience and rapid development has only at its infancy. The MRC’s approach is to 
slow development to a pace that is manageable. Can the Mekong Basin afford to suffer the same learning 
cycle experienced on the Columbia basin? The millions of inhabitants that depend on fish for their survival 
will not want to wait that long. The scale of social impacts in the Mekong is much greater than they are in 
the Columbia Basin.  
The term “sustainable development: is used widely but probably not really understood  – particularly 
when it comes to hydropower development on river basins. Often political power plays a role is decided 
which  sectors  are  developed  or  not.  The  MRC  is  as  risk  of  losing  its  credible  if  it  fails  to  manage 
“sustainably  development”  the  basin.  However,  one  thing  is  clear;  the  current  path  is  unsustainable 
showing  declining  resilience  in  highly  vulnerable  sectors  (hydropower  and  infrastructure)  and  at 
institutional scales (MRC) that are responsible and trusted to protect the basin from collapse.  
Another important question is raised from the comparison is can basins be resilient at some scales while 
non-resilient in others? 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that capacity at smaller scales, in the case of Tribal Nations, can 
increase cooperation and thus resilience to conflict at larger (international) scales. In the Columbia Basin 
the presence of Tribes in basin management has not only increased the overall resilience of the basin, it 
has improved interagency cooperation and influenced state and federal agencies to better cooperate in 
water management. This is a case where increased resilience at smaller scales increased resilience at large 
scales.  
By  the  same  token,  lack  of  resilience  in  the  fisheries  sector  on  the  Columbia  basin  has  at  times 
destabilized  the entire basin  system. This is evidenced by the continuing intervention of the Federal 279 
 
judicial system in managing the Columbia River Basin. The lack of progress in restoring ecological health to 
the  basin  has  created  a  somewhat  “dysfunctional”  resilience  in  the  basin  whereas  institutions  have 
incredible impediments to overcome to operate and manage national resources effectively. The Tribes 
have had to continually innovate methods in the institutional framework to conserve fish and solicit state 
and federal support to back them – often with limited success.  
There are clear decreasing trends of cooperation in both the Mekong and Columbia River basins. For the 
Mekong Basin, a majority of negative events are in the hydropower, water quantity, and infrastructure 
and development. These are related to proposed mainstream development projects and dry season water 
shortages – many of which are blamed (wrongly) on upstream dams in China. The decline in cooperation 
on the Columbia Basin is due to conflict over fish and fishing rights in Tribal communities, hydropower 
developments, and water quality issues due to mining contamination. While the trends are still declining, 
there are signs the trend in the Columbia may be abating.  
A surprising result is the positive impact of Tribal Nations on water management. The working hypothesis 
was that development erodes resilience at the local scale – which has been true for the Native Americans 
since the 1920s. Therefore it is assumed that their impact on water management would be negative 
however, in fact it is positive. This is most likely due to the only recent data set used for the study. If Tribal 
influence was added going back to 1950 (the start of the BAR dataset), it might show a different result. 
What is does show is that giving Tribal Nations the same status as nation-states has improved their 
bargaining power and consequently improved resilience in the basin. This finding might have implications 
for efforts in the Mekong Basin. The inclusion and status of ethnic groups and stakeholders in the Mekong 
Basin  could  have  a  positive  effect  on  basin  resilience.  The  MRC  has  made  a  great  effort  to  include 
stakeholders as part of the consultation process (MRC 2011). However, many ethnic groups are still left 
out of decision-making at the strategic level.  
Institutional  resilience  in  the  Mekong  Basin  is  wavering  in  the  face  of  seemingly  unstoppable  rapid 
development driven by a thirst for energy and foreign income by nations within the basin. There is a 
somewhat split-personality among some basin riparians - some need development of hydropower to 
satisfy their energy needs while at the same time oppose projects that have unsustainable development 
objective. Like most complex societies and political systems, many states in the Mekong Basin exhibit 
complex and competing interests.  
Institutional resilience in the Columbia basin is approaching a crossroads with possible negotiation of the 
Columbia River Treat looming on the horizon. If renegotiated, the CRT could increase resilience in the 
basin  by  specifically  addressing  ecosystem  protection  and  restoration  as  part  of  the  treaty  which  is 
currently is not included. Legitimacy of the treaty could strengthened by also adding the NPCC and CRITFC 280 
 
as US Entities and including a Fisheries Committee as part of the implementing body. Many years of 
excluding  environmentalists,  farmers,  Native  Americans,  and  stakeholders  have  created  a  sense  of 
fatalism  amongst  stakeholders  which  could  be  regained  if  a  more  inclusive  CRT  is  negotiated  and 
implemented.  
Having completed Part A, B, and C as part of the overall methodology in Figure 1.2, Chapter 5 gives a 
summary of findings and conclusions for the dissertation.  
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5.  CHAPTER 5: DISSERTATION FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation I answer some key questions on resilience of large river basins. Referring back to Figure 
1.2, in Part A, I have looked at the resilience of the Mekong Basin by modeling it as a complex system and 
characterizing the thresholds, feedbacks, and stressors that could undermine resilience at various scales. I 
looked at the vulnerability and resilience of the Mekong social-ecological system at several scales. In Part 
B (Figure 1.2), I assessed the MRC’s conflict management activities and designed a conflict management 
strategy  to  increase  resilience  across  multiple  scales  within  the  basin.  I  applied  systems  thinking  to 
environmental conflict at sub-basin scales by creating and implementing a collaborative learning project 
to  address  environmental  conflict  in  the  Mekong  Basin.  In  Part  C  (Figure  1.2),  I  used  a  resilience 
framework and conflict and cooperation methods to compare resilience on the Mekong and Columbia 
River  Basins  in  response  to  rapid  water  resources  development.  Finally,  I  analyzed  the  institutional 
responses to development and evaluated comparative basin resilience on the Mekong and Columbia River 
Basins.  
5.1.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Referring back to Figure 1.2, in Chapter 1, I sought to answer some key research questions. Research 
question (1) is addressed in both Chapter 1 and 2. Research questions (2a) and (2b) are addressed in 
Chapter 2 (Part A):  
Dissertation Flow – Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Part A: (Figure 1.2) 
(1)  Is a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) model an appropriate tool to evaluate basin 
resilience? 
In  the  Introduction  I  explored  the  links  between  environmental  determinism,  conflict,  and  systems 
thinking  on complex freshwater systems by looking  at recent evidence. Those who  thought that the 
environment was responsible for all of society’s actions were only looking at one side of the coin (Darwin 
1871;  Huxley  1883;  Ratzel  1882).  Semple  saw  beyond  the  Malthusian  response  and  realized  that 
civilization has more than a simple motive to survive – that there is a common interest and in fact an 
enjoyment  in  not  just  surviving  but  working  together  (Semple  1911).  As  civilizations  progressed, 
adaptation was crucial to survival and the argument shifted to whether or not humankind (Wittfogel 
1956, Sprout and Sprout 1957) or the environment (Toynbee 1958) was solely responsible as the driver 
for adaptation. They may not have known that their arguments had more significance than just a good 
natured debate. It would usher in a new era in natural resource management. Soon the question of the 
environment would be on nearly everyone’s agenda – from security, to hippies, to Agent Orange, to 292 
 
timber trade, to water resources development, to ozone depletion. Surely, if we humans had clearly 
mastered our environment, why were we making such a mess out of it?  
It was time to go back to the books. Sprout and Sprout were still working on the effect of the environment 
on human agency – this time at the policy level – as environmental issues were beginning to surface 
internationally. Why were we destroying the environment if it was the very thing that we depended on 
for survival? Geertz found that as we progressed we merely were innovating our methods to improve our 
living conditions and maximize food production – agricultural productivity (Geertz 1963). It was here at 
the systems perspective was first suggested. Geertz was convinced that we simply misunderstood the 
complex relationship between society and the environment and that our understanding, or ecological 
anthropology, was part of the problem. So where would that leave us? Where do we find social-ecological 
systems theory? 
The  search  continued  for  causation  rather  than  understanding.  Why  are  there  conflicts  rather  than 
cooperation? Who or what was responsible for conflict? The environment was still under interrogation 
and Homer-Dixon was Sherlock Homes. He set out to prove or disprove the effects of the environment on 
human conflict, and over the course of his investigations changed his own view on the matter. It seemed 
that the environment was not, again, solely responsible, going back to Semple, but only partly responsible 
for human conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999). And while this debate was continuing, the research community 
had split into disciplines. Those who were studying the effects of development and policy, such as White, 
who himself changed his own view over time, and others, for by this time Western nations had developed 
and were having to respond to the adverse effects of their own (White 1945, 1962, 1974, 1977). There 
were those who were continuing to claim the environment was primarily responsible for human conflict 
such  as  Gleick  and  Homer-Dixon  (Gleick  1993;  Homer-Dixon  1999),  those  who  were  focusing  on  the 
science, or understanding of cooperation over natural resources such as Delli Priscoli, Postel, Wolf, and 
others (Delli Priscoli 1997; Postel 1999; Wolf 1998), and those who were trying to understand why we 
were still failing to manage our environment sustainably, such as Holling, Berkes, and Levin in the field of 
ecology (Berkes et al. 1998; Holling 1973; Levin 1998). Which leads to a substantial finding; It is probably 
not the environment’s fault we have made such a mess of things. What are we missing? 
This was the beginning of a new era in understanding our relationship to our environment. We had to 
stop playing the “blame game” and get on with trying to figure out where our understanding is lacking 
and build a new way of thinking about our relationship to our environment. When Holling first introduced 
the theory of ecological resilience most were unmoved (Holling 1973). However, as time went on, more 
and more researchers began to embrace the idea that nature is a complex system, our societies are 
becoming  more  complex,  and  in  the  three  centuries  we  have  been  so  distracted  that  we  have  lost 293 
 
understanding and connection to our environment. Holling recognized that we do not need resilience 
theory to save us, we need resilience theory because the ecosystem needs it. We had been using the 
concept  of  resilience  to  suit  our  own  needs,  namely  engineering  resilience  (Table  1.1).  We  did  not 
understand ecological resilience because we did not understand complex systems.  
Therefore, a major finding in this dissertation is the concept of resilience has many meanings. Whether 
we apply it to engineering problems to optimize operation and function, whether we apply it to society to 
better understand how to cope with stress and change, whether we apply it to institutions to better 
understand how they function, cooperate, and respond to stress, or whether we apply it to ecosystems to 
better  understand  how  nature  functions,  responds  to  stress,  and  exhibits  thresholds  and  feedback 
behavior.  We  need  to  be  careful  how  we  define  resilience  before  we  use  it  to  understand  our 
environment.  
Another finding is that resilience is related to vulnerability and that in some instances the two can be 
inversely proportional. In this dissertation, I defined vulnerability the degree to which a system is sensitive 
to, exposed to, and resilient to the adverse effect of human or environmental disturbances. The term 
“adverse”  is  of  course  normative  and  I  do  not  want  to  go  back  and  have  the  debate  whether  the 
environment helping or hurting us, the point is that nature can have a large impact on human life. How 
can we deal with it? Are we merely again trying to ‘optimize’ our interaction with the environment to 
survive, and calling is “sustainability” or “resilience?” Maybe. Thus the negative also must have a positive, 
so if vulnerability is a negative, resilience must be a positive. 
So, another finding is taking into account the great work that came before, and bringing together the 
disciplines  of  Geography,  Ecology,  Sociology,  Anthropology,  Political  Science,  Engineering,  and  Water 
Science, I have defined a new form of resilience, termed simply “basin resilience.” A river basin system’s 
capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt to biophysical, socio-economic, and political changes (or stressors) 
while still maintaining its essential structure, feedbacks, and functional integrity, is said to be resilient. 
How then, can we apply it to a river basin? 
This thought applied to the Mekong leaves us with the question, if the Mekong Basin is not resilient, what 
is  it?  Many  have  proclaimed  that  the  Mekong  is  a  resilient  river  basin  (organization)  because  it  has 
survived  the  series  of  conflicts  and  challenges  in  the  region  since  1957.  This  was  discussed  in  the 
Introduction. In fact, this is true to some extent. However, the conflicts in the region kept the real work of 
the  committee  for  progressing,  namely,  water  resource  development.  The  Mekong  Committee 
transformed into the Interim Committee and once the Interim Committee was abolished it became the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), which has existed now for 15 years. Now that the MRC has its full 
strength, the region as moved on with development, energy needs are skyrocketing, China is developing 294 
 
upstream, Viet Nam, with a very high population density, is growing rapidly and is an extremely sensitive 
downstream riparian and caretaker of the Mekong Delta, the plans drawn up in the 1950s and 1960s are 
being  implemented.  The  MRC’s  purpose  is  to  sustainably  develop  the  Mekong  Basin.  How  can  they 
manage  all  these  stressors  at  the  same  time?  Is  it  too  much  to  ask  to  remain  resilient?  Has  our 
understanding of resilience changed since the 1950s? Or even since the 1990s? Absolutely. 
This leads to the finding that our understanding of resilience has changed, and is continuing to develop as 
we move forward. In the spirit of Wittfogel, as we understand and adapt to the consequences of our own 
actions, such as rapid and unilateral development on the Columbia Basin, we had to reform our own 
thinking around resilience. It is no longer acceptable to be resilient in one sector, such as hydropower or 
flood control, and not in ecosystem health, fisheries, Tribal entitlements, and water quality. We now have 
a greater responsibility to understand and manage the entire system. This means we need to better 
understand the system and how it functions, interacts, and changes. Therefore, resilience is not merely 
the resilience of a single entity or sector, it is the resilience of the whole basin as one entity. In fact, we 
have already acknowledged this due to the proliferation of river basin organizations around the world. We 
recognize the importance of managing transboundary waters as one basin. How then, do we measure it? 
This leads to another finding in this dissertation. A social-ecological system (SES) accurately characterizes 
large river basins by accounting for complex behavior, thresholds, and feedback mechanisms. Complex 
systems contain feedbacks, thresholds, and self-organizing behavior that models employed previously do 
not  accurately  represent.  A  new  model  is  needed,  and  SESs  are  one  avenue  available  to  us.  Social-
ecological systems come from the evolution of thought explained earlier and incorporate our current (yet, 
incomplete) understanding of ecology, climate, complex systems, and social and political behavior. The 
progress made to understand and implement SESs in the last decade has been remarkable. Unfortunately, 
the application of SESs to large river basins has been practically non-existent.  
So another finding is that SESs can be used to determine resilience on large river basins. The model I used 
accounted for social and ecological components in the analysis. By focusing on feedbacks, I was able to 
populate the model across a number of scales, creating a multi-scalar model. By linking the feedback 
model, in this case, the SES, which itself does not include thresholds, I was able to create a system that 
modeled several thresholds and feedbacks in the Mekong Basin. In fact, I was able to create threshold 
resilience curves for a number of sectors in the basin. The model, with modification, enabled a value to be 
assigned  to  resilience  for  the  basin.  The  importance  to  assigning  a  value  to  the  system  cannot  be 
understated. If it cannot be measured, it cannot be controlled. This was an important step and ultimately 
a critical feature of the SES model to determine resilience.  295 
 
There  were  several  challenges  encountered  during  the  research  process.  First,  identifying  a 
comprehensive list of feedbacks and thresholds in the basin was a difficult and time consuming process. 
For thresholds, only a few key thresholds were analyzed for this study. A complete inventory of thresholds 
and  feedbacks  at  multiple  scales  would  be  a great  asset  for  the  basin  and  for  future  analysis.  Local 
stakeholders could be engaged in the process of creating such an inventory while at the same time 
educating them on systems behavior and building local knowledge and resilience to changes in the basin 
system. An inventory would provide a baseline for analysis and understanding of how the social and 
ecological system interacts over time. This would enable to track changes in the system over time and an 
evaluation of critical relationships under stress. I could envision a software system modeling this quite 
effectively. Relationships between institutional and the ecological system, such as EIAs, natural resource 
management plans, river basin organizations, or laws and regulations, could be attached to each feedback 
mechanism thereby assigning its meaning and function while depicting its relationships to other entities. 
In my analysis I was able to create only a small number of threshold resilience curves that describe the 
behavior of key sectors in the basin (Figure 2.35). A thorough inventory of thresholds and feedbacks 
would allow a full characterization of all sectors in the basin. So another finding is that the SES approach 
would  be  greatly  improved  by  having  an  inventory  of  feedbacks  and  thresholds  of  the  basin  before 
applying the model.  
Regarding feedbacks, more data would provide greater confidence and higher resolution of elements in 
the system. The current research only took a snapshot of the basin system at one moment in time. A 
complete inventory of feedbacks would include connections between entities that were not included in 
my analysis, such as Resource Users to Resources Users (RU-RU), for example economies based on natural 
resource extraction. Some of this data was indirectly measured through the vulnerability assessment. 
However,  if  markets  were  included,  they  could  be  measured  and  used  for  better  approximations  of 
threshold and feedback behavior. Great strides have been made in the last few years to identify specific 
indicators  for  resilience.  Much  of  this  progress  comes  from  advancements  made  in  vulnerability 
assessments of socio-ecological landscapes created in response to work on climate change (IPSI 2011). In 
particular with respect to the Mekong Basin, the MRC has planned to assess baseline resilience every five 
to ten years, dependency on fish every three years, shocks and trends and socio-economic data every 
three years, and resilience indicators every year. This reflects the increasing visibility and importance of 
measuring and monitoring resilience in large complex river basins such as the Mekong. Therefore, another 
finding is that greater resolution of system analysis works hand in hand with better measurability.  
Another challenge is the difficulty in accounting for political influence in the system. The systems model 
drew links between elements primarily focused on water delivery, movement, or use. It did not account 
for  the  social  constructions  of  those  elements  which  in  a  wider  political  context  can  have  large 296 
 
implications on how the system functions, or more importantly, adapts and transforms under stress. If 
institutional thresholds are breached, the political context, for example the dominant political party in 
Thailand,  could  influence  the  outcome  of  a  reorganization  of  the  MRC.  This  is  not  a  completely 
hypothetical  situation.  In  the  early  1990s,  the  Thai  Foreign  Minister  and  others  within  the  Thai 
government forced out the UNDP director of the then Interim Mekong Committee due to conflicts over a 
number of Thai water projects in Northeast Thailand that planned to remove water from the mainstream 
in the dry season. Therefore, another finding is that a better method of incorporating political agency is 
needed in the SES model.  
Some general observations are that methodology is still new in river basin management. Systems are not 
easy concept to comprehend. They are messy, complex, and difficult and expensive to model. And they 
often come into conflict with traditional natural resource management principles that seek to maximize 
efficiency and benefit (yield) from ecosystem services. This meant that many traditional components such 
as economics and hydropolitics were not included in the analysis. This may cause consternation to some 
who rely on traditional methods of understanding and measuring resilience in river basins. Wider use of 
SESs on river basins, greater resolution of analyses will create better understanding and more acceptance 
of these methods in the academic and water professional communities.  
Dissertation Flow – Chapter 2, Part A: (Figure 1.2) 
(2a)  Is the Mekong Basin resilient? 
(2b)  Is the basin resilient at some scales and not others? 
I find that the Mekong Basin has Medium-Low resilience. This equates to 45 percent out of 100, or a value 
of 1.8 on a 3-pt scale. Additionally, I find that the Mekong Basin is resilient at some scales but not resilient 
in others. Based on the definition of resilience derived in Chapter 1, the Mekong Basin remains resilient if 
it can remain functioning under stress and not lose its form or function. In this regard, the Mekong Basin 
is still functioning at the regional level, national level, and provincial levels. The ecological system was 
seen to be the most resilient and it continues to absorb changes without loss of function.  
As a social-ecological system, the ecological part of the Mekong Basin is more resilient than the social 
side. Figure 2.33 shows that most of the social side of the system is less resilient than the physical side, 
except for the Resource Users connection to Public Infrastructure Providers, which has benefited recently 
by  increased  effort  to  involve  stakeholders  in  public  participation  and  dialogue.  In  general,  national 
institutions have little understanding of the effects of development on ecosystems and social livelihoods, 
particularly in the medium to long-term. Several mishaps on tributary projects have driven reforms in 
social and economic impact planning – some of which have been implemented on the Nam Ngum II 297 
 
hydropower project. However, the lack of comprehensive environmental and social impact assessment on 
the  recent  proposal  to  build  Xayaburi  Dam  in  Lao  PDR  on  the  Mekong  mainstream  is  evidence  of 
continued lack of resilience in water resource governance, regulatory, and planning processes.  
The basin also exhibits lack of resilience due to threshold behavior at the sub-basin scale. My study of the 
3S region shows that the Sesan river turns on the mainstream Mekong is flood years. This represents 
threshold behavior. Additionally, a number of conflicts on tributary projects highlight the need for greater 
scrutiny on larger projects. Several cases of collapsed fisheries at Pak Mun, Yali Falls, Theun-Hinboun, and 
the 3S region are warning signs that thresholds exist in river development. Figure 2.35 illustrates this 
point – while approaching the limits of a particular threshold, whether it is water quality, governance, or 
fisheries, basin resilience drops off at an increasing rate. This is typical of threshold behavior. This gives 
another finding. 
Some sectors in the basin are more resilient than others. Figure 2.35 shows this by displaying a range of 
threshold resilience curves. Hydropower and ecosystem health both have a steep threshold resilience 
curve indicating a high sensitivity to change. The governance curve is similar and has nearly the same 
slope as the basin resilience curve. This indicates that governance in the basin is sensitive to thresholds at 
nearly the same rate as the basin. Therefore, governance could be used as a sort of proxy for basin 
resilience. However, it is not that simple. Sectors that have steeper threshold curves can affect sectors 
through cross-scalar mechanisms. Therefore, the basin has to be analyzed as a system. Proxy indicators 
are problematic. Referring back to Figure 2.35, floods show less sensitivity to threshold resilience – an 
indication of the relative resilient behavior of the Mekong freshwater ecosystem – particularly flow rate. 
Curves were not constructed for water quantity, quality, and fish production however, these sectors 
appear  to  have  high  threshold  risk  and  low  resilience.  More  data  is  needed  to  construct  threshold 
resilience curves for these sectors. In the case of fisheries, the sector is so sensitive to the basin that only 
figures exist at high threshold risk, i.e., the curve exists but are nearly vertical! 
A significant finding is that vulnerability exists at the provincial and national scale. Cambodia and Lao PDR 
are extremely vulnerable to basin development compared with Viet Nam and Thailand. Particularly with 
regard to fisheries and ecosystem health, Cambodia and Lao PDR have little adaptive capacity to handle 
large shocks to the system. At the provincial level, some provinces such as Tonle Sap and Kratie are more 
vulnerable than others and these areas are potentially adversely affected by hydropower development. 
There is also data collected by the MRC to suggest that specific districts and communities are more 
vulnerable to basin development than others however, that was not studied in this dissertation.  
Another finding is that there is not sufficient resilience in the Mekong Basin to absorb large disturbances – 
such  as  mainstream  dams  or  significant  climate  change.  The  method  I  used  for  the  basin  resilience 298 
 
assessment  is  useful  for  making  comparisons  as  the  numbers  were  normalized  by  quartile.  Taking 
numbers from Table 2.23 (full data in Table 2.30), the basin average for vulnerability is 1.84 (1 = low, 2 = 
medium, and 3 = high) aggregated from district and provincial scales, remembering that vulnerability is 
social  data.  The  basin  average  for  adaptive  capacity  without  the MRC  was 1.76  – slightly  below  the 
national vulnerability figures. If the MRC is added to adaptive capacity, the figure increased to 1.85. 
Adding thresholds the vulnerability dropped to 1.76. Taking away the MRC  with thresholds, adaptive 
capacity dropped to 1.67 – leaving the basin more vulnerable than it is resilient. The take-away from this 
is that given the sensitivity of thresholds in the Mekong Basin, relying on the LMB countries alone leaves 
the basin vulnerable to threats. Adding the MRC provides more resilience to match vulnerabilities. These 
are only relative numbers – but they do provide a picture of basin resilience and the relative strengths of 
system elements and differences in scalar components.  
On one hand those who claim the Mekong Basin is resilient are correct. The basin is operating at in a 
stable condition and contains a reasonable amount of resilience to remain in that state. However, in 
reality,  the  Mekong  is  on  a  knife  edge.  If  a  significant  stress  hits  the  basin,  it  could  cause  severe 
consequences and there is not sufficient adaptive capacity to absorb large disturbances. Signs of this are 
occurring at sub-basin scales. If for some reason the MRC fails or disbands, the basin will be in a very 
vulnerable state. If I were asked to design a resilient system, I would want to have a 2 to 1 adaptive 
capacity to vulnerability ratio. Regrettably, the Mekong Basin ratio is near parity.  
Another finding from my dissertation is that an important objective in resilience analysis of river basins 
should be to understand where critical thresholds of key system variables are, for example entire sectors 
such as ecosystem health for floods, or single variables such as fish catch, and determine strategies to 
either avoid them by building capacity or reduce the rate of changes into them before a threshold is 
crossed. For the Mekong system, slowing the rate of development should be the first step. The MRC has 
recommended a 10-year moratorium on mainstream projects (excluding tributary projects). The second 
step should be to gather more data and better characterize the key thresholds in the system. They have 
made a good start and much has been accomplished in the last five to ten years but there are still many 
unknowns particularly how tributaries influence the basin via threshold and feedbacks.   
A significant finding is that thresholds exist at the institutional level. The research demonstrates that lack 
of resilience at smaller scales rupture feedback systems and force other parts of the basin to experience 
problems. This has occurred in the 3S region of the Mekong Basin after Yali Falls dam was built in Viet 
Nam. The impacts of the dam on the Se San River had negative transboundary impacts downstream in 
Cambodia and caused significant damage to fisheries, livelihoods, and economic losses along the Sesan 
River basin. It also weakened institutional resilience at the MRC who was slow to respond to the situation. 299 
 
Eventually, the Asian Development Bank stepped in to create a regional river organization (SWG) which 
eventually became the Se San Protection Network (SPN). Regional and international actors supported the 
regional  river  basin  organization  in  absence  of  national  and  MRC  capacity.  Therefore,  irresponsible 
national development objectives, in this case in Viet Nam, exposed vulnerabilities and lack of resilience in 
community and provincial areas of Viet Nam and Cambodia, exposed a lack of capacity at the regional 
level at the MRC, and reduced basin resilience by creating transboundary conflicts downstream. In fact, 
Figure 2.32 shows that adaptive capacity in Thailand is greater than at the Mekong River Commission.  
Therefore, another finding is that adaptive capacity is higher at some national scales, for example in 
Thailand,  than  it  is  at  the  MRC.  The Mekong River  Commission  has  significant capacity  to  deal  with 
technical,  data  collection,  and  coordination  activity.  However,  it  lacks  the  mandate  and  authority  to 
respond to national level conflicts. This vulnerability is somewhat built into the organization’s mandate. 
This  has  been  demonstrated  recently  by  the  suspension  of  construction  on  Xayaburi  Dam  on  the 
mainstream Mekong. The primary contractor for the project, sited in Lao PDR, is a Thai company. The 6-
month Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement (PNPCA) process initiated by the 
MRC discovered that the Thai contractor had failed to complete a thorough environmental and social 
impact study of the area. Even though the project plans to benefit Thailand by selling power back to the 
Thai Kingdom, Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam joined in support to delay the project for 1-year. In this 
case, maybe due to the involvement of Thailand both as beneficiary and contractor, Thailand exercised its 
influence  to  delay  construction  until  the  comprehensive  EIA  and  SIA  is  completed.  The  MRC,  while 
administering and facilitating the PNPCA process, did not have the power to stop construction. Its role 
was to facilitate the process. Had Thailand not objected to move ahead, the construction could have 
continued.  And  in  fact  later  this  year  construction  could  continue  if  the  Thai  contractor  meets  its 
obligations.  
Dissertation Flow – Chapter 3, Part B: (Figure 1.2) 
(3)  Does Conflict Management and Collaborative Learning enhance resilience in the 
Mekong Basin?  
Adaptive capacity results from Chapter 2 show that the MRC possesses high capacity in funding, planning, 
and  self-organization  activity  (Figure 2.26).  It  has fairly good flexibility  in  that  it  supports cross-scale 
interactions and has overlapping programs of basin responsibility. The MRC is weaker in the area of 
watershed management and sub-basin conflict management, or the ability to learn from crises. This is 
illustrated by developments in the 3S region, Nam Ngum II, Pak Mun, and other tributary projects where 
the MRC failed to act. Realizing that the MRC cannot do everything well, how can it improve at the sub-
basin scale where it lacks capacity? Chapter 3 addressed this question.  300 
 
A finding from this chapter is that the MRC’s Conflict Prevention and Management (CPM) strategy lacked 
resilience at the sub-basin scale. It contained three primary strategies. First, trade-off facilitation tools 
were largely scaled at the basin level leaving out tributary projects. Understanding that the first priority is 
basin-level development, projects were in process on the tributaries and the MRC’s strategy did not 
address them. Second, the scenario assessments on hydropower did not take into account system-level 
effects such as the analysis I did on the 3S region on Chapter 2. I found that tributary effects from the 
Sesan were non-linear and “switch on” mainstream effects in flood years. The MRC’s scenario analysis 
failed to incorporate these effects and therefore lacked resilience and system understanding. Third, the 
decision-making tools at the MRC again only address mainstream issues. This meant that capacity building 
was  focused  at  the  basin  level.  This  was  beginning  to  change  in  2008  with  a  greater  focus  on 
environmental “hotspots” by the Environment Programme and increased stakeholder engagement and 
dialogue sessions driven by the Basin Development Plan Programme.   
Another finding is that the MRC’s institutional framework and mandate need to be revisited and revised 
so it can operate more easily at sub-basin scales. The current institutional arrangement sees the MRC 
working through NMCs to influence national issues. This works to some extent however, many of the 
NMCs lack sufficient capacity to influence national-level water management. NMCs in the Mekong Basin 
exist primarily to help with data coordination and facilitation of stakeholder meetings. The LMB countries 
need to either integrate NMCs more into their line agencies or reform the MRC’s mandate to give greater 
flexibility in national level strategies. Reform of the NMCs would be much easier than changes to the 1995 
Agreement.  Therefore  the  finding  is  that  reform  of  the  NMCs  is  necessary  to  strengthen  the  MRC’s 
Conflict Prevention and Management strategy.  
The second part of Chapter 3 was the application of Collaborative Learning (CP) to environmental conflicts 
in the basin. A significant finding is that CP is an appropriate tool for addressing sub-basin scale conflict in 
the Mekong. Firstly, CP is designed to address complex environmental conflict by engaging stakeholders in 
process of address issues. Not only was it designed for community and provincial level analysis, it was 
entirely  process  focused  and  contained  training  for  stakeholders  and  participants  –  a  critical  and 
important aspect of building resilience and adaptive capacity at the local level. This is an area in which the 
MRC is lacking.  
Another finding was that the CP process was similar to Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) and that both 
could be combined into one process to avoid confusion. At the time of implementation of the CP program 
(2008),  the  name  was  changed  to  Collaborative  Decision-making  process  due  to  perceptions  by 
stakeholders that activities were “toothless.” This meant that previous engagements with stakeholders 
ended without producing significant changes and outcomes. More effort was needed to engage decision-301 
 
makers to attend the sessions so that when significant decisions that affected outcomes were needed, for 
example, changing regulations on over-fishing for catfish on the mainstream, or river bank encroachments 
in Laos, reforms could be implemented.  
A  result  that  could  not  be  confirmed  in  this  dissertation  is  the  outcome  of  the  two  pilot  projects. 
Unfortunately,  funding  for  the  pilots  lapsed  in  2009  but  the  Environment  Programme  at  the  MRC 
incorporated CP as part of their environmental activity. Ongoing support of MSPs by M-POWER and IUCN 
continued  through  the  basin  so  that  work  on  environmental  “hotspots”  is  progressing  albeit  under 
different leadership.  
Finally, and importantly, Collaborative Learning, whether it is called Collaborative Decision-making, or 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, fill a large process gap in resilience and adaptive capacity in the basin. Not 
only is it been shown to be an essential characteristic of highly adaptive complex systems, it addresses 
known deficiencies in the institutional framework in the Mekong Basin. Time will be the judge if the 
methods  prove  effective,  although  there  are  promising  signs  already.  As  reported  earlier,  resilience 
between Resource Users and Public Infrastructure Providers, which includes the MRC and national line 
agencies,  has  already  improved.  Part  of  this  improvement  is  due  no  doubt  to  increased  knowledge, 
agency, and decision-making power of communities at sub-basin scales in the Mekong. If these tools work 
in other river basins, what else can be learned by doing basin comparisons? Chapter 4 addressed this 
question. 
Dissertation Flow – Chapter 4, Part C: (Figure 1.2) 
(4a)  Is a resilience framework an effective tool for making comparisons of large river 
basins? 
(4b)  Can large river basins rapidly develop while still remaining resilient? 
In Chapter 4, I use resilience as a framework for basin comparisons between the Mekong and Columbia 
River Basins. The first finding is that this is a useful method for comparing basins from vastly different 
geographies, socio-economic backgrounds, and political environments. The framework applied in Chapter 
4 is slightly different than the one applied in Chapter 2 on the Mekong.  I did not use a SES on the 
Columbia. Instead, I used the definition of basin resilience developed in Chapter 2 to compare the basins. 
A finding from the analysis is that the Mekong Basin is much more physically resilient than the Columbia 
Basin. Figure 4.18 showed that the Mekong contains nearly two-times the annual runoff and discharge 
than the Columbia Basin. It is also nearly 2.5 times the length of the Columbia. This finding is similar to the 
finding from Chapter 2. The Mekong is most resilient in the ecological dimension.  302 
 
This thought leads to the next finding, which is the effect of development on freshwater ecosystems in 
the basins. Comparison of the developed wet/dry flow ratio for the two basins is 1.57, meaning that 
Mekong projects should have a relatively low impact (on flow rate only) compared with the Columbia. 
Conclusions based on this finding are problematic. Firstly, this only deals with flow rate which is not the 
only indicator of ecosystem health. Secondly, the figures from the Mekong are only modeled impacts. 
Actual impacts could be much greater. And finally, this does not account for river blockages or barriers in 
the basin. Flow rates can be maintained by run-of-the-river dams while still blocking primary migration 
routes for fisheries. This leads to the next finding. 
The rate of planned development in the Mekong Basin is 23 percent higher than the highest rate of 
development experienced on the Columbia River Basin. Based on analysis I conducted on the rate of 
development  on  the  Columbia  Basin  since  1880,  and  development  plans  on  the  Mekong  Basin,  I 
determined that the current rate of development in the Mekong could be not resilient. Experience in the 
Columbia  Basin  confirms  (Figure  4.7)  that  similar  rates  of  development  will  devastate  wild  fish 
populations. In the Columbia Basin, salmon populations collapsed from 1910 to 1990 due in part to the 
construction of dams. Salmon are considered to be a highly adaptive species. This means less or equally 
adaptable species in the Mekong Basin are doomed if current development plans go ahead. This leads to 
another important finding from my dissertation. 
Based on my definition of basin resilience, the Columbia Basin is not resilient and has not been resilient 
since 1950. Collapse of the fishing industry, extinction of many populations of endemic fish, displacement 
of Tribal nations, and breach of several treaties with Native American tribes are examples of low resilience 
in the basin. While it may be argued the Columbia River Treaty (CRT) is a resilient treaty, it only deals with 
hydropower  and  flood  control.  Other  sectors  in  the  basin,  such  as  water  quality,  fisheries,  native 
entitlements, and public participation are lacking. This leads to the next finding.  
Cooperation over water management is decreasing in both the Mekong and Columbia Basins. BAR results 
clearly show decreasing trends of cooperation in the areas of hydropower, joint management, and water 
quality. In the case of the Mekong, there were three (-3s) and seven (-2s) in the last three years. The 
United States has withheld funding of the MRC over its concern about development in the region. On the 
Columbia, concerns over fishing rights, hydropower, and mining impacts and water quality continue to 
cause  conflict  in  the  basin.  The  increasing  pressure  on  fisheries  has  also  created  problems  with 
jurisdictional authority and Tribal nations. However, in the Columbia, there are some encouraging signs of 
resilience. This leads to my next finding. 
The sovereign status of Tribes in the United States has led to increased cooperation in the Columbia basin. 
Cooperation on the BAR scale I used in the analysis increased between 1.0-1.5 points over the last four 303 
 
years. The variation among Tribal interactions is also half the variation between traditional state actors, 
suggesting  Tribal  water  management  is more  consistent  than  US-Canadian  interactions.  Much of  the 
increase in cooperation is due to agreements and settlements over tribal fishing rights on the Lower 
Snake River Basin, Flathead River Basin in Montana, and funding for cooperative agreements between 
Tribes  in  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.  Fish  and  Wildlife  Service.  Previous  analysis  of  conflict  and 
cooperation (BAR) data excluded Tribes from the analysis as they were not considered sovereign nations, 
i.e., they were not international actors in the management of water on international basins. Therefore 
actions within the basin involving Tribal parties were not included. I challenged that assumption given the 
reality that Tribes, at least in the United States, are sovereign nations. There are signs that First Nations 
tribes in Canada are seeking similar status within the Canadian Province of British Columbia. This finding 
suggests  that the  status  of parties  taking  part  in  water  management  can  increase resilience  in  large 
international basins. This leads to my next finding. 
The Mekong framework (PNPCA) for reviewing potential new mainstream projects is inflexible and erodes 
regional resilience and adaptive capacity in the basin. The case of Xayaburi dam demonstrates that the 
PNPCA process needs to be reformed. From the time that Lao PDR proposed Xayaburi dam on 20 Sept 
2010, the MRC and all relevant parties had only 6-months to review, comment, or protest the project. It 
must be said that this process was executed, and as a result, the project was delayed. This could be 
considered a success. Cambodia, Thailand, and Viet Nam all agreed the project should be delayed pending 
a comprehensive EIA be completed by the Thai developer, Ch Karnchang Plc. However, this is only good 
for one year. Once this is complete, the developer has no obligation to go through another 6-month 
process and needs no written agreement for the dam to go ahead, meaning construction could resume by 
October of 2012 (Bangkok Post 2012). While the purpose of the PNPCA is not to halt development, the 
installation of the first mainstream project on the Mekong would open the gates for others to go ahead. 
This  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  MRC’s  statement  that  there  should  be  a  10-year  moratorium  on 
mainstream development. It represents a failure of the MRC’s mandate to sustainably develop the basin 
and is an example of a lack of institutional resilience at the regional scale. 
Likewise, another finding from my dissertation is a lack of institutional resilience in the Columbia River 
Basin.  The  current  CRT  focuses  on  only  hydropower  and  flood  control.  The  treaty  created  an 
implementation body to manage it. The US Entity includes the BPA and USACE and the Canadian Entity is 
BC Hydro. As studied earlier in Chapter 2 and 4, principles of a resilient water institution include flexibility, 
self-organization,  and  capital,  in  addition  to  concrete  enforcement  provisions  and  conflict  resolution 
mechanisms. The CRT has all of these except flexibility. It is well funded, contains concrete enforcement 
provisions, and reverts to the IJC for conflict resolution. However, it lacks flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions in the basin. It has adapted through great cost and time due mainly to judicial interventions 304 
 
and to the politicizing of environmental degradation and salmon decline. The Northwest Power Act (NPA) 
and Endangered Species Act (ESA) are examples of the federal judicial interventions to protect fish in the 
basin. Still today  a Federal Judge in Portland,  Oregon is forced to make judgments on  how the CRT 
Entities, the BPA and USACE, manage and protect fisheries in the basin. This is clearly an example of a lack 
of flexibility in the CRT and reduces the ability of the basin to adaptive to changes.  
This leads to my final finding, which is that the Columbia Basin is not resilient based on the definition of 
basin resilience I develop earlier. If one part of the basin lacks resilience, which can alter or change the 
function or structure of the basin, then the basin lacks resilience. It can be argued that the CRT itself is a 
resilient  institution  –  it  has  clear  management  authority,  conflict  resolution  mechanisms,  allocates 
resources, all resilient traits. However, it lacks flexibility to manage outside its original mandate. This is 
similar to the MRC – its mandate is a constraint to flexibility in a fashion that erodes resilience as a river 
basin institution. The Columbia River Basin suffers a similar trait due to the Columbia River Treaty. If the 
Treaty  is  revised,  more  flexibility  and  stakeholder  representation  should  be  included  in  the  US 
implementation body such as including the NPCC and CRITFC as Entities and the addition of a Fisheries 
Committee. These changes would make the Columbia River Treaty a highly resilient, adaptive institution 
and drive the Columbia Basin towards a more resilient, sustainable future. 
5.2.  CAVEATS AND LIMITATIONS 
This  dissertation  focuses  on  a  methodology  to  measure  and  quantify  resilience  on  large  river  basins 
particularly the Mekong Basin. There are several caveats and limitations to this approach.  
Until now, upstream development in China has had little effect on the Lower Mekong Basin with the 
exception of rapids blasting in the Chiang Khong region. However, this situation will probably not remain. 
A number of studies confirm Chinese dams, sometimes referred to in China as the Lancang cascade, will 
have significant effects on the LMB (ICEM/MRC 2010; MRC 2005). Given China’s upstream position and 
the monsoonal (wet/dry) regime of the Mekong system, China’s contributions to downstream flow vary 
significantly.  Its  overall  contribution  to  average  Mekong  discharge  is  16  percent  (16%)  or  76  cubic 
kilometers  (km
3).  However,  since  Mekong  flows  are  driven  by  primarily  snow  melt  (similar  to  the 
Columbia) in the dry season, from December to May China’s contribution of flow increases to 40 percent 
(40%) or 190 km
3, a 150 percent (150%) increase from its wet season contribution (Figure 5.1).  
Stakeholders, planners, and officials are concerned about wet season reduction of flows particularly in 
Tonle Sap in Cambodia and the Viet Nam Delta. They are also very concerned about the cascade’s effect in 
the dry season. Chinese officials insist and modeling data shows that the UMB and LMB cascades will 
increase flows in the dry season (Figure 4.4) but, since China is the upper most riparian and is not part of 305 
 
the Mekong River Commission Agreement, who’s mandate is to sustainably manage the basin, amny have 
little confidence that China will coordinate basin operations with the Lower Basin countries.  
 
Figure 5.1: China's Influence on LMB Hydrology. Source: MRC 2005, 30. China’s average flow contribution 
at Kratie is 16% during the wet season, but rises to 40% in the dry season. 
At the time of this writing, four of the seven dams in the Lancang cascade are operational and a fifth 
(Nuozhadu) is impounding water (Hongbin 2012). Chinese interests in navigation and dam construction 
are  dominated  by  economic  concerns.  Opportunities  for  trade  with  lower  basin  nations  and  the 
generation of electricity to serve growing and industrializing populations within China have been at the 
center of plans to utilize the resources of the Lancang-Jiang. China has steadfastly insisted on calling its 
section of the river the Lancang-Jiang, a clear implication that this is a Chinese river and decisions on its 
use are subject to Chinese sovereign interests alone. 
In a very thorough study, Sokhem and Sunada (2008) analyze interactions between China and regional 
actors in the LMB. They determine that China is engaging in only pragmatic cooperation (Sokhem and 
Sunada 2008). China’s interests in the UMB are hydropower, trade and economic security, navigation, and 
the protection of its infrastructure whereas in LMB countries are concerned with a wide range of water 
resource development issues such as irrigation, bank stability, water quality, fisheries, and floods and 
drought (Sokhem and Sunada 2008). The areas of potential risk of conflict and lack of resilience are water 
quantity, bank erosion, and navigation; China’s priorities differ from LMB countries and its concerns for 
downstream riparians have only recently began to emerge. 
Sokhem and Sunada (2008) give China credit for engagement with regional bodies such as ASEAN and the 
GMS but score them low on interactions with the MRC and even lower on navigation (Sokhem and Sunada 
2008). This indicates a relatively low geopolitical resilience between China and the LMB countries and 306 
 
MRC.  Examples  have  been  conflicts  over  the  blasting  of  rapids  on  the  Upper  Mekong  Navigation 
Improvement Project, poor relations during the floods in 2008, and tense relations over extreme drought 
in 2010. Even given these challenges, there are signs of improving cooperation and coordination. 
In 2000, China, Myanmar, Thailand, and Lao PDR signed the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on 
Lancang-Mekong River to improve navigability of 360 km of river between Simao in Southern China to 
Luang Prabang in Lao PDR. After the floods in 2008, China doubled the frequency of data sharing with the 
Mekong River Commission. And in 2010, after many blamed China for low flows during the dry season, 
which actually had nothing to do with the UMB dams, China responded by canceling the Mengsong, one 
of the Lancang cascade.  
Other upstream issues that could affect LMB resilience are the impacts of Chinese dams on stream power 
and sedimentation. Estimates are that the cascade will reduce sediment transport downstream by 75 to 
81 percent (75-81%), or reduce sediment loads from 90 to 20 metric tons per year (Mt/yr) (ICEM/MRC 
2010, 67). With over half the Chinese dams already build and operating in the UMB, sediments have 
begun accumulating behind UMB dams in Yunnan. Efforts to implement technical solutions are ongoing 
including seasonal flushing and sluice gates to release trapped sediments downstream. This represents a 
huge challenge to the future of the Mekong Basin and has the possibility of eroding basin resilience in the 
near future. Measures to monitor sediment transport are only now becoming available to the MRC and 
downstream countries. Future resilience assessments should include sediment transport as part of the 
vulnerability and resilience scores. 
Regarding the SES model, the approach used to determine basin resilience was adapted specifically for 
the Mekong Basin. While a resilience framework is used to compare the Mekong and Columbia Basins in 
Chapter 4, the methodology in Chapter 2 uses basin-specific data from the Mekong to quantify basin 
resilience. To evaluate resilience in another basin, the model would need to be applied to the basin in 
questions, thresholds analyzed, vulnerability determined, and basin resilience calculated. In addition to 
data, the model has additional limitations that were not addressed in this dissertation. 
First, system theory focuses on relationships (feedbacks) between elements defined in the model (Figure 
2.16). In this dissertation, the control volume was drawn around the Lower Mekong Basin. Therefore, 
overtly attributable flows in and out of the LMB were not accounted for in the model. This limitation 
could bias the results in a number of ways, but most notably the hydrologic and political influence of 
China on the basin. In 2010 there were extremely low flows due to an unusually dry “dry season” causing 
conflict  in  the  basin  as  reported  in  Section  4.6.  As  it  turned  out  the  effects  were  purely  due  to 
hydrometeorological having nothing to do with China. However, perceptions are powerful. In the future, 
China’s hydrological and political influence on the LMB will most likely grow. A basin resilience model will 307 
 
need to account for this influence by either expanding the control volume to include the Upper Basin or 
add incoming stressors or feedbacks into the LMB control volume in the SES model.  
Second, external political forces, such as those exhibited by stressors and outside actors such as China or 
other transnational actors, can act overly on institutional and human agency in the SES. Regional politics 
are  not  modeled  in  the  SES.  More  study  is  needed  to  determine  the  most  effective  method  for 
incorporating power and politics into the SES model – in particular the institutional side of the system. As 
noted in the findings and discussion section, political actions can significantly and sometimes drastically 
affect  the  basin.  In  fact,  institutional  thresholds  can be  breached  via  political  action.  The  SES  would 
account for these effects through Public Infrastructure Providers governance, but signals could be diffuse. 
In the case of the collapse of the Interim Mekong Committee for example, it was disbanded due to a 
conflict over membership (Cambodia) and Thailand’s plans to divert water from the mainstream during 
the dry season (Browder 2000). While these effects eventually are manifested through workings of the 
social-ecological system, a clearer pathway for the effects of political agency on institutional resilience is 
needed in the model.  
Additionally,  the  SES  model  is  limited  by  the  quality  of  threshold  and  feedback  data  collected.  An 
inventory of thresholds with associated indicators would greater increase accuracy and resolution of the 
basin resilience method.  Likewise, an inventory of feedbacks would greatly  increase reliability of the 
resilience  scores.  In  this  dissertation,  54  feedbacks  where  characterized.  While  an  extensive  list, 
undoubtedly many more feedbacks that were not characterized are present in the basin. Of the feedbacks 
that were identified, there were model elements at the international level that were not included in the 
basin,  such  as  international  NGOs.  A  limited  number  of  feedbacks  involving  international  actors,  for 
example, “Regional and national dialogues over water development,” were represented and grouped with 
Public Infrastructure Providers (Table 2.10).  
In Chapter 4, development rate on the Mekong and Columbia Basins are compared by assessing the rate 
of dams built per year over a decadal time frame. Only dams over 15 meters in height and/or reservoirs 
larger than 3 MCM. This method is limited to the development of dams and does not include irrigation 
and reservoir volumes in the measure of developmental impact. A more robust analysis would include a 
wider range of water resources development impacts from reservoir storage, irrigation diversions, canals, 
and transfer projects. 
Finally, the  conflict and  cooperation data utilized in Chapter 4  is limited only to international actors 
involved  with  water  management.  It  does  not  capture  scales  below  the  international  level  as  was 
addressed in Chapter 2 and 3. Moreover, the effect of Tribes on the water management process was only 
investigated back four years. Although statistically significant based on the increase in cooperation, the 308 
 
analysis should be extended back to the beginning of the dataset to give an accurate picture of Native 
Americans in water management in the Columba River Basin. Analysis of native or specific ethnic or 
minority groups on other river basins such as the Hmong in the Mekong or Kurds in the Tigris-Euphrates 
would allow a wider conclusion to be made about the new cooperative role of formerly neglected native 
and minority groups on water management in large river basins.  
5.3.  CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of conclusions that I have drawn from the findings in this dissertation. Some of them 
raise more questions than contain answers. They all are formulated out the understanding and research 
that came from the completion of this dissertation.  
First, the concept of resilience contains many meanings and when applied to a river basin, is a measure of 
the basin system’s capacity to absorb, manage, and adapt to biophysical, socio-economic, and political 
changes (or stressors) while still maintaining its essential structure, feedbacks, and functional integrity. In 
river basins, vulnerability is inversely proportional to resilience. As our understanding of resilience has 
evolved, so has our ability to define it. It will need to continue to evolve and change.  
Second, large complex river basins contain threshold, feedback, and self-organizing characteristics. Social-
ecological systems (SESs) accurately characterize these processes and are effective tools employed to 
determine basin resilience. SES models can be enhanced by incorporating an inventory of thresholds and 
feedbacks  of  the  basin  providing  greater  resolution  of  system  variables  which  would  also  improve 
measurability.  Moreover,  a  better  method  of  incorporating  political  agency  would  improve  model 
accuracy. 
Third, the Mekong Basin is a large and complex river basin. Basin resilience was found to be medium-low 
and  not  consistent  across  scale  or  sector.  The  most  resilient  component  of  the  Mekong  Basin  is  its 
ecological system. While still largely undeveloped, it was not surprising to find that the biophysical system 
is still robust. The relationship between resource users and the institutions is also fairly resilient due to 
recent efforts to foster public participation in basin development planning activities. These efforts are 
driven by the threat of a large number of potential mainstream projects planned for the basin. If basin 
resilience is to be maintained, the focus on capacity building of resource users at the sub-basin scale must 
continue.  
Forth, and conversely, other parts of the social system in the Mekong are not resilient. The relationship 
between  resource  users  and  public  infrastructure  has  suffered  due  to  poor  understanding  of  the 
environmental  processes  and  lack  of  engagement  of  social  learning  and  monitoring.  Similarly  the 309 
 
interaction between developers and infrastructure has suffered due to lack of comprehensive social and 
environmental impact assessments. The LMB countries have been weak at enforcing higher standards for 
developers  resulting  in  costly  and  inequitable  responses  to  communities  displaced  by  hydropower 
projects.  
Fifth, the Mekong basin lacks resilience at sub-basin scales – both at the national and watershed levels. 
Both Cambodia and Lao PDR are highly vulnerable, not only to basin development but to any significant 
changes  in  the  basin,  and  have  additional  vulnerabilities  at  the  provincial  scale.  Moreover,  tributary 
projects have exposed both ecological and institutional vulnerabilities in several regions of the basin. 
These cases are indications of greater potential impacts of mainstream development projects. 
Sixth, basin resilience is largely a function of threshold sensitivity to key system variable and sectors. 
Some  of  these  thresholds  exist  at  the  institutional  level  making  governance  an  important  variant  in 
determining  basin  resilience.  Hydropower  and  ecosystem  health  sectors  have  the  lowest  threshold 
resilience  in  this  study,  followed  by  fisheries  and  water  quality.  Governance  has  similar  threshold 
resilience as the entire basin. This suggests that if governance is made more resilient, the basin will 
become more resilient.  
Seventh,  areas  of  governance  that  lack  resilience  include  the  MRC’s  self-organization  and  learning 
capacity, institutional mandate, and Conflict Prevention and Management strategy. The MRC is one of the 
most  resilient  organizations  in  the  region,  but  lacks  sufficient  capacity  to  neither  enhance  sub-basin 
capacity  nor  the  capacity  to  significantly  slow  or  alter  the  development  of  mainstream  projects. 
Additionally support is needed to reform the National Mekong Committees to help foster resilience in 
their respective line agencies. The emergence of Collaborative Learning processes and Multi-Stakeholder 
Platforms is an effort to fill the gap left by the MRC’s lack of capacity to enhance resilience at sub-basin 
levels.  
Eighth, a resilience framework is a useful tool for making comparisons of the Mekong and Columbia 
Basins. Results conclude that the Mekong ecosystem is more resilient than the Columbia due in part to its 
sheer size. Compared with development on the Columbia Basin, the results from this study indicate the 
current rate of development in the Mekong is unsustainable and threatens resilience in the basin. As a 
result, cooperation on the Mekong as declined in face of rising uncertainty over its development agenda 
and the MRC’s capacity to sustainably manage the basin. The MRC’s Procedures for Notification, Prior 
Consultation, and Agreement process is drastically too short and will most likely result in construction of 
the first mainstream dam within a year. The failure of the MRC to uphold a 10-year moratorium on 
mainstream development will significantly erode its creditability, legitimacy, and future as a stabilizing 
force in the region and Mekong Basin.  310 
 
Finally, a persistent and significant decline in cooperation over water management in the Columbia Basin 
since 1960  is resulting  in  erosion  in basin  resilience. Declining  salmon  populations,  decreasing  water 
quality, dysfunctional relations with Tribal nations, lack of public participation, and an inflexible Columbia 
River Treaty has left the basin vulnerable and lacking resilience in several key sectors. Adding the NPCC 
and Tribal representation to the existing treaty framework would greatly improve its flexibility as an 
institution. This would go a long way to enhancing the treaty’s legitimacy and would likely increase overall 
basin resilience. Surprisingly, recent involvement of Tribal nations has had a net cooperative effect on 
water  management.  The  newly  acquired  sovereign  status  of  Native  American  tribes  has  significantly 
altered  the  water  management  paradigm  and  improved  resilience  in  the  Columbia  Basin.  I  would 
conclude that the status of minority groups is a significant factor in the resilience of the Columbia Basin, a 
result with potential positive implications for underrepresented minorities in other large river basins, such 
as the Mekong. 
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6.1.  APPENDIX A: DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS IN THE LOWER MEKONG BASIN 
Table 6.1: Mainstream Dams planned in the Mekong Basin. Source: ICEM/MRC 2010, 151. 
   
Location Developer
Earliest 
Potential 
Commiss-ion 
Date
Design 
Status
Environment 
Assessment 
Status
Rated 
Head 
(m)
Plant Design 
Discharge 
(m3/s)
Installed 
Capacity 
(MW)
Peaking 
Capability 
(MW)
Mean 
Annual 
Energy 
(GWh )
Firm 
Annual 
Energy 
(GWh)
Full 
Supply 
Level 
(mamsl )
Low 
Supply 
Level 
(Mamsl)
Live 
Storage 
(mcm)
Reservior 
Area 
(km2)
Length 
of dam 
(m)
Height 
(m) 
Pak Beng  Lao PDR 
Datang 
International 
Power 
Generation 
(China) 
2016
MoU, 
feasibility 
IEE submitted  31 7,250 1,230 1,230 5,517 4,073 340 334 442 87 943 76
Luang 
Prabang 
Lao PDR 
PetroViet Nam 
Power 
Corporation 
(Viet Nam) 
2016
MoU, 
feasibility 
Feasibility 
study, 
40 3,812 1,410 1,412 5,437 4,205 310 308 734 90 1,106 68
Xayaburi  Lao PDR 
SEAN & Ch. 
Karnchang 
Public Co Ltd 
(Thailand) 
2016
MoU, 
feasibility 
Feasibility & 
full ESIA 
submitted 
24 6,018 1,260 1,260 6,035 5,139 275 270 225 49 810 32
Pak Lay  Lao PDR 
CEIEC and 
Sino‐Hydro 
(China) 
2016
MoU, 
feasibility 
IEE submitted  26 4,500 1,320 1,320 6,460 4,252 240 237 384 108 630 35
Sanakham  Lao PDR 
Datang 
International 
Power 
Generation 
(China) 
2016
MoU, 
feasibility 
Not yet  25 5,918 700 1,200 5,015 3,978 220 215 106 81 1,144 38
Pakchom 
Lao PDR 
Thailand 
N/a  2017
MasterPla
n 
Not yet  22 5,720 1,079 1,079 5,318 5,052 192 190 12 74 1,200 55
Ban Koum 
Lao PDR 
Thailand 
Italian Thai 
Asia Corp. 
Holdings 
(Thailand) 
2017
MoU, 
feasibility 
Not yet  19 11,700 1,872 1,872 8,434 8,012 115 115 0 133 780 53
Lat Sua  Lao PDR 
Charoen 
Energy and 
Water Asia Co 
Ltd (Thailand) 
2018
MoU, 
pre‐feasib
ility 
Pre‐feasibility 
study 
submitted 
10.6 10,000 686 686 2,668 1,524 97.5 95.5 0 13 1,300 27
Don 
Sahong 
Lao PDR 
Mega First 
(Malaysia) 
2016
PDA, 
detailed 
planning 
Full EIA 
submitted, 
17 2,400 240 240 2,375 1,989 75 72 115 290 (ha) 
1820‐720
-2730 
10.6‐8.2‐
8.3 
Thakho 
diversion 
Lao PDR 
CNR & EDL 
(France/Lao) 
2016
MoU, 
pre‐feasib
ility 
IEE submitted  16 380 50 50 360 71.7 68.7 n/a  n/a 
Channel 
1,800m 
n/a 
Stung 
Treng 
Cambodia 
Song Da 
Construction 
Co. (Viet Nam) 
N/a 
MoU, 
pre‐feasib
ility 
Not yet  15 18,493 980 591 4,870 2,937 55 50 70 211 10,884 22
Sambor  Cambodia 
China 
Southern 
Power Grid 
(China) 
2020
MoU, 
pre‐feasib
ility 
Pre‐feasibility 
submitted 
33 17,668 2,600 2,030 11,740 9,150 40 39 465 620 18,002 56
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS  DIMENSIONS  MANAGEMENT STATUS 
M
a
i
n
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
D
a
m315 
 
6.2.  APPENDIX B: LAND DEGRADATION TABLES 
 
Table 6.2: Land Degradation in LMB Countries. Source: FAO TERRASTAT Database. 
Country 
Land 
Degradation 
(total) 
Land degradation total 
a  Degradation due to agricultural activities 
Severe 
Very 
severe 
Total 
degradation 
% of total 
area 
degraded 
Severe 
Very 
severe 
Total 
degradation 
% of 
degraded 
area 
% of 
total 
area 
'000 km²  '000 km²  '000 km²  '000 km²  %  '000 km²  '000 km²  '000 km²  %  % 
Cambodia  183  48  40  89  49  0  8  8  9  4 
Laos  232  0  3  3  1  0  0  0  0  0 
Thailand  516  144  258  401  78  64  12  76  19  15 
Viet Nam  330  97  162  259  79  71  19  90  35  27 
Philippines  295  227  10  237  79  0  0  0  0  0 
Total  28682  6336  2071  8407  29  3220  285  3506  42  12 
 
a Light and moderate degradation Figures not shown; 
b  A = agriculture; O = overgrazing; D = deforestation; I = industrialization; V = over exploitation 
of vegetation; 
c  W = water erosion; N = wind erosion; C = chemical deterioration; P = physical deterioration 
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Table 6.2 (Continued). Land Degradation in LMB Countries. Source: FAO TERRASTAT Database. 
Country 
Land 
degrada
tion 
(total) 
Severity of human-induced degradation  Land degradation severity and population distribution 
Severe 
Very 
Severe 
Causes  Light  Moderate  Severe  Very Severe 
'000 km² 
'000 
km² 
% 
'000 
km² 
%  Cause
b  Type
c 
Light 
area 
(%) 
Popu-
lation 
density 
Moder-
ate area 
(%) 
Popula-
tion 
density 
Severe 
area 
(%) 
Popula-
tion 
density 
Very 
severe 
area (%) 
Popula-
tion 
density 
Cambodia  183  48  27  40  22  D  W  2  67  36  26  27  13  22  82 
Laos  232  0  0  3  1  D  W  16  28  83  17  0  n/a  1  56 
Thailand  516  144  28  258  50  D,A  W,C  2  116  20  55  28  101  50  137 
Viet Nam  330  97  29  162  49  D,A  W,C  0  n/a  21  227  29  324  49  125 
Philippines  295  227  3  10  3  D  W  0  n/a  18  128  3  208  3  356 
Total  28682  6336  22  2071  7  -  -  12  5  32  13  22  26  7  8 
 
a Light and moderate degradation Figures not shown; 
b  A = agriculture; O = overgrazing; D = deforestation; I = industrialization; V = over exploitation 
of vegetation; 
c  W = water erosion; N = wind erosion; C = chemical deterioration; P = physical deterioration 
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6.3.  APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY DATA 
Table 6.3: Provincial Resilience and Vulnerability Data. Indicator sources: Table 2.2. 
 
Country Province
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Dam Site
Cambodia Kratie 606903 28.5 2.49 0 70.9 97.2 71 5 1361 16.5 5.7 13.1 36.9 23.2 Yes
Cambodia Preah Vihear 125274 8.6 2.49 81.9 90.8 29.1 117 2.6 1361 12.1 2.6 17.7 18.4 3.7 Yes
Cambodia Siem Reap 731265 67.6 2.49 82.8 91.7 53.7 76 4.6 1361 7.9 5.3 13.4 10.7 9.4 Yes
Cambodia Stung Treng 85162 7.3 2.49 69.8 87.9 16.4 122 2.7 1361 12.1 2.8 19.3 18.4 14.1 Yes
Lao PDR Bokeo 129600 18.3 3 94.8 85.6 38.9 82 1.5 1471 32.6 1.4 45 18 8 Yes
Lao PDR Champasak 571900 32.5 3 87.3 90.8 37.4 91 2.6 1471 32.6 2.5 58 14 20 Yes
Lao PDR Luang Phabang 416100 12.3 3.1 82.9 82.3 51.1 119 0.7 1471 31.25 0.8 27 29 7 Yes
Lao PDR Oudomxay 239800 13.7 3 84.9 94.2 66.1 88 2.1 1471 18.5 2.2 32 16 14 Yes
Lao PDR Vientiane 326900 18 3 82.5 90.8 27.8 102 3.5 1471 50.65 3.6 61 45 53 Yes
Lao PDR Vientiane Municipality 597800 133.7 3 36.9 70.4 13.5 72 7.2 1471 66.05 7.5 89 70 100 Yes
Lao PDR Xayaboury 332800 17.8 3 92.8 94 17.7 130 1.4 1471 30.85 1.5 33 70 15 Yes
Thailand Chiang Rai 1111752 96.7 0.67 82.3 44 10.32 10.8 2272 55.43 85.3 97.4 92.3 Yes
Thailand Loei 570105 53.1 1.2 83 44.8 36.75 15.1 4.7 2073 55.43 3.2 97.4 99 87 Yes
Thailand Ubon Ratchathani 1686300 107.4 0.89 84.1 53.2 18.06 9.2 0.9 1741 55.43 0.8 81.2 96.3 85.8 Yes
Cambodia Banteay Meanchey 606903 86.5 2.49 82.9 88.2 40.9 92 8 1361 15.5 9.8 19.2 17.1 12.1 No
Cambodia Battambang 833119 67.8 2.49 82.4 90.6 26.4 80 8 1361 16.5 9.3 21.6 36.9 13.9 No
Cambodia Kampong Cham 1316438 164.2 2.49 97.2 86.3 12.1 79 4.3 1361 13.4 4.6 19.3 14.8 11.7 No
Cambodia Kampong Chhnang 438753 75.7 2.49 90 92.8 44.6 91 3.1 1361 9.5 3.2 19.3 6 6 No
Cambodia Kampong Speu 609905 85.3 2.49 93.1 95.1 18.2 80 2.8 1361 10.6 2.7 22.4 9.2 4 No
Cambodia Kampong Thom 597752 41.2 2.49 88.4 91.6 29.1 85 8.2 1361 11.4 10 3.7 20 6.7 No
Cambodia Kampot 229592 108.4 2.49 93.7 93.8 18.7 74 3.7 1361 17.4 3.8 13.2 22.5 6.8 No
Cambodia Kandal 1129333 301.3 2.49 94.6 86.6 18.4 70 4.9 1361 16.9 5.3 36.2 16 12.8 No
Cambodia Koh Kong 2591 11.8 2.49 77.8 74.1 8.2 68 9.3 1361 8 12.6 36.3 29.3 38.8 No
Cambodia Kong Pailin 606903 23.7 2.49 69.9 81.7 38.6 97 6.9 1361 12.1 7.6 32.8 18.4 13.4 No
Cambodia Mondul Kiri 33513 2.3 2.49 78.3 85.3 19.9 135 7.4 1361 7.1 7.4 7.6 21 8.5 No
Cambodia Otdar Meanchey 71722 11.1 2.49 67.3 101.5 39.1 98 4.5 1361 7.9 5.7 3.2 10.7 2.6 No
Cambodia Phnom Penh 1050214 3447.6 2.49 43 56.1 11.9 44 12.6 1361 42.5 17 85.4 87.9 80.2 No
Cambodia Prey Veng 869523 193.7 2.49 94.2 86.9 53.1 75 3 1361 13.4 2.9 54.5 2.5 3.9 No
Cambodia Pursat 319013 28.4 2.49 84 100.1 40.7 104 3.5 1361 10.3 3.6 12.3 11.7 9.7 No
Cambodia Ratana Kiri 98995 8.7 2.49 82 91.9 8.8 169 3 1361 7.1 3.1 5.5 21 14.9 No
Cambodia Svay Rieng 228576 No
Cambodia Takeo 830008 221.8 2.49 95 92.8 15.2 66 3.5 1361 16.2 3.7 13 8.3 4.6 No
Cambodia Tonle Sap No
Lao PDR Attapeu 99400 8.5 3.1 94.8 89.6 48 93 1.9 1471 19.1 1.3 30 11 11 No
Lao PDR Bolikhamxay 186111 11 3.1 93.8 98.6 27.9 136 2.7 1471 34.6 2.8 65 22 34 No
Lao PDR Huaphanh 25329 14.8 3 94.1 105.6 71.3 125 1.4 1471 25.65 1.6 23 36 16 No
Lao PDR Khammuane 308951 16.7 3.1 86.6 90.3 44.5 83 2.2 1471 29.35 2.2 38 14 33 No
Lao PDR Luangnamtha 130900 21.6 3.1 89.1 103.8 40.8 132 1.7 1471 30.2 1.9 37 25 19 No
Lao PDR Phongsaly 161178 9.4 3 94.3 92.8 57.9 94 1 1471 18.3 1.2 27 12 5 No
Lao PDR Saravane 292300 24 3 93.7 98 39.2 86 0.6 1471 15 0.5 39 4 15 No
Lao PDR Savannakhet 766200 30.9 3 85.1 91.9 41.9 80 1.9 1471 27.45 1.8 66 11 32 No
Lao PDR Sekong 73200 8.4 3 84.5 91.2 49.7 96 0.9 1471 11.75 0.7 43 14 10 No318 
 
Table 6.3 (Continued): Provincial Resilience and Vulnerability Data. Indicator sources: Table 2.2. 
 
Country Province
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Dam Site
Lao PDR Xaysomboun SR 61700 7.6 2.9 91.5 108.9 62.8 138 1.6 1471 34.5 1.1 39 19 8 No
Lao PDR Xiengkhuang 130595 12.6 3.1 93 124.6 42.9 121 1.9 1471 43.6 2.2 37 44 18 No
Thailand Amnat Charoen 356775 113.7 82.1 52.4 21.63 10.8 2.2 1413 55.43 2.9 89.5 98.4 No
Thailand Burirum 1488278 144.7 0.92 86.2 51.4 25.76 4.1 4.2 1751 55.43 5.5 92.4 96.5 82.2 No
Thailand Chaiyaphum 1075746 85.7 0.92 83.8 47.4 16.44 2 1.2 2058 55.43 1.2 99.1 98.2 87.3 No
Thailand Chanthaburi 94907 75.7 1.94 67.2 41.7 7.43 12.2 4038 55.43 95.3 98.5 82.4 No
Thailand Chiang Mai 141030 74.6 0.74 73.5 41.6 5.16 2.4 4397 55.43 85.3 96.2 89.9 No
Thailand Kalasin 919232 132.6 0.84 79.6 46.2 39.85 6.5 3.3 1691 55.43 3.4 84.3 98.1 95.3 No
Thailand Khon Kaen 1727464 159.2 0.63 78.3 44.2 17.17 10.1 4.1 3129 55.43 4 98.2 99.2 94.4 No
Thailand Maha Sarakham 942171 179 0.7 87.8 45 13.07 1.1 3.3 1734 55.43 4.3 98 99.5 96.7 No
Thailand Mukdahan 309955 71.6 1.58 84.9 50.4 24.14 8.8 4.7 2384 55.43 3.8 79 96.1 85.5 No
Thailand Nakhon Phanom 683692 124.1 0.93 86.2 49 48.12 13.1 9.2 1577 55.43 9.3 81.1 99 85.6 No
Thailand Nakhon Ratchasima 2446783 124.7 0.71 79 47.9 21.31 6.6 1.2 2863 55.43 1.4 99.2 98.3 84.5 No
Thailand Nong Bua Lamphu 481502 125 77.1 47.9 49.95 48.8 29.7 1327 55.43 38 98.6 99.2 No
Thailand Nong Khai 881711 120.5 1.01 79.2 47.6 35.87 6.8 17.5 1943 55.43 25.5 86.9 98.2 83.3 No
Thailand Phayao 299091 0.56 9.58 10.9 2220 55.43 96.8 No
Thailand Phetchabun 77961 76.2 0.96 83.5 46.1 12.97 3 2256 55.43 93.8 98.1 84.6 No
Thailand Roi Et 1252116 151.4 1.1 87.8 48.8 22.23 3.5 0.6 1741 55.43 0.9 93.3 99 95.5 No
Thailand Sa Kaeo 199283 67.5 85.3 51.4 22.9 3.8 2730 55.43 97.6 98.4 No
Thailand Sakon Nakhon 1036178 108.4 0.94 86 46.1 40.46 4 17.8 1724 55.43 30 86 97.7 91 No
Thailand Si Saket 1402818 159 0.87 89.4 53.8 26.48 8.5 4.9 1553 55.43 6.3 76.3 95.1 86.2 No
Thailand Surin 1325694 163.5 0.83 92.1 55.7 41 4.4 0.5 1565 55.43 0.6 75.8 91.5 82.3 No
Thailand Udon Thani 1459097 125.1 0.92 72.8 46 34.48 9.1 11.2 2056 55.43 14.4 91.7 99.1 93.5 No
Thailand Yasothon 558530 134.9 0.54 88.9 51.1 50.25 7.3 0.7 1567 55.43 0.3 93.7 98.6 91.3 No
Viet Nam An Giang 2077000 600.2 1.1 78.4 59.5 40.6 32.2 5.2 1602 31.6 6.3 27.3 79.9 66.7 No
Viet Nam Bac Lieu 744300 291.6 0.8 75.5 60.7 37.7 38.5 4.1 1325 32.7 4.9 76 68.6 28.7 No
Viet Nam Ben Tre 1305400 561.1 0.3 91.7 55.5 32.5 40.8 5.5 1410 44.7 6.2 20.1 97.4 52.7 No
Viet Nam Binh Phuoc 36075 95.4 3.8 84.6 69.1 17.9 23.7 3.7 861 41.8 2.8 89.7 85.6 29.4 No
Viet Nam Ca Mau 1139300 215.4 1.7 81.4 65.5 34.5 41 8.2 1619 31.9 13 76.2 91.6 29.6 No
Viet Nam Can Tho 1836200 606 0.8 78.3 56 34.9 39.2 7.7 1577 37.5 9.4 33.1 99 62 No
Viet Nam Dak Lak 1334071 90.9 5 79 82.3 39.5 57.3 1.7 1248 47.3 1.6 91.8 85.7 52 No
Viet Nam Dong Thap 1578200 483.8 1.3 85.7 59.5 39.1 45.7 5 1161 34.4 6 13.4 96 60.2 No
Viet Nam Gia Lai 413889 62.4 3.4 74.8 79.9 53.8 73.5 2 917 38.8 1.6 58.3 45.4 54 No
Viet Nam Kien Giang 1524000 238.9 1.9 78 66.7 38 37.4 4.3 1660 32.1 5.4 62.2 79 42.7 No
Viet Nam Kon Tum 273676 32.7 2.9 68.2 83.3 52.2 82.6 1.4 845 37.3 1.6 69.2 62.7 55.2 No
Viet Nam Lai Chau 50186 34.7 2.5 88 89.1 77.7 64.5 1.3 658 21.9 0.8 23.3 42.6 30.9 No
Viet Nam Lam Dong 141842 102.2 3.7 61.4 69.9 33.7 23.8 1.9 1023 51.3 1.5 87.2 84.2 68.5 No
Viet Nam Long An 525469 290.7 1.2 83.8 57.5 30.5 24.6 4.6 1589 45.6 4.2 66.6 82.4 74.7 No
Viet Nam Quang Tri 90406 120.7 1.9 76.6 78.5 52 50.6 5.3 940 64.7 4.6 77.3 73.9 78.5 No
Viet Nam Soc Trang 1191000 363.8 0.6 82.2 61.8 42.4 37.8 3.5 1443 32.3 4.1 69.7 81.1 37.7 No
Viet Nam Thua Thien Hue 107374 206.7 1.3 70.7 74.3 47.2 30.3 5.5 1033 5 90.4 68.3 74.5 No
Viet Nam Tien Giang 1141084 677.7 0.4 87 55.7 27.6 24.9 3.9 1461 46.6 3.9 51.8 98.7 85 No
Viet Nam Tra Vinh 978300 434.4 0.9 87.2 60.3 41.8 37 4 1500 39.2 4.7 53.1 65 28.9 No
Viet Nam Vinh Long 1017700 685.1 0.2 85.8 54 33 26.2 3.5 1506 51.6 4.1 16.5 99.3 48.1 No319 
 
Table 6.3 (Continued): Provincial Resilience and Vulnerability Data. Indicator sources: Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
Country
Provinces Affected by 
Proposed Dams
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Cambodia Kratie 606903 28.5 2.49 0 70.9 97.2 71 5 1361 16.5 5.7 13.1 36.9 23.2
Cambodia Preah Vihear 125274 8.6 2.49 81.9 90.8 29.1 117 2.6 1361 12.1 2.6 17.7 18.4 3.7
Cambodia Siem Reap 731265 67.6 2.49 82.8 91.7 53.7 76 4.6 1361 7.9 5.3 13.4 10.7 9.4
Cambodia Stung Treng 85162 7.3 2.49 69.8 87.9 16.4 122 2.7 1361 12.1 2.8 19.3 18.4 14.1
Lao PDR Bokeo 129600 18.3 3 94.8 85.6 38.9 82 1.5 1471 32.6 1.4 45 18 8
Lao PDR Champasak 571900 32.5 3 87.3 90.8 37.4 91 2.6 1471 32.6 2.5 58 14 20
Lao PDR Luang Phabang 416100 12.3 3.1 82.9 82.3 51.1 119 0.7 1471 31.25 0.8 27 29 7
Lao PDR Oudomxay 239800 13.7 3 84.9 94.2 66.1 88 2.1 1471 18.5 2.2 32 16 14
Lao PDR Vientiane 326900 18 3 82.5 90.8 27.8 102 3.5 1471 50.65 3.6 61 45 53
Lao PDR Vientiane Municipality 597800 133.7 3 36.9 70.4 13.5 72 7.2 1471 66.05 7.5 89 70 100
Lao PDR Xayaboury 332800 17.8 3 92.8 94 17.7 130 1.4 1471 30.85 1.5 33 70 15
Thailand Chiang Rai 1111752 96.7 0.67 82.3 44 10.32 10.8 2272 55.43 85.3 97.4 92.3
Thailand Loei 570105 53.1 1.2 83 44.8 36.75 15.1 4.7 2073 55.43 3.2 97.4 99 87
Thailand Ubon Ratchathani 1686300 107.4 0.89 84.1 53.2 18.06 9.2 0.9 1741 55.43 0.8 81.2 96.3 85.8
Country Dam Site (yes/no)
LMB Pop 
2000
Pop_Den_p
pc
Avg of 
Pop_Grow
Average of 
Rural 
Population
Average of 
Dependency 
Ratio
Average of 
Poverty 
Rate
Average of 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Average of 
Unemployme
nt
Average of 
GDP per 
capita ($PPP)
Average of 
Secondary Net 
Enrolment
Average of 
Female 
Unemployme
nt Rate
Average of 
Access to 
Safe Water
Average of 
Access to 
Sanitation
Average of 
Access to 
Electricity
Cambodia No 548492 287.0 2.49 83.2 88.0 26.1 88.6 5.7 1361 13.9 6.6 23.9 20.8 14.7
Cambodia Yes 387151 28.0 2.49 58.6 85.3 49.1 96.5 3.7 1361 12.2 4.1 15.9 21.1 12.6
Lao PDR No 203260 15.0 3.04 91.0 99.6 47.9 107.6 1.6 1471 26.3 1.6 40.4 19.3 18.3
Lao PDR Yes 373557 35.2 3.01 80.3 86.9 36.1 97.7 2.7 1471 37.5 2.8 49.3 37.4 31.0
Thailand No 870910 119.9 0.93 82.4 48.2 26.6 8.5 6.8 2169 55.4 8.9 90.2 97.8 88.9
Thailand Yes 1122719 85.7 0.92 83.1 47.3 21.7 11.7 2.8 2029 55.4 2.0 88.0 97.6 88.4
Viet Nam No 875274 309.7 1.79 79.9 67.0 40.3 41.6 4.1 1269 40.2 4.6 57.7 79.3 53.0
RANKS
Cambodia No 2 4 2 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3
Cambodia Yes 2 2 2 1 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4
Lao PDR No 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 3 3 1 3 3 3
Lao PDR Yes 2 2 4 2 3 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 3
Thailand No 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 4 1 2 4 1 1 1
Thailand Yes 4 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1
Viet Nam No 3 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 2 2320 
 
6.3.1.  Indicators used in Provincial Resilience 
Table 6.4: Provincial Resilience Indicators. Sources: Table 2.2. 
Indicator  Units 
LMB Popuation 2000  persons 
Population Density  Persons/square kilometer/capita 
Average of Popuation Growth Rate  Percent (%) 
Average of Rural Population  Percent (%) 
Average of Dependency Ratio  Percent (%) 
Average of Poverty Rate  Percent (%) 
Average of Infant Mortality Rate  Deaths/1,000 live births 
Average of Unemployment  Percent (%) 
Average of GDP per capita ($PPP)  US$ GDP/capita 
Average of Secondary Net Enrolment  Percent (%) 
Average of Female Unemployment Rate  Percent (%) 
Average of Access to Safe Water  Percent (%) 
Average of Access to Sanitation  Percent (%) 
Average of Access to Electricity  Percent (%) 
Dam Site  Location 
 
 
 
 321 
 
6.4.  APPENDIX D: ADAPTIVE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT DATA. 
Table 6.5a: Adaptive Capacity Assessment for Cambodia.  
 
   
Issue Area
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
(H/M/L)
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
(H/M/L)
Learning 
from Crises 
(H/M/L)
Support for 
WSM 
(H/M/L)
Evidence of 
CPs or MSPs 
(H/M/L)
National 
funding 
(H/M/L)
 Planning 
Documents 
(H/M/L)
Outside 
funding 
(H/M/L)
Row 
Totals
Agriculture 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1.75
Species Conservation 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1.75
Ecosystem Health 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1.50
Fish Production 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2.00
Floods 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1.75
Forest Management 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1.75
Governance 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1.63
Hydro 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1.25
Irrigation 2 2 1 2 1 3 3 2 2.00
Water Quality 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1.75
Water Quantity 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.38
Column Averages 2.18 1.64 1.18 1.18 1.09 1.82 2.18 2.18 1.68
Cambodia
Adaptive Capacity 
(3=High, 1=Low)
Capital & Planning
Self-Organization and 
Learning
Flexibility322 
 
Table 6.5b (Continued): Adaptive Capacity Assessment for Lao PDR. 
 
   
Issue Area
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
(H/M/L)
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
(H/M/L)
Learning 
from Crises 
(H/M/L)
Support for 
WSM 
(H/M/L)
Evidence of 
CPs or MSPs 
(H/M/L)
National 
funding 
(H/M/L)
 Planning 
Documents 
(H/M/L)
Outside 
funding 
(H/M/L)
Row 
Totals
Agriculture 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1.50
Species Conservation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00
Ecosystem Health 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00
Fish Production 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1.63
Floods 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1.38
Forest Management 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.13
Governance 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1.63
Hydro 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1.63
Irrigation 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1.88
Water Quality 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.13
Water Quantity 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1.63
Column Averages 1.18 1.45 1.18 1.36 1.00 1.55 1.45 2.09 1.41
Adaptive Capacity 
(3=High, 1=Low)
Lao PDR
Flexibility
Self-Organization and 
Learning
Capital & Planning323 
 
Table 6.5c (Continued): Adaptive Capacity Assessment for Thailand. 
 
   
Issue Area
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
(H/M/L)
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
(H/M/L)
Learning 
from Crises 
(H/M/L)
Support for 
WSM 
(H/M/L)
Evidence of 
CPs or MSPs 
(H/M/L)
National 
funding 
(H/M/L)
 Planning 
Documents 
(H/M/L)
Outside 
funding 
(H/M/L)
Row 
Totals
Agriculture 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2.50
Species Conservation 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1.75
Ecosystem Health 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 2.13
Fish Production 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 1 2.38
Floods 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 2.25
Forest Management 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 2.50
Governance 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 1 2.38
Hydro 2 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 2.25
Irrigation 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 1 2.38
Water Quality 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 1.75
Water Quantity 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 2.13
Column Averages 2.36 2.45 2.00 2.36 1.64 2.91 2.45 1.55 2.22
Adaptive Capacity 
(3=High, 1=Low)
Thailand
Flexibility
Self-Organization and 
Learning
Capital & Planning324 
 
Table 6.5d (Continued): Adaptive Capacity Assessment for Viet Nam. 
 
   
Issue Area
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
(H/M/L)
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
(H/M/L)
Learning 
from Crises 
(H/M/L)
Support for 
WSM 
(H/M/L)
Evidence of 
CPs or MSPs 
(H/M/L)
National 
funding 
(H/M/L)
 Planning 
Documents 
(H/M/L)
Outside 
funding 
(H/M/L)
Row 
Totals
Agriculture 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 2.50
Species Conservation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.13
Ecosystem Health 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 1.75
Fish Production 1 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 2.38
Floods 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 3 1.88
Forest Management 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 2.13
Governance 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1.63
Hydro 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 1.75
Irrigation 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 2.38
Water Quality 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1.50
Water Quantity 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 1.88
Column Averages 1.45 1.73 1.45 2.18 1.18 2.64 2.45 2.09 1.90
Viet Nam
Flexibility
Self-Organization and 
Learning
Capital & Planning
Adaptive Capacity 
(3=High, 1=Low)325 
 
Table 6.5e (Continued): Adaptive Capacity Assessment for the Mekong Region (MRC). 
 
 
Issue Area
Overlapping 
Responsibilities 
(H/M/L)
Cross-scale 
Institutions 
(H/M/L)
Learning 
from Crises 
(H/M/L)
Support for 
WSM 
(H/M/L)
Evidence of 
CPs or MSPs 
(H/M/L)
National 
funding 
(H/M/L)
 Planning 
Documents 
(H/M/L)
Outside 
funding 
(H/M/L)
Row 
Totals
Agriculture 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1.88
Species Conservation 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1.13
Ecosystem Health 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 2.25
Fish Production 1 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 2.13
Floods 2 1 3 1 2 3 3 3 2.25
Forest Management 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1.63
Governance 3 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 2.63
Hydro 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1.63
Irrigation 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2.00
Water Quality 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3 2.25
Water Quantity 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 2.50
Column Averages 1.82 1.82 1.36 1.91 1.55 2.73 2.55 2.45 2.02
Adaptive Capacity 
(3=High, 1=Low)
Regional (MRC)
Flexibility
Self-Organization and 
Learning
Capital & Planning326 
 
6.4.1.  Institutional Framework Data Used for Adaptive Response Assessment 
6.4.1.1.  Cambodia 
Primary Sources 
Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC). 2003. Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Cambodia - National Sector Review. Basin Development Plan Programme. Phnom Penh: CNMC.  
MRC BDP. 2005. BDP: The Basin Development Plan. National Sector Reviews. BDP Library Volume 13. 
Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission.  
Water Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2011. Cambodia Data. http://www.wepa-
db.net/policies/measures/currentsystem/cambodia.htm , accessed 11 February 2011. 
Secondary Sources 
Bunnara, M., Inthiravongsy, S., V. Viranan and P. Thi Thuy Co. 2004. Country Status Report on Watershed 
Management in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet nam. As Background Information for the 
Policy Dialogue on Watershed Management. 28-30 September 2004. Vientiane: MRC-GTZ 
Cooperation Programme. 
Hatda, An Pich, Mao Hak. 2002. Strategic Planning and Management of Water Resources Development: 
Cambodia Country Paper. Kingdom of Cambodia. MRCS/ESCAP Sub-Regional Workshop 16TH-19TH 
July 2002. Phnom Penh: Cambodia National Mekong Committee Secretariat and Ministry of Water 
Resources and Meteorology.  
International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM). 2003. Cambodia National Report on 
Protected Areas and Development. Review of Protected Areas and Development in the Lower 
Mekong River Region. 148pp. Queensland, Australia: Indooroopilly.  
Molle, F. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: Current discourses and practices. 
Research report 95, 43p. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI.  
Pang, P., and S. Khoun. 2000. Water resources planning process. Second draft. National working paper. 
Mekong River Commission / Cambodia National Mekong Committee. 
Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2009. Outlook of Water Environmental Management 
Strategies in Asia. Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment, Japan. 
6.4.1.2.  Lao PDR 
Primary Sources 
Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC). 2004. Integrated Water Resources Management in Lao PDR - 
National Sector Review. Basin Development Plan Programme. Vientiane: LNMC.  
MRC BDP. 2005. BDP: The Basin Development Plan. National Sector Reviews. BDP Library Volume 13. 
Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission.  327 
 
Water Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2011. Lao Data. http://www.wepa-
db.net/policies/measures/currentsystem/laos.htm , accessed 11 February 2011. 
Secondary Sources 
Bunnara, M., Inthiravongsy, S., V. Viranan and P. Thi Thuy Co. 2004. Country Status Report on Watershed 
Management in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet nam. As Background Information for the 
Policy Dialogue on Watershed Management. 28-30 September 2004. Vientiane: MRC-GTZ 
Cooperation Programme. 
Molle, F. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: Current discourses and practices. 
Research report 95, 43p. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI.  
MRC / GTZ. 2007. Proceedings Regional Consultation Meeting 2007 on Watershed Management in the 
Lower Mekong Basin. 5-7 November 2007. Vientiane: Lao PDR. 
Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2009. Outlook of Water Environmental Management 
Strategies in Asia. Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment, Japan. 
6.4.1.3.  Thailand 
Primary Sources 
MRC BDP. 2005. BDP: The Basin Development Plan. National Sector Reviews. BDP Library Volume 13. 
Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission.  
Thailand National Mekong Committee (TNMC). 2004. Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Thailand - National Sector Review. Basin Development Plan Programme. Bangkok: TNMC.  
Water Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2011. Thailand Data. http://www.wepa-
db.net/policies/measures/currentsystem/thailand.htm , accessed 11 February 2011. 
Secondary Sources 
Bunnara, M., Inthiravongsy, S., V. Viranan and P. Thi Thuy Co. 2004. Country Status Report on Watershed 
Management in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet nam. As Background Information for the 
Policy Dialogue on Watershed Management. 28-30 September 2004. Vientiane: MRC-GTZ 
Cooperation Programme. 
Molle, F. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: Current discourses and practices. 
Research report 95, 43p. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI.  
Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2009. Outlook of Water Environmental Management 
Strategies in Asia. Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment, Japan. 328 
 
6.4.1.4.  Viet Nam 
Primary Sources 
MRC BDP. 2005. BDP: The Basin Development Plan. National Sector Reviews. BDP Library Volume 13. 
Phnom Penh: Mekong River Commission.  
Viet Nam National Mekong Committee (VNMC). 2003. Integrated Water Resources Management in Viet 
Nam - National Sector Review. Basin Development Plan Programme. Vientiane: VNMC.  
Water Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2011. Vietnam Data. http://www.wepa-
db.net/policies/measures/currentsystem/vietnam.htm , accessed 11 February 2011. 
Secondary Sources 
Biltonen, E.; Hussain, I., and D. D. Tuan (eds.). 2003. Pro-poor Intervention Strategies in Irrigated 
Agriculture in Asia. Vietnam Country Paper. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management 
Institute. 
Bunnara, M., Inthiravongsy, S., V. Viranan and P. Thi Thuy Co. 2004. Country Status Report on Watershed 
Management in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet nam. As Background Information for the 
Policy Dialogue on Watershed Management. 28-30 September 2004. Vientiane: MRC-GTZ 
Cooperation Programme. 
Molle, F. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mekong region: Current discourses and practices. 
Research report 95, 43p. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI.  
MRC and VNMC. 2002. Nam Rom River Basin. Case study and project ideas. Mekong River Commission 
and Vietnam National Mekong Committee in association with Lai Chau Province. Vietnam. 
Water Environment Partnership in Asia (WEPA). 2009. Outlook of Water Environmental Management 
Strategies in Asia. Tokyo: Ministry of the Environment, Japan. 
6.4.1.5.  Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
Primary Sources 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2006. Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No. 8 – Flow Regime 
Assessment. Vientiane: Lao PDR: MRC. 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2011. Integrated Water Resources Management-based Basin 
Development Strategy for the Lower Basin 2011-2015. Basin Development Plan Programme. 
Vientiane: Mekong River Commission.  
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2011. Strategic Plan 2011-2015. MRC Secretariat. Vientiane: Mekong 
River Commission.  329 
 
Secondary Sources 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2010. State of the Basin Report 2010. Vientiane: Mekong River 
Commission. 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2011. Annual Report 2010. Vientiane: Mekong River Commission. 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2011. Mekong River Commission. 15 Years of Cooperation for 
Sustainable Development 1995-2010. Vientiane: Mekong River Commission. 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2012. Mekong River Commission Audited Financial Statements - as at 
and for the year ended 31 December 2011. Russell-Bedford Accountants. Vientiane: Mekong River 
Commission.  
Mekong River Commission (MRC). 2012. Mekong River Commission Development Partners’ Funds. 
Audited Financial Statements as at and for the year ended 31 December 2011. Russell-Bedford 
Accountants. Vientiane: Mekong River Commission.  
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6.4.1.6.  Watershed Management Review 
Table 6.6: Watershed Management (WSM) Review in Mekong Basin System. Data source: Bunnera et al. 
2004.  
ISSUES  Cambodia  Lao PDR  Thailand  Viet Nam 
Coordination 
Insufficient coordination between sectors and between central and local 
administrative levels 
Institutions and 
Mandates 
Issues are covered 
more than polities 
There are few 
explicit mandates 
for WSM issues 
All issues covered 
implicitly, but no 
explicit mandate 
for siltation 
Five issues covered 
explicitly: water 
quality; water 
quantity; planning; 
monitoring; and 
river basin 
management 
Financial Incentive 
Insufficient funds to prepare integrated WSM; no specific budget allocated to  WSM 
activities 
Capacity Building  Policy analysis  Policy analysis 
More information 
for local 
administrators 
Policy analysis for 
central and local 
staff 
 
Funds, resources, human capacity, and coordination are still the constraints. 
  Co-ordination across sectors needs improving everywhere 
  Consolidation of existing laws is vital  
  All countries want to learn from each other  
  Stakeholder participation is emphasized in Thailand  
  The private sector has a role to play  
  Training is a priority in all countries  
  Self-financing mechanism are needed for sustainability 
Primary Sources 
Bunnara, Min, Inthiravongsy, Sengkham, Vanchai Viranan and Pham Thi Thuy Co. 2004. Country Status 
Report on Watershed Management in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet nam. As Background 
Information for the Policy Dialogue on Watershed Management. 28-30 September 2004. Vientiane: 
MRC-GTZ Cooperation Programme. 
Bach, H., Clausen, T.J., Dang, T.T., Emerton, L., Facon, T., Hofer, T., Lazarus, K., Muziol, C., Noble, A., Schill, 
P., Sisouvanh, A., C. Wensley and L. Whiting. 2011. From local watershed management to integrated 
river basin management at national and transboundary levels. Vientiane: Mekong River Commission. 331 
 
6.5.  APPENDIX E: RESILIENCE MATRIX 
Table 6.7: Basin Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity Matrix. 
   
Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam
R-R
(1) Ecosystem changes and fish 
stocks
Ecosystem Health Fish Production Low Slow Climage Change Development H H L M L L M L M 1.966 HIGH
R-R
(2) Wet/dry season flood and 
fish stocks
Floods Fish Production Med Fast Climage Change Development H M L M L L M L M 1.864 MED
R-R
(3) Water quality / turbidity and 
fish stocks
Water Quality Fish Production Med Slow Population Development H M L H L L L L M 1.852 MED
R-R (4) Predation
Species 
Conservation
Fish Production Med Slow Population Climate Change M L L M L L L L L 1.977 HIGH
R-R (5) Nutrient cycling Ecosystem Health Water Quality Low Slow Population Climate Change M H M M L L M L M 1.966 HIGH
R-R (6) Flood/spawning ground Floods Fish Production High Fast Development Climate Change H M M H L L M L M 1.591 VERY LOW
R-RU
(1) Timing of monsoons trigger 
fish migrations
Floods Fish Production Med Fast Development Climate Change H H M M L L M L M 1.682 LOW
R-RU (2) Deforestation practices
Forest 
Management
Ecosystem 
Health
High Slow Population Development L H H M L L M M L 1.830 MED
R-RU (3) Floods and fish yields Floods Fish Production High Fast Climage Change Development H M L M L L M L M 1.773 LOW
R-RU (4) Boats and pollution Ecosystem Health Water Quality Med Slow Population Development M L L H L L M L M 2.057 HIGH
R-RU
(5) River gardens and wet/dry 
season
Ecosystem Health Floods Med Fast Development Climate Change M H L M L L M L M 1.784 LOW
R-RU (6) Over/Illegal fishing  Fish Production
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Population Development H M M H M L M M M 1.682 LOW
R-RU (7) Land use and river health Ecosystem Health Water Quality High Slow Population Development H M L H L L M L M 1.784 LOW
R-RU
(8) Agriculture and 
chemical/fertilizers
Agriculture Water Quality High Slow Population Development M M L H L L M M L 2.011 HIGH
R-RU (9) Septic use Water Quality
Ecosystem 
Health
Med Fast Population Development H H L M L L L L M 1.670 VERY LOW
R-RU (10) Logging and mining
Forest 
Management
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Development Population M H M M L L M M L 1.648 VERY LOW
R-PIP
(1) Operational – dam releases, 
water levels, flows
Water Quantity Hydro High Fast Development Population H M L M L L M L M 1.773 LOW
R-PIP (2) Irrigation management Irrigation Water Quantity Med Fast Development Population M M L M M L M M M 2.057 HIGH
R-PIP (3) Use of EIA/SEA studies Hydro
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Development Population H H M H L L M L L 1.409 VERY LOW
R-PIP
(4) Transparency and public 
participation in planning 
processes
Governance Hydro High Fast Governance Development H M M H L L M L M 1.625 VERY LOW
R-PIP
(5) Institutional capacity and 
knowledge
Governance Hydro High Slow Governance Development H H L M L L M L M 1.898 MED
R-PIP
(6) Short-term development 
policy
Governance Hydro Med Slow Development Governance H H M H L L M L M 1.807 LOW
R-PIP (7) Resource capture/energy use Ecosystem Health Hydro High Fast Development Population H M L M L L M L M 1.693 LOW
R-PIP
(8) Extreme weather causes 
flooding
Floods
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Climage Change Development M M L H L L M L M 1.773 LOW
R-PI
(1) Dam reduces fish capture 
(mortality, blockage, habitat)
Hydro Fish Production High Fast Development Climate Change H M L M L L M L L 1.682 LOW
R-PI
(2) Pulse timing / structure 
failure
Hydro Fish Production Low Fast Development Climate Change H M L M L L M L L 1.864 MED
R-PI (3) Relocation due to inundation Hydro Governance High Fast Development Population H H M M L L M L L 1.500 VERY LOW
R-PI (4) Downstream effect on fish Hydro Fish Production High Fast Development Population H M L H L L M L L 1.591 VERY LOW
R-PI
(5) Change to ecosystem – loss of 
habitat
Hydro
Ecosystem 
Health
Med Slow Population Development H H M M L L M L L 1.773 LOW
R-PI (6) Impact of tourism Hydro
Ecosystem 
Health
Med Slow Population Development M M L L L L M L L 2.136 HIGH
Resource to 
Resource
Resource to 
Resource Users
Resource to 
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers
Feedback 
Code
Type of 
Feedback
Feedback Mechanism Issue Area 1 Issue Area 2 Avg Rank Avg Q1 Rank
Threshold 
Risk
Fast/ 
Slow
Stressors 1 Stressors 2
Vulnerabilities Adaptive Response by Country Adaptive 
Response 
Regional
Resource to 
Public 
Infrastructure332 
 
Table 6.7 (Continued): Basin Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity Matrix. 
 
 
Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam Cambodia Lao PDR Thailand Viet Nam
RU-PIP
(1) Water resources 
development – long‐term 
impacts on local, provincial, and 
national resource users
Governance Hydro High Fast Development Population H M L M L L M L M 1.807 LOW
RU-PIP
(2) Public participation in 
construction & operation process
Governance Hydro High Fast Development Governance H H M M L L M L M 1.625 VERY LOW
RU-PIP
(3) Public ownership, 
stewardship, symbolic 
participation
Governance Hydro High Slow Governance Development M H L M L L M L M 1.989 HIGH
RU-PIP
(4) Monitoring and local 
involvement in water policy
Governance Hydro Med Fast Governance Development M H L M L L M L M 1.898 MED
RU-PIP
(5) Mitigation and resettlement 
issues over water resources 
development
Governance Hydro High Fast Governance Development H H L L L L M L M 1.807 LOW
RU-PIP
(6) Employing local knowledge in 
water policy development
Governance Hydro High Slow Governance Development M M L M L L M L M 2.080 HIGH
RU-PIP
(7) Regional and national 
dialogues over water 
development
Governance Hydro Med Slow Governance Development M M L M L L M L M 2.170 HIGH
RU-PIP
(8) Stakeholder participation 
meetings over water 
development alternatives
Governance Hydro High Slow Governance Development H M L M L L M L M 1.989 HIGH
RU-PIP
(9) Watershed management 
support, conflict management at 
local level
Governance
Ecosystem 
Health
High Slow Governance Development H H M M L L M L M 1.807 LOW
RU-PIP
(10) Sector programs to enhance 
cross-scale capacity building
Governance
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Governance Development M H L M L L M L M 1.807 LOW
RU-PIP
(11) National institutional 
capacity, regional involvement
Governance
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Governance Development H H M M L L M L M 1.625 VERY LOW
RU-PI (1) Resettlements Hydro Governance High Fast Development Population H H L L L L M L L 1.682 LOW
RU-PI (2) Impact on communities Hydro Governance High Slow Development Population H H L L L L M L L 1.864 MED
RU-PI (3) Social memory Ecosystem Health Governance Med Slow Population Development H M M M L L M L M 1.875 MED
RU-PI (4) Ecosystem changes Ecosystem Health Hydro High Slow Development Climate Change H H M H L L M L M 1.602 VERY LOW
RU-PI
(5) Local involvement – 
monitoring, design
Hydro Governance Med Fast Governance Development M H L M L L M L L 1.773 LOW
RU-PI (6) Sabotage & terrorism Governance
Ecosystem 
Health
High Fast Governance Population M L L L L L M L M 2.080 HIGH
PIP-PI
(1) Impacts during construction 
phase
Hydro Governance High Fast Development Governance M H L M L L M L L 1.682 LOW
PIP-PI (2)EIA/SEA into design cycle  Governance Hydro High Fast Development Governance H H M H L L M L M 1.534 VERY LOW
PIP-PI
(3) Public participation in 
planning process
Governance Hydro High Fast Governance Development H H M H L L M L M 1.534 VERY LOW
PIP-PI (4) Maintenance of structures Hydro Governance Med Slow Governance Development M M L M L L M L L 2.045 HIGH
PIP-PI
(5) Enforcement of allocation 
rules
Governance Hydro Med Fast Governance Development H H L M L L M L M 1.807 LOW
PIP-PI (6) BOT / BOOT building schemes Governance Hydro High Fast Governance Development M H M L L L M L M 1.807 LOW
PIP-PI
(7) Institutional capacity & 
knowledge
Governance
Ecosystem 
Health
High Slow Governance Development H H M M L L M L M 1.807 LOW
Feedback 
Code
Type of 
Feedback
Feedback Mechanism Issue Area 1
Resource Users 
to Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers
Resource Users 
to Public 
Infrastructure
Public 
Infrastructure 
Providers to 
Public 
Infrastructure
Vulnerabilities Adaptive Response by Country Adaptive 
Response 
Regional
Avg Rank Avg Q1 Rank Issue Area 2
Threshold 
Risk
Fast/ 
Slow
Stressors 1 Stressors 2333 
 
6.6.  APPENDIX F: MATRIX OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MGMT. ACTIVITIES AT THE MRC 
Table 6.8: Matrix of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities at the MRC. 
MRC Programme  Activities to Address Issues, Differences and Disputes 
Environment 
  Recently asked by the JC to address hot spots. 
  Management of transboundary wetlands. 
  Evaluation of the EIA on the Upper Mekong navigation improvement. 
  Water quality monitoring on the Sesan River. 
  Impact diagnostic study on 3S. 
  EP has been involved in: 
  Guidelines for transboundary EIA 
  Transboundary Environmental Risk Assessment 
  Responding to request to address potential conflict issues that are 
environmental but not necessarily transboundary (NT2, T-H, T-S, etc.) 
Flood Management and 
Mitigation 
Drafted discussion papers on MRC mandate re: conflict prevention and dispute 
resolution; developed an approach and ToR for the implementation of Component 3 
(C3); conducted one round of national and regional consultations on the 
implementation of C3; presently in the process of modifying C3 document, as 
requested by the Member States during the regional consultation meeting; and 
compiling an inventory of possible transboundary issues in each of the member states 
to be implemented through the NMCs.  C3 will: 
  Provide tools, cooperation and dialogue on structural proposals C2 with 
potential transboundary effects; 
  Provide tools, cooperation and dialogue on investment proposals ADB (FMMP) 
and World Bank (MRWAS) with potential transboundary effects; 
  Provide tools, cooperation and dialogue on selected BDP investment/structural 
proposals with potential transboundary effects.  
Agriculture, Irrigation and 
Forestry Programme - 
Watershed Management 
Comprehensive programme to provide necessary watershed management 
information, knowledge and skills involving decision-makers, middle managers, local 
leaders, planners and practitioners, and training of trainers.  
Navigation 
  Facilitator between Cambodia and Viet Nam on cross-border navigation 
agreement and protocols: set up road-map for negotiations; prepared an action 
plan for implementation of the finalized agreement and protocols; provision of 
legal study (identifying opportunity and challenges); technical assistance in 
drafting new provisions of the protocol; and technical assistance in developing 
harmonization of rules and regulations.   
  Need for harmonization of NavAids.   
  Traffic safety and environmental sustainability: prevention of pollution is priority 
(focusing on rule and regulation, standards, procedures); contingency planning; 
training; and intervention procedures.  
Fisheries 
  Neutral third party to facilitate and support conflict management processes 
  Communication between stakeholders/conflict parties 
  User involvement in monitoring and research 
  Build technical capacity for improved resource use 
  Practical mitigation measures through application of technical and institutional 
innovations 334 
 
Table 6.8 (Continued): Matrix of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities at the MRC. 
MRC Programme  Activities to Address Issues, Differences and Disputes 
Basin Development 
Planning 
BDP2 conceptualizes basin planning; namely as consisting of a planning process, a 
knowledge basis and assessment tools, and capacity to run the process by applying 
the knowledge base and the tools. Its four programme components are to:  
o  C1 - Programme management and communication;  
o  C2 - Rolling IWRM-Basin BDP;  
o  C3 - Knowledge base and assessment tools; and  
o  C4 - IWRM-Basin planning capacity 
Implement the IWRM-Based Basin Strategy - lay out the long-term goals and specific 
objectives of basin development and management, provide strategic directions for 
further development of the basin 
  Employs basin development scenarios generated through modeling and the DSF 
to evaluate development options in the Basin 
  Enhances stakeholder communication and involvement in the process of 
development planning and decision-making 
  Improves and deploys knowledge base and assessment tools 
  Develops capacity within the MRC in trade-off facilitation and decision-making 
Water Utilization 
  Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing (PDIES) (2001).   
  Technical Guidelines for Information System and Custodianship (2003).   
  Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (2004) (PNPCA) 
and Technical Guidelines to Implement PNPCA (2005).   
  Procedures for Water Use Monitoring (PWUM) (2004).   
  Procedures for Maintenance of Flow on the Mainstream (PMFM) (2006) and 
Technical Guidelines to Implement PMFM (2005).   
  Procedures for Water Quality (PWA) (2006 waiting to sign).   
Intent of these procedures and supporting guidelines: to provide systematic and 
uniform process for information of the 1995 Agreement for the mutually accepted 
and riparian equally fair objectives/principles of cooperation for Sustainable 
Development. 
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6.7.  APPENDIX G: PROJECTS IN THE COLUMBIA AND MEKONG BASINS 
Table 6.9: Project History on the Columbia River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams (NID) 
Database. 
Columbia River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID Height (Ft.)  Sum of NID Storage  #Projects 
1908  9  600  1 
Tr-Columbia River  9  600  1 
Three Lakes Reservoir Dam  9  600  1 
1919  18  411  1 
Columbia Slough  18  411  1 
Fairview Lake  18  411  1 
1920  18  600  1 
Tr-Columbia River  18  600  1 
Meadow Lake Dam  18  600  1 
1926  18  9  1 
Tr-Columbia River  18  9  1 
Blue Gulch Reservoir Dam  18  9  1 
1932  71  131000  1 
Columbia River  71  131000  1 
Rock Island  71  131000  1 
1937  229  537090  2 
Columbia River  197  537000  1 
Bonneville Dam  197  537000  1 
BONNEVILLE LOCK AND DAM  197  537000  1 
Tr-Columbia River  32  90  1 
Blair Reservoir Dam  32  90  1 
1941  550  9562000  1 
Columbia River  550  9562000  1 
GRAND COULEE  550  9562000  1 
1945  15  1200  1 
Tr-Columbia River  15  1200  1 
Jenkins-Webley Dam  15  1200  1 
1946  10  120  1 
Tr-Columbia River  10  120  1 
Jorgensen Dam  10  120  1 
1950  12  2449  1 
Tr-Columbia Rive  12  2449  1 
Alkali Lake  12  2449  1 
1951  13  19  1 
Tr-Columbia River  13  19  1 
HAIGHT RESERVOIR DAM  13  19  1 
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Table 6.9 (Continued). Project History on the Columbia River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams 
(NID) Database. 
Columbia River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID Height (Ft.)  Sum of NID Storage  #Projects 
1952  190  40671  8 
COLUMBIA RIVER OS  137  25400  5 
SCOOTENEY - NORTH DIKE  25  15250  1 
SCOOTENEY DIKE 1  15  15250  1 
SCOOTENEY DIKE 2  13  15250  1 
SCOOTENEY DIKE 3  25  15250  1 
SODA LAKE DIKE  59  10150  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  37  15250  2 
North Scooteney Dike  17  15250  1 
Scooteney Reservoir Outlet Dam  20  15250  1 
Tr-Columbia River  16  21  1 
CRISMAN RESERVOIR DAM  16  21  1 
1953  10  92  1 
Tr-Columbia River  10  92  1 
Snook Lake Dam  10  92  1 
1954  220  1350000  1 
Columbia River  220  1350000  1 
McNARY LOCK AND DAM  220  1350000  1 
1955  238  600933  2 
Columbia River  230  593000  1 
CHIEF JOSEPH DAM  230  593000  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  8  7933  1 
Eagle Lake Dam  8  7933  1 
1957  216  330410  2 
Columbia River  200  330000  1 
THE DALLES LOCK AND DAM  200  330000  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  16  410  1 
WB5 Wasteway Detention Dam  16  410  1 
1960  7  433  1 
Tr-Columbia River  7  433  1 
Sims Dam  7  433  1 
1961  214  191175  3 
Columbia River  187  191000  1 
Priest Rapids  187  191000  1 
Tr-Columbia River  27  175  2 
McKay Dam  15  120  1 
Ringold Springs Fish Pond  12  55  1 
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Table 6.9 (Continued). Project History on the Columbia River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams 
(NID) Database. 
Columbia River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID Height (Ft.)  Sum of NID Storage  #Projects 
1962  149  390170  3 
Columbia River  130  390000  1 
Rocky Reach  130  390000  1 
TR COLUMBIA RIVER  9  110  1 
RUDY WALTERS  9  110  1 
Tr-Columbia River  10  60  1 
Ringold Pond Dam  10  60  1 
1964  25  49.1  1 
Ditch via Eight Mile Creek, Trib Columbia River  25  49.1  1 
Lake Camp Baldwin  25  49.1  1 
1965  220.5  796070  2 
Columbia River  205.5  796000  1 
Wanapum  205.5  796000  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  15  70  1 
Ely Pump Storage Dam  15  70  1 
1968  390  3030000  2 
Columbia River  390  3030000  2 
JOHN DAY LOCK AND DAM  230  2530000  1 
Wells  160  500000  1 
1973  15  270  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  15  270  1 
Iowa Beef Processors Waste Pond No.1  15  270  1 
1975  48  285  2 
Offstream-Columbia R.  48  285  2 
Kennewick No. 1-Aerated Wastewater Lagoon  24  132  1 
Kennewick No. 2 Aerated Wastewater Lagoon  24  153  1 
1976  89  150056  2 
Columbia River (cooling)  82  150000  1 
Carty Reservoir  82  150000  1 
Tr-Columbia River  7  56  1 
Snakebite Reservoir Dam  7  56  1 
1977  22  491  1 
Columbia River, Trib to  22  491  1 
Crates Point Reservoir  22  491  1 
1980  47  425  2 
Columbia River, Trib to  32  300  1 
Walchi Reservoir  32  300  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  15  125  1 
K2H Farms McNary No. 1 Reservoir  15  125  1 338 
 
Table 6.9 (Continued). Project History on the Columbia River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams 
(NID) Database. 
Columbia River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID Height (Ft.)  Sum of NID Storage  #Projects 
1981  14  4100  1 
Columbia Slough  14  4100  1 
Smith-Bybee Lakes  14  4100  1 
1982  15  6030  1 
Tr-Columbia River-Offstream  15  6030  1 
PEC 66.0 Hydro Power Plant  15  6030  1 
1983  45  100  2 
Tr-Columbia River-Offstream  45  100  2 
EBC 4.6 Hydro Power Plant  10  50  1 
Scooteney Inlet Power Plant  35  50  1 
1984  30  150  1 
Tr-Columbia River  30  150  1 
PEC 1973 Power Plant  30  150  1 
1986  13  100  1 
Columbia River-Offstream  13  100  1 
Sunheaven Farms Reservoir  13  100  1 
1993  45  870  1 
Tr-Columbia River  45  870  1 
Tyson Fresh Meats Wastewater Lagoon  45  870  1 
1996  9  80  1 
Offstream-Columbia  9  80  1 
George_City of_Wastewater Treatment Lagoon  9  80  1 
1997  42  517  2 
Offstream-Columbia  24  286  1 
Kennewick Sewage Lagoon System  24  286  1 
Offstream-Columbia R.  18  231  1 
Pasco Process Water Reuse Storage Lagoon  18  231  1 
1998  11  31  1 
Columbia River - Offstream  11  31  1 
Sunheaven Farms - Robert Munn Pond  11  31  1 
Unknown Date  48.5  905  5 
Cunningham Slough, Trib/Columbia  28.4  462  3 
Deep Lake Reservoir  9.5  102  1 
Millionaire Lake Reservoir  9  120  1 
Ruby Lake Reservoir  9.9  240  1 
Trib/Columbia River  20.1  443  2 
Multnomah Channel Dam #1  8.6  203  1 
Multnomah Channel Dam #2  11.5  240  1 
Grand Total  3,336  17,129,911  62 339 
 
Table 6.10: Project History on the Snake River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams (NID) Database. 
Snake River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID 
Height (Ft.) 
Sum of NID 
Storage 
# of Projects 
1901  88  7425  1 
Snake River  88  7425  1 
Swan Falls  88  7425  1 
1903  6.5  500  1 
Henrys Fork Snake River  6.5  500  1 
Egin Canal Diversion  6.5  500  1 
1905  118.7  46720  2 
Snake River  80  39000  1 
Milner Dam-middle  80  39000  1 
SNAKE RIVER (OS)  38.7  7720  1 
MURTAUGH LAKE  38.7  7720  1 
1906  21  220200  1 
SNAKE RIVER TR  21  220200  1 
MINIDOKA SOUTH DIKE  21  220200  1 
1907  65  1500  4 
Snake River  65  1500  4 
Shoshone Falls Dam 1  16  1500  1 
Shoshone Falls Dam 2  16  1500  1 
Shoshone Falls Dam 3  15  1500  1 
Shoshone Falls Dam 4  18  1500  1 
1909  25  4600  1 
SNAKE RIVER (OS)  25  4600  1 
WILSON LAKE  25  4600  1 
1913  65  9800  1 
Henrys Fork, Snake River  65  9800  1 
Ashton  65  9800  1 
1935  53.4  955  2 
Snake River  53.4  955  2 
Twin Falls  19.4  955  1 
Twin Falls Intake Dam  34  955  1 
1937  85  26  1 
Snake River  85  26  1 
Upper Salmon Falls A-Plant & Forebay  85  26  1 
1949  71.6  11090  1 
Snake River  54.6  10900  1 
Lower Salmon  54.6  10900  1 
1950  147  8515  1 
Snake River  140  8415  1 
Bliss  140  8415  1 
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Table 6.10 (Continued): Project History on the Snake River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams 
(NID) Database. 
Snake River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID 
Height (Ft.) 
Sum of NID 
Storage 
# of Projects 
1952  115  247000  1 
Snake River  115  247000  1 
C J Strike  115  247000  1 
1956  270  1417810  1 
SOUTH FORK SNAKE RIVER  270  1417810  1 
PALISADES  270  1417810  1 
1958  420  2896700  1 
Snake River  420  1426700  1 
Brownlee Dam  420  1426700  1 
1961  363  174972  3 
Snake River  363  174972  3 
Oxbow  326  116586  2 
Oxbow Fuse Plug  37  58386  1 
1962  208  406500  1 
Snake River  208  406500  1 
ICE HARBOR LOCK AND DAM  208  406500  1 
1965  23.8  368  1 
SNAKE RIVER (OS)  23.8  368  1 
PACIFIC LAND CO  23.8  368  1 
1967  330  188000  1 
Snake River  330  188000  1 
Hells Canyon  330  188000  1 
1968  330  200000  1 
Snake River  330  200000  1 
Hells Canyon Dam  330  200000  1 
1969  226  432000  1 
Snake River  226  432000  1 
LOWER MONUMENTAL LOCK AND DAM  226  432000  1 
1970  226  565200  2 
Snake River  226  565200  2 
Lower Granite Dam Levees (Lewiston)  0  0  1 
LITTLE GOOSE LOCK AND DAM  226  565200  1 
1973  36.2  41  1 
SNAKE RIVER (OS)  36.2  41  1 
SUNSET PALISADES  36.2  41  1 
1974  16.5  153  1 
TR-SNAKE RIVER  16.5  153  1 
LAMB-WESTON  16.5  153  1 
   341 
 
Table 6.10 (Continued): Project History on the Snake River. Sources: USACE National Inventory of Dams 
(NID) Database. 
Snake River Dam Projects History 
Date, Project name, River/Tributary  Sum of NID 
Height (Ft.) 
Sum of NID 
Storage 
# of Projects 
1975  228  485000  1 
Snake River  228  485000  1 
LOWER GRANITE LOCK AND DAM  228  485000  1 
1977  104  1671300  1 
Snake River  104  1671300  1 
AMERICAN FALLS  104  1671300  1 
1982  154  3630  7 
Snake River  154  3630  7 
City Forebay  15  1200  1 
Lower Diversion  14  1200  1 
POWER DAM NO 1 UPPER  23  800  1 
POWER DAM NO 3  34  400  1 
Upper Dike  12  1230  1 
Upper Diversion Dam #1  23  1230  1 
Upper Diversion Dam #2  33  1230  1 
1986  12  50  1 
SNAKE RIVER (OS)  12  50  1 
KING HILL  12  50  1 
1988  100  6700  3 
Snake River  100  6700  3 
Gem State  40  6700  1 
Gem State Left Dike  30  6700  1 
Gem State Right Dike  30  6700  1 
1992  106  180  3 
Snake R. - Offstream  40  26  1 
Broetje Mountain Pond Dam  40  26  1 
Snake River  44  100  1 
Milner Forebay  44  100  1 
Unnamed Tr - Snake R.  22  54  1 
Broetje Orchards Block 92 Dam  22  54  1 
1994  14.5  25  1 
TR-SNAKE RIVER  14.5  25  1 
J-CANAL REREGULATING  14.5  25  1 
Grand Total  4,029  9,006,960  48 
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Table 6.11: Mekong Dams used in Projected Development Rate. Sources: World Bank, BDP, ICEM/MRC 
2010. 
Country  Project  MW 
Main-
stream 
Date 
Com-
plete 
Construct-
ion 
Operational  Status 
2009  2011  2000  2009  2011 
MOU/ 
PDA 
Signed 
2011 
Cambodia 
Mekong at 
Sambor 
2600  x  2016 
             
Cambodia 
Mekong at 
Stung Treng 
980  x 
2016/2
020               
Cambodia  Lower Se San 2  420 
 
2017 
             
Cambodia  Lower Sre Pok 2  222 
 
2017 
             
China  Manwan  1500  x  1996 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
China  Dachaosan  1350  x  2004 
     
x  x 
 
COMP 
China  Jinghong  1750  x  2010  x  x 
   
x 
 
COMP 
China  Xiaowan  4200  x  2011  x  x 
   
x 
 
COMP 
China  Gonguoqiao  750  x  2012  x  x 
       
UCON 
China  Ganlanba  150  x  2013 
 
x 
       
UCON 
China  Nuozhadu  5500  x  2014 
 
x 
       
UCON 
China  Mengsong  600  x  2025 
           
XXXX 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Luangprabang 
1410  x  2014 
         
2007  MOU 
Laos 
Mekong at Don 
sahong 
360  x  2015 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos 
Mekong at Pak 
lay 
1320  x  2020 
         
2007  MOU 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Sanakham 
660  x  2018 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Phou Ngoy 
651  x  2018 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Pakbeng 
855  x  2018 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Xayabouri 
1285  x  2019 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos 
Mekong at 
Thatho 
50  x  2016 
         
2009  MOU 
Laos  Selebam  5 
 
1970 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Dong  1 
 
1970 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Ngum (1)  155 
 
1971 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Xeset 1  45 
 
1990 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Ko  1.5 
 
1996 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Song  60 
 
1996 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Theun-Hinboun  210 
 
1998 
   
x  x  x  1994  COMP 
Laos  Houayho  150 
 
1999 
   
x  x  x  1993  COMP 
Laos  Nam Leuk  60 
 
2000 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
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Table 6.11 (Continued): Mekong Dams used in Projected Development Rate. Sources: World Bank, BDP, 
ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Country  Project  MW 
Main-
stream 
Date 
Com-
plete 
Construct-
ion 
Operational  Status 
2009  2011  2000  2009  2011 
MOU/ 
PDA 
Signed 
2011 
Laos  Nam Mang 3  40 
 
2005 
     
x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Xepon  75 
 
2008 
     
x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Lik  100 
 
2009 
     
x  x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Xekaman 3  250 
 
2010  x  x 
   
x  2006  COMP 
Laos  Nam Theun 2  1070 
 
2010  x 
     
x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Xeset 2  76 
 
2010  x 
     
x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Lik 1-2  100 
 
2010 
 
x 
   
x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Nhone  2.4 
 
2011 
 
x 
   
x 
 
COMP 
Laos  Nam Ngum 5  120 
 
2012  x  x 
     
2007 
UCON 
70% 
Laos  Nam Ngum 2  615 
 
2013  x  x 
       
COMP 
Laos 
Theun-Hinboun 
ext. 
280 
 
2012 
 
x 
     
2008 
UCON 
90% 
Laos  Tad Salen  3.2 
 
2012 
 
x 
     
2009 
UCON 
29% 
Laos  Nam Long  5 
 
2013 
 
x 
     
2011  COMP 
Laos  Xekaman 1  322 
 
2014 
 
x 
     
2005  XXXX 
Laos  Nam Sim  8 
 
2015 
 
x 
     
2007  COMP 
Laos  Nam Ngiep 2  180 
 
2015 
 
x 
     
2010  COMP 
Laos  Nam Ngum 3E  580 
 
2011 
             
Laos  Nam Ngum 2B  183 
 
2012 
             
Laos  Xe Kong 3d  91.1 
 
2012 
             
Laos  Xe Kong 3up  144.6 
 
2012 
             
Laos  Xenamnoy 1  148 
 
2013 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Tha 1  168 
 
2015 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Lik 1  60 
 
2014 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Ngum 3  460 
 
2017 
         
1997  PLANS 
Laos 
Nam Ou 1-7 
(cascade) 
1156 
 
2015 
         
2007  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Phak  45 
 
2015 
         
2009  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Pha  130 
 
2016 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Mang 1  57 
 
2015 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Mo  120 
 
2015 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Beng  34 
 
2015 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos 
Xepian-
Xenamnoy 
390 
 
2016 
         
2008  PLANS 
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Table 6.11 (Continued): Mekong Dams used in Projected Development Rate. Sources: World Bank, BDP, 
ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Country  Project  MW 
Main-
strea
m 
Date 
Com-
plete 
Construct-
ion 
Operational  Status 
2009  2011  2000  2009  2011 
MOU/ 
PDA 
Signed 
2011 
Laos  Nam Kong 1  150 
 
2015 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Ngum 4A  55 
 
2015 
             
Laos  Nam Theun 1  523 
 
2018 
         
2004  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Kong 2  66 
 
2017 
         
2011  PLANS 
Laos  Se Kong 4  300 
 
2017 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Sane 3  65 
 
2016 
         
2008  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Kong 3  45 
 
2016 
         
2009  MOU 
Laos  Nam Theun 3  236 
 
2016 
         
2005  XXXX 
Laos  Xe Katam  61 
 
2016 
         
2007  PLANS 
Laos  Se Kong 5  330 
 
2016 
         
2009  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Seuang 1  63 
 
2017 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Seuang 2  141 
 
2017 
         
2010  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Ngiep 1  263 
 
2018 
         
2006  PLANS 
Laos  Nam Bak 2B  116 
 
2018 
             
Laos  Xe Xou  59 
 
2020 
             
Laos  Pa Mong  4800 
 
2020 
             
Laos  Thakek  360 
                 
Laos 
Theun-Hinboun 
NG8                     
Laos 
Xekaman2 (Xe 
Neua) 
53 
             
2006  MOU 
Laos  Dak e meule (IPP)  130 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Houay Champi  5 
             
2009  MOU 
Laos  Nam Bak 1  160 
             
2007  MOU 
Laos  Nam Bak 2  40 
             
2007  MOU 
Laos  Nam Feuang  28 
             
2007  MOU 
Laos  Nam Ham  3.5 
             
2005  MOU 
Laos  Nam Khan 2  126 
             
2006  MOU 
Laos  Nam Khan 3  47 
             
2006  MOU 
Laos  Nam Ma 1, 2, 3  149 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Nam Mo 1  80 
             
2010  MOU 
Laos  Nam Mouan  124 
             
2010  MOU 
Laos  Nam Neun  65 
             
2009  MOU 
Laos 
Nam Ngiep 
Mouang Mai 
38 
             
2010  MOU 
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Table 6.11 (Continued): Mekong Dams used in Projected Development Rate. Sources: World Bank, BDP, 
ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Country  Project  MW 
Main-
stream 
Date 
Com-
plete 
Construct-
ion 
Operational  Status 
2009  2011  2000  2009  2011 
MOU/ 
PDA 
Signed 
2011 
Laos 
Nam Ngum 
Downstream 
110 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Nam Ngum 4  220 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Nam Phai  60 
             
2009  MOU 
Laos  Nam Phoun  74 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Nam Phouan  60 
             
2010  MOU 
Laos  Nam Poui  60 
             
2010  MOU 
Laos  Nam Pod  15 
             
2009  MOU 
Laos  Nam Sum 1  102 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Nam Sum 3  186 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos 
Sekong 
Downstream 
80 
             
2010  MOU 
Laos 
Sekong 3 
(3A&3B) 
205 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Xebanghieng 1  50 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Xebanghieng 2  52 
             
2008  MOU 
Laos  Sebangnouan  80 
             
2005  MOU 
Laos  Xekanman 4  80 
             
2006  MOU 
Laos 
Nam Ang Tha 
beng 
30 
             
2011  MOU 
Laos  Xepian-Houaysoy  100 
             
2010  MOU 
Lao-
Thailand 
Mekong at Ban 
Koum 
2000  x  2020 
         
2008  MOU 
Lao-
Thailand 
Mekong at 
Pakchom 
1079  x  2017 
             
Thailand  Nam Pung  6 
 
1965 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Ubol Ratana  25 
 
1966 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Sirindhorn  36 
 
1968 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Chulabhorn  40 
 
1971 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Nam Pao  1.3 
 
1971 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Nam Oon  0.4 
 
1973 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Lam Phra  0.85 
 
1976 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Huai Luang 
   
1984 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Pak Mun  136 
 
1997 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Thailand  Lam Takhong  500 
 
2002 
     
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Se San 3  273 
 
2006  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Se San 3A  96 
 
2006  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
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Table 6.11 (Continued): Mekong Dams used in Projected Development Rate. Sources: World Bank, BDP, 
ICEM/MRC 2010. 
Country  Project  MW 
Main-
stream 
Date 
Com-
plete 
Construct-
ion 
Operational  Status 
2009  2011  2000  2009  2011 
MOU/ 
PDA 
Signed 
2011 
Viet Nam  Ban Tou Srah  86 
 
2008  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Buon Kuop  280 
 
2008  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Plei Krong  120 
 
2008  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Se San 4  360 
 
2009  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Yali  720 
 
2000 
   
x  x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Se San 4A  255 
 
2008  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Sre Pok 4  100 
 
2009  x 
   
x  x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Sre Pok 3  300 
 
2011  x  x 
   
x 
 
COMP 
Viet Nam  Duc Xuyen  58 
 
2025 
             
Viet Nam  Upper Kontum  220 
 
2025 
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6.8.  APPENDIX H: CONFLICT/COOPERATION BAR EVENT DATA FOR THE MEKONG AND 
COLUMBIA RIVER BASINS 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Full Conflict / Cooperation BAR data for the Mekong and Columbia Basins.  
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Figure 6.2: Regression of BAR Events on Mekong and Columbia Basins. 
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Figure 6.3: Event Data Statistics from the Mekong and Columbia River Basins. 350 
 
6.8.1.  Event Data Search Statistics for the Columbia Basin 
Table 6.12: Water Event Search Statistics on Lexis-Nexis – Columbia Basin. 
Columbia River Basin Lexis-Nexis hit statistics 
Year  Search terms  Raw hits 
Selected 
hits 
Yes's 
% Selected 
hits/Raw hits 
% Yes/ 
Raw 
hits 
% Yes/ 
Selected 
hits 
Notes 
7/1/2008  columbia  1407  111  10  7.9%  0.7%  9.0% 
 
to 
6/30/2009 
snake OR spokane OR "lake roosevelt" 
OR "grand coulee dam" OR kootenay 
OR kootenai OR "pend oreille" OR  
pendoreille OR okanogan OR kettle 
473  36  8  7.6%  1.7%  22.2% 
 
7/1/2009  columbia  1639  31  7  1.9%  0.4%  22.6% 
 
to 
6/30/2010 
snake OR spokane OR "lake roosevelt" 
OR "grand coulee dam" OR kootenay 
OR kootenai OR "pend oreille" OR  
pendoreille OR okanogan OR kettle 
595  60  9  10.1%  1.5%  15.0% 
Many articles (not 
incl.) on the 
Nevada/Utah 
Snake Valley 
water deal 
7/1/2010  columbia  1674  27  7  1.6%  0.4%  25.9% 
 
to 
6/30/2011 
snake OR spokane OR "lake roosevelt" 
OR "grand coulee dam" OR kootenay 
OR kootenai OR "pend oreille" OR  
pendoreille OR okanogan OR kettle 
517  31  9  6.0%  1.7%  29.0% 
 
2008-
20011 
flathead  161  16  4  9.9%  2.5%  25.0% 
"flathead" 
inadvertantly not 
included earlier 
Totals 
 
6466  312  54  4.8%  0.8%  17.3% 
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6.8.2.  Updated search terms on LexisNexis – MEKONG BASIN 
HLEAD(Mekong OR lancang OR "Tonle Sap" OR "Mae Nam Khong" OR "River Khong") AND HLEAD(water! 
OR river* OR lake OR dam* OR stream OR tributary OR diversion OR irrigation OR pollution OR water 
quality OR flood! OR drought! OR channel OR canal OR fish OR hydroelect! OR reservoir AND treaty OR 
agree!  OR  negotiat!  OR  resolution  OR  commission  OR  secretariat  OR  joint  management  OR  basin 
management OR peace OR accord OR "peace accord" OR settle! OR cooperat! OR collaborat! OR dispute! 
OR conflict! OR disagree! OR sanction! OR war OR troops OR "letter of protest" OR hostility OR shots fired 
OR boycott OR protest*) AND NOT HLEAD(sea OR ocean OR navigat! OR nuclear OR "water cannon" OR 
"light water reactor" OR "mineral water" OR "hold water" OR "cold water" OR "hot water" OR "water 
canister" OR "water tight" OR " water down*" OR "flood of refugees" OR Rivera OR Suez OR Panama OR 
oil OR drugs OR "three gorges") 
Search Date:   11 June 2008 to 30 June 2011 
Index Terms Added: Asia 
Select Source: News, All (English, Full Text) 
Initial search: 609 hits + 38 docs with “basin” in search terms 
1
st cut download: 220 selected for review 
Final selection:  53 new events 
 
6.8.3.  Updated search terms LexisNexis – COLUMBIA BASIN 
HLEAD(Columbia OR Snake OR ) AND HLEAD(water! OR river* OR lake OR basin OR dam* OR stream OR 
tributary OR diversion OR irrigation OR pollution OR water quality OR flood! OR drought! OR channel OR 
canal  OR  fish  OR  hydroelect!  OR  reservoir  AND  treaty  OR  agree!  OR  negotiat!  OR  resolution  OR 
commission OR secretariat OR joint management OR basin management OR peace OR accord OR "peace 
accord" OR settle! OR cooperat! OR collaborat! OR dispute! OR conflict! OR disagree! OR sanction! OR war 
OR  troops  OR  "letter  of  protest"  OR  hostility  OR  shots  fired  OR  boycott  OR  protest*)  AND  NOT 
HLEAD(Carolina OR "Columbia, Md" OR "Lake Shore Gold" OR "Sun River" OR sea OR ocean OR navigat! 
OR nuclear OR "water cannon" OR "light water reactor" OR "mineral water" OR "hold water" OR "cold 
water" OR "hot water" OR "water canister" OR "water tight" OR " water down*" OR "flood of refugees" 
OR Rivera OR Suez OR Panama OR oil OR drugs OR "three gorges") 
Search Date:   11 June 2008 to 30 June 2011 
Index Terms Added: North America 
Select Source: News, All (English, Full Text) 
Initial search: 6488 hits  
1
st cut download: 312 selected for review 
Final selection:  54 new events 
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Figure 6.4: Events by Issue Area on the Columbia and Mekong Basins. 
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6.8.4.  Tribal Influences - Statistics 
General Linear Model: BAR_Scale versus Decade, Tribes, Number of Parties, Issue Type 
Factor      Type    Levels    Values           
Decade      fixed    4    1960s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s 
Tribes YES/NO    fixed    2    No Tribes, Tribes 
Countries_Tribes   fixed    7    2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19 
Issue_Code1    fixed    10    1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 
 
Table 6.13: General Linear Model and ANOVA - Decadal Statistics. Adjusted SS for Tests. 
Source  DF  Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS  F  P-value  % Effect 
Decade  3  59.747  102.345  34.115  13.76  0  28.2% 
Tribes YES/NO  1  24.86  18.184  18.184  7.33  0.009  5.0% 
Countries_Tribes  6  40.038  35.2  5.867  2.37  0.043  9.7% 
Issue_Code1  9  80.446  80.446  8.938  3.6  0.002  22.2% 
Error  51  126.487  126.478  2.48 
   
34.9% 
Total  70  331.578  362.653 
       
S = 1.57484               
R
2 = 61.85               
Adj R
2 = 47.64               
 
General Linear Model: BAR_Scale versus Year, Tribes, Number of Parties, Issue Type 
Factor      Type    Levels    Values           
Year      fixed    15  1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1967, 1991, 2001,  
2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 
Countries_Tribes   fixed    7  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19 
Tribes YES/NO    fixed    2  No Tribes, Tribes 
Issue_Code1    fixed    10  1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 
 
Table 6.14: General Linear Model and ANOVA - Yearly Statistics. Adjusted SS for Tests. 
Source  DF  Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS  F  P-value  % Effect 
Year  14  147.762  138.8  9.914  4.4  0.000  44.7% 
Countries_Tribes  6  33.68  24.416  4.069  1.81  0.122  7.9% 
Tribes YES/NO  1  14.066  9.964  9.964  4.43  0.042  3.2% 
Issue_Code1  9  47.038  47.038  5.226  2.32  0.033  15.2% 
Error  40  90.032  90.032  2.251      29.0% 
Total  70  331.577  310.25 
 
     
S = 1.50027               
R
2 = 72.85               
Adj R
2 = 52.48               354 
 
Table 6.15: T-test data for Tribal Influences on Water Cooperation. 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
ALL DATA BAR (C-T) BAR (C-C)
Mean 1.595 1.273
Variance 3.692 6.205
Observations 37 33
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.3
df 60
t Stat -1.159
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.125
t Critical one-tail 1.296
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.251
t Critical two-tail 1.671
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
2000s-2010s TRIBES NO TRIBES
Mean 1.605 0.136
Variance 3.543 2.314
Observations 38 22
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 52
t Stat 3.298
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001
t Critical one-tail 1.675
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002
t Critical two-tail 2.007
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
2008-2011 TRIBES NO TRIBES
Mean 1.605 0.533
Variance 3.543 2.552
Observations 38 15
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 30
t Stat 2.089
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.023
t Critical one-tail 1.697
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.045
t Critical two-tail 2.042
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances
ALL DATA TRIBES NO TRIBES
Mean 1.605 1.273
Variance 3.543 6.205
Observations 38 33
df 37 32
F 0.571
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.051
F Critical one-tail 0.570355 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Tribal Influences on Conflict and Cooperation (BAR) on the Columbia Basin. Bar charts show a clear increase in BAR scale (cooperation) from 
the presence of Tribes in water management on the Columbia River Basin. 
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6.8.5.  BAR Event Scale 
Table 6.16: TFDD BAR Scale (Water Intensity Scale). Source TFDD; Yoffe et al. 2003. 
BAR Scale (Water Event Intensity Scale) 
BAR SCALE  EVENT DESCRIPTION 
-7  Formal Declaration of War 
-6 
Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic cost: Use of nuclear weapons; 
full scale air, naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; massive 
bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of military 
installations; chemical or biological warfare. 
-5 
Small scale military acts: Limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexing 
territory already occupied; seizing material of target country; imposing blockades; 
assassinating leaders of target country; material support of subversive activities against target 
country. 
-4 
Political-military hostile actions: Inciting riots or rebellions (training or financial aid for 
rebellions); encouraging guerilla activities against target country; limited and sporadic terrorist 
actions; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; giving sanctuary to 
terrorists; breaking diplomatic relations; attacking diplomats or embassies; expelling military 
advisors; executing alleged spies; nationalizing companies without compensation. 
-3 
Diplomatic-economic hostile actions: Increasing troop mobilization; boycotts; imposing 
economic sanctions; hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air; embargoing 
goods; refusing mutual trade rights; closing borders and blocking free communication; 
manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; granting sanctuary to 
opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against target country; refusing to 
support foreign military allies; recalling ambassador for emergency consultations regarding 
target country; refusing visas to other nationals or restricting movement in country; expelling 
or arresting nationals or press; spying on foreign government officials; terminating major 
agreements. Unilateral construction of water projects against another country's protests; 
reducing flow of water to another country, abrogation of a water agreement. 
-2 
Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction: Warning retaliation for acts; 
making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions or 
policies; denouncing leaders, system, or ideology; postponing heads of state visits; refusing 
participation in meetings or summits; leveling strong propaganda attacks; denying support; 
blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the UN or other international bodies. Official 
interactions only. 
-1 
Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction: Low key objection to policies or 
behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through third party; failing to reach an agreement; 
refusing protest note; denying accusations; objecting to explanation of goals, position, etc.; 
requesting change in policy. Both unofficial and official, including diplomatic notes of protest. 
0 
Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation: Rhetorical policy statements; non-
consequential news items; non-governmental visitors; indifference statements; compensating 
for nationalized enterprises or private property; no comment statements. 
1 
Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions--mild verbal support: Meeting of high 
officials; conferring on problems of mutual interest; visit by lower officials for talks; issuing 
joint communiqués; appointing ambassadors; announcing cease-fires; non-governmental 
exchanges; proposing talks; public non-governmental support of regime; exchanging prisoners 
of war; requesting support for policy; stating or explaining policy. 
2 
Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime: Official support of policy; raising legation to 
embassy; reaffirming friendship; asking for help against third party; apologizing for 
unfavorable actions or statements; allowing entry of press correspondents; thanking or asking 
for aid; resuming broken diplomatic or other relations. 
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Table 6.16 (Continued): TFDD BAR Scale (Water Intensity Scale). Source TFDD; Yoffe et al. 2003. 
BAR Scale (Water Event Intensity Scale) 
3 
Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic): Starting diplomatic relations; 
establishing technological or scientific communication; proposing or offering economic or 
military aid; recognizing government; visit by head of state; opening borders; conducting or 
enacting friendship agreements; conducting cultural or academic agreements or exchanges. 
Agreements to set up cooperative working groups. 
4 
Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement: Making economic loans, grants; 
agreeing to economic pacts; giving industrial, cultural, or educational assistance; conducting 
trade agreements or granting most favored nation status; establishing common transportation 
or communication networks; selling industrial-technological surplus supplies; providing 
technical expertise; ceasing economic restrictions; repaying debts; selling non-military goods; 
giving disaster relief. Legal, cooperative actions between nations that are not treaties; 
cooperative projects for watershed management, irrigation, poverty-alleviation. 
5 
Military economic or strategic support: Selling nuclear power plants or materials; providing air, 
naval, or land facilities for bases; giving technical or advisory military assistance; granting 
military aid; sharing highly advanced technology; intervening with military support at request 
of government; concluding military agreements; training military personnel; joint programs 
and plans to initiate and pursue disarmament. 
6 
International Freshwater Treaty; Major strategic alliance (regional or international): Fighting a 
war jointly; establishing a joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military 
maneuvers; establishing economic common market; joining or organizing international 
alliances; establishing joint program to raise the global quality of life. 
7 
Voluntary unification into one nation: Merging voluntarily into one nation (state); forming one 
nation with one legally binding government. 
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6.8.6.  BAR Event Categories 
Table 6.17: BAR Event Categories. Source: TFDD 2012. 
Issue #  Issue Area  Description of Issue Areas* 
1  Water Quality 
Events relating to water quality or water-related 
environmental concerns 
2  Water Quantity  Events relating to water quantity 
3 
Hydro-power/Hydro-
electricity 
Events relating to hydro-electricity or hydro-power facilities 
4  Navigation  Events relating to navigation, shipping, ports 
5  Fishing  Events relating to fishing 
6  Flood Control/Relief 
Events relating to flooding, flood control, flood damage, 
flood relief 
7  Economic Development  General economic/regional development 
8  Joint Management 
Events involving joint management of basin or water 
resources, especially where the management concerns cover 
a range of issue areas 
9  Irrigation  Events relating to irrigation of agricultural areas 
10  Infrastructure/Development 
Events relating to the infrastructure or development 
projects, including dams, barrages, draining of swamps for 
development purposes, canals. 
11 
Technical 
Cooperation/Assistance 
Events relating to technical or economic cooperation or 
assistance, including project evaluations or river surveys and 
funds for ranges of improvements to water-related 
technology/infrastructure 
12  Border issues  Events relating to rivers as shared borders/boundaries 
13  Territorial issues 
Events relating to territorial claims, where the territory is 
associated with a water body, e.g., a river island 
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